On January 23, 2012 two policemen approached writer Yuri Vynnychuk at his home in the Western Ukrainian city of L’viv and demanded from him a written explanation of the poems he had presented a few months earlier in Kyiv at the “Night of Erotic Poetry” festival. The policemen said they were authorized to do so by the prosecutor general who had received a complaint from the Communist MP, Leonid Hrach, which unabashedly qualified Vynnychuk’s poems as “pornography” and a “call for the violent overthrow of Ukraine’s government” (http://world.maidan.org.ua/2012/statement-on-the-political-persecution-of-the-ukrainian-writer-yuri-vynnychuk).

Yuri Vynnychuk is a renowned author with some international fame, so he has not been arrested, beaten, and forced to confess, as happens on a daily basis all over Ukraine to his less fortunate and not so famous compatriots. Oleksiy Cherneha, for instance, a young activist of the “Patriot of Ukraine” from the provincial town of Vasyl’kiv (Kyiv Oblast), recollects his encounter with the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) officers as follows:

Immediately after I was detained [on August 23, 2011], I was taken to the regional SBU center where I was held without charge or sanction from the investigator or court until Aug. 27, much longer than the 72 hours allowed by law […]
While I was at the regional SBU center, I was questioned around the clock. During the interrogation, physical methods were used against me repeatedly – I was beaten on my neck and the soft parts of the body, forced to do the splits, humiliated, threatened with physical violence and also mocked with accusations of pedophilia.
The SBU officers also tried to force me to give untruthful evidence against my acquaintances… After I had refused to give this untruthful evidence, I was shackled and they continued to beat me.
For four days I was interrogated and not allowed to sleep or eat.
During the torture and humiliation I repeatedly demanded to be told my official status in the case and also information about the examination of the things found at my place during the search. But I received no answer to any of my questions. I was also refused a meeting with my lawyer, and all interrogations happened without his presence.
While I was in custody, I informed the SBU that I had been diagnosed with epilepsy and that the doctors had recommended that I stick to a sleep pattern and eat regularly, because not to do so could affect my health and even lead to death.
However, the SBU officers ignored this and for four days I was interrogated without sleep or food. Such behavior is a flagrant violation of human rights and guarantees of respect for dignity contained in the Constitution.
During interrogation on Aug. 25, SBU officers forced a compact disk into my hand which had allegedly been found at the place on Hrushevskogo Street on Aug. 22.
There, like at my residence, the SBU alleged it had found information about assembling a homemade explosive device and a video of child pornography.
Afterward I was told they had “evidence” against me and in a similar way they could create any “evidence,” and for this not to happen I had to write that my acquaintances Shpara and Bevz had left the things in my room that had been found during the search.
When I refused, painful injuries were inflicted on me.
On the night of Aug. 26, I was informed that I would be released if I signed a few documents. I was forced to sign a letter to the head of the SBU saying that no physical coercion had been applied to me and that I voluntarily consented to give evidence from Aug. 23 to Aug. 27.
I assert that all signatures that I made during that time were extracted in ways banned by the Code of Criminal Procedure ( http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/112476/). (See also: Katya Gorchinskaya, “Allegations of SBU horrors recall cruel Stasi methods,” 15 September 2011: http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/112911/.)

Stories like this are typical in Yanukovych’s Ukraine. They vary in detail but have one thing in common: rampant lawlessness that reigns supreme in the country and unscrupulous use of law-enforcement agencies for the regime’s political goals. The Kyiv Post editorial aptly described Ukraine’s judicial system as “broken, corrupt and manipulated by oligarch-controlled politicians, chief among them president Viktor Yanukovych”:

Police still beat, torture, falsify evidence and extract false confessions. They conduct armed raids with masks with the permission of the manipulated courts.
Prosecutors operate in a web of secrecy in which they are accountable to no one but the chief prosecutor, who is appointed by Yanukovych.
Judges cannot exercise independence for fear of losing their jobs – or worse.
The presumption of guilt replaces the presumption of innocence through the pre-trial jailing of suspects for up to 18 months in horrible conditions, the denial of bail and adequate legal representation, the denial of speedy trial by jury and so on (http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/editorial/detail/114769/).

Yuri Vynnychuk predictably rejected the accusations as absurd and stated that the interference in literary matters by politicians, prosecutors and other officials was illegal and anti-constitutional. The story got broad publicity in the mass media; Ukrainian PEN-center endorsed a protest; the writer himself used a public commemoration of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch’s birthday in downtown L’viv to read his subversive poems to his cheerful fans. And finally, the sweetheart Hanna Herman, Yanukovych’s advisor and a writer herself, called a L’viv colleague and apologized for the excessive zeal of her boss’s subordinates (http://life.pravda.com.ua/person/2012/01/30/93822/).

Personally, I would prefer her to call Mr. Cherneha, or Ms. Hanna Synkova, or many other victims of the regime’s brutality, and to deal with the officers that tortured and humiliated them rather than the two pathetic policemen sent by their dull bosses to Yuri Vynnychuk’s place. So far, it looks like a Bad Cop versus Good Cop show. However it ends, it should not obscure the much more serious, brazen, innumerable cases of human rights violations in Yanukovych’s Ukraine. The very addition of “pornography” to the alleged “call for a violent overthrow of the government” tends to make the entire story farcical, to downplay and de-contextualize the political message of Vynnychuk’s work. Yet, whatever the initial intentions of both the writer and his opponents, the actual implications of the conflict seem to be broader and more complex.

First of all, the poem in question is certainly not Vynnychuk’s chef d’oeuvre, nor is it an exemplary case of political correctness. There are two English translations of this poetical pamphlet, one of which is entitled “Kill the Bugger” and the other “Kill the Pidaras” (http://durdom.in.ua/uk/main/news_article/news_id/27029.phtml).

The former translation is a much better reflection of the poem’s idea, yet the latter renders properly the ambiguity that exists in the original. The obscenity “pidaras” borrowed from Russian criminal slang has a sexual (actually sexist) connotation related to “pederast,” but in a colloquial speech it means typically a sodomite or a “total idiot” (therefore the female form “pidaraska” can also be used). Nevertheless, the underlying sexist connotation makes the text rather tasteless and implicitly homophobic, even though it clearly hints that the Ukrainian government and the incumbent president may well be considered sodomites rather than homosexuals.

The slogan “kill” (whoever) is also distasteful, though it should not be interpreted literally. The poet may mean symbolic/political “killing,” or even refer to Anton Chekhov’s famous dictum: “to kill a slave within ourselves,” and to Shevchenko’s classical “Testament”: to “wake up and rise up, and break the shackles, and sanctify freedom with the enemy’s evil blood.” Still, in the society with a weak tradition of tolerance and political liberalism, and deeply rooted tradition of homophobia, xenophobia, and daily coercion, all these ambiguities and provocative slogans may reverberate and fuel even more hatred and brutality rather than the desired purification.

As a vice-president of the Ukrainian PEN-centre assigned by the colleagues to draft the protest, I was really in a difficult position. I had to condemn the police interference in literary matters and, at the same time, distance myself and the center from the controversial poem, which I would have certainly advised the author neither to read, nor to publish or produce – at least in its current form. I attempted to solve the dilemma by placing the case in the broader context of the government’s systemic infringement of the freedom of speech and political persecution of writers, scholars, journalists, and civic activists. At the same time, in a personal conversation, I expressed to the author (a friend) disapproval of his dubious text.

The point seems to be obvious: we may profoundly disagree with a writer’s views and forms of their expression but we should guarantee him/her the right to express those views without censorship and political pressure. It is up to the public and literary critics to evaluate the text, not the police, prosecutors, and security service. We defend the general principle, and not a specific author or text. A few years ago, I happened to disapprove of then president Viktor Yushchenko’s intention to criminalize the denial that the Great Famine of 1932-33 in Ukraine was Genocide. By the same token, I staunchly disagree with similar decisions of some other governments to make the denial of Armenian and other genocides a criminal offense. People should have a right to express the most ugly and stupid ideas as long as they do not call directly for illegal and violent actions against other people. This is particularly true about the writers and artists who may bear moral, political, professional, and, in some cases, administrative responsibility for their words but definitely should not be considered criminals. It seems self-evident, but I have noticed from pending public debates the subtle difference between the defense of a general principle and of specific texts. It is usually blurred and politicized.

Yuri Vynnychuk’s case, in a way, resembles that of Yulia Tymoshenko. Here, again, we protest against her political persecution not because we support her politically, share her views or consider her own governmental policies consistent with liberal democracy and rule of law. We simply believe that political decisions should not be criminalized – exactly like poems, novels, or artistic performances.

So, the second question emerges: why does President Yanukovych commit or, rather, allow his lieutenants to perpetrate the blunders that compromise him and his regime both domestically and internationally? The simple answer is that no authoritarian regime can survive without some lawlessness and coercion. However, it is one thing to torture inmates in provincial prisons, to harass young and as yet unknown civic activists, or to take over one’s opponents’ businesses via sheer racket or kangaroo courts. It is quite another to attack outstanding figures whose ordeal draws immediately broad and sometimes even exaggerated public attention.

Viktor Yanukovych may be neither wise enough to adequately understand politics, or diligent enough to keep a careful eye on his political menials. But he has a huge apparatus, doubled in size and salaries since Yushchenko’s times, and he should have no problems with professional analysis, political advice and ultimate decision-making. And this is the point. So far, after two years of his presidency, he has been moving from bad to worse in all his decisions, and steadily losing his popular rating from over 60 percent to single-digit figures. If his advisors are as incompetent as their leader, it is very unfortunate. If they are smart but manipulate him in a cowardly fashion –for Moscow’s or their personal benefits, or both – it could be catastrophic.

The Vynnychuk affair might have been initiated by a senile communist, who felt insulted by the writer’s mockery of Communist rhetoric and paraphernalia. At least, this is what Hanna Herman suggested. One may wonder however to what degree the communists in Ukraine are independent players. So far, they behave like government puppets assigned to do the dirtiest jobs that the government prefers not to engage in openly. Smearing Ukrainian NGOs as subversive agents of the West might be the most graphic example. Neither the Kuchma nor the Yanukovych governments dared to do this themselves since this might have undermined their fake “pro-European” rhetoric. Yet, remarkably, they provided the communists with full logistic support, publicity, and the needed votes in the parliament to pass the anti-NGO laws.

In the Vynnychuk case the manipulators could play one more game and try to capitalize on the president’s fears and phobias. Viktor Yanukovych, indeed, seems to be preoccupied with his personal security. This may stem from his unfortunate 2004 presidential campaign when he was attacked by an egg and became so terrified that he lost consciousness. Taras Chornovil, Yanukovych’s ally and former close adviser, claims that the president’s phobias originate from his peculiar experience in the Donbas region – dubbed the Ukrainian Sicily. Yanukovych sincerely believes that “someone wants to kill him,” Chornovil says http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/116724/.

The President’s paranoia might be an excellent tool for those in his entourage who know how to use it. And Vynnychuk’s poem “Kill the Pidaras” fits them well. Back in September, there was a huge scandal in Kyiv when people wore teeshirts that featured the slogan: “Thanks to inhabitants of Donbas for the [election of the] president-pidaras.” Police raided the store, confiscated the T-shirts, and forced the businessman who produced them to flee abroad. The word “pidaras,” however, has acquired one more connotation hardly unknown to either Yuri Vynnychuk or Viktor Yanukovych.

The Vynnychuk case, even though on a much smaller scale, is as ambiguous as that of Tymoshenko. Both shed a light on the lawlessness that reigns in the country. But both can be used also be used to obscure the scale of repressions and to trivialize the political essence of the events. Therefore, whatever we think about both heroes and their work, we should remember the broader context and perceive the general tendency rather than unpleasant, albeit isolated, incidents.

Ironically, the annual EU-Ukraine summit held in Kyiv on December 19 overshadowed all other political events in Ukraine over the past few weeks, even though its actual results were close to zero. Moreover, the meager results had been rather predictable since the Ukrainian government had not indicated any intention to ease its multifaceted pressure on civil society, nor had the EU looked ready to condone Kyiv’s increasingly authoritarian behavior.

Yet, the drama under the title “Ukraine–EU Association Agreement” had been played for so long and by so many actors, that most of the viewers could not merely give it up. Some expected a miracle, but many more simply watched the ship sinking, taking down with it sheaves of toughly negotiated documents.

Still, the Ukrainian crew looked surprisingly cheerful and the foreign guests apparently unworried. Unlike the viewers, all the participants of the performance had got what they wished. Ukraine’s friends like Poland or Sweden left the door open, i.e., the Agreement negotiations pending, albeit at the lowest speed possible and with the slimmest chance of being completed in any form in the foreseeable future. Ukraine’s opponents, like France and Germany, got a plausible excuse not to initial the Agreement they had not wanted to sign anyway. And the Ukrainian president got one more opportunity for publicity photographs with the EU Big Bosses and could display them ad nauseam on all the loyalist TV channels and newspapers. Now, he can continue his “European” rhetoric with even greater confidence.

Very few people believe in this rhetoric but this is of little importance. The main goal of president’s talks is not to bring Ukraine closer to the EU, but rather to prevent his own and his cronies’ expulsion from this prestigious club. Most of them, on a personal level, integrated into the EU long ago, with their families, businesses, bank accounts, and all the daily habits like shopping, holidaying, or health and relaxation. They may dupe Moscow, Brussels, and their own electorate with ideas of a Russian-led Customs Union, Single Economic Space, or Eurasian integration. This is for fools’ consumption—for ‘lokhi’, as they say. But for the real men, the “krutye patsany,” as they define themselves, there is a much better place called “Europe.” And they have already joined it—with no action plans and association agreements, merely with some stolen assets, laundered money, and diplomatic passports that allow them, unlike common Ukrainian “lokhi,” to enter the Schengen fortress without visas.

“Lokhi’,” i.e. Ukrainian society, seems to be the only loser in this whimsical game between the Ukrainian government and EU bureaucracy. Half-measures and general incoherence badly hamper EU policies everywhere, not only in Ukraine. On the one hand, the EU was right to postpone the initialing of the Agreement for some technical reasons, and to condition its signing and eventual ratification with clear demands for restoration of democratic practices in Ukraine. On the other hand, this reasonable decision was not buttressed by a set of additional sticks and carrots. EU politicians seem to believe that the Association Agreement per se is a sufficient bonus for the Ukrainian leaders to strive toward. This might have been true if Mr Yanukovych et al cared a little about something they barely understand: the national interest. This is hardly the case, however. Therefore, a tougher approach is needed, something the feckless EU fails to apply even against bloody dictators from Central Asia.

Such an approach was clearly outlined by Andrew Wilson, a leading expert on Ukrainian affairs, in his policy memo for the European Council on Foreign Relations. He suggested the EU leaders adopt a twin-track approach: “The agreements cannot be formally signed, but should be kept alive until Ukraine is ready to implement the conditionality laid out in resolutions by the European Parliament and other bodies. But lecturing Ukraine on human rights at the summit will have little effect. The EU should also move towards sanctions that show its red lines have not been dropped; targeting the individuals most responsible for democratic backsliding and signaling more general vigilance against the Ukrainian elite’s free-flowing travel and financial privileges in the EU” http://www.ecfr.eu/page//UkraineMemo.pdf .

Since the EU has been reluctant to introduce any serious sanctions against the post-Soviet autocrats, especially in resource-rich countries like Russia, Kazakhstan, or Azerbaijan, their Ukrainian twins have very little to worry about. In December, Yanukovych and his Party of Regions continued their Gleichschaltung in both political life and the economy. First, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine approved (what a surprise!) the decision of the parliament that allows the government to pay social benefits to various categories of people at its whim—even though in past years the Court, not yet staffed with the president’s loyalists, twice rejected similar claims as a violation of the national constitution http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2011/12/27/6870668 . Second, the government of Crimea ceded 9,000 hectares of valuable land to a murky hunters’ society registered to three pals of the president http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2011/12/26/6868443/. Third, the President’s 38-year-old son acquired a few more industrial assets and entered the lists of Ukraine’s top hundred richest men http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38740. Fourth, the President’s friend and sponsor Rinat Akhmetov received a concession for the virtually monopolistic export of electricity http://www.epravda.com.ua/publications/2011/12/15/309807/, just as another friend and sponsor of the president, Yuri Ivanyushchenko, allegedly acquired a monopoly over the export of grain a few months ago http://lb.ua/news/2011/03/28/90044_Yura_Yenakiivskiy_stav_generalom.html. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has been completely emasculated and de facto subordinated to the presidential administration, under the pretext of the so-called judicial reform http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/119708/. And another band of “professionals” from Donbas has occupied several dozen top governmental positions in both Kyiv and other regions of Ukraine http://gazeta.ua/articles/politics-newspaper/_yanukovich-priznachae-na-posadi-lyudej-yakih-znayut-jogo-diti/409143.

Once again, Ukraine was downgraded in 2011 by various international agencies in terms of democracy, civil rights, freedom of speech, corruption, inequality and injustice, conditions for doing business, etc. This might be a part of a global anti-Yanukovych conspiracy, as his propagandists suggest, but domestic opinion surveys confirm the same tendencies. In May, a revealing poll was carried out nationwide by the reputable Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences. The respondents were asked how, in their opinion, the situation had changed in various social fields within the past few months. The answers (below) shed some light on the essence of Yanukovych’s “reforms” that arguably required some curbs on civic freedoms and democratic institutions:
Changed
for worse Not
changed Changed
for better
Economic situation in Ukraine in general 58.1 37.1 4.8
Level [standards?] of living 68.4 29.4 2.4
Level of corruption 37.2 59.8 3.0
Level of democracy in the country 33.1 63.9 3.0
Protection from authorities’ arbitrariness 36.1 61.4 2.5
Job guarantees and possibilities of employment 51.6 46.6 1.8
Source: Krytyka, 15:7-8 (2011), 6.

On December 21, at the annual Putin-style president’s press-conference, Mustafa Nayem from the news portal “Ukrainska Pravda” dared to put to Yanukovych the question that perplexes virtually all Ukrainians: “Viktor Fedorovych, you mentioned many times that the economic situation in the country is bad, people do not feel any improvements in their life, there are no money in state coffins for the victims of Chornobyl, or veterans of Afghanistan… At the same, we observe every day how your personal life is improving. We see how you rent a helicopter at $1 million [a year] from the company controlled by your son http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2011/07/20/6405659/. We know that in Mezhyhirya [Yanukovych’s 140-hectare estate near Kyiv, controversially privatized http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2011/11/16/6760109/] the construction work is continued by the companies controlled by your son. What is the secret of your success – why is everything so bad for the country and so good for you?” «I do not know what happy life and gossip about my family you are talking about,» responded the president, «I just want to say that I don’t envy you» http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/leschenko/4ef2403ec1268/view_print/.

It is not clear whether the president lost his temper and overtly threatened the journalist or just completed one his numerous linguistic faux pas. It is remarkable also that he completely ignored the essence of the Nayem’s question about corruption, nepotism, and lack of restraint, and interpreted everything as indiscreet interference in his family life. This is a minor story that tells, however, a lot about both intellectual and moral quality of the ruling “elite.”

One may praise the EU for its reluctance to make a deal with these people, but one should also censure the EU for still tolerating these people far too much.

Here’s an excerpt:

The concert hall at the Syndey Opera House holds 2,700 people. This blog was viewed about 27,000 times in 2011. If it were a concert at Sydney Opera House, it would take about 10 sold-out performances for that many people to see it.

Click here to see the complete report.

As Ukraine’s relationship with the EU continues to flounder over human rights issues, the imprisonment of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and the lengthy detention of former Interior Minister Yuri Lutsenko, there are signs that the government is prepared to flout existing laws to gain closer association with Gazprom and the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The consequences could be not only the loss of links with the European Energy Community (hereafter EEC) but also the undermining of sovereignty.

On December 4, Russia’s Ambassador to Ukraine Mikhail Zurabov announced that the new gas agreement between the two states would have the status of an international agreement, rather than a business arrangement between the two responsible companies, Gazprom and Naftohaz. Russia is evidently responding to the EU’s plans for closer integration with Ukraine and greater transparency in the transit of gas from Russia to Western Europe. Analyst Maksim Alinov comments that the results of the inter-state agreement proposed by the Russian ambassador would override current Ukrainian laws, which make it illegal to transfer Ukraine’s transit system to Russian control—a similar sale to Gazprom occurred recently in Belarus. Alinov also believes that the flouting of the agreement in place would also give Russia significant influence over the internal economic and political situation in Ukraine (Zerkalo Nedeli, Dec 9).

Another analyst, Maksim Honchar, goes further, maintaining that Kyiv’s apparent reversal of policy on the EEC would violate the July 1, 2010 law “Concerning the main principles of domestic and foreign policy,” Article 7 of which stipulates that Ukraine’s oil, gas, and electricity networks should be operating according to EU rules. In his view this indicates a willingness to surrender national interests, which would be an even more serious threat to Ukraine’s pro-European policy than the imprisonment of Tymoshenko. It would also strengthen considerably the position of Gazprom, a monopolist enterprise that seeks to deploy energy as an instrument of political control. Ukraine would acquire cheap gas but gradually lose its sovereignty, rendering the Association Agreement with the EU obsolete and leading to the next stage, which would be a defensive alliance with Russia (Zerkalo Nedeli, Dec 9).

The EU meanwhile continues to demand the release of Tymoshenko as a prequel to the initializing of the Association Agreement, though with diminishing hopes and growing frustration. Wilfred Martens, President of the European People’s Party, stated that Ukraine, like Poland, could be an important EU player, and that without its addition the EU project could not be complete. However, as a prerequisite to the start of the process leading to the Agreement, the Party of Regions must release Tymoshenko, Lutsenko, and other political prisoners (UN IAN, Dec 7). However, Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Hryshchenko demurred, stating that Tymoshenko could not be used as a bargaining chip in trade relations and that her situation was a matter for the Ukrainian Judiciary. To discuss the issue in this way, he added, would be tantamount to indicating that the latter is not an independent body (UNIAN, Dec 7).

Although the ruling group of Ukraine faces several serious economic dilemmas and recently rejected for a second time the IMF’s demand to raise energy prices, it does not seem to be facing a serious threat from the opposition. Indeed, the political situation seems relatively unaffected by the Tymoshenko saga. Analyst Kost Bondarenko maintains that the population has lost interest in the struggle between Tymoshenko and the ruling elite, while Vadim Karasev considers that the apparent lack of public sympathy for Tymoshenko reflects the general perception of her as a former representative of the political establishment (Segodnya, Dec 7, and ff.). In general therefore that is a positive sign for the authorities and a signal that the arrest of Tymoshenko has not affected ratings for the president and the Regions Party.

The latter seems to be calculating each step in cynical fashion, taking action and then monitoring the response. Karasev also notes that the leadership thinks the release of Tymoshenko would be seen as a sign of weakness. Also the Ukrainian leaders are watching closely political events in Russia, where the rise of oppositional activities could have a domino effect in Ukraine. Various polls denote that Yanukovych remains the leading individual politician with ratings between 17.4 and 20.7%, whereas the ratings of Tymoshenko, the only serious contender, range from 13 to 14.1% (polls by KMIS, Social Monitoring, “Rating,” and Sotsis). Yatsenyuk in third place has, at most, 9.9% support. In short, there is no longer a serious contender from the opposition as with Tymoshenko out of the picture.

The ruling group may also consider that in the year 2011 it could have expected to see its popularity drop because of the introduction of unpopular measures such as pension and taxation codes, whereas the new year may bring better fortunes, not least through the hosting of the popular soccer competition, Euro-2012. Perhaps of more importance is the evident tolerance of the EU for the abuses of power in Kyiv, in contrast to the sanctions it has applied in Belarus. Ukraine has moved rapidly from one of the most democratic of post-Soviet states to a position well down the scale. At the same time the corruption that has long pervaded the Ukrainian economy has not diminished.

Adding to the contentedness of the ruling group in Ukraine, the United States is preoccupied with other issues and unlikely to engage with Ukraine at the highest level until after the 2012 presidential election, according to former US ambassador to Ukraine, Steven Pifer (http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2011/1208_ukraine_pifer.aspx?p=1). Thus Yanukovych and the Regions have in effect carte blanche to continue the current path. The EEC agreement appears to have been jettisoned.

However, for the second time since the January 2010 election (the first being the Kharkiv Accords on the Black Sea Fleet), they are posing serious threats to the sovereignty of Ukraine, relinquishing hard-won rights for the immediate prospect of cheap gas and permitting a much more powerful role for Russian agencies like Gazprom to step in and purchase Naftohaz. The next logical stage would be for Ukraine to join the Customs Union (with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus). Only a year ago that would have been unthinkable, but it is now a serious possibility.

On November 17, the Ukrainian parliament adopted a new electoral law for the conducting of the next parliamentary elections in October 2012 http://portal.rada.gov.ua/rada/control/en/publish/article/info_left?art_id=290355&cat_id=105995. So far, its draft is available only in Ukrainian http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb_n/webproc4_1?id=&pf3511=41814 . Besides some novelties and modifications, the law essentially reestablishes the mixed system under which half of the deputies are elected through first-past-the-post elections in single-member districts, and half through proportional representation in nationwide multi-member districts. Such a system had been employed in Ukraine until the Orange revolution but was replaced eventually with a purely proportional system of elections from the nationwide party lists.

Back in 2004, the reason for change was two-fold. First, it intended to encourage the development of the party system, promote coalition building in the parliament and in line with amendments to the constitution render the government more dependent on the specific parties and the parties more responsible for the government. The second goal was even of greater importance. The earlier mixed system, especially its “majoritarian” part, employed in Ukraine until 2004, turned out to be highly susceptible to all sorts of manipulation and abuse of power by unscrupulous authorities. The proportional system, instead, was to reduce corruption both in electoral districts where government-connected oligarchs bribed voters, and in the parliament where the “independents” (typically local officials or businessmen) became easy prey for governmental blackmail and bribery.

The 2002 parliamentary elections provide a graphic example of how the majoritarian system benefited the authoritarian government of Leonid Kuchma. Then, despite all the dirty tricks, the pro-presidential parties made up only 20% of votes in the nationwide district, whereas their opponents, Viktor Yushchenko’s and Yulia Tymoshenko’s blocs, won 30%. Yet, the second half of the parliament was made up of the “independents” from single-member districts, so, predictably, most of them succumbed to the multiple arguments provided by the omnipotent presidential administration, and joined the incumbents.

To make bad things worse, the Ukrainian version of the majoritarian system does not require the winner to get 50+ per cent of votes in his/her district. In the first-past-the-post elections reintroduced in Ukraine, victory can be secured by sheer plurality, not necessarily a majority of votes. It means that pro-governmental candidates, however unpopular, can win elections with 20% of votes and less if they manage successfully to split opposition (and votes), produce as many fake competitors as possible, and eliminate the most dangerous rivals by decisions of fully obedient courts subservient to the authorities.

This is exactly what happened in last year’s local elections where the government carried out a dry run of the new-old system. For instance, in the proportional representation part of the election to the Kyiv Regional Council, the Party of Regions got 26 percent of the vote. Yet, in the first-past-the-post contests, almost all of the party’s candidates won. As a result it controls 65.5 percent of the regional council http://www.tol.org/client/article/22303-blocking-out-its-rivals.html.

One may argue, of course, that the first-past-the-post system should not be a big problem for opposition if they manage to unite against the incumbents or at least to agree on a common single candidate in each district. There are two hurdles, however, of both an objective and subjective nature. First, democratic forces are never as consolidated and monolithic as authoritarians who care little for ideological subtleties and principled debates but do care a lot about mafia-style discipline supported by enormous resources, patronage networks, elaborate blackmail, and coercion. And secondly, even if the democrats manage to unite, the authoritarian incumbents are skilful in splitting them, multiplying the bogus alternatives and, in some cases, eliminating the potential or even actual winners by courts under the most ridiculous pretexts.

To further undermine the opposition’s ability to unite, the new electoral law bars electoral blocs from participation in elections. This brings an additional advantage to the authoritarian Party of Regions and delivers, in particular, a serious blow against the political force of Yulia Tymoshenko that is broadly known as her eponymous bloc, while her specific political party “Batkivshchyna” (Fatherland), even though the strongest within the bloc, is largely unknown. The increase of the electoral threshold from 3 to 5 percent also targets the opposition, which, unlike the incumbents, consists of many small parties unable to surpass that total. As a result, all the votes of the opposition parties that fail to reach the threshold will be distributed proportionally among the parties that manage to do it. In other words, the Party of Regions will get a significant share of opposition votes that otherwise would never go to them.

Remarkably, the Party of Regions in opposition was fairly satisfied with the proportional electoral system as well as all other amendments to the constitution http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2011/11/17/6760394/. It is not that the system was perfect. Its major flaw was voters’ inability to influence the sequence of candidates on party slates. This made parties akin to closed political clubs where the leaders had too much power and were prone to arrange the electoral party lists in a voluntaristic fashion, evaluating prospective candidates by their financial contribution rather than moral, political, or professional merits. But the problem was not insurmountable, as the experience of many consolidated democracies, e.g. neighboring Poland, graphically demonstrates. To improve the proportional system, both Ukrainian and international experts suggested the so-called “open lists,” which would provide people with an opportunity to vote not only for a specific party but also for the preferred candidate on the party’s list.

Ironically, Viktor Yanukovych himself supported this change during his 2010 presidential campaign but eventually backtracked to his current position of support for a mixed electoral system. The reason for this volte-face was allegedly a lack of support for the “open lists” system in the parliament.However, this argument is as preposterous as the president’s claims that Ukrainian courts are impartial and independent and he has no leverage to influence them. Even more laughable is the assumption that the president has no influence over his own Minister of Justice Oleksandr Lavrynovych, who dares today to ridicule his boss’ project from 2009: “Imposing open lists is a mockery of law, common sense, and citizens. It’s lobbied for by the opposition, while we offer a better mechanism, whereby people choose their own members of parliament” http://www.tol.org/client/article/22303-blocking-out-its-rivals.html.

All those who remember Yanukovych’s U-turn on the issue of Ukraine’s NATO membership (in 2002-2004, when he was Prime-Minister, he had no objections to it), should not be surprised by his latest opportunistic move. Neither the president nor his Party of Regions has ever had any political principles or ideology besides strong commitment to absolute power that can be converted into wealth and, in turn, more secure absolute power. They have no strategy, and all their moves are determined by short-term political-cum-business expediency. In this case, the ultimate goal of the Regionnaires is clear: not to improve the existing electoral law but, rather, to introduce a new law that offers them benefits and disadvantages the opposition.

As early as March 2011, the American experts from the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute suspended their cooperation with the Lavrynovych-led working group created back in 2010 by the president with the stated task to amend the elections law, and make it more coherent, transparent and acceptable for the both government and opposition. The Americans discovered that they were simply manipulated by the Ukrainian authorities, which were intent on legitimizing, with a help of reputable foreigners, their quasi-legalistic machinations.

More recently, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) and OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) submitted their detailed and rather critical analysis of Lavrynovych’s project, which contained a remarkable passage regarding the card-sharp tactics of the Ukrainian lawmakers: “The electoral system chosen in the draft law is not the one discussed by the Venice Commission representatives during their meetings with the Ukrainian authorities and not the one recommended by the Resolution 1755 (2010) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe” http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2011/CDL%282011%29059prov-e.pdf.

And finally, the International Foundation of Electoral Systems (IFES) sent an equally strong message to the Ukrainian authorities in its own expert analysis of proposed changes: “IFES notes that the draft law was developed in an atmosphere of considerable uncertainty and mistrust between the Government of Ukraine, political parties and civil society. Numerous concerns regarding the draft law, and the process by which it was created, were raised to IFES by members of opposition parties, civil society, electoral experts and the international community… IFES shares the concerns expressed by many Ukrainian and international stakeholders regarding the government’s decision to change the electoral system in the present political climate. Electoral systems can always be improved for the better, but given the lack of consensus in the country; the significant impact of the proposed changes on the political landscape; and relatively short timeline for implementing these changes, it is highly questionable whether it makes sense to change the system at the present time. While the newly proposed system may be a legitimate one, there is no major flaw in the current system that would require an immediate change without further discussion” http://ifes.org/Content/Publications/Papers/2011/Review-and-Analysis-of-the-Draft-Law-on-the-Election-of-Peoples-Deputies-of-Ukraine.aspx.

Even more surprising is that the new law was approved ultimately by 366 MPs (of 450 in the Ukrainian parliament), i. e., not only by the ruling majority but also a major part of the opposition. It seems that supported the lesser of two evils–-the draft law with some minor concessions for the opposition instead of the genuine, much more discriminatory draft that would have been passed by the Party of Regions anyway. This is probably true since the President and his allies have enough votes in the parliament to pass any decision they need. Yet, the reality is that the Party of Regions can muster a pro-presidential majority in the next parliament with or without the insignificant concessions they have made to their opponents. It is just a matter of a few seats they may not get in elections and a few extra millions they would have to spend eventually in the parliament to buy the needed number of “independents.” But this is quite a reasonable price to pay for the legitimization the new law, both domestically and internationally, with the precious help of the opposition.

Once again, the Ukrainian democrats “shot themselves in the foot,” helping the Regionnaires to dismantle the last achievement of the Orange revolution: the election system that precluded, more or less successfully, large-scale falsifications and vote buying. Now they may lay bets only on whether the Regionnaires can muster a simple majority (226+) in the future parliament or the qualified majority (300+) that would enable them to change the Constitution and, in 2015, to elect the president, with all his enormous powers, by a simple parliamentary vote. My bet is that this is exactly the main goal of Viktor Yanukovych and the major rationale of virtually all his policies to date.

The most recent survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre, conducted from over 2,000 respondents in all regions of Ukraine between 29 September and 4 October, i.e. prior to the conviction of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko on 11 October, indicates that the approval rate of President Viktor Yanukovych is falling. Only 10% of those surveyed “fully support” his policies, compared to 14.3% for Tymoshenko, 11.9% for Arsenii Yatsenyuk, and 10.2% for boxing champion Vitalii Klychko (better known in the Western media as Vitali Klitschko). Other politicians are to be found even further down the list, including Serhii Tigipko and Anatolii Grytsenko with 5.8% each, Dmytro Tabachnyk at 2.6%, and former president Viktor Yushchenko at 1.5%.

Those who answered “I do not support” showed negative ratings for both Tymoshenko (56.7%) and Yanukovych (54.6%), as well as for Yushchenko (80.4%). Not a single figure had a high rating in “fully support” than in “do not support,” suggesting the disillusionment of the electorate with the current crop of leaders (Zerkalo Nedeli, 18 Oct). Another poll also shows that more residents of Ukraine prefer integration with the European Union than the Russian-led Customs Union, particularly in the western regions where 76.9% support Euro-integration compared to only 6.2% who favor joining the “Common Economic Space” with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Overall 43.7% of those polled support integration with the EU and 30.5% the Customs Union, both relatively high figures. Support for the former is highest among young people between 18 and 29, and lowest among those over 60. Those who favor the Customs Union offer a reverse generational demography, with backing highest among those over 50 and lowest among those 18-29 years of age (news.zn.ua, 25 Oct).

The behavior of the ruling administration continues to elicit concern both inside and outside Ukraine. Following the postponement of a scheduled visit of Yanukovych to Brussels, the European Parliament expressed regrets that the European Commission and Yanukovych would not have the chance to reestablish “a constructive dialogue” that could have resulted in an Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU. The European Parliament “deplored” the sentencing of Tymoshenko to seven years in jail, noting that the law by which she was convicted dates back to Soviet times, and other laws do not conform to EU standards (Interfax Ukrainy, 27 Oct). The scheduled EU-Ukraine summit in December may deal with some of these issues. In general the EU response to the sentencing of Tymoshenko was relatively mild, perhaps because the Eastern Partnership group, which recently gathered in Warsaw, is preoccupied with the situation in neighboring Belarus, which was notably excluded from its decisions and about which a separate statement was issued by the Joint Declaration on 29-30 September (Council of the European Union, press release, 30 Sept).

However, little seems to improve as far as Ukraine’s ruling group is concerned. In late October, there appeared a report from Mariupol that employees of the giant Azovstal’ and the Illich Corporation, both of which are owned by tycoon Rinat Akhmetov, were being forced to take out membership in the Party of Regions. Employees were given two forms, one for membership in the PR and the other about payment of membership dues and asked to return the forms to the heads of their sections. Membership dues were said to be 1 UAH monthly for workers, 3 for engineers, 5 for senior foremen, and 10 for the head of the shop floor. Azovstal’ employs over 15,000 people, so the annual amount collected would be around 250,000 UAH annually, or double the budget of the Mariupol branch of the Party of Regions. Those who are reluctant to join could also be punished by deprivation of “bonuses” that account for as much as 40% of regular salaries. The report also indicated that those who were unwilling to join the PR and pay such dues could lose their jobs through reorganization of branches of the company. There were similar stories from Zaporizhzhya and Kharkiv, and in the latter city similar pressure was placed on students of the Skovoroda University (Ukrains’ka Pravda, Oct 26).

The pessimists were right: the Pechersk district court has fully approved the criminal charge against Yulia Tymoshenko, the former prime-minister of Ukraine, and sentenced her to seven years in prison. This is the maximum term provided by the respective article of the Criminal Code. Additionally, Ms Tymoshenko was barred from occupying any public office within three consecutive years, and fined $190 million for the damages to the Ukrainian economy that she arguably incurred in 2009 by signing an unfair gas contract with her Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin.

A few weeks ago, rumors emerged in Kyiv that the decision on Tymoshenko’s case had been decided in advance by President Viktor Yanukovych himself, and that the court had only to rubber-stamp the maximum prison term for his arch-rival. Even though Yanukovych defeated her narrowly last year in the presidential election, Tymoshenko still is the leader of the opposition and his main challenger. Whether the rumors were based on accurate information leaked from the president’s office or merely a gloomy intuition of Tymoshenko’s supporters, optimists had some reason to expect that the Western criticism of the kangaroo process would not be completely ignored by the Ukrainian authorities. The president who boasts of his “pragmatism” would surely not put at risk the entire project of Ukraine’s European integration for the dubious purpose of personal vengeance.

The additional three-year ban on taking a public office imposed by the court on Yulia Tymoshenko, suggests that the main driving force behind Yanukovych’s decision was not only vengeance but also fear. Tymoshenko is believed to be not merely the strongest challenger for the incumbent regime but also its real nemesis who would not hesitate to pay them in kind, and would likely do so on much stronger legal grounds. Now, through the court ruling, she is effectively excluded from both the 2015 presidential election with Mr. Yanukovych and the 2020 competition with his likely handpicked successor.

The court decision, announced on 11 October, provoked a storm of protest in Western capitals, especially in the European Union. The EU leaders, indeed, placed high stakes on pending negotiations about the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) and Association Agreements with Ukraine and expected to finalize them by the end of the year. On many occasions, they warned Kyiv that they would hardly be able to maintain close relations with a country that applies selective justice against the leaders of the political opposition and criminalizes legitimate decisions of the previous government. That the warnings have been ignored has filled the Westerners with sheer indignation. Leaving diplomatic courtesy aside, they state clearly now that no Association agreement, with DCFTA as part of it can be signed until Ukraine proves its full commitment to European values.

It signifies not only a demand to release Yulia Tymoshenko and other political prisoners but also to stop government pressure on civil society, harassment of independent media, manipulation of laws (the election law in particular), and so on. The government seems to be lost. Its leaders apparently do not understand why a minor, in their view internal, issue has caused such a huge international furore, and how to get out of this lose-lose situation. Ironically, the Westerners themselves have greatly contributed to the current confusion. Since March 2010, they have benignly neglected the growing roughness and lawlessness of Yanukovych’s regime, starting with a de facto parliamentary coup d’etat and ending up with the shamelessly manipulated local elections and even more unscrupulous changes of the national constitution. In fact, the Europeans sent Yanykovych and his associates a very wrong signal: guys, as long as you can restore and maintain some order in this chaotic country, we don’t care much about law and democracy in your fiefdom. What the Westerners offered as a benefit of doubt, the Ukrainian authorities took as a carte blanche.

Now, the both sides are badly surprised and bitterly disappointed. The Westerners simply do not understand why Yanukovych ignored so defiantly their quite clear message to leave Tymoshenko in peace. And Yanukovych seems to be equally puzzled why they decided finally to react, having accepted tacitly all his tricks throughout a year and a half. He may believe, quite sincerely, that the EU reaction is just a show staged by the smart Western politicians for their candid electorate – exactly like the Tymoshenko trial is staged by his “goodfellas” for domestic purposes.

Whatever the rationale, Yanukovych seems not to fully understand that his reprisal on Tymoshenko is not the main reason for ostracizing him but just the last straw that broke the camel’s back, i.e. the patience of the EU leaders. One may speculate how many of them are truly concerned about Ukraine’s democracy and how many (likely the majority) that are using the case as the pretext to exclude a nuisance like Ukraine from the European project and, inter alia, to please the old pal Vladimir http://dt.ua/POLITICS/vin_pilyae_suk_pid_soboyu_a_vpade_krayina-89690.html. The fact is that the Ukrainian government has crossed the red line and entered uncharted land where they no longer receive the benefit of doubt and benign neglect for thuggish behavior, cheating and bluffing, for whatever reason.

In a way, Yanukovych committed the same mistake as his former boss Leonid Kuchma. He delegitimized himself, both domestically and internationally. He has lost credibility and, henceforth, will be seen not as a leader trying to fix a dysfunctional democracy, but as an arrogant autocrat who is striving to dismantle the remnants of political pluralism and genuine competition inherited from his predecessor Viktor Yushchenko. Hitherto, to maintain good relations with the EU, Yanukovych needed only to prove that he is not completely hopeless and autocratic – a not so difficult task in the context of post-Soviet sultans, dictators, and “national leaders.” After the Tymoshenko conviction a minimum pass will no longer suffice. A strong “C” is required, and this is a sea change since neither mentally nor institutionally are the Ukrainian authorities able to qualify.

Yanukovych may pardon Yulia Tymoshenko now, as some experts suggest; or may push the new Criminal Code through the parliament that decriminalizes Tymoshenko’s transgressions, as he hinted himself; or, vice-versa, he may open a new criminal case against her, as the Security Service of Ukraine has already announced http://news.dt.ua/POLITICS/sbu_spravu_za_borgi_pered_rf_porusheno_proti_timoshenko_i_lazarenka-89574.html. In either case, he would remain a lame duck president, despised at home and distrusted abroad, squeezed between the EU and Russia, and torn between two mutually exclusive but equally unreliable strategies of survival. One of them means submitting to the EU demands and accepting European values and respective behavior. This sounds promising, but looks very unlikely since neither the president nor his oligarchic team understands what those values mean and how they can be treated seriously, nor are they ready to accept fair play and expose themselves to free political and economic competition.

The alternative strategy is much more likely – to play possum as long as possible, defy the European Union’s pressure, to look for support in the Kremlin, to promise and not to deliver, to be smart like Aliaksandr Lukashenka, or at least Leonid Kuchma. The problem however is that Yanukovych is not that smart, nor are Ukrainians obedient enough, nor is the Kremlin eager to support all these smarties for a song. And last but not least, the Ukrainian officials-cum-oligarchs are not very happy with the looming prospect of being blacklisted in the EU like their Belarusian brethren.

The most probable scenario is that Yanukovych’s regime will make another attempt to cheat the Westerners. To this end, they may release Tymoshenko in order to continue reprisals against opposition, civil society, and the independent mass media, with the implicit goal to monopolize all the political and economic power http://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2011/10/14/6665143/. If society resists the latter, they will employ coercion; if the EU applies sanctions against Ukraine, they will turn to Moscow.

Paradoxically, the same people who nurtured Yanukovych might become his political gravediggers. The Ukrainian oligarchs are very unlikely to follow the president in his drift to Moscow, and even less so his break with the EU. This group, however, is highly opportunistic and would never oppose the president openly until and unless society demonstrates its strength and the West steps up pressure.

The news that imprisoned former Premier of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko is now facing charges of embezzlement, linked to her time as the president of United Energy Systems of Ukraine in the 1990s, raises questions about the motivations of the Ukrainian government and President Viktor Yanukovych in particular.

Why was she jailed in the first place? And why has an old issue, linked to a time when virtually all the Ukrainian oligarchs had their hands in the public trough, suddenly resurfaced?

On October 10, Tymoshenko received a 7-year prison sentence for her part in a gas deal negotiated with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in 2009 that was “disadvantageous for Ukraine.” Throughout the trial she had expressed her contempt for the judge and prosecutor and argued that the procedure was politically motivated. Virtually all the Western governments concurred while Russia was furious that the 2009 agreement had been so publicly reopened.

Yanukovych, supposedly, wished to rid himself of his main political opponent before the parliamentary elections scheduled for October 2012. However, the trial and verdict endangered Ukraine’s chances of signing an Association Agreement with the European Union, which has been under negotiation for some time. Some critics, such as David Kramer of Freedom House, maintain that the discussions should be postponed until Tymoshenko and other opposition leaders have been released and pardoned.

But why was she tried and imprisoned at all?

One suggestion, offered by Dominique Arel, Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Ottawa, is that Yanukovych persecuted Tymoshenko because he believed he could get away with it. The premise is that for the Europeans, relations with Ukraine are too important to be imperiled by a domestic quarrel.

Writing in a Russian source, analysts Maksim Logvinov and Vladislav Zhukovsky, think that the goal of the original trial was to force Russia to revise the price of gas sold to Ukraine. They also maintain that targeting Tymoshenko was a means to divert blame from the government for the economic crisis that Ukraine will face shortly because of the high prices of gas. However, the gamble failed because all the relevant parties—Russia, the EU, and the United States—took the side of Tymoshenko and criticized the Ukrainian authorities. In many ways the trial became a cause célèbre for the embattled Ukrainian opposition.

Yet the actions of Yanukovych still lack rationale and these analyses perhaps attribute a degree of Machiavellianism and political astuteness to the president that have not always been evident, despite his triumphant election victory in January 2010.

Ukrainian analyst Vitalii Portnikov has provided the most logical explanation: the initiatives in the Tymoshenko case are not coming from the president but from a “party of war” within the leadership that includes the head of the Secret Service (SBU), Valery Khoroshkovsky, Serhii Yevochkin of the presidential administration, the Energy Minister Yury Boyko, prominent businessman Dmytro Firtash, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Kostyantyn Hryshchenko. Their goal is to isolate Yanukovych and undermine any plans for integration with the EU or the Russian-led Customs Union. Both are perceived as threats to their own power.

The presence within this group of Firtash is possibly the most significant. An ally of former president Viktor Yushchenko, he established a position for his company RosUkrEnergo as an intermediary in the bitter gas war between Russia and Ukraine. Firtash offered to buy the gas from Russia and resell it to Ukraine.

Tymoshenko, a woman of formidable business acumen, cut Firtash out of the equation with the 2009 agreement. He is now officially back in business (he also controls much of Ukraine’s titanium industry), and out for revenge. The goal appears to be to ensure the complete demise of his rival.

As for the new charges, there is little question that Tymoshenko—then known as the “gas princess”—benefited from state patronage. From 1995 to 1997, when she was president of United Energy Systems of Ukraine, she was given highly lucrative government contracts—including control over imported gas from Russia—by then Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko, who was later convicted for money laundering and wire fraud by a US court. Yet the list of those who could be tried for past crimes in Ukraine is a long one that includes many current oligarchs, and one past president.

It seems safest to assume that either Yanukovych is far more scheming than many have surmised hitherto, or else (and more likely) he is being prodded and pushed by powerful interest groups whose goal is to keep Ukraine free from economic ties so that they are left free to amass wealth.

Such “freedom” requires the obliteration of the opposition and its leader, manipulation of elections, and systematic deployment of the SBU against their critics. In Arel’s view, by targeting Yulia Tymoshenko the Ukrainian government has demonstrated it has the wherewithal to stop opponents from challenging the president. The main casualty is democratic Ukraine.

But few of the “party of war” are likely to lose sleep over that.

This article first appeared in the EDMONTON JOURNAL, 15 October 2011

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