The Viktors Go to Brussels

David Marples and Myroslava Uniat

After the February 25 16^th EU-Ukraine summit in Brussels, Ukraine’s chances of signing an Association Agreement later this year in Vilnius appeared as uncertain as they were before the meeting. What is lacking is a single unequivocal statement from President Viktor Yanukovych that he is prepared to meet the EU halfway and agree to the preconditions that have been outlined and reiterated numerous times by various leaders of Brussels. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s relations with the Russian-led Customs Union seem equally as ambivalent, but continue in parallel form in the background.

The Europeans have made it plain that the continuing imprisonment of opposition politicians Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuri Lutsenko is part of the equation. If the EU has compromised, then it may be on the issue of the former. While Brussels-based politicians condemn the escalation of the charges against Ukraine’s former Prime Minister, there is less emphasis today than hitherto that the release of Ms Tymoshenko is an essential prerequisite for the signing of the agreement. Regarding Lutsenko, on the other hand, the situation is simply confusing. Evhen Balitskiy, a deputy from the Regions Party, speaking on Ukraine’s Channel 5 on February 21, stated firmly that the two detained figures would be released only when they had completed their sentences, and that Ukraine would not cave into outside pressure for an early end to their confinement (http://www.unian.net/news/554646-regional-otpuskat-timoshenko-i-lutsenko-ranshe-sroka-nikto-ne-sobiraetsya.html).

Another report of February 23 suggested that Yanukovych was indeed willing to compromise on both cases, but without setting a time frame (http://www.unian.net/news/555201-ukrainskiy-interes-anketa-evrointegratsii-i-ansambl-dlya-igryi-na-trube.html). Lutsenko’s wife expressed her view that the president had paid close attention to issues dealing with her husband and that his detention was a political matter, i.e. that he had been imprisoned for criticizing the government (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/22/6984173 ). Just three days later, a report from the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, maintained that after his meeting with the presidents of Poland and Slovakia, Yanukovych had promised to release Lutsenko in order to demonstrate Ukraine’s commitment to joining Europe. But the press service of the Polish president Bronislaw Kororowski would neither deny nor confirm the statement (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/25/6984254/).

Meanwhile EU politicians were expressing optimism both before and after the Brussels summit. European Commission president Jose Manuel Barroso enunciated his vision of Ukraine as future member of the European Union and expressed his faith that Ukraine has a European future. The effort to get an Association Agreement signed in November at the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius was endorsed not only by Barroso, but also by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton, and European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy Stefan Fule. They did add the proviso, however, that Ukraine should resolve the issue of “selective justice” and remove “deficiencies” in the conducting of parliamentary elections (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?kerivnitstvo_yes_hoche_shhob_ukrayina_stala_chlenom_yevrosoyuzu&objectId=1279188).

There was, however, another familiar Ukrainian visitor in the Belgian capital. Prior to the summit, at an evening meeting with Barroso that lasted over an hour, former president Viktor Yushchenko commented that the Tymoshenko case should not hold up proceedings (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?yushhenko_pered_samitom_govoriv_z_barrozu_pro_ukrayinu_i_timoshenko__zmi&objectId=1278974). The future of the Ukrainian state, stated Yushchenko, should not be a hostage of the “Tymoshenko affair.” Whether the Europeans still perceive Yushchenko as a credible authority is a moot point. The former president has rarely missed an opportunity to denounce his former Prime Minister, whose lengthy jail sentence was due in part to his testimony, and he appears content to serve the Regions government in his new role as an informal negotiator.

The delayed visit of Yanukovych to Moscow, on the other hand, finally took place on March 4, following its postponement last December. The main topics on the agenda were cooperation in energy, trade, and the economic sphere, particularly the conditions on which Ukraine might join the Customs Union. In addition Yanukovych returned to an old conundrum of the Kuchma era, namely the notion that there could be a joint Ukrainian-Russian venture to rent out Ukraine’s gas transportation system (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?yanukovich_u_rosiyi_zaproponuye_stvoriti_spilne_pidpriyemstvo__taran&objectId=1279284; http://www.rferl.org/content/putin-yanukovych-moscow/24918397.html ). Russia, however, is insisting that Ukraine recognize the validity of previous agreements, which include not only the unfortunate 2009 deal on gas prices negotiated by Tymoshenko, but also cooperation and progress toward the integration of the Russian and Ukrainian nuclear industries in accordance with the July 12, 2012 memorandum signed in Yalta. One possible component of this agreement is joint construction of units 3 and 4 of the VVER nuclear power station at Khmelnyts’kyi (http://www.unian.net/news/556804-yanukovich-i-putin-pogovoryat-o-gaze.html ).

 In April 2011 Yanukovych suggested that Ukraine might join the Customs Union in a 3+1 format precluding its full integration. That notion received qualifiede support from Regions deputy and Deputy Prime Minister Serhiy Tihipko, a former chair of the National Bank of Ukraine. Tihipko observed that Ukraine’s entry into the Customs Union has been under negotiation since 2010 and that the proposed treaty details are about 1,000 pages in length. Good progress has been made in his view. But neither side has started to work seriously on the 3+1 idea, an approach that he would not reject. Still, the EU market is seven times larger, which renders it more interesting for the Ukrainian economy (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/22/6984174 ). Implicitly therefore the Customs Union is a viable back-up plan should negotiations with Brussels result in failure.

 If, as seems plausible, Yanukovych is using talks with Russia to persuade Brussels to void the various conditions for signing the Associaton Agreement, he is demonstrating remarkable political naivety. The outcome could be the failure of the November meeting with the EU and equally unfruitful negotiations with Russia, which has considerable sway over the immediate future of Ukrainian energy policy in several of its major spheres, but especially oil, gas, and nuclear power. Andrew Wilson of the European Council of Foreign Relations commented that if the president was a wise man, then he would at least agree to release Lutsenko, but [he] «is not wise» (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?yes_pidpisav_bi_ugodu_pro_asotsiatsiyu_navit_z_timoshenko_v_tyurmi__ekspert&objectId=1278880 ). Valery Chaliy of the Kyiv-based Razumkov Center maintains that the chances of the Association Agreement being signed are no better than 20%. And Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt declared that «To put it mildly, the current signs of progress in Ukraine are quite limited» (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?imovirnist_pidpisannya_ugodi_pro_asotsiatsiyu_z_yes__20__ekspert&objectId=1278849).

 The EU has no doubt taken into consideration the overwhelming support for Ukraine’s European aspirations in the Ukrainian Parliament and the fact that even the government, despite its vacillations and the lack of firm directions at the level of the presidency, is generally in favor. It should take note, however, that negotiations on the side of Kyiv are not taking place with sincerity or even an evident willingness to compromise. All too often the vindictiveness toward former enemies and fear of retribution at some future date for more conciliatory policies, particularly in dealing with the Tymoshenko and Lutsenko cases, mean that at best, the Europeans will see no more than sluggish and very reluctant steps to comply with even modest requests. As Wilson has noted, however, a failure in November could seriously undermine the very existence of the Eastern Partnership. Ukraine might then have no immediate options other than the Customs Union, either in the so-called 3+1 formation or deeper integration on terms emanating from Moscow.

Casus Vynnychukus and Freedom of Speech

Mykola Riabchuk

On January 23, 2012 two policemen approached writer Yuri Vynnychuk at his home in the Western Ukrainian city of L’viv and demanded from him a written explanation of the poems he had presented a few months earlier in Kyiv at the “Night of Erotic Poetry” festival. The policemen said they were authorized to do so by the prosecutor general who had received a complaint from the Communist MP, Leonid Hrach, which unabashedly qualified Vynnychuk’s poems as “pornography” and a “call for the violent overthrow of Ukraine’s government” (http://world.maidan.org.ua/2012/statement-on-the-political-persecution-of-the-ukrainian-writer-yuri-vynnychuk).

Yuri Vynnychuk is a renowned author with some international fame, so he has not been arrested, beaten, and forced to confess, as happens on a daily basis all over Ukraine to his less fortunate and not so famous compatriots. Oleksiy Cherneha, for instance, a young activist of the “Patriot of Ukraine” from the provincial town of Vasyl’kiv (Kyiv Oblast), recollects his encounter with the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) officers as follows:

Immediately after I was detained [on August 23, 2011], I was taken to the regional SBU center where I was held without charge or sanction from the investigator or court until Aug. 27, much longer than the 72 hours allowed by law […]
While I was at the regional SBU center, I was questioned around the clock. During the interrogation, physical methods were used against me repeatedly – I was beaten on my neck and the soft parts of the body, forced to do the splits, humiliated, threatened with physical violence and also mocked with accusations of pedophilia.
The SBU officers also tried to force me to give untruthful evidence against my acquaintances… After I had refused to give this untruthful evidence, I was shackled and they continued to beat me.
For four days I was interrogated and not allowed to sleep or eat.
During the torture and humiliation I repeatedly demanded to be told my official status in the case and also information about the examination of the things found at my place during the search. But I received no answer to any of my questions. I was also refused a meeting with my lawyer, and all interrogations happened without his presence.
While I was in custody, I informed the SBU that I had been diagnosed with epilepsy and that the doctors had recommended that I stick to a sleep pattern and eat regularly, because not to do so could affect my health and even lead to death.
However, the SBU officers ignored this and for four days I was interrogated without sleep or food. Such behavior is a flagrant violation of human rights and guarantees of respect for dignity contained in the Constitution.
During interrogation on Aug. 25, SBU officers forced a compact disk into my hand which had allegedly been found at the place on Hrushevskogo Street on Aug. 22.
There, like at my residence, the SBU alleged it had found information about assembling a homemade explosive device and a video of child pornography.
Afterward I was told they had “evidence” against me and in a similar way they could create any “evidence,” and for this not to happen I had to write that my acquaintances Shpara and Bevz had left the things in my room that had been found during the search.
When I refused, painful injuries were inflicted on me.
On the night of Aug. 26, I was informed that I would be released if I signed a few documents. I was forced to sign a letter to the head of the SBU saying that no physical coercion had been applied to me and that I voluntarily consented to give evidence from Aug. 23 to Aug. 27.
I assert that all signatures that I made during that time were extracted in ways banned by the Code of Criminal Procedure ( http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/112476/). (See also: Katya Gorchinskaya, “Allegations of SBU horrors recall cruel Stasi methods,” 15 September 2011: http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/112911/.)

Stories like this are typical in Yanukovych’s Ukraine. They vary in detail but have one thing in common: rampant lawlessness that reigns supreme in the country and unscrupulous use of law-enforcement agencies for the regime’s political goals. The Kyiv Post editorial aptly described Ukraine’s judicial system as “broken, corrupt and manipulated by oligarch-controlled politicians, chief among them president Viktor Yanukovych”:

Police still beat, torture, falsify evidence and extract false confessions. They conduct armed raids with masks with the permission of the manipulated courts.
Prosecutors operate in a web of secrecy in which they are accountable to no one but the chief prosecutor, who is appointed by Yanukovych.
Judges cannot exercise independence for fear of losing their jobs – or worse.
The presumption of guilt replaces the presumption of innocence through the pre-trial jailing of suspects for up to 18 months in horrible conditions, the denial of bail and adequate legal representation, the denial of speedy trial by jury and so on (http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/editorial/detail/114769/).

Yuri Vynnychuk predictably rejected the accusations as absurd and stated that the interference in literary matters by politicians, prosecutors and other officials was illegal and anti-constitutional. The story got broad publicity in the mass media; Ukrainian PEN-center endorsed a protest; the writer himself used a public commemoration of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch’s birthday in downtown L’viv to read his subversive poems to his cheerful fans. And finally, the sweetheart Hanna Herman, Yanukovych’s advisor and a writer herself, called a L’viv colleague and apologized for the excessive zeal of her boss’s subordinates (http://life.pravda.com.ua/person/2012/01/30/93822/).

Personally, I would prefer her to call Mr. Cherneha, or Ms. Hanna Synkova, or many other victims of the regime’s brutality, and to deal with the officers that tortured and humiliated them rather than the two pathetic policemen sent by their dull bosses to Yuri Vynnychuk’s place. So far, it looks like a Bad Cop versus Good Cop show. However it ends, it should not obscure the much more serious, brazen, innumerable cases of human rights violations in Yanukovych’s Ukraine. The very addition of “pornography” to the alleged “call for a violent overthrow of the government” tends to make the entire story farcical, to downplay and de-contextualize the political message of Vynnychuk’s work. Yet, whatever the initial intentions of both the writer and his opponents, the actual implications of the conflict seem to be broader and more complex.

First of all, the poem in question is certainly not Vynnychuk’s chef d’oeuvre, nor is it an exemplary case of political correctness. There are two English translations of this poetical pamphlet, one of which is entitled “Kill the Bugger” and the other “Kill the Pidaras” (http://durdom.in.ua/uk/main/news_article/news_id/27029.phtml).

The former translation is a much better reflection of the poem’s idea, yet the latter renders properly the ambiguity that exists in the original. The obscenity “pidaras” borrowed from Russian criminal slang has a sexual (actually sexist) connotation related to “pederast,” but in a colloquial speech it means typically a sodomite or a “total idiot” (therefore the female form “pidaraska” can also be used). Nevertheless, the underlying sexist connotation makes the text rather tasteless and implicitly homophobic, even though it clearly hints that the Ukrainian government and the incumbent president may well be considered sodomites rather than homosexuals.

The slogan “kill” (whoever) is also distasteful, though it should not be interpreted literally. The poet may mean symbolic/political “killing,” or even refer to Anton Chekhov’s famous dictum: “to kill a slave within ourselves,” and to Shevchenko’s classical “Testament”: to “wake up and rise up, and break the shackles, and sanctify freedom with the enemy’s evil blood.” Still, in the society with a weak tradition of tolerance and political liberalism, and deeply rooted tradition of homophobia, xenophobia, and daily coercion, all these ambiguities and provocative slogans may reverberate and fuel even more hatred and brutality rather than the desired purification.

As a vice-president of the Ukrainian PEN-centre assigned by the colleagues to draft the protest, I was really in a difficult position. I had to condemn the police interference in literary matters and, at the same time, distance myself and the center from the controversial poem, which I would have certainly advised the author neither to read, nor to publish or produce – at least in its current form. I attempted to solve the dilemma by placing the case in the broader context of the government’s systemic infringement of the freedom of speech and political persecution of writers, scholars, journalists, and civic activists. At the same time, in a personal conversation, I expressed to the author (a friend) disapproval of his dubious text.

The point seems to be obvious: we may profoundly disagree with a writer’s views and forms of their expression but we should guarantee him/her the right to express those views without censorship and political pressure. It is up to the public and literary critics to evaluate the text, not the police, prosecutors, and security service. We defend the general principle, and not a specific author or text. A few years ago, I happened to disapprove of then president Viktor Yushchenko’s intention to criminalize the denial that the Great Famine of 1932-33 in Ukraine was Genocide. By the same token, I staunchly disagree with similar decisions of some other governments to make the denial of Armenian and other genocides a criminal offense. People should have a right to express the most ugly and stupid ideas as long as they do not call directly for illegal and violent actions against other people. This is particularly true about the writers and artists who may bear moral, political, professional, and, in some cases, administrative responsibility for their words but definitely should not be considered criminals. It seems self-evident, but I have noticed from pending public debates the subtle difference between the defense of a general principle and of specific texts. It is usually blurred and politicized.

Yuri Vynnychuk’s case, in a way, resembles that of Yulia Tymoshenko. Here, again, we protest against her political persecution not because we support her politically, share her views or consider her own governmental policies consistent with liberal democracy and rule of law. We simply believe that political decisions should not be criminalized – exactly like poems, novels, or artistic performances.

So, the second question emerges: why does President Yanukovych commit or, rather, allow his lieutenants to perpetrate the blunders that compromise him and his regime both domestically and internationally? The simple answer is that no authoritarian regime can survive without some lawlessness and coercion. However, it is one thing to torture inmates in provincial prisons, to harass young and as yet unknown civic activists, or to take over one’s opponents’ businesses via sheer racket or kangaroo courts. It is quite another to attack outstanding figures whose ordeal draws immediately broad and sometimes even exaggerated public attention.

Viktor Yanukovych may be neither wise enough to adequately understand politics, or diligent enough to keep a careful eye on his political menials. But he has a huge apparatus, doubled in size and salaries since Yushchenko’s times, and he should have no problems with professional analysis, political advice and ultimate decision-making. And this is the point. So far, after two years of his presidency, he has been moving from bad to worse in all his decisions, and steadily losing his popular rating from over 60 percent to single-digit figures. If his advisors are as incompetent as their leader, it is very unfortunate. If they are smart but manipulate him in a cowardly fashion –for Moscow’s or their personal benefits, or both – it could be catastrophic.

The Vynnychuk affair might have been initiated by a senile communist, who felt insulted by the writer’s mockery of Communist rhetoric and paraphernalia. At least, this is what Hanna Herman suggested. One may wonder however to what degree the communists in Ukraine are independent players. So far, they behave like government puppets assigned to do the dirtiest jobs that the government prefers not to engage in openly. Smearing Ukrainian NGOs as subversive agents of the West might be the most graphic example. Neither the Kuchma nor the Yanukovych governments dared to do this themselves since this might have undermined their fake “pro-European” rhetoric. Yet, remarkably, they provided the communists with full logistic support, publicity, and the needed votes in the parliament to pass the anti-NGO laws.

In the Vynnychuk case the manipulators could play one more game and try to capitalize on the president’s fears and phobias. Viktor Yanukovych, indeed, seems to be preoccupied with his personal security. This may stem from his unfortunate 2004 presidential campaign when he was attacked by an egg and became so terrified that he lost consciousness. Taras Chornovil, Yanukovych’s ally and former close adviser, claims that the president’s phobias originate from his peculiar experience in the Donbas region – dubbed the Ukrainian Sicily. Yanukovych sincerely believes that “someone wants to kill him,” Chornovil says http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/116724/.

The President’s paranoia might be an excellent tool for those in his entourage who know how to use it. And Vynnychuk’s poem “Kill the Pidaras” fits them well. Back in September, there was a huge scandal in Kyiv when people wore teeshirts that featured the slogan: “Thanks to inhabitants of Donbas for the [election of the] president-pidaras.” Police raided the store, confiscated the T-shirts, and forced the businessman who produced them to flee abroad. The word “pidaras,” however, has acquired one more connotation hardly unknown to either Yuri Vynnychuk or Viktor Yanukovych.

The Vynnychuk case, even though on a much smaller scale, is as ambiguous as that of Tymoshenko. Both shed a light on the lawlessness that reigns in the country. But both can be used also be used to obscure the scale of repressions and to trivialize the political essence of the events. Therefore, whatever we think about both heroes and their work, we should remember the broader context and perceive the general tendency rather than unpleasant, albeit isolated, incidents.

CORRUPTION AT THE TOP–DISAFFECTION BELOW. [STASIUK BLOG NOTES 2/11]

David Marples

The most recent survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre, conducted from over 2,000 respondents in all regions of Ukraine between 29 September and 4 October, i.e. prior to the conviction of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko on 11 October, indicates that the approval rate of President Viktor Yanukovych is falling. Only 10% of those surveyed “fully support” his policies, compared to 14.3% for Tymoshenko, 11.9% for Arsenii Yatsenyuk, and 10.2% for boxing champion Vitalii Klychko (better known in the Western media as Vitali Klitschko). Other politicians are to be found even further down the list, including Serhii Tigipko and Anatolii Grytsenko with 5.8% each, Dmytro Tabachnyk at 2.6%, and former president Viktor Yushchenko at 1.5%.

Those who answered “I do not support” showed negative ratings for both Tymoshenko (56.7%) and Yanukovych (54.6%), as well as for Yushchenko (80.4%). Not a single figure had a high rating in “fully support” than in “do not support,” suggesting the disillusionment of the electorate with the current crop of leaders (Zerkalo Nedeli, 18 Oct). Another poll also shows that more residents of Ukraine prefer integration with the European Union than the Russian-led Customs Union, particularly in the western regions where 76.9% support Euro-integration compared to only 6.2% who favor joining the “Common Economic Space” with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Overall 43.7% of those polled support integration with the EU and 30.5% the Customs Union, both relatively high figures. Support for the former is highest among young people between 18 and 29, and lowest among those over 60. Those who favor the Customs Union offer a reverse generational demography, with backing highest among those over 50 and lowest among those 18-29 years of age (news.zn.ua, 25 Oct).

The behavior of the ruling administration continues to elicit concern both inside and outside Ukraine. Following the postponement of a scheduled visit of Yanukovych to Brussels, the European Parliament expressed regrets that the European Commission and Yanukovych would not have the chance to reestablish “a constructive dialogue” that could have resulted in an Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU. The European Parliament “deplored” the sentencing of Tymoshenko to seven years in jail, noting that the law by which she was convicted dates back to Soviet times, and other laws do not conform to EU standards (Interfax Ukrainy, 27 Oct). The scheduled EU-Ukraine summit in December may deal with some of these issues. In general the EU response to the sentencing of Tymoshenko was relatively mild, perhaps because the Eastern Partnership group, which recently gathered in Warsaw, is preoccupied with the situation in neighboring Belarus, which was notably excluded from its decisions and about which a separate statement was issued by the Joint Declaration on 29-30 September (Council of the European Union, press release, 30 Sept).

However, little seems to improve as far as Ukraine’s ruling group is concerned. In late October, there appeared a report from Mariupol that employees of the giant Azovstal’ and the Illich Corporation, both of which are owned by tycoon Rinat Akhmetov, were being forced to take out membership in the Party of Regions. Employees were given two forms, one for membership in the PR and the other about payment of membership dues and asked to return the forms to the heads of their sections. Membership dues were said to be 1 UAH monthly for workers, 3 for engineers, 5 for senior foremen, and 10 for the head of the shop floor. Azovstal’ employs over 15,000 people, so the annual amount collected would be around 250,000 UAH annually, or double the budget of the Mariupol branch of the Party of Regions. Those who are reluctant to join could also be punished by deprivation of “bonuses” that account for as much as 40% of regular salaries. The report also indicated that those who were unwilling to join the PR and pay such dues could lose their jobs through reorganization of branches of the company. There were similar stories from Zaporizhzhya and Kharkiv, and in the latter city similar pressure was placed on students of the Skovoroda University (Ukrains’ka Pravda, Oct 26).

Ukraine at 20

David Marples

Twenty years ago, the Ukrainian parliament declared independence, following a failed putsch in Moscow. The dramatic move virtually guaranteed the end of the Soviet Union, as Mikhail Gorbachev admitted. It also raised hopes that the new state of 52 million people would emerge as a democratic and strong country through its strategic location in central Europe.

The late 1980s saw a cultural revival and a popular movement led by leading writers who spearheaded the move to independence. Catalyzed by the USSR’s failure to respond to the 1986 Chornobyl disaster, it revisited “blank spots” of the past, such as the tragic famine of 1932-33 and Stalin’s purges. Fueled by activists from a plethora of informal associations—environmental, political, and religious—it signaled real hope for Ukraine, a resource-rich country endowed with valuable agricultural land. The future seemed bright.

However, two decades of independence have brought deep disappointment. Ukrainian intellectuals are virtually falling over each other with cynical remarks about the rates of corruption, alcoholism, infectious diseases, and lack of freedoms (see Mykola Riabchuk’s article on this site).

Conversely, Western analysts seem slightly more upbeat, if only because they compare Ukraine favorably with other former states of the USSR like Russia and Belarus, or the monolithic dictatorships of Central Asia. Despite difficulties, the economy has returned to positive growth. And, the mere fact of survival is an achievement, the longest period of independence in Ukrainian history.

It is impossible, however, to avoid an impression of fading optimism.

On the eve of Independence Day, the government banned any public demonstrations other than the official celebration.

Yulia Tymoshenko, a former prime minister and a co-leader of the 2004 Orange Revolution, remains on trial for making a 2008 gas deal with Russia, despite coming down with a debilitating illness. Her onetime ally and former president Viktor Yushchenko testified against her at the trial, further testimony to the disintegration of the democratic forces.

The president, Viktor Yanukovych, has filled the cabinet with cronies from the Donbas, few of whom even speak Ukrainian. He appears every inch the Soviet bureaucrat, thuggish and vindictive, and actively using the security forces against his enemies.

The failure to live up to early expectations can be attributed to several factors.

First, there were inevitable teething problems. The parliamentary chair, Leonid Kravchuk, former ideological secretary of the Communist Party, became Ukraine’s first president on December 1, 1991. By declaring independence on August 24, the Communists managed to retain power and remained strong during the following years, paralyzing government and opposing their former mentor, Kravchuk.

Second, Ukraine’s eastern cities were a stronghold of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Nikita Khrushchev made his political career in Donetsk; Leonid Brezhnev was born in Kamenskoe—today known as Dniprodzerzhinsk after the founder of the Soviet secret police (latterly the KGB), Felix Dzerzhinsky.

These cities fought for supremacy after independence, struggling for control of vital resources in coal mining, ferrous metallurgy, and chemicals. The Dnipropetrovsk group triumphed in the mid-90s with Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko and his Deputy Energy Minister Tymoshenko. But the notoriously corrupt Lazarenko looted an estimated $200 million from Ukraine in 1996-97 and was eventually tried and convicted in USA.

Today it is the Donetsk group that wields power. It suffered a severe setback with the Orange triumph, but the leniency of the Yushchenko presidency ensured its recovery. There is a notable continuity from former Soviet bosses to the current “clan” leaders of the region. Backed by magnates like Rinat Akhmetov, the Yanukovych regime is interested in empowerment rather than democratic ideals. Above all it wishes to prevent a return to the Orange movement of 2004.

Third, and crucially, the Yushchenko presidency (2005-10) became mired in fractious disputes and failed to build on the energy created in the streets of Kyiv. Not only did it avoid addressing corruption, it failed to bring to trial the main transgressors, and restored Yanukovych to eminence by, improbably, making him Prime Minister in August 2006.

Fourth, neither the European Union nor Russia under Putin and Medvedev has supported Ukraine adequately. The EU failed to live up to its promises for early membership during the Orange Revolution, whereas Russia started a war over gas prices with the Yushchenko administration, and today is an uncomfortable and intrusive neighbor that seeks much tighter integration with Kyiv.

Critically, the government of Ukraine has failed to enunciate a national vision for Ukraine. On the contrary, Yanukovych and his associates encourage regionalism, divisions, and extremism in order to pose as the voice of moderation. The growing authoritarianism poses a serious threat to democracy that can no longer be ignored by European leaders or by Ukrainians themselves.

This article appeared simultaneously in the Edmonton Journal, Ottawa Citizen, and Vancouver Province, 24 August 2011

Analysis of the 17 January Ukrainian Presidential Elections

Ivan Lozowy,
The Ukraine Insider

ITEM A.: THE ALSO-RANS

Following the first round of Ukraine’s presidential elections the stage is set for a huge battle between the political front-man for the Donetsk “clan” Viktor Yanukovych and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.

The results included one surprise, a surge by Serhiy Tyhipko:

Yanukovych – 35.32%
Tymoshenko – 25.05%
Tyhipko – 13.06%
Yatseniuk – 6.96%
Yushchenko – 5.45%
Symonenko – 3.55%
Lytvyn – 2.35%

Former parliamentary speaker Arseniy Yatseniuk posted a disappointing fourth place with close to 7 percent of the vote. Yatseniuk has tried putting a brave face on matters, but considering that he received massive media support from one of Ukraine’s richest oligarchs, Dmytro Firtash, his political career has been dealt a serious blow. According to government sources, Yatseniuk’s other backers included the oligarchs Viktor Pinchuk and Ihor Kolomoisky. As has happened before in other contexts, Russian experts hired to handle his campaign strategy failed miserably by trying to depict Yatseniuk, a bespectacled young man at times called “Kinder-surprise” (referring to a toy surprise in a chocolate egg treat) as a determined, tough leader and chose military as the overriding theme of his campaign. Shades of Dukakis riding a tank…

The current parliamentary speaker, Wolodymyr Lytvyn, was even more disappointed, his supporters now calling for a recount. Having bought up votes in order to squeeze into parliament with his eponymous block in 2007, Lytvyn is now left high and dry because he did not pass the crucial 3 percent mark, which is the threshold for making it into parliament.

As for Viktor Yushchenko, placing fifth and getting under five and a half percentage points surprised no one and serves as a fitting end to his detached, desultory and do-nothing presidency. True to form, however, Yushchenko personally seems blissfully unaware of the consequences of these elections much less the reasons for his stupefying downfall. He is off to create a new political force, mustering a dozen tiny political organizations from the national-democratic camp.

Tyhipko’s surprise showing in the first round was the result of an intense media campaign depicting him as a strong leader, a professional. He correspondingly benefited from the protest vote, though by less than expected, according to his own admission, and given the widespread dissatisfaction with the constantly-recurring same cast of characters in Ukraine’s political show.

Tyhipko is now cast as the “king-maker” and both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko are feverishly courting his support for the second round, due to be held February 7.

In his career Tyhipko has served many roles, starting out as Kolomoisky’s business partner, serving as Vice Prime Minister and Chairman of the National Bank under President Leonid Kuchma, flirting with the national-democratic camp and serving as Yanukovych’s presidential campaign chairman in 2004.

Tymoshenko’s campaign was fully aware of Tyhipko’s importance in chipping away at Yanukovych’s support in Ukraine eastern regions. She told her closest supporters a month before elections that Tyhipko would come in third place. But it is no secret that she sees Tyhipko as “too ambitious,” which was borne out by his refusal this week to agree to a prime-ministership under President Tymoshenko.

ITEM B.: TOO CLOSE FOR COMFORT

All the expected post-voting rhetoric aside, Yanukovych did worse than expected and, more importantly, worse than he had to in order to assure him a win in the second round. At first glance, a ten percent lead looks commanding, but the weaknesses are apparent on closer inspection.

Yanukovych’s problem is that the votes he received in the first round are close to the limit of the votes he can count on in a second round. His supporters are steadfast, but he has very little reach outside their circle. Many Ukrainians are appalled at the possibility of Yanukovych’s assuming the presidency, thereby elevating the
Donetsk “clan,” with its violent and bloody history, to the highest offices in the land. The Orange Revolution took place in 2004 largely as a result of the “fear factor” aroused by the specter of Yanukovych, who served two prison terms, coming to power in Ukraine (See The Ukraine Insider, Vol. 9, No. 4 from November 17, 2009). This factor will now mobilize votes against Yanukovych and, correspondingly, for Tymoshenko.

Yanukovych has traditionally relied on significant voting falsifications, as was revealed during elections in 2004 by the investigative journalist Wolodymyr Ariyev (http://zakrytazona.tv/ua/programs/zakrita zona/teksti/service/vibori- perezavantazhennya/).

Most importantly, Tymoshenko has the “court” advantage, i.e. she controls the Supreme Court of Ukraine through its Chairman, Vasyl Onopenko. If it suits Tymoshenko, Onopenko will decide that white is black and vice-versa, akin to the habits of the infamous Kyvalov (Serhiy Kyvalov, Chairman of the Central Election Commission in 2004,
known as “Kydalov,” or “The Cheater”). The first court to review election complaints, the Higher Administrative Court, is engaged in a tug-of-war between two of its members for the seat of the court’s Chairman, which holds the key to control over this court. Thus Yanukovych has staked out tents in all the strategic locations around
Kyiv in preparation for popular demonstrations which will be needed to pressure the courts.

As for Tymoshenko, she may still stumble before February 7. Apparently at her instigation, President Mikhail Saakashvili responded to a call for support, which culminated in the bizarre picture of hundreds of “international observers” from Georgia pouring into Donetsk the day before voting.

Vol. 10, No. 1
January 22, 2010

Post-Mortem on Yushchenko’s Presidency

By Myron Spolsky

The following comments were in response to an exchange of opinions on Facebook. They have been edited slightly. DRM

1. We should avoid stereotyping Ukrainians by nationality. By quirk of history they are here, are citizens and define this country. Xenophobia is then the next step. Thankfully, Ukraine is reasonably free of racism and anti-semitism (notwithstanding the efforts of certain elements of the Jewish community to paint a different picture, but that is a separate issue. Yanukovych is indeed Belarusian (but mostly Soviet thug), Tymoshenko is a Heinz 57 of Jewish, Armenian, Ukrainian, Tihipko is Ukrainian-Moldovan, etc, etc. Ultimately, the purity of one’s blood does not determine the effectiveness of the leader.
2. In 2004, Ukraine had a clearcut choice between the continuation of the thuggery and what appeared to be a downtrodden and wronged opposition, who appeared to have a programme (although, in the background, we knew that there was no real programme – more on this latter).
3. In fact, as the CPU leader often said, Yushchenko was no more and no less than the leader of a competing oligarchical grouping, or grouping of oligarchs, each with different plans. He himself led a small interest group consisting of family members and close friends with interests in land, banking and some natural resources. But he appeared to be more honest than Yanukovych,
4. Yushchenko lacked a written ideological position, a written strategic plan to implement his ideology, and hoped to rely on the “people” to implement this nebulous ideology….
5. Any effort by people within the election team to formalize the ideological basis and write an implementation plan were met with derision; the reaction to an strategic implementation plan was even less welcoming.
6. Yushchenko felt that it was sufficient to throw out a few slogans about Europeanization and the Euro-Atlantic defense shield, plus justice, to make the system change.
7. To suggest that Yushchenko appeared more honest may be an effort to be kind to him as his presidency ends – recall the defense of a minister caught in the first month of the presidency in a conflct of interest over the re-export of natural gas and crude oil and over a non-existing degree, the situation with Yushchenko’s son – and Yushchenko’s sense of entitlement which allowed his son to bring an expensive car into the country without paying duties for it, etc., etc., and several instances where his son was involved in “misunderstandings” with others.
8. Failure to return the constitution to its pre-December 2004 edition.
9. Failure to reform bureaucratic requirements (starting with the laws governing notarial requirements, corporations acts, etc.)
10. Failure to reform the police and prosecutor’s office
11. Failure to reform the entire justice system
12. Failure to reform the budgetting system and appropriations
13. The appointment of one of the most corrupt medical officers as minister of health, replacing a professional who wanted to reform the medical system
14. Failure to re-appoint Hrytsenko Minister of Defense and the appointment of Yekhanurov to the ministry.

Let’s examine what he really did:

1. Media: the media has become more russified than before 2004. And certainly the quality of the music played and the TV shows shown are lesser than those 5 years ago.
2. Much noise was made about Holodomor, the Kozak era, Trypillia, but no effort was made to educate in the public media and in the school system about the issues. None, zero. Some decree was occasionally signed asking the media to inform about these issues, but nothing was ever enforced.
3. Baturyn and other reconstructions: money was spent (wasted) on major projects, while other projects, less flamboyant, but no less important, were ignored. In many cases, funds were stolen, stalling projects (the Trypillian dig at Talne, Cherkaska oblast; Poltavske Zemstvo building, Crimean digs, etc.)
4. Other than the work conducted by Ivan Vakarchuk, nothing has occurred to Ukrainianize the school system.

Corruption:

1. In the days following the Supreme Court decision on the elections, Yushchenko’s people were already staking out land within Kyiv on which to start construction of their projects. Immediately following the inauguration, Yushchenko’s people were busy starting their construction projects and dealing with the Party of the Regions people to find compromises on questionable land plots.
2. The natural gas deal with Russia, 2006. Who’s pocket book benefited?
3. Yushchenko’s gubernatorial appointments all too often laundered away budgeted funds (and election campaign funds) into their personal projects. Yushchenko’s party’s election campaigns were badly financed not because of the lack of funds, but because the funds were being siphoned off by his governors. Despite reports from campaign workers directly to the president, nothing was done to change the situation.
4. Appointments: his best and most active supporters were swept away. In their places, corrupt cronies were appointed, often those who had served under Kuchma and who had been fired by Kuchma for corruption – if you were fired by Kuchma it meant that you had really stolen a great deal, so much that even Kuchma was embarrassed.

Work ethic and reality: meetings with the president went on endlessly, with Yushchenko expounding on either kozatstvo or holodomor. Bureaucrats were summoned to meetings, only to sit in the chambers for the whole day without result. Some, who had more panache, would send underlings to sit in the chambers waiting for the meeting. Yushchenko’s love of his flowers, bees and kovbasa making (reportedly) apparently took up part of his working day. Lack of desire to read: he signed documents without reading them, hence some inane appointments and awards. Inabiility to resolve direct issues: Gongadze case and his own poisonning. Bad judgement of people – if he knew that Tymoshenko was a criminal (and he certainly had full access to that information when he was PM), then why did he appoint her (twice). Why the deal in September 2005 with Yanukovych – he knew that his former nemesis would signed anything just to become Prime Minister.

EU admonishes Ukraine for lack of reforms

David Marples

It was billed as a pivotal moment in Ukraine’s integration into Europe, a December 4 summit between the country and the European Union in Kyiv, ending with the long anticipated signing of an association agreement. It didn’t happen. Instead, the EU leaders criticized Ukraine for its lack of progress in reforms, withheld a substantial loan and postponed any free trade and accession agreements for the foreseeable future.

At the summit, President Viktor Yushchenko asked for “political understanding” from the EU, maintaining that the delay in signing the association agreement was a result of weariness over further expansion and the consequences of the world recession. He also stated that the Ukrainian government had failed to meet its obligations with “international financial institutions” and parliament had failed to pass various laws.

However, he added, if elected, the integration process would continue and he is the only candidate entering the January 17 presidential elections firmly committed to Ukraine’s eventual acceptance in the EU. All the problems, he assured his audience “are temporary.”

One senses the complete disillusionment of the European leaders with Ukraine, and particularly Yushchenko. European Commission President, Jose Manuel Barroso told the Ukrainian president that reforms were needed, and that bold words were not being followed up with appropriate actions. He urged Ukraine’s leaders to end their perpetual bickering and work together.

Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt, whose country is the current president of the European Union, expressed his desire for Ukraine’s president, government, and parliament to make a joint effort to reform the economy and the energy industry. At the heart of the EU’s concern is the secure supply of Russian gas, in transit through Ukraine.

Yushchenko’s self-appraisal seems misguided. More than any other figure, he has not only failed to address current problems, but also undermined the efforts of his Prime Minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, to introduce reforms.

Tymoshenko not only averted another gas crisis as a result of a meeting with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, but also removed the corrupt intermediary RosUkraineEnergo (Russian-Ukrainian Energy) from the equation. However, the president cannot work with her and has frequently preferred to collaborate with his former rival, Regions Party leader Viktor Yanukovych, against his Prime Minister.

Ukraine’s economic standing today has fallen to an all-time low. Fitch Investors’ Service, for example, has reduced its ranking to B-, six levels below the investment grade. According to Bloomberg.com, Ukraine is the world’s second-least credit worthy country. The currency is in a tailspin, and both the IMF and EU have suspended credit tranches that are badly needed to offset the effects of the recession.

The vast majority of Ukrainian residents put the blame on Yushchenko for current problems. Society is polarized between ostentatiously rich entrepreneurs and a majority that is barely subsisting. Virtually all the oligarchs of 2004 are still present. For example, Viktor Pinchuk, the son-in-law of former president Leonid Kuchma—whose corrupt and secretive leadership was partly responsible for the Orange Revolution—recently consolidated six Ukrainian television companies into a single holding.

Yushchenko is reported to earn about US$5,000 per month. But a year after his election his son Andrey, aged 19, was driving a BMW valued at almost US$200,000, the only such car in Kyiv according to the newspaper Ukrains’ka Pravda. Such stories suggest that the president was not sincere about ending corruption in Ukraine.

Earlier this year, however, Yushchenko presented a list of his accomplishments as president: the creation of a democratic state with a free media, and serious pretensions to join the EU and NATO. In reality, as the electorate perceives, these achievements are undermined by negative acts and extraordinary pettiness toward those considered his rivals.

One should add that Yushchenko’s enemies, chief among which are the leaders of Russia, have deliberately tarnished his image. But the Russians did not need to invent much.

Ironically, the Europeans prefer to deal with Belarus’s authoritarian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka, once the pariah of the continent who ruled what one US strategist called “an outpost of tyranny.” Belarus is less corrupt and politically more stable than Ukraine, partly because the country lacks an effective opposition. But it does not flatter to deceive.

Where does this leave Ukraine?

First, no agreements with the Europeans will be ratified until after the presidential elections. The EU will then take stock with the new president—likely either Tymoshenko or Yanukovych. Like Russia, they are waiting for Yushchenko to leave office.

Second, Ukraine’s political elite seems as firmly entrenched as the Communist Party once was. That fact is hardly surprising given that it took advantage of the collapse of the USSR to take over Ukraine’s economic assets, especially steel. Only a united leadership can end this hegemony, and the realistic solution would be to nationalize the major industrial companies.

Third, it seems self-evident that Ukraine has to determine its own economic and political path, one that is not dictated by the IMF, Russia, or the European Union. Its leaders might heed the advice of the Swedish Prime Minister and focus on cooperation rather than squabbling. The impasse of the past five years cannot be repeated.

(First published in the Edmonton Journal, (December 2009)

Shades of Grey Shroud Orange Anniversary

David Marples

Saturday, November 21, marked five years since the start of the Orange Revolution that saw protesters mass in the streets of Kyiv to protest a flawed vote in the second round of the presidential elections that favored incumbent Prime Minister, Viktor Yanukovych. After a series of events and the intrusion of the Constitutional Court, that round was re-run and challenger Viktor Yushchenko was elected president of Ukraine. He formed a coalition of Orange forces that included his Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and Speaker of Parliament, Oleksandr Moroz.

Five years on and into another election campaign, the Orange camp is in a sorry mess. Moroz has left. Although Tymoshenko is in her second term as Prime Minister, she faces a large opposition in parliament and feuds constantly with the president. She is running against Yushchenko for the presidency in January 2010. Yanukovych, leader of the Regions Party, is back once again, intent on sabotaging the Tymoshenko campaign as well as opposing fiscal measures to deal with the recession.

Very little makes sense in Ukrainian politics, which are so intricate, corrupt, and mutable that few can unravel events to make a pertinent analysis.

Recently, for example, the International Monetary Fund, which last year provided a loan of $16.4 billion to help Ukraine, withheld a tranche of $3.8 billion. The reason was that the president and the parliamentary opposition (Yanukovych) backed a rise in minimum wages of 20% next year, thus contravening IMF conditions for continuing the loans. Perhaps they acted from humanitarian motives, but more likely they simply wished to undermine the position of the Prime Minister.

The president has also vetoed a law that would have provided about $125 million to combat H1N1 in Ukraine, which recently reached epidemic proportions with 189 deaths. There is little logic to him agreeing to wage increases but ignoring the flu virus.

One of the ironies of the president’s approval of the pay rises is that Yushchenko is known as a fiscal conservative, who lambasted Tymoshenko’s 2009 budget for its free-spending profligacy. Rumors in Kyiv now suggest that the president’s office would like to secure the release of former Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko, currently under arrest in the United States for money laundering. The reason is that his return to Ukraine would undermine the position of his former Deputy PM, Tymoshenko, then known as the ‘gas princess’ in an era of runaway corruption.

Tymoshenko for her part has campaigned hard to improve her position. Without doubt she has spent the most money—according to Yushchenko she has exploited the office of Prime Minister to finance her campaign. This week she met with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in Yalta and secured an agreement on gas prices in 2010, which would mean that Ukraine would not be penalized for purchasing less gas than agreed. This was a major coup given the interruptions to gas supplies to Europe last year as a result of a Russian-Ukrainian impasse. It also signals to voters that under a Tymoshenko presidency, relations with Russia would improve dramatically.

At the same time, Yushchenko hosted Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili in Kyiv. According to the Ukrainian media, Tymoshenko and Putin enjoyed a few jokes at the expense of the two chief leaders of the color revolutions of the early 21st century. Russia has accused Ukraine’s president of supporting the Georgians in the August 2008 conflict.

Polls suggest that Tymoshenko is catching up with Yanukovych as the election’s frontrunner. A poll conducted by Ukrainian Project System on November 12, indicated that Yanukovych has the backing of 21.4% of voters to her 18.1%. Arseny Yatseniuk, in third place, has only 8% and is no longer a serious contender.

The most recent poll of the Razumkov Centre on a potential runoff between Tymoshenko and Yanukovych suggests that it would be a very close call. Tymoshenko would win easily in Western Ukraine, by a lesser margin in the Centre, and Yanukovych is well ahead in the south and east.

The choice for voters seems rather stark. Yanukovych is still the arch apparatchik, fumbling and inarticulate, and bankrolled by Ukraine’s main oligarch Rinat Akhmetov. The Western media describe him as pro-Russian, but he is essentially a tool of eastern oligarchs, people who wish to maintain their influence and power over resources and industry. There is no question that Prime Minister poses a threat to such forces.

Tymoshenko, on the other hand, is a ruthless politician with few clearly delineated principles other than her own advancement and power. In her first period as Prime Minister in 2005—it lasted only 9 months—she alienated most of her Cabinet. In the second, she has struggled to deal with the economic crisis. IMF funds have cushioned the blow, but the Ukrainian economy shrank by almost 16% in the third quarter of 2009. The steel industry will take years to recover from a dramatic drop in trade abroad.

The next president will not only need to introduce radical economic measures, he/she will need to work with Parliament. To date, the failure to form a workable coalition in the legislature, added to unseemly squabbles between the main leaders, has resulted in deadlock. In 2004, Yushchenko was the outsider, a potential candidate to end the rampant corruption in Ukraine and make a new beginning. In 2010 voters face a bleaker choice and the alternatives seems less clear-cut.

(Edmonton Journal, 23 November 2009)

Yanukovych Grabs Early Lead in Ukraine’s Presidential Campaign

David R. Marples

Two recent opinion polls monitoring Ukraine’s presidential election campaign in the lead-up to the January 2010 vote indicate that Regions Party leader Viktor Yanukovych is well ahead.

The Kyiv Research and Branding group, which canvassed respondents between August 4 and 14, has Yanukovych with 26%, followed by Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko at 16.5%, and Arseny Yatsenyuk 12.6%. Angus Reid reported on August 12 that Yanukovych has the support of 29.9%, with Tymoshenko at 15%, and Yatsenyuk with 12.8%.

The latter poll is the first to suggest that Yanukovych could poll more than the combined votes of his main challengers.

Although Ukrainians have often mocked the self-styled “Proffesor” (as the word was misspelled in his campaign literature in 2004) who in 2006 managed to expunge from the record his incarceration for manslaughter during his youth, and while electors seem weary of the familiar faces in political life, the 59-year old lawyer and engineer still looks the likely winner in January.

It is only five years since Yanukovych ran for president against current incumbent Viktor Yushchenko. In that campaign, not only did he have implicit backing from Vladimir Putin, but also Russia (partly through Gazprom) helped to fund his campaign. In Moscow his campaign posters were everywhere, and 560,000 Ukrainians resident in Russia signed his support list for presidential candidacy. At a Congress of the Ukrainian Diaspora in Moscow, city mayor Yuri Luzhkov and then First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev endorsed him as the next president of Ukraine.

During the 2004 campaign Yanukovych reportedly used funds designated for the Prime Minister’s office for his campaign, promised to make Russian the second state language of Ukraine, and offered dual citizenship to ethnic Russians. During the protests in Kyiv that followed the rigged vote of the run-off, Yanukovych supporters said that a referendum on the autonomy of Donetsk and Luhansk regions would be held if Yushchenko became president.

Many observers considered that Yanukovych’s political career was over when Yushchenko won the rerun second round of the election in December 2004 and became Ukraine’s third president.

However, in the 2006 parliamentary elections, Yanukovych staged a comeback and once again became Prime Minister. His Regions party won more than 45% of the vote in 9 districts of Ukraine, all in the east and south of the country.

How did he achieve such a revival of fortunes?

First, his party had financial support from several businessmen, including Ukraine’s richest tycoon, born and raised in Donetsk, Rinat Akhmetov. Second, his party’s organization was centralized and even autocratic, prohibiting any factionalism. Third, the Orange coalition had split and its leaders were fighting each other. Lastly, he promised that his party would focus on economic issues and rectify problems promptly. He had little chance to do so because another parliamentary election followed in 2007 and a new Orange coalition was formed.

Yanukovych has always had solid backing. As the former governor of Donetsk province, he is assured of overwhelming support from Ukraine’s eastern industrial regions. His backers control the country’s leading banks, machine-building and metallurgical factories, steelworks, and coal mines.

Western Ukrainians and Ukrainians in the Diaspora hold Yanukovych in low esteem. His sycophantic responses to Russia’s various attacks on the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko suggest he will quickly move Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence. Nation building will end and the pro-European direction will be halted. Yanukovych has promised a referendum on Ukraine’s membership of NATO, and although he favors trade with the EU, he does not endorse full membership.

However, no Ukrainian president can change course so abruptly. In 1994, Leonid Kuchma became president on a platform of moving Ukraine closer to Russia, but once in office he maintained a firm distance. Belarus’ president, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, sought a union with Russia in 1997, but today promotes independence and distance from Moscow. In the current climate, friendship with Moscow means being a client state.

Conversely, Ukraine’s path to the EU is closed as long as Germany and France persist in blocking it. Germany’s close economic ties to Russia preclude any short-term change of direction. The Eastern Partnership notwithstanding, Brussels has been a big disappointment from Ukraine’s perspective; its major players have made a mockery of Yushchenko’s goals of joining European structures.

The economic and political climate today does not allow for a radical change of direction. The current path to reduce dependency on gas supplies from the Russians will likely be maintained. Most voters are concerned primarily about jobs, wages, and pensions.

Ukrainians have reservations about NATO but they have no wish to become a pawn of Russia. A solution must also be found to the constant wrangling over power between president and parliament, likely through amendments to the Constitution.

As Ukraine celebrates 18 years of independence on Tuesday, it is at a difficult stage both economically and in its political evolution. To Western observers it seems unthinkable that voters would choose Yanukovych as the next president. The lack of suitable alternatives suggests nonetheless that it could happen.

UKRAINIANS PREFER STRONG LEADERS

David Marples

Two recent opinion polls by the Research and Branding Institute in Kyiv provide some startling revelations about political opinions in Ukraine, just as Parliament has approved new presidential elections on January 17.

A June 2009 poll with over 2,000 respondents from all regions of Ukraine is declared to have a margin of error of 2.2%. It provides a plethora of data about the leading candidates for president. Former Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, who lost in the 2004 elections to current president Viktor Yushchenko, leads with the support of 26.8% of respondents, followed by Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko at 15.8%, and former Foreign Minister and chairman of parliament Arsenii Yatsenyuk, 12.3%. President Yushchenko is backed by a meager 2.1%.

If the election, as seems likely, requires a second round, then Yanukovych would triumph over either of his main challengers: against Tymoshenko by 38.8 to 28.8%; and against Yatsenyuk by 36.7 to 30.8%. If the second round were between Yatsenyuk and Tymoshenko, the former would eke out a narrow victory.

The emergence of Yatsenyuk as a serious contender is a recent phenomenon. A former protégé of President Yushchenko, he reportedly has financial backing from two controversial figures: Dmitrii Firtash, a leading stockholder in the RosUkrEnergo company that mediated in the dispute over the price for the sale of Russian gas to Ukraine; and Viktor Pinchuk, the son-in-law of former President Leonid Kuchma, who owns four Ukrainian TV channels. A native of Chernivtsi, Yatsenyuk is of Jewish origin and turned 35 on May 22, the minimum age at which one can run for the post of president.

At present, 51.2% of those polled will definitely participate in the elections, while 24% may exercise their right to vote. As there is speculation that parliamentary elections may take place simultaneously, the standing of the major political parties is also of relevance: the Regions Party leads among respondents with 29.3%, followed by the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc with 15.5%, and the Yatsenyuk Bloc with 10.6%.

Recently, a move to form a coalition between the two largest blocs (Regions and Tymoshenko) failed after Yanukovych ultimately rejected the idea. At one point the Regions leader had suggested changing the minimum age to run for president to 50, which would have removed Tymoshenko and Yatsenyuk from the contest.

A poll conduced by the same organization in May focused on attitudes of residents of Ukraine to other countries and blocs. These results are perhaps even more enlightening, given the general synopsis in Western media that Ukraine is Western leaning or pro-Europe.

Over 35% of those polled would prefer to see Ukraine join a Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; 20% would like Ukraine to join a United Europe (European Union); and 23% want the country to remain independent without joining any such formation. Incidentally, support for joining the EU is much higher in Belarus than in Ukraine.

In terms of attitudes to leaders of former Soviet republics, 58% hold a positive attitude toward Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, 56% feel the same way about hard-line Belarusian president Alyaksandr Lukashenka, and 55% have a favorable attitude toward Russian president Dmitry Medvedev. By contrast only 11% feel positive about Georgian president Mikeil Saakashvili.

Western leaders are considerably less popular. The highest rated is US President Barack Obama (31%), followed by Angela Merkel of Germany (29%), and Frances’ Nicolas Sarkozy and Poland’s Lech Kaczynski (tied at 22%). Notably, however, both Obama and Merkel received higher totals than Ukraine’s leading candidate Yanukovych.

Lastly, looking at attitudes toward other countries, the results were as follows: 57% of respondents feel positively toward Russia, 45% toward Belarus, and 20% toward Germany. Only 3% feel positively about Georgia, which was supported firmly by President Yushchenko during its August 2008 war with Russia.

Some deductions can be made from these results, which are consistent with findings of Western researchers such as Stephen White at the University of Glasgow.

First, the economic downturn has not affected significantly the political attitudes of Ukrainian residents. Ukrainian citizens appear to favor strong leaders over weak, albeit more democratic–leaning statespersons. They are generally pro-Russian and skeptical toward both the United States and the EU.

Second, the chances of success of Prime Minister Tymoshenko in the January 2010 elections are slim. Her popularity has fallen in recent months after the seemingly endless squabbles with the president and what is perceived as her single-minded pursuit of the highest office. At one point she clearly intended to push through a constitutional change to elect the next president through the parliament, but such a maneuver today would only work in favor of Yanukovych.

Third, regionally there is a marked contrast between attitudes in western regions and the rest of Ukraine. Western Ukraine is more pro-Europe and anti-Russian, with political support divided between Tymoshenko (23.4%) and Yatsenyuk (23.2%). However, Western Ukrainians make up only one-fifth of Ukraine’s population.

Fourth, Ukrainians are deeply unhappy with the current president, an increasingly isolated figure who seems incapable of communicating in any meaningful way with his electorate. A realist might opt not to run and campaign for newcomer Yatsenyuk, notwithstanding the credibility of some of his financial backers. But Yushchenko seems intent on running again, even though every indicator suggests that he is unelectable.

This article appeared originally in the EDMONTON JOURNAL on 27 June 2009.