Shades of Grey Shroud Orange Anniversary

David Marples

Saturday, November 21, marked five years since the start of the Orange Revolution that saw protesters mass in the streets of Kyiv to protest a flawed vote in the second round of the presidential elections that favored incumbent Prime Minister, Viktor Yanukovych. After a series of events and the intrusion of the Constitutional Court, that round was re-run and challenger Viktor Yushchenko was elected president of Ukraine. He formed a coalition of Orange forces that included his Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and Speaker of Parliament, Oleksandr Moroz.

Five years on and into another election campaign, the Orange camp is in a sorry mess. Moroz has left. Although Tymoshenko is in her second term as Prime Minister, she faces a large opposition in parliament and feuds constantly with the president. She is running against Yushchenko for the presidency in January 2010. Yanukovych, leader of the Regions Party, is back once again, intent on sabotaging the Tymoshenko campaign as well as opposing fiscal measures to deal with the recession.

Very little makes sense in Ukrainian politics, which are so intricate, corrupt, and mutable that few can unravel events to make a pertinent analysis.

Recently, for example, the International Monetary Fund, which last year provided a loan of $16.4 billion to help Ukraine, withheld a tranche of $3.8 billion. The reason was that the president and the parliamentary opposition (Yanukovych) backed a rise in minimum wages of 20% next year, thus contravening IMF conditions for continuing the loans. Perhaps they acted from humanitarian motives, but more likely they simply wished to undermine the position of the Prime Minister.

The president has also vetoed a law that would have provided about $125 million to combat H1N1 in Ukraine, which recently reached epidemic proportions with 189 deaths. There is little logic to him agreeing to wage increases but ignoring the flu virus.

One of the ironies of the president’s approval of the pay rises is that Yushchenko is known as a fiscal conservative, who lambasted Tymoshenko’s 2009 budget for its free-spending profligacy. Rumors in Kyiv now suggest that the president’s office would like to secure the release of former Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko, currently under arrest in the United States for money laundering. The reason is that his return to Ukraine would undermine the position of his former Deputy PM, Tymoshenko, then known as the ‘gas princess’ in an era of runaway corruption.

Tymoshenko for her part has campaigned hard to improve her position. Without doubt she has spent the most money—according to Yushchenko she has exploited the office of Prime Minister to finance her campaign. This week she met with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in Yalta and secured an agreement on gas prices in 2010, which would mean that Ukraine would not be penalized for purchasing less gas than agreed. This was a major coup given the interruptions to gas supplies to Europe last year as a result of a Russian-Ukrainian impasse. It also signals to voters that under a Tymoshenko presidency, relations with Russia would improve dramatically.

At the same time, Yushchenko hosted Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili in Kyiv. According to the Ukrainian media, Tymoshenko and Putin enjoyed a few jokes at the expense of the two chief leaders of the color revolutions of the early 21st century. Russia has accused Ukraine’s president of supporting the Georgians in the August 2008 conflict.

Polls suggest that Tymoshenko is catching up with Yanukovych as the election’s frontrunner. A poll conducted by Ukrainian Project System on November 12, indicated that Yanukovych has the backing of 21.4% of voters to her 18.1%. Arseny Yatseniuk, in third place, has only 8% and is no longer a serious contender.

The most recent poll of the Razumkov Centre on a potential runoff between Tymoshenko and Yanukovych suggests that it would be a very close call. Tymoshenko would win easily in Western Ukraine, by a lesser margin in the Centre, and Yanukovych is well ahead in the south and east.

The choice for voters seems rather stark. Yanukovych is still the arch apparatchik, fumbling and inarticulate, and bankrolled by Ukraine’s main oligarch Rinat Akhmetov. The Western media describe him as pro-Russian, but he is essentially a tool of eastern oligarchs, people who wish to maintain their influence and power over resources and industry. There is no question that Prime Minister poses a threat to such forces.

Tymoshenko, on the other hand, is a ruthless politician with few clearly delineated principles other than her own advancement and power. In her first period as Prime Minister in 2005—it lasted only 9 months—she alienated most of her Cabinet. In the second, she has struggled to deal with the economic crisis. IMF funds have cushioned the blow, but the Ukrainian economy shrank by almost 16% in the third quarter of 2009. The steel industry will take years to recover from a dramatic drop in trade abroad.

The next president will not only need to introduce radical economic measures, he/she will need to work with Parliament. To date, the failure to form a workable coalition in the legislature, added to unseemly squabbles between the main leaders, has resulted in deadlock. In 2004, Yushchenko was the outsider, a potential candidate to end the rampant corruption in Ukraine and make a new beginning. In 2010 voters face a bleaker choice and the alternatives seems less clear-cut.

(Edmonton Journal, 23 November 2009)

Yanukovych Grabs Early Lead in Ukraine’s Presidential Campaign

David R. Marples

Two recent opinion polls monitoring Ukraine’s presidential election campaign in the lead-up to the January 2010 vote indicate that Regions Party leader Viktor Yanukovych is well ahead.

The Kyiv Research and Branding group, which canvassed respondents between August 4 and 14, has Yanukovych with 26%, followed by Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko at 16.5%, and Arseny Yatsenyuk 12.6%. Angus Reid reported on August 12 that Yanukovych has the support of 29.9%, with Tymoshenko at 15%, and Yatsenyuk with 12.8%.

The latter poll is the first to suggest that Yanukovych could poll more than the combined votes of his main challengers.

Although Ukrainians have often mocked the self-styled “Proffesor” (as the word was misspelled in his campaign literature in 2004) who in 2006 managed to expunge from the record his incarceration for manslaughter during his youth, and while electors seem weary of the familiar faces in political life, the 59-year old lawyer and engineer still looks the likely winner in January.

It is only five years since Yanukovych ran for president against current incumbent Viktor Yushchenko. In that campaign, not only did he have implicit backing from Vladimir Putin, but also Russia (partly through Gazprom) helped to fund his campaign. In Moscow his campaign posters were everywhere, and 560,000 Ukrainians resident in Russia signed his support list for presidential candidacy. At a Congress of the Ukrainian Diaspora in Moscow, city mayor Yuri Luzhkov and then First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev endorsed him as the next president of Ukraine.

During the 2004 campaign Yanukovych reportedly used funds designated for the Prime Minister’s office for his campaign, promised to make Russian the second state language of Ukraine, and offered dual citizenship to ethnic Russians. During the protests in Kyiv that followed the rigged vote of the run-off, Yanukovych supporters said that a referendum on the autonomy of Donetsk and Luhansk regions would be held if Yushchenko became president.

Many observers considered that Yanukovych’s political career was over when Yushchenko won the rerun second round of the election in December 2004 and became Ukraine’s third president.

However, in the 2006 parliamentary elections, Yanukovych staged a comeback and once again became Prime Minister. His Regions party won more than 45% of the vote in 9 districts of Ukraine, all in the east and south of the country.

How did he achieve such a revival of fortunes?

First, his party had financial support from several businessmen, including Ukraine’s richest tycoon, born and raised in Donetsk, Rinat Akhmetov. Second, his party’s organization was centralized and even autocratic, prohibiting any factionalism. Third, the Orange coalition had split and its leaders were fighting each other. Lastly, he promised that his party would focus on economic issues and rectify problems promptly. He had little chance to do so because another parliamentary election followed in 2007 and a new Orange coalition was formed.

Yanukovych has always had solid backing. As the former governor of Donetsk province, he is assured of overwhelming support from Ukraine’s eastern industrial regions. His backers control the country’s leading banks, machine-building and metallurgical factories, steelworks, and coal mines.

Western Ukrainians and Ukrainians in the Diaspora hold Yanukovych in low esteem. His sycophantic responses to Russia’s various attacks on the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko suggest he will quickly move Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence. Nation building will end and the pro-European direction will be halted. Yanukovych has promised a referendum on Ukraine’s membership of NATO, and although he favors trade with the EU, he does not endorse full membership.

However, no Ukrainian president can change course so abruptly. In 1994, Leonid Kuchma became president on a platform of moving Ukraine closer to Russia, but once in office he maintained a firm distance. Belarus’ president, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, sought a union with Russia in 1997, but today promotes independence and distance from Moscow. In the current climate, friendship with Moscow means being a client state.

Conversely, Ukraine’s path to the EU is closed as long as Germany and France persist in blocking it. Germany’s close economic ties to Russia preclude any short-term change of direction. The Eastern Partnership notwithstanding, Brussels has been a big disappointment from Ukraine’s perspective; its major players have made a mockery of Yushchenko’s goals of joining European structures.

The economic and political climate today does not allow for a radical change of direction. The current path to reduce dependency on gas supplies from the Russians will likely be maintained. Most voters are concerned primarily about jobs, wages, and pensions.

Ukrainians have reservations about NATO but they have no wish to become a pawn of Russia. A solution must also be found to the constant wrangling over power between president and parliament, likely through amendments to the Constitution.

As Ukraine celebrates 18 years of independence on Tuesday, it is at a difficult stage both economically and in its political evolution. To Western observers it seems unthinkable that voters would choose Yanukovych as the next president. The lack of suitable alternatives suggests nonetheless that it could happen.

UKRAINIANS PREFER STRONG LEADERS

David Marples

Two recent opinion polls by the Research and Branding Institute in Kyiv provide some startling revelations about political opinions in Ukraine, just as Parliament has approved new presidential elections on January 17.

A June 2009 poll with over 2,000 respondents from all regions of Ukraine is declared to have a margin of error of 2.2%. It provides a plethora of data about the leading candidates for president. Former Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, who lost in the 2004 elections to current president Viktor Yushchenko, leads with the support of 26.8% of respondents, followed by Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko at 15.8%, and former Foreign Minister and chairman of parliament Arsenii Yatsenyuk, 12.3%. President Yushchenko is backed by a meager 2.1%.

If the election, as seems likely, requires a second round, then Yanukovych would triumph over either of his main challengers: against Tymoshenko by 38.8 to 28.8%; and against Yatsenyuk by 36.7 to 30.8%. If the second round were between Yatsenyuk and Tymoshenko, the former would eke out a narrow victory.

The emergence of Yatsenyuk as a serious contender is a recent phenomenon. A former protégé of President Yushchenko, he reportedly has financial backing from two controversial figures: Dmitrii Firtash, a leading stockholder in the RosUkrEnergo company that mediated in the dispute over the price for the sale of Russian gas to Ukraine; and Viktor Pinchuk, the son-in-law of former President Leonid Kuchma, who owns four Ukrainian TV channels. A native of Chernivtsi, Yatsenyuk is of Jewish origin and turned 35 on May 22, the minimum age at which one can run for the post of president.

At present, 51.2% of those polled will definitely participate in the elections, while 24% may exercise their right to vote. As there is speculation that parliamentary elections may take place simultaneously, the standing of the major political parties is also of relevance: the Regions Party leads among respondents with 29.3%, followed by the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc with 15.5%, and the Yatsenyuk Bloc with 10.6%.

Recently, a move to form a coalition between the two largest blocs (Regions and Tymoshenko) failed after Yanukovych ultimately rejected the idea. At one point the Regions leader had suggested changing the minimum age to run for president to 50, which would have removed Tymoshenko and Yatsenyuk from the contest.

A poll conduced by the same organization in May focused on attitudes of residents of Ukraine to other countries and blocs. These results are perhaps even more enlightening, given the general synopsis in Western media that Ukraine is Western leaning or pro-Europe.

Over 35% of those polled would prefer to see Ukraine join a Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; 20% would like Ukraine to join a United Europe (European Union); and 23% want the country to remain independent without joining any such formation. Incidentally, support for joining the EU is much higher in Belarus than in Ukraine.

In terms of attitudes to leaders of former Soviet republics, 58% hold a positive attitude toward Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, 56% feel the same way about hard-line Belarusian president Alyaksandr Lukashenka, and 55% have a favorable attitude toward Russian president Dmitry Medvedev. By contrast only 11% feel positive about Georgian president Mikeil Saakashvili.

Western leaders are considerably less popular. The highest rated is US President Barack Obama (31%), followed by Angela Merkel of Germany (29%), and Frances’ Nicolas Sarkozy and Poland’s Lech Kaczynski (tied at 22%). Notably, however, both Obama and Merkel received higher totals than Ukraine’s leading candidate Yanukovych.

Lastly, looking at attitudes toward other countries, the results were as follows: 57% of respondents feel positively toward Russia, 45% toward Belarus, and 20% toward Germany. Only 3% feel positively about Georgia, which was supported firmly by President Yushchenko during its August 2008 war with Russia.

Some deductions can be made from these results, which are consistent with findings of Western researchers such as Stephen White at the University of Glasgow.

First, the economic downturn has not affected significantly the political attitudes of Ukrainian residents. Ukrainian citizens appear to favor strong leaders over weak, albeit more democratic–leaning statespersons. They are generally pro-Russian and skeptical toward both the United States and the EU.

Second, the chances of success of Prime Minister Tymoshenko in the January 2010 elections are slim. Her popularity has fallen in recent months after the seemingly endless squabbles with the president and what is perceived as her single-minded pursuit of the highest office. At one point she clearly intended to push through a constitutional change to elect the next president through the parliament, but such a maneuver today would only work in favor of Yanukovych.

Third, regionally there is a marked contrast between attitudes in western regions and the rest of Ukraine. Western Ukraine is more pro-Europe and anti-Russian, with political support divided between Tymoshenko (23.4%) and Yatsenyuk (23.2%). However, Western Ukrainians make up only one-fifth of Ukraine’s population.

Fourth, Ukrainians are deeply unhappy with the current president, an increasingly isolated figure who seems incapable of communicating in any meaningful way with his electorate. A realist might opt not to run and campaign for newcomer Yatsenyuk, notwithstanding the credibility of some of his financial backers. But Yushchenko seems intent on running again, even though every indicator suggests that he is unelectable.

This article appeared originally in the EDMONTON JOURNAL on 27 June 2009.

Blockading the Verkhovna Rada

Kateryna Malyhina

For nearly a month Ukraine’s legislature has been paralyzed. The Party of Regions (PR) is blocking the work of the Parliament. The cause is the secret letter to NATO about Ukraine’s accession to the Membership Action Plan that was signed by the Head of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine A. Yatsenyuk. The PR claims that such an action was not sanctioned by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and therefore lacks the approval of the Ukrainian people. As a result Yatsenyuk had no right to put his signature to such an important document. Both de facto and de jure, they are right. But what in reality stands behind such an action?

At a first glance, the Party of Regions has dual benefits. On the one hand, it has raised its credibility in the eyes of people, showing that it acts as a true opposition, which seeks to ensure that those who are in power do not violate laws. On the other hand, referring to the “desire of the Ukrainian nation” and demanding a referendum on Ukraine’s accession to NATO, the PR does not explicitly oppose NATO, but at the same time strengthens the position among its traditional voters, who had already begun to doubt the ability of the PR, to defend their interests.

However, the list of the benefits for the PR in this situation does not end here. Having failed to gain power, the PR needs to fulfill its most important current task: that is, to prevent the normal functioning of Tymoshenko’s government, but not to advocate expressly for her resignation. There are two reasons why the PR will not take this latter step. First, by distributing social benefits, she is at the peak of popularity now and direct actions will only enhance her popularity. Second, it will benefit Yanukovych to let Tymoshenko “work” now, make mistakes, and thus show that her government is unable to lead Ukraine into a “bright future.”

By blocking parliament, the PR seized the opportunity to impede Tymoshenko’s plans, while acting within the law. Tymoshenko’s government urgently needs money in order to continue its mega-project named “compensation of lost deposits in the USSR Savings Bank.” The quickest and easiest way to obtain money is through re-privatization of companies, which has already been proven to work. Why put all one’s efforts in developing the economy, when one can quickly “redistribute” everything, referring to the unfair privatization in the 90s. That is why the Prime Minister has already made attempts to dismiss the Head of the State Property Fund Valentyna Semenyuk. Tymoshenko needs her own man for such a responsible position (incidentally, Andrei Portnov from BYUT was thought to be the replacement for Semenyuk). But this turned out to be far from easy. According to Article 85 §12 of the amended Constitution, the right to appoint and dismiss the Head of the State Property Fund has been allocated to the Verkhovna Rada. And the legislature is not functioning at this time.

But as the Ukrainian saying goes, “too much of something can be harmful.” The PR cannot block the parliament indefinitely. It is also highly unlikely that the PR will succeed in forcing through its own terms–to vote on the commencement to the Membership Action Plan only after a referendum–because it cannot at present gain a majority in parliament. To further block the work of the Verkhovna Rada will soon no longer be profitable. First, while the “30 days” before the President has the duty to dissolve the parliament (according to the Art. 90 §3 of Ukraine’s Constitution) are already counting down, Yatsenyuk has already stated that he will not let the Verkhovna Rada work for half a day and be blocked again afterwards. Therefore the only possibility to start the countdown from day one is when the parliament will be fully “unblocked.” Second, if the PR continues blocking the parliament, time will start to work against it in a while. The PR will be blamed for a new political crisis. Moreover, Tymoshenko will declare once again that she has been prevented from working, which will only improve her image.

There is one more risk when prolonging the conflict. The President may start exercising legislative functions directly from his office. Indeed, Article 93 of the Constitution states that the President of Ukraine has the right of legislative initiative; and according to Article 106 the president then issues decrees and orders, which are mandatory for execution, and Article 113 indicates that the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is still accountable to the President of Ukraine. Thus, there is a risk of introducing the “direct” presidential rule: Yushchenko would issue the decrees that Tymoshenko’s government need, bypassing the parliament. There is no question that the Party of Regions recognizes this possibility.

Therefore, it is likely that conflict will be soon resolved and the Verkhovna Rada must resume its work in the nearest future. By permitting this to happen and despite the technical defeat, the Party of Regions will still remain the winner. After all, the problem is not NATO.

First published at ХайВей// HighWay on February 19, 2008

http://h.ua/story/84206/

The 2007 Parliamentary Elections: Winners, Losers, and Coalition Prospects

By Ilya Khineyko

On 30 September, for the second time in two years, Ukraine held parliamentary elections, which were recognized as free and fair by international observers from the West and Russia. Five blocs and parties: the Our Ukraine – People’s Self-Defense (OU-PSD, NUNS in the Ukrainian acronym), the Tymoshenko bloc, the Party of Regions (PofR), the Communist Party, and the Lytvyn bloc garnered more than the 3% required to get into the new parliament. It is, however, far from certain when the political forces represented in the new Rada will be able to form a parliamentary majority and appoint a new government. As it stands, the political crisis that has permeated the Ukrainian political scene since last spring is far from over. Some unexpected political alliances might emerge from the protracted political discussions that are likely to follow the announcement of the final results on 15 October. The Party of Regions has the largest percentage and highest number of seats, followed closely by the Tymoshenko Bloc, while the pro-presidential OU-PSD is a distant third. The two other factions in the new parliament have less than fifty seats combined, but it is widely expected that the smallest faction, the Lytvyn Bloc, could play the role of a kingmaker in the new parliament.

Results of 2006 Parliamentary Elections

Party Seats Percentage

Party of Regions 175 34.37
Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko 156 30.71
NUNS 72 14.5
Communist Party 27 5.39
Bloc Volodymyr Lytvyn 20 3.96

In assessing these results, a background of the events leading up to this election is useful. The election season in Ukraine began on 2 April when President Yushchenko issued a decree dissolving the previous convocation of the Verkhovna Rada. What seemed a last resort on the part of the President came after the ruling coalition of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych and Speaker Oleksandr Moroz had successfully wooed a handful of opposition deputies to switch sides, leading to talks on forming a constitutional majority, a move that would have rendered the president a purely ceremonial figure. Opinion polls indicated that the early elections would not change the status quo as the Party of Regions was expected to retain its high standings, while the fortunes of Our Ukraine seemed bleak. Indeed, the Party of Regions managed to increase slightly its percentage of the vote as did the OU-PSD bloc. However, both parties stand to lose a handful of seats each in the new parliament, due to the dramatic surge of the Tymoshenko bloc, the biggest winner in the elections. Tymoshenko’s parliamentary faction will expand from 129 to 156 deputies as a result of gaining 8% more votes than it received compared to the 2006 results. The combined tally of the OU-PSD and the Tymoshenko Bloc (228 seats) is enough to form a parliamentary majority and establish a new ‘Orange’ government. The events seemed to be following this course on election night when a jubilant Yulia Tymoshenko was greeted by leader of PSD and leading candidate on the OU-PSD candidate list, Yuri Lutsenko. During a joint press-conference both leaders vowed to stay true to the “ideals of the Maidan” and honor the pre-election agreements to form a coalition of democratic forces. However, on 3 October, President Yushchenko caused consternation among the Orange campwhen he issued a statement urging all political forces to “seek a compromise” and consider forming a broad coalition that would include the Party of Regions as well.

Why did the President decide to contradict the leader of his party and what lies behind the call for unity and compromise? Several observers pointed out that a Yulia Tymoshchenko government would seriously undermine if not completely dash Yushchenko’s hopes to run for the presidency again in 2008. By becoming the Prime Minister now, Yulia Tymoshenko would be able to use the powers of the office to boost her profile at the expense of Yushchenko to the point where nominating her as the presidential candidate of the Orange forces would be the only choice left to defeat Yanukovych or any other presidential hopeful from the Party of Regions. It appears in retrospect that Viktor Yanukovych made a huge political blunder by attempting to strip the president of the last vestiges of real power instead of forging a meaningful alliance with Our Ukraine that would relegate the Tymoshenko Bloc to the opposition benches. As the prominent Ukrainian pundit Yulia Lymar pointed out, “The problem of Yanukovych lies in the fact it took too long for him, that is until now, to realize that he needs Yushchenko as much as Yushchenko needs him… Unfortunately, this card cannot be played any more”

Yet, there is no unity within the OU-PSD bloc concerning Tymoshenko’s current candidacy. Whereas business groups in Our Ukraine represented by Yuri Yekhanurov are vehemently opposed to the possibility of Tymoshenko becoming Prime Minister as evidenced in a memo published by Ukrains’ka pravda, Yuri Lutsenko and his People’s Self-Defense group are clearly in favor of such a step. It is likely that if Yanukovych retains his prime-ministerial post, Lutsenko’s party members will break away from Our Ukraine and join forces with BYuT. Furthermore, the Orange electorate remains deeply antagonistic to the figure of Yanukovych, so Our Ukraine risks losing even more electoral support to the Tymoshenko Bloc if an alliance between Yushchenko and Yanukovych becomes a reality. In this light, the standings of Viktor Yanukovych within the PofR might not be as solid as they appear. As Ukrains’ka pravda’s analysis reveals, the Party of Regions candidate list was filled by people loyal to Rinat Akhmetov who is much more willing to seek rapport with Yushchenko in order to stop Yulia Tymoshenko even if it would mean changing the leadership of the party.

The prospect of an Orange coalition remains a more feasible option. After a closed door meeting with President Yushchenko on 4 October, Yuri Lutsenko opined that the Orange coalition might be formed by 15 October when the Central Electoral Committee is scheduled to announce the official results. However, given the factors described above, Ukrainian politics may yield more surprises in the coming weeks.

Published by the Stasiuk Program for the Study of Contemporary Ukraine, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. This article may be reproduced with appropriate acknowledgement.

The election campaign in Ukraine is already underway

Ukraine takes a decisive step closer to parliamentary elections after 155 Verkhovna Rada deputies surrender their mandates.

By Ilya Khineyko

On June 15 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the 5th session ceased to exist. By the morning of that day, 151 deputies from Our Ukraine and the Tymoshenko bloc had submitted their resignation papers to Oleksandr Moroz, bringing the total number of parliamentarians below the necessary quorum of 300. Later that same day, four more resignations were announced.
The de-facto dissolution of the Verkhovna Rada was carried out through the resignations of opposition deputies in accordance with the May 27 agreement of the Big Three, which ended the two-months-long political crisis in Ukraine. It happened in spite of the obstructionist maneuvers on the part of Oleksandr Moroz, who stands to lose most from the dissolution of the current parliament. Also, many rank-and-file opposition deputies were extremely reluctant to relinquish their mandates. As Ukrains’ka Pravda reports, before the resignations list was read out loud at the Verkhovna Rada session, “many MPs [had] asked not to have their names put in the top ten of the list because in the event that dissolution of parliament fails they would never have a chance to return to the Verkhovna Rada.”

UKRAINE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS DEEPENS

David Marples

The bewildering series of events in Ukraine over the past two months have led to a compromise between the two main factions: the office of the president led by Viktor Yushchenko and the Parliament led by Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich. A third figure, Speaker of the Parliament Oleksandr Moroz, also added his signature to the new agreement. However, most analysts concur that the real struggle is yet to come.

From the Brink of Civil Strife to a New Election Campaign

By Ilya Khineyko

The most recent agreement by the three branches of government in Ukraine to hold elections on September 30, 2007 may not spell the end of the political crisis, which has plagued the country for the last two months.

“Today we can say that the political crisis is over,” Viktor Yushchenko told the Italian newspaper Corriere Della Serra on May 28, a day after Yushchenko, Oleksandr Moroz, and Viktor Yanukovych signed a joint statement, agreeing to set a date for early parliamentary elections on September 30. One cannot help but feel a strong sense of déjà vu regarding such confident pronouncements. After all, the political crisis in Ukraine, which began on April 2 when a presidential decree on the dissolution of the parliament was issued, was supposed to come to an end on May 4 when the president and prime minister agreed to hold early parliamentary elections. However, two important things were missing in the agreement: no definite election date was set and the signature of the third party, Verkhovna Rada speaker Moroz. At the time, it appeared that the Party of Regions had simply ‘disposed’ of the wily speaker whose party stood little chance of getting into the new Rada. These machinations, perhaps, provide a clue to understanding the tumultuous events of the last week that led to the Sunday agreement of the “Big Three.”

The crisis is over?

Yushchenko and Yanukovych agree to go to the polls this summer.

by Ilya Khineyko

On May 4, the political crisis in Ukraine evidently came to an end. As the BBC reported “Ukraine’s president and prime minister have agreed to hold early parliamentary elections in a bid to end weeks of political deadlock.” Later that day, speaking to his supporters on the Maidan premier Yanukovych urged all citizens of Ukraine to vote in the upcoming elections.

“Those who want to hold elections, those who initiated them will receive an answer from you. You will decide who should be in power in this country. You will be able to give the mandate to politicians in the near future.”

While the Constitutional Court debates Yushchenko’s decree, Yanukovych bids for Western approval

By Ilya Khineyko

According to a well-known saying, “the wheels of justice turn slowly.” Perhaps, that is what the Constitutional court of Ukraine might want to use in its defense to justify keeping the country in a legal limbo as it is taking time to hand out a verdict on the April 2 decree of the Ukrainian president. While both sides of the conflict have to wait patiently for the court to decide, by no means have they been idle in the past week. Each has accused each other of trying to sway the judges’ opinions. In addition, Suzanna Stanik has been involved in a corruption scandal of her own. However, even if it should turn out to be impossible to change the balance of power on the Ukrainian political scene, the ruling coalition has mounted a spirited and multi-faceted campaign to present its case abroad.