Beyond sticks and carrots: Western policy towards Ukraine

Iryna Solonenko and Peter Rutland

The publication of a letter from a dozen academics titled “EU should get tough now with Yanukovych [11]” in the Kyiv Post on June 16 has triggered a lively debate [12] about Western policy towards Ukraine. Taras Kuzio, Lucan Way, Serhiy Kudelia and half-a-dozen colleagues argue that the West must apply pressure on President Viktor Yanukovych to halt the erosion of democratic freedoms that has taken place since he took office in February 2010. They propose a visa-ban on top Ukrainian officials, and a halt to the introduction of a free-trade area with the European Union, unless what they see as the politically inspired trials of former officials such as ex-premier Yulia Tymoshenko are dropped. 

In response, Alexander Motyl [13] and Adrian Karatnycky [14] have argued that keeping Ukraine out of Moscow’s orbit should be the main priority shaping Western policy. They argue that the application of sanctions would merely help Yanukovych consolidate his authoritarian regime and push him even further in the direction of close ties with Russia.

“It is not unusual for Western foreign policy to be pulled between promoting democratic values on one hand and defending the West’s geopolitical interests on the other. However, the debate over Ukraine has an artificial quality in that it contributes to the over-personalization of politics in this country of 46 million people, reducing it to a personal battle between Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko.”

Even though most of the initial letters’ signatories are based in North America, it is interesting that they focus their call for sanctions on the European Union and not the US government. This reflects the perception that nowadays Brussels, not Washington, holds the key to Ukraine.

The context for this debate is that by the end of this year the EU and Ukraine are supposed to conclude talks on an Association Agreement [15] (AA) that have been under way for four years. The advocates of sanctions are concerned that such an agreement would give the Yanukovych government a free hand to manipulate the parliamentary elections that will take place in fall 2012.

It is not unusual for Western foreign policy to be pulled in two directions, between promoting democratic values on one hand and defending the West’s geopolitical interests on the other. However, the debate over Ukraine has an artificial quality in that it contributes to the over-personalization of politics in this country of 46 million people, reducing it to a personal battle between Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko. This is not to deny that a gross miscarriage of justice does seem to be under way in the Tymoshenko trial [16] – just that this factor alone should not bring Western policy towards Ukraine to a grinding halt.

The international record on sanctions of all types has been mixed, at best: on average, they work about half the time. One relevant success story would be the sanctions imposed on Slovakia before 1998. They did succeed in triggering a social mobilization that ousted Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and set Slovakia on the path to EU entry.

At this juncture, however, the chances that sanctions on Ukraine’s top leaders would cause a radical shift in their political style, or mobilize society against them, are slim. The sanctions advocates don’t really explain why they think these sanctions would work. Conditionality only works if the benefits of complying with external requirements outweigh the costs of reforms. Ukraine’s ruling elites (like politicians everywhere) think short-term. In the short-term perspective the incumbent elites might consider they have more to lose from having free elections than they will gain from the long-term benefits the AA offers. Indeed, it would take up to 10-15 years for the deep and comprehensive free trade area between the EU and Ukraine, a core component of the AA, to become a reality, while in the short run the costs of adaptation will need to be paid. Added to which, Moscow can also exercise leverage, and try to neutralize Western initiatives.

Rather than play the carrots and sticks game, trying to influence leaders’ decisions, it is better to wager on society. This means seeing through to their conclusion the negotiations. The sanctions debate overlooks the potential transformative effect the AA will have on Ukraine. Signing the agreement would mean that Ukraine enters serious commitments to reform itself. Since the major barriers to EU-Ukraine bilateral trade are non-tariff, access to the EU market will require Ukraine to adopt up to 1,500 pages of acquis communautaire regulations. The AA will be a legally binding arrangement, meaning that the EU and European companies can bring Ukraine to the European Court of Justice if provisions of the agreement have been violated, and vice versa.

This type of engagement will encourage domestic reform-minded actors to push for change from inside. It will unlock the potential of numerous groups and individuals that are interested in reform, but have limited tools to push for them under present conditions. These actors include both civil society groups and businesses, who will be able to use the AA procedures to push for a more competitive environment and above all a fairer judicial process in Ukraine.

It is true that the EU runs the risk of being seen as compromising the values on which it wants the partnership with neighboring countries be based. When announcing the successful conclusion of AA talks this December, the EU should make it clear that it expects democratic norms to be upheld in Ukraine. But refusing to sign the agreement altogether would likely bring no policy change at all.

Failure to conclude the AA would not only be a blow to Ukraine, but also a nail in the coffin of the EU’s already embattled Eastern Neighborhood Policy – which is built on the premise that there are common values uniting the EU and its eastern neighbors.

Smart engagement, including increased flows of trade, mobility of people and growing interdependence, which the AA offers, is the way to go. Post-war Europe started with functional and technocratic integration, with no sign of political union in sight. What the EU is today, even with the current crisis, is still impressive. This tried and proven path of long-term integration is the best hope for success with Ukraine and other Eastern neighbors. Engagement will produce a critical mass of institutions, practices and individuals that will inevitably challenge the current regimes in the longer run. There is no short-term quick fix to the deficiencies in Ukraine’s political culture.

Links:
[1] http://www.opendemocracy.net/themes/russia-theme
[2] http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia
[3] http://www.opendemocracy.net/topics/international-politics
[4] http://www.opendemocracy.net/topics/democracy-and-government
[5] http://www.opendemocracy.net/countries/ukraine
[6] http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia/topics/politics
[7] http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia/topics/human-rights
[8] http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia/topics/foreign
[9] http://www.opendemocracy.net/author/iryna-solonenko
[10] http://www.opendemocracy.net/author/peter-rutland
[11] http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/106920/
[12] http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/mykola-riabchuk/ukraine-blackmail-and-bluff
[13] http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/new/blogs/motyl/Integrating_an_Authoritarian_Ukraine_into_Democratic_Europe
[14] http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/108653/print/
[15] http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/109355/
[16] http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/natalia-sedletska/ukrainian-politics-on-trial
[17] http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/iryna-solomko/yuri-lutsenko-views-from-prison-cell
[18] http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/aleksey-matsuka/dispatch-from-donetsk
[19] http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/olena-tregub/ukraine-europe-its-brightest-hope
[20] http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/david-marples/ukraine-crisis-of-self-identity
[21] http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/mykola-riabchuk/viktor-yanukovych-pandora%E2%80%99s-box-and-moscow-orchestra
[22] http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
[23] http://www.opendemocracy.net/about/syndication

This article was originally published by our partner organization, Open Democracy, 4 August 2011 and is reissued here with permission.

Ukraine’s Fast Track to NATO Too Quick for Many in Nation

David Marples

Ukraine has been accepted as the latest member of the World Trade Organization after fifteen years of negotiations. WTO membership is expected to accelerate Ukraine’s prospects of joining the European Union. Further, Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko has requested that Ukraine be permitted to participate in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), and ultimately to be accepted as a full member of NATO. What has been the impact of these events and what are the likely consequences?

WTO membership should bring some benefits to the Ukrainian economy, particularly for the steel industry, which faced prohibitive export tariffs from EU countries hitherto. The resulting free competition and reduction of barriers are expected to boost industrial growth and ensure the production of more high quality products in this nation of 46 million. However, it may also increase foreign competition in a number of sectors, such as banking and machine building. Ukraine’s acceptance preceded that of Russia, which is on the waiting list. Officially Ukraine supports Russian membership, since problematic issues such as Russian gas prices could then be resolved under the WTO umbrella rather than bilaterally.

There should be no problems with the Ukrainian parliament’s ratification of WTO membership. The same cannot be said of the bid to take part in MAP, which has aroused angry responses from the Party of Regions and from Russia. Over the past week, MPs from the large opposition party have blocked the rostrum in the Rada, refusing to allow debate on the issue of NATO membership. Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych has stated that on this issue there can be no compromise, membership is inconceivable without a national referendum, and a majority of Ukraine’s residents are firmly opposed to the country joining the defensive alliance.

For Russia too, the issue is a thorny one. Russian president Vladimir Putin is still smarting from Poland’s agreement to accept a US anti-missile base on its territory which, allied with a radar station in the Czech Republic, would serve as an interception point for missiles aimed at the United States by a rogue state (the inference is Iran). Russia has accepted NATO membership of former Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. Ukraine is a different matter entirely.

Putin, who is due to step down as president next month, points out that whereas Russia has dismantled military bases in areas like Cuba and Vietnam, the United States has established new sites in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, in addition to the anti-missile site slated for Poland. NATO’s eastward expansion to include Ukraine and Georgia is seen as a bid to surround Russia with hostile bases and to commence a new arms race.

Ukraine is a particularly sensitive case for Russia. Under Putin, Russian-Ukrainian relations were very close prior to the Orange Revolution in 2004, at which time Yanukovych, Russia’s choice for president, was defeated in a third run-off election. Though Putin’s likely successor Dmitry Medvedev has not engaged in anti-Western rhetoric, he is expected to echo Putin’s concerns over new perceived threats to Russian security.

NATO leaders, who meet in Bucharest in April, have welcomed the potential membership of Ukraine. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer noted that Russia’s protests would not be a factor when making a decision whether to accept Ukraine. The rationale behind further NATO expansion, however, has rarely been outlined. The implication is clearly that new members require protection from a real or potential external enemy, which could only be Russia. The latter country has not helped its case by its belligerence toward its neighbors. Estonian president Toomas Ilves stated recently that in making a decision on the future membership of Ukraine and Georgia, NATO members should not give into Russian threats and blackmail.

The danger for Ukraine lies in the precarious position of the Tymoshenko government. With a majority of just two deputies, it has embarked on a campaign to integrate Ukraine with Euro-Atlantic structures without further delay, including membership of the EU, which ostensibly has been boosted by WTO membership. But it is not in a position to join NATO without alienating a large segment of the population. While most residents of Ukraine welcome WTO and future EU membership, they do not feel the same way about the country joining the alliance. NATO has a poor reputation associated with past actions in Serbia and the Near East.

Others are concerned about the impact on relations with Russia, a country with which trade turnover totaled $30 billion in 2007–the next highest turnover, with Germany, was $5 billion. Ukraine’s plans to ease dependence on Russian resources by building pipelines from Turkmenistan seem based on wishful thinking rather than reality. Ukraine has a number of serious issues to discuss with post-Putin Russia, including the future of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the port of Sevastopol. And Russia has never hesitated to use its greatest state-owned resource–gas– as a means of maintaining its former Soviet-era ties to Ukraine.

In short, whereas the government’s initiatives toward Europe seem logical, there are grounds to question the wisdom of a fast-track Ukrainian entry into NATO, particularly without a sustained internal debate on the issue first.

[This article was first published on 13 February 2008 by the Edmonton Journal, along with the subtitle: "But other initiatives toward Europe seem logical, enjoy wide appeal." Copyright is owned by CanWest and the article may be cited but cannot be reproduced without
permission]

While the Constitutional Court debates Yushchenko’s decree, Yanukovych bids for Western approval

By Ilya Khineyko

According to a well-known saying, “the wheels of justice turn slowly.” Perhaps, that is what the Constitutional court of Ukraine might want to use in its defense to justify keeping the country in a legal limbo as it is taking time to hand out a verdict on the April 2 decree of the Ukrainian president. While both sides of the conflict have to wait patiently for the court to decide, by no means have they been idle in the past week. Each has accused each other of trying to sway the judges’ opinions. In addition, Suzanna Stanik has been involved in a corruption scandal of her own. However, even if it should turn out to be impossible to change the balance of power on the Ukrainian political scene, the ruling coalition has mounted a spirited and multi-faceted campaign to present its case abroad.