Democracy on the Run

David Marples

Belarusians vote Sunday in the presidential elections, the first since 2006. In Kyiv, Ukraine, anyone with access to the Internet could watch the mass brawl in the Parliament on Thursday. Meanwhile, in Moscow, thousands of extremists rioted and attacked anyone who appeared to have a darker complexion after the death of a soccer fan in ethnic clashes in the city.

The first decade of the 21st century is not ending well in the Slavic heartland of the former Soviet Union.

The Belarusian election is a ritual. The winner is already known because Alyaksandr Lukashenka, the first and only president of Belarus, is assured of victory in the first round over nine opponents. Every facet of the election has been under government control, and the nine alternative candidates are dismissed as “enemies of the people.” They were introduced on national television as “nine identical candidates.”

However, Lukashenka’s situation was uncertain for several weeks because of a well-publicized spat with Russia. On Dec. 9, this ended during his visit to Moscow when President Dmitry Medvedev, who had accused Lukashenka of crossing all boundaries of human decency during the recent trading of barbs, decided after all that he was the best candidate from Russia’s perspective.

In return, Lukashenka has agreed to join a common economic space with Russia and Kazakhstan, and to accept the Russian ruble as the sole currency, effective Jan. 1, 2012. He is also under severe pressure to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (shunned by most of the world), and heavily reliant on Russia and the IMF for future loans. Belarus, however, is back into the Russian fold, though the European Union had not rejected him.

The EU’s Eastern Partnership badly needs Belarus because few of its members are very reliable. One is Ukraine, where the democratic structure is crumbling rapidly. President Viktor Yanukovych and his Regions Party are constructing a power base while trying to ensure the complete demise of the opposition.

Yulia Tymoshenko, leader of the Batkivshchyna faction in the parliament, has been accused of illegal use of funds during her term as prime minister from 2007-10. In protest, members of her faction surrounded the rostrum to block procedure. About 40 members of the Regions faction removed them by force, using fists and, in one case, a chair. Three Batkivshchyna deputies required treatment in hospital. Tymoshenko, meanwhile, has been told not to leave the country.

The episode is the latest in a series of actions conducted by the Regions Party. Ukraine today is under the sway of a group of politicians from the Donbass who are turning the country into a fiefdom. Only the wildest optimist could anticipate that Yanukovych will be voted out of office in 2015. Though he is four years older than Lukashenka, he has initiated moves to consolidate a personal presidency that if unchecked could last for a decade or more.

Russia, the neighbour of both Ukraine and Belarus, abandoned democracy several years ago as a recipe for chaos. In a sense, it was. The amassing of wealth by several oligarchs with their own personal kingdoms, bodyguards and control over Russia’s natural resources repelled many Russians. Today they still have corruption, but they also have order and control under the dual regime of President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.

Two weeks ago, through what can charitably be described as quiet pressure, FIFA, the body that controls world soccer, awarded Russia the 2018 World Cup. It beat bids from England and Spain-Portugal, among others. It is a fitting stage for a country in which extreme racists are allowed to roam the streets of the capital attacking innocent victims. The fact that Russia has no soccer stadiums suitable for games, or that fans may have to cross seven time zones for individual matches, evidently made no impression on the FIFA selection committee.

In 2012, Russia will have another presidential election. Who will run? It doesn’t really matter. Perhaps Putin will be president, in which case he will no doubt appoint Medvedev prime minister. Or we will have more of the same. The only prospect of any excitement would be if a rift developed between the two politicians. But that is not likely. They have too much to lose.

This week as well, former tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky, once Russia’s richest man and owner of the Yukos oil company, went on trial again for the embezzlement of millions of rubles. Putin stated that “a thief must sit in jail” and favourably compared the victim’s likely sentence of 17 years (he has served seven) to that of Bernard Madoff in the United States. Khodorkovsky and partner Platon Lebedev are accused of theft of oil from their own company.

Khodorkovsky is an unlikely symbol of the demise of democracy in Russia, but he is in jail less for illegally amassed wealth than because he presented a political challenge to Putin. There is no fighting in Russia’s parliament because it is firmly subdued, as is the assembly in Belarus. But Ukraine is also moving toward a presidential autocracy, with a power vertical (a highly centralized political system) and an entrenched ruling elite.

Imagine the heroes of Goodfellas in power and one has a fairly accurate picture of the mentality of these ruling elites: power-hungry, selfish, corrupt, increasingly wealthy and utterly ruthless.

In this respect, they deserve the title “post-Soviet elite.” Stalin would have been proud of his offspring.

This article was published in the EDMONTON JOURNAL on 18 December 2010.
Read more: http://www.edmontonjournal.com/news/Democracy/3998324/story.html#ixzz18TwVeiCu

Flawed by Design: the Local Elections in Ukraine

By Mykola Riabchuk

On the eve of Ukrainian local elections scheduled for October 31 relatively few people and virtually no experts believed they would be free and fair – and with good reason. The first shot at the optimists’ hopes was fired shortly after the presidential elections, as the new parliamentary majority and new government were created in a patently unconstitutional way under the leadership of President Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions. One of their first decisions, rubber-stamped by the now-obedient parliament without any discussion, was cancellation of local elections scheduled by the Ukrainian Constitution to be held in May and their eventual (and, again, absolutely illegal) rescheduling in October.

The reason behind this delay was patently obvious. The victorious team was not ready yet to begin another triumphant campaign after taking office in March. They needed some time to fix the playing field in the most beneficial way for themselves. Step by step, they changed radically the electoral law, stacked both central and local electoral commissions with their loyalists, subordinated completely the administrative courts that are in charge, inter alia, of solving electoral disputes, replaced all the governors and local presidential representatives that supervise the process, placed unscrupulous allies in charge of all the law-enforcement agencies, and hired even more unprincipled hacks to run national TV and radio.

Yet, even more importantly, they sent clear symbolic signals to both their supporters and opponents, but primarily to those who stood on the sidelines, reluctant and hesitant. The signals left little doubt about who was coming back to power and what kind of policies would be implemented. The police, for the first time since the Orange revolution, encroached upon people’s constitutional right for peaceful protests, restraining arbitrarily, on many occasions, their freedom of assembly. The secret police harassed demonstratively journalists, scholars, and NGO activists. Tax authorities intimidated disobedient businessmen, including media-owners, suggesting that there would be problems for those who would not tow the line. And prosecutors, in the best traditions of selective application of law, have arrested a number of opposition figures on corruption charges, all of which, so far, have been broadly trumpeted but poorly substantiated.

In brief, the new authorities have effectively redeployed all the mechanisms of Kuchma’s notorious “blackmail state” that had been abandoned but never disbanded after the revolution by President Yushchenko and his team. Now, the entire nation is paying the price for the inability of the Orange leaders to clean house, eradicate corruption, and introduce the rule of law.

As the elections neared and all the power was being concentrated increasingly in the hands of Yanukovych and his lieutenants, the dirty electoral tricks from the Kuchma era resurfaced conspicuously. Here and there, reports surfaced about the most inconvenient opposition candidates who were either barred from running, or bribed or intimidated to withdraw their candidacy, or stand aside. The most incompliant were arrested on the traditional “corruption” charges that could not necessarily be proved but would certainly eliminate the rival from the impending elections.

Tymoshenko and her “Batkivshchyna” party were considered the main rivals of the incumbent authorities, so the dirtiest tricks were directed primarily against them. The most outrageous was probably the creation of bogus parties under the same name that were slavishly registered by the election commissions, while the authentic “Batkivshchyna” documents were rejected. As a result, Tymoshenko’s party was effectively excluded from the elections in at least three crucial regions – Lviv, Kyiv, and Ternopil.

The far-right “Svoboda” appeared to be the main beneficiary of this game. They won a plurality of 30-35% in the three oblasts of Halychyna and mad significant advances in the Kyiv oblast, accumulating a respectable 5% on the national scale that, if repeated eventually in the 2012 parliamentary elections, would qualify them for seats in the Rada. For the Party of Regions it was actually a win-win situation. Having no chance to beat Tymoshenko in her western strongholds, they used “Svoboda” to undermine her strength and, at the same time, to discredit the opposition – both domestically and internationally – as dangerous radicals, nationalists, even crypto-fascists. At the same time, they understand well that “Svoboda,” unlike “Batkivshchyna,” has no chance of expanding significantly beyond Western Ukraine to challenge the Party of Regions in its traditional strongholds. Therefore, all the national TV channels (otherwise effectively censored by the authorities) hosted eagerly the “Svoboda” leaders in their political talk shows while Tymoshenko and her close associates were effectively blacklisted from the same “pluralistic” programs.

The day of the elections did not bring much violence but it brought considerable chaos. Long lines queued outside the polling stations and many voters gave up the wait, rendering the turnout unusually low for Ukraine, while many more remained at home because the bulletins disseminated by the authorities seemed to indicate there was no real choice of candidates. An unusually high number of voters (7%) voted against all candidates – probably for the same reason. In at least two places, Yasynovata (Donetsk oblast) and Kamyanets-Podilsky, where popular local leaders supported by opposition were barred from standing, the “against all” vote reached 30%. The disorder was exacerbated at various polling stations as uncounted bulletins were found and observers expelled; some members of the commissions left, or were locked out, or reportedly bribed or forced to sign fixed protocols, and more.

The final results had not been announced a week later, when this article went to press. Local results were announced wholesale by the district commissions rather than at each polling station as required by law. In all the districts where the exit polls showed the Party of Regions candidates lagging closely behind their rivals (for example, in Odesa, Luhansk, and Kharkiv), the official results reversed those standings.

Impartial observers are unanimous: “Ukraine’s Oct. 31 local elections did not meet standards for openness and fairness set by the presidential elections earlier this year.” Or, as the Kyiv Post editor put it more straightforwardly: “Yanukovych, still hobbled by his complicity in fraudulent elections during the era of ex-President Leonid Kuchma, had a chance to show he is a democratic leader. Instead, the president showed he’s the same old conniver unworthy of leading a great nation of 46 million people.” Alas, that’s true.

But what does this unpleasant result mean for the country?

First, the Party of Regions has advanced further in monopolizing all branches of power and consolidating its authoritarian rule. In terms of the popular vote it received a mere plurality of around 36% – much less than its candidate Viktor Yanukovych attained nine months ago in the second round of the presidential elections (49%), but roughly the same proportion he got in the first round. Yet, in practical terms, the electoral system adjusted by the Party of Regions to their particular needs, gives them multiple advantages. Only half of the local deputies are elected from the party lists. The first-past-the-post system apparently enhances the authority of Yanukovych’s party as it is the biggest one and endows it with a vested interest in splitting and cloning the opposition parties as much as possible, as well as in rigging election results because even minor manipulations of such a system can be crucial.

The remaining half of the elected local deputies are the so-called “independents,” even though they are nominated by different parties. Most of them are local officials or businessmen highly vulnerable to official blackmail, bribery, and intimidation. The majority, as we know from the Kuchma era, end up in the government camp – the only place where they can secure their business.

So, the Party of Regions has a good chance to create a majority not only in its traditional strongholds in the south east but also in most oblasts and towns of central Ukraine, governed until recently by “Batkivshchyna” and other “Orangists.” In some cases, the Communists who gained their usual 5%, will be employed as allies, in other cases Tigipko’s “Strong Ukraine” (4%) or Yatseniuk’s “Front of Changes” (7%) might be lured into a coalition. In any case, the Party of Regions will be able to increase its grip over the country, which will likely result in further crackdowns on the independent mass media, NGOs, political opposition, and disloyal (or not loyal enough) businesses.

Yet, this outcome may not make Yanukovych’s life easier. As Yulia Mostova remarked poignantly in a recent issue of Dzerkalo tyzhnia, by eliminating the opposition he becomes his own worst enemy (http://www.dt.ua/1000/1550/70762/). He cannot satisfy the Westerners who expect from him the promised reforms, not just moribund authoritarian “stability.” Nor can he satisfy the Kremlin, which requires more “integration” moves from him and demands that more and more national assets be given up. Something should be certainly done for the radical reform of the country but the incumbent president’s ability to achieve anything other than augmenting rampant corruption looks even less feasible than before the elections.

Circus at the Rada

Zenon Zawada
Kyiv Bureau Editor
The Ukrainian Weekly

The latest opposition protest at the Verkhovna Rada, on September 7, resembled a three-ring circus that revealed the increasing radicalization and tension in Ukrainian politics, which appears to be poised for a nasty eruption as predicted by numerous observers.

About 10,000 demonstrators (I estimate about 2,500 pro-government and 7,500 opposition) arrived from throughout Ukraine, despite extensive efforts by the police to prevent the arrival of demonstrators. Any bus companies found to be transporting opposition protestors automatically have their transportation license confiscated. All the dozen or so protestors I spoke with today either arrived by train or their own cars. They all said bus companies declined to transport them.

Only three parties were represented at the protest: Batkivschyna (led by Yulia Tymoshenko), the Svoboda nationalists (led by Oleh Tiahnybok) and the People’s Rukh of Ukraine (Narodnyi Rukh) led by Borys Tarasyuk. Viktor Yushchenko has vanished from the Ukrainian political scene and Our Ukraine is extinct, as well as the orange color, which Ukrainians now associate with the Donetsk Shakhtar soccer team more than anything else.

Previous protests were marred by Svoboda nationalists shouting down more moderate voices, who yelled “Tiah-ny-bok!” even as prominent leaders such as Tymoshenko spoke. It was no different this time around. The protest meeting was marred by hundreds of radicalized Svoboda youths in their 20s attempting to shout down most other speakers, including Borys Tarasyuk and former police chief Yurii Lutsenko.

Lutsenko is not a popular figure in Ukrainian politics, having been among those who most betrayed the Orange ideals. Yet the fact he was shouted down demonstrates the aggressiveness of Svoboda supporters, who didn’t seem to be interested in joining the unification of opposition forces, but causing enmity.

When demonstrators attempted to take away their megaphones, in order to stop them from southing down other speakers, the Svoboda boys shoved and even punched back, continuing to repeat over and over, “Tiah-ny-bok!” Soon enough, their zombie-like fanaticism for Tiahnybok led other demonstrators to accuse them of either being at the protest for money, as paid provocateurs, or intentionally causing division among the opposition forces at the behest of the Party of Regions.

Indeed many Ukrainian patriots suspect that the Svoboda party engages in ethnically and politically motivated provocations and aggressive behavior in order to benefit the Party of Regions. Today’s behavior of the young male supporters, many in their 20s, only contributed to that view.

After the rally, Tiahnybok insisted to those gathered around him (including me) that he didn’t spur his supporters into shouting his name or disrupting the rally. He said they were upset because the demonstration’s organizers, the Committee to Defend Ukraine, denied him an opportunity to speak. However another party leader, Iryna Farion, was allowed to address the crowd, so the behavior of the Svoboda crowd seemed unreasonable.

Additionally, the Svoboda nationalists appeared as if they came to the rally prepared to attack Tymoshenko (and anyone besides their own leaders, for that matter), having arrived with printed placards with slogans that taunted her, such as “Who made (natural) gas serfs out of Ukrainians?”

In her speech, Tymoshenko hammered on the government’s unpopular decisions to increase natural gas prices, increase utility bills by 30 percent, increase the pension age, and increase the Kyiv subway fare (from 22 cents to 25 cents). She also referred to the government as Ukrainophobes, citing its Russification policies.

Farion is among the most radical politicians in Ukraine, so it can as no surprise that she called for “Ukraine for Ukrainians” and ridding the nation of the “animals in government.” She used very loaded language, calling upon the protesters “to shoot them up with their voting ballots” at the October 31 elections and speaking of a “final catharsis” that will soon arrive.

Similar language was used by the Committee to Defend Ukraine chairman Dmytro Pavlychko, who said openly that Ukraine “is headed for an explosion.” That does seem to be the direction of events as such protests draw more supporters. And the Yanukovych administration does seem to be provoking the opposition into a violent confrontation, with its radically pro-Russian cultural policies that denigrate the dignity of ethnically conscious Ukrainians.

It’s apparent the government is even laying the groundwork for such a violent confrontation, which it can use as a pretext to impose a full-scale authoritarianism as evidenced in Belarus and even some form of martial law. If the opposition enters into an “explosion,” as Mr. Pavlychko suggested, then it better plan the right strategy to ensure that it emerges as the winner, not the defeated.

The techniques used by the government to deal with the opposition are getting fiercer. While earlier allowing protestors to line up along Hrushevskoho Street on the side opposite of the parliament building, this time they weren’t allowed to walk along the street at all. Once again, the government surrounded the parliament building with thousands of Party of Regions supporters, who were comfortably shielded by metal barricades and hundreds of police. Their fanaticism and bizarre behavior is accelerating as fast as the radicalization of the opposition, which was forced to hold its meeting at the Mariyinskiy Palace, adjacent to the parliament building.

It came as no surprise to see more than a thousand Russian Orthodox radicals marching in columns around the parliament building, holding icons and wooden crosses and singing Church Slavonic hymns. This has been a common sight at the barricades that have surrounded the parliament at protests since Yanukovych came to power.

I should note that never was religion integrated into political activity to such an extent as the Yanukovych administration is currently exploiting it. The Orange forces never invoked religion during their reign in the government or their role in the opposition. This leads to the conclusion that the Party of Regions is truly fearful of the opposition and has resorted to extreme measures to extend their grip on power, such as manipulating the Orthodox devoted into defending their authoritarian rule.

It shocked me to see hundreds of Party of Regions supporters participating in a Orthodox moleben ceremony led by Orthodox priests within their barricaded fortress, directly in front of the parliament building just as the opposition was meeting. I had never seen such a direct infusion of religion in politics, which has very dangerous potential because it introduces a new irrational element to the conflict. Politics is supposed to offer rational, compromised solutions to disputes. Religion is irrational and therefore can lead people to do highly irrational things.

The scene inside the parliament was just as bizarre as abut a dozen deputies of the Tymoshenko Bloc led a blockade of the podium. Yet the pro-Russian coalition was voting on and approving legislation during this “blockade,” rendering it wholly ineffective and largely a ploy for television cameras.

The most hopeful sign is that the opposition forces are swelling and gaining support among the population. Today’s anti-government protest was the largest since the Yanukovych administration took power.

Yet it was very disheartening to see the opposition forces so divided. (What else is new?) It seems as though Ukrainians are incapable of uniting, no matter how compelling the conditions might be. While I once reserved sympathy and admiration for the Svoboda nationalists and their fierce devotion to the Ukrainian cause, I lost much sympathy and respect for them after today’s protest. They demonstrated such unconstructive narrow-mindedness and hostility towards the other opposition parties that I’m starting to believe they’re more of a hindrance than a benefit to the Ukrainian cause. Their radical positions on many issues aren’t capable of unifying the country, and play into the hands of the Party of Regions in reinforcing the Soviet stereotype of western Ukrainians as “fascist,” hostile, intolerant and dangerous.

The consensus is that Yanukovych and the Party of Regions are seeking the same authority in Ukraine that Putin enjoys in Russia and Lukashenko in Belarus. They will tighten the screws of their authoritarian rule following the October 31 elections, which will no doubt be falsified and rigged in many cities. The amended election law approved on August 30 only enhances the government’s ability to falsify the vote, as detailed in The Ukrainian Weekly last week.

The latest episode in the Yanukovych nightmare is the September 7 announcement by Yevhen Bystrytskyi, the executive director of the Renaissance Foundation in Ukraine, that the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) is reviewing its work in Kyiv. While George Soros is no angel and no one to be admired, the Renaissance Foundation offers much support to many of Ukraine’s democracy-building institutions. As we recall, Vladimir Putin supported legislation in the Russian Duma in 2006 limiting the ability of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to operate in Russia. No doubt, Yanukovych would also like to restrict the presence western NGOs which offer financial support to organizations committed to democracy-building and Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration. The Renaissance projects targeted by the SBU so far are not political, yet it’s clearly the strategy of the current government to slowly and gradually eliminate the Western presence. If the Renaissance Fund is strangled, so go many Ukrainian NGOs.

On the Importance of Being Candid

Mykola Riabchuk

Dmytro Potekhin, an activist of the youth movement that played an important role during the Orange Revolution, has recently circulated a number of questions that may look rhetorical at first glance but, like the childish questions of Voltaire’s Candide, they deserve serious consideration.

“Isn’t it strange”, he wrote, “that in a country where
1) the government is not legitimate since it was formed by unconstitutional majority;
2) the parliament is not legitimate since the majority did not result from a revote nor was it dissolved and reelected;
3) the court system is not legitimate since it operates under the new ‘law’ passed by the ‘parliament’;
4) the ‘president’ is not legitimate since he has done nothing either with the ‘parliament’ or with the ‘government’ to reestablish constitutional rule,
- the key human rights activists are complaining that the ‘minister’ of interior is not gathering the public council to hear about human rights abuses, while saying nothing about the unconstitutional nature of the whole situation;
- the key freedom movement is ‘against censorship’, while its activists – journalists keep calling all these people who took over the institutions ‘president’, ‘prime minister’, ‘minister’ projecting their legitimacy;
- the bloggers wonder why the security service is removing posts from their blogs, but still call it Security Service of Ukraine, not Security Service of Usurpers;
- the businesses are complaining that the taxes are too high, while they are taken by a bunch of organized people who in the early 90s were called racketeers;
- the opposition is going to take part in the elections under the ‘law’ passed by a bunch of MPs still calling themselves deputies, none of whom get out of this fake Verhovna Rada […]
People, what are we talking about?!”*

To put it simply, why has a de-facto parliamentary coup d’etat and eventual usurpation of power by a minority clique been tacitly accepted by both the political opposition and society at large?

There are many answers that largely explain, albeit not justify, the odd situation.

First, the dubious takeover of power was approved by the Constitutional Court – even though the same Court a year and a half ago passed the opposite decision on a similar issue. Actually, the credibility of the Court was undermined long ago, in 2003, when the constitutional pundits recognized that Leonid Kuchma could run for presidency for the third time because his first term did not count – he had served it arguably under the old constitution. The Orange leaders put much more efforts into subduing the Court than making it really efficient and independent. Society never voiced strong concerns about this – and now we all are duly punished for our passivity and opportunism.

Secondly, the coup d’etat was accepted by Western governments with a benign neglect that placed the Ukrainian opposition in an odd situation: they had to deny the legitimacy of the government whose validity, in fact, was recognized (or at least not questioned) internationally.

And thirdly, the misrule of the Orange leaders has discredited not only them – as today’s opposition, but democracy in general. This boosted the attractiveness of the authoritarian alternative within one part of the society, and frustrated, demoralized, and alienated the other part, hindering its ability to resist. In such a situation, a minority party with sufficient resources and determination can easily capture the state – as happened in Italy or Germany long ago, and more recently in Russia.

So, I would say that the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government is recognized by default – simply because there is no other government (since Tymoshenko unexpectedly easily stepped down in March, passing authority to the usurpers), nor is there any viable alternative (since the opposition is still in disarray, and society either frustrated with everything or still trustful in the new duce).

In this regard, David Marples is probably right when questioning Alexander Motyl’s prediction of the imminent collapse of the Yanukovych presidency in Ukraine – probably by the year 2012 (Edmonton Journal, Aug. 9, 2010). It looks really overoptimistic – but not because of “perceptible economic recovery and increasing popularity of the Yanukovych leadership”, as Dr. Marples suggests. Neither “recovery” nor “popularity” are actually viable. The former is mostly connected to the post-crisis recovery of the entire world economy and to a very low base for comparison. The latter is related to the ‘honeymoon’ period of Yanukovych’s presidency and still high expectations of his electorate (actually, Yushchenko’s popularity at the time was even higher but has since fallen dramatically). So far, there are no economic reforms in sight to secure sustainable growth. And austerity measures designed to support this growth do not target officials or friendly oligarchs, so would hardly sustain the president’s popularity in the near future.

Motyl might be wrong for another reason. He expects that the 2012 parliamentary and 2015 presidential elections will be free and fair – as they used to be within the past five years. Not necessarily. Given the pace and direction of political and legal “reforms” introduced by the new regime, we may have Russia-style ‘managed democracy’ in Ukraine very soon. Actually, the local elections this Fall will provide a good litmus test for Ukraine’s democratic procedures and institutions. So far, the changes of the electoral law rubber-stamped by the parliament to advantage the ruling party a few months before the elections do not evoke much optimism. They introduced a number of retroactive requirements that should have been abolished by any impartial court if it happened to exist in Ukraine. And they confirmed once again the strong intention of the government to play with rules rather than play by rules.

So now might be a proper time to come back to the candid questions raised by Dmytro Potekhin and to remind the king and his court that they are naked. They got some carte-blanche, however dubious, to introduce law and order and much needed reforms. But instead, they bring even more lawlessness and disorder, and introduced very peculiar “reforms” that satisfy mostly their oligarchic friends and Moscow patrons. For the beginning, I suggest to mention, wherever possible, their titles and positions within the quotation marks or with the words “so called”.

Potekhin is right – we do not have a legitimate government, legitimate parliament, legitimate Court. We have people who call themselves “ministers”, “deputies”, and “judges”. Let them do it. But we should not accept their claims at face value.

*Potekhin’s text has been modified slightly for grammatical reasons. DRM

Blockading the Verkhovna Rada

Kateryna Malyhina

For nearly a month Ukraine’s legislature has been paralyzed. The Party of Regions (PR) is blocking the work of the Parliament. The cause is the secret letter to NATO about Ukraine’s accession to the Membership Action Plan that was signed by the Head of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine A. Yatsenyuk. The PR claims that such an action was not sanctioned by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and therefore lacks the approval of the Ukrainian people. As a result Yatsenyuk had no right to put his signature to such an important document. Both de facto and de jure, they are right. But what in reality stands behind such an action?

At a first glance, the Party of Regions has dual benefits. On the one hand, it has raised its credibility in the eyes of people, showing that it acts as a true opposition, which seeks to ensure that those who are in power do not violate laws. On the other hand, referring to the “desire of the Ukrainian nation” and demanding a referendum on Ukraine’s accession to NATO, the PR does not explicitly oppose NATO, but at the same time strengthens the position among its traditional voters, who had already begun to doubt the ability of the PR, to defend their interests.

However, the list of the benefits for the PR in this situation does not end here. Having failed to gain power, the PR needs to fulfill its most important current task: that is, to prevent the normal functioning of Tymoshenko’s government, but not to advocate expressly for her resignation. There are two reasons why the PR will not take this latter step. First, by distributing social benefits, she is at the peak of popularity now and direct actions will only enhance her popularity. Second, it will benefit Yanukovych to let Tymoshenko “work” now, make mistakes, and thus show that her government is unable to lead Ukraine into a “bright future.”

By blocking parliament, the PR seized the opportunity to impede Tymoshenko’s plans, while acting within the law. Tymoshenko’s government urgently needs money in order to continue its mega-project named “compensation of lost deposits in the USSR Savings Bank.” The quickest and easiest way to obtain money is through re-privatization of companies, which has already been proven to work. Why put all one’s efforts in developing the economy, when one can quickly “redistribute” everything, referring to the unfair privatization in the 90s. That is why the Prime Minister has already made attempts to dismiss the Head of the State Property Fund Valentyna Semenyuk. Tymoshenko needs her own man for such a responsible position (incidentally, Andrei Portnov from BYUT was thought to be the replacement for Semenyuk). But this turned out to be far from easy. According to Article 85 §12 of the amended Constitution, the right to appoint and dismiss the Head of the State Property Fund has been allocated to the Verkhovna Rada. And the legislature is not functioning at this time.

But as the Ukrainian saying goes, “too much of something can be harmful.” The PR cannot block the parliament indefinitely. It is also highly unlikely that the PR will succeed in forcing through its own terms–to vote on the commencement to the Membership Action Plan only after a referendum–because it cannot at present gain a majority in parliament. To further block the work of the Verkhovna Rada will soon no longer be profitable. First, while the “30 days” before the President has the duty to dissolve the parliament (according to the Art. 90 §3 of Ukraine’s Constitution) are already counting down, Yatsenyuk has already stated that he will not let the Verkhovna Rada work for half a day and be blocked again afterwards. Therefore the only possibility to start the countdown from day one is when the parliament will be fully “unblocked.” Second, if the PR continues blocking the parliament, time will start to work against it in a while. The PR will be blamed for a new political crisis. Moreover, Tymoshenko will declare once again that she has been prevented from working, which will only improve her image.

There is one more risk when prolonging the conflict. The President may start exercising legislative functions directly from his office. Indeed, Article 93 of the Constitution states that the President of Ukraine has the right of legislative initiative; and according to Article 106 the president then issues decrees and orders, which are mandatory for execution, and Article 113 indicates that the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is still accountable to the President of Ukraine. Thus, there is a risk of introducing the “direct” presidential rule: Yushchenko would issue the decrees that Tymoshenko’s government need, bypassing the parliament. There is no question that the Party of Regions recognizes this possibility.

Therefore, it is likely that conflict will be soon resolved and the Verkhovna Rada must resume its work in the nearest future. By permitting this to happen and despite the technical defeat, the Party of Regions will still remain the winner. After all, the problem is not NATO.

First published at ХайВей// HighWay on February 19, 2008

http://h.ua/story/84206/

The 2007 Parliamentary Elections: Winners, Losers, and Coalition Prospects

By Ilya Khineyko

On 30 September, for the second time in two years, Ukraine held parliamentary elections, which were recognized as free and fair by international observers from the West and Russia. Five blocs and parties: the Our Ukraine – People’s Self-Defense (OU-PSD, NUNS in the Ukrainian acronym), the Tymoshenko bloc, the Party of Regions (PofR), the Communist Party, and the Lytvyn bloc garnered more than the 3% required to get into the new parliament. It is, however, far from certain when the political forces represented in the new Rada will be able to form a parliamentary majority and appoint a new government. As it stands, the political crisis that has permeated the Ukrainian political scene since last spring is far from over. Some unexpected political alliances might emerge from the protracted political discussions that are likely to follow the announcement of the final results on 15 October. The Party of Regions has the largest percentage and highest number of seats, followed closely by the Tymoshenko Bloc, while the pro-presidential OU-PSD is a distant third. The two other factions in the new parliament have less than fifty seats combined, but it is widely expected that the smallest faction, the Lytvyn Bloc, could play the role of a kingmaker in the new parliament.

Results of 2006 Parliamentary Elections

Party Seats Percentage

Party of Regions 175 34.37
Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko 156 30.71
NUNS 72 14.5
Communist Party 27 5.39
Bloc Volodymyr Lytvyn 20 3.96

In assessing these results, a background of the events leading up to this election is useful. The election season in Ukraine began on 2 April when President Yushchenko issued a decree dissolving the previous convocation of the Verkhovna Rada. What seemed a last resort on the part of the President came after the ruling coalition of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych and Speaker Oleksandr Moroz had successfully wooed a handful of opposition deputies to switch sides, leading to talks on forming a constitutional majority, a move that would have rendered the president a purely ceremonial figure. Opinion polls indicated that the early elections would not change the status quo as the Party of Regions was expected to retain its high standings, while the fortunes of Our Ukraine seemed bleak. Indeed, the Party of Regions managed to increase slightly its percentage of the vote as did the OU-PSD bloc. However, both parties stand to lose a handful of seats each in the new parliament, due to the dramatic surge of the Tymoshenko bloc, the biggest winner in the elections. Tymoshenko’s parliamentary faction will expand from 129 to 156 deputies as a result of gaining 8% more votes than it received compared to the 2006 results. The combined tally of the OU-PSD and the Tymoshenko Bloc (228 seats) is enough to form a parliamentary majority and establish a new ‘Orange’ government. The events seemed to be following this course on election night when a jubilant Yulia Tymoshenko was greeted by leader of PSD and leading candidate on the OU-PSD candidate list, Yuri Lutsenko. During a joint press-conference both leaders vowed to stay true to the “ideals of the Maidan” and honor the pre-election agreements to form a coalition of democratic forces. However, on 3 October, President Yushchenko caused consternation among the Orange campwhen he issued a statement urging all political forces to “seek a compromise” and consider forming a broad coalition that would include the Party of Regions as well.

Why did the President decide to contradict the leader of his party and what lies behind the call for unity and compromise? Several observers pointed out that a Yulia Tymoshchenko government would seriously undermine if not completely dash Yushchenko’s hopes to run for the presidency again in 2008. By becoming the Prime Minister now, Yulia Tymoshenko would be able to use the powers of the office to boost her profile at the expense of Yushchenko to the point where nominating her as the presidential candidate of the Orange forces would be the only choice left to defeat Yanukovych or any other presidential hopeful from the Party of Regions. It appears in retrospect that Viktor Yanukovych made a huge political blunder by attempting to strip the president of the last vestiges of real power instead of forging a meaningful alliance with Our Ukraine that would relegate the Tymoshenko Bloc to the opposition benches. As the prominent Ukrainian pundit Yulia Lymar pointed out, “The problem of Yanukovych lies in the fact it took too long for him, that is until now, to realize that he needs Yushchenko as much as Yushchenko needs him… Unfortunately, this card cannot be played any more”

Yet, there is no unity within the OU-PSD bloc concerning Tymoshenko’s current candidacy. Whereas business groups in Our Ukraine represented by Yuri Yekhanurov are vehemently opposed to the possibility of Tymoshenko becoming Prime Minister as evidenced in a memo published by Ukrains’ka pravda, Yuri Lutsenko and his People’s Self-Defense group are clearly in favor of such a step. It is likely that if Yanukovych retains his prime-ministerial post, Lutsenko’s party members will break away from Our Ukraine and join forces with BYuT. Furthermore, the Orange electorate remains deeply antagonistic to the figure of Yanukovych, so Our Ukraine risks losing even more electoral support to the Tymoshenko Bloc if an alliance between Yushchenko and Yanukovych becomes a reality. In this light, the standings of Viktor Yanukovych within the PofR might not be as solid as they appear. As Ukrains’ka pravda’s analysis reveals, the Party of Regions candidate list was filled by people loyal to Rinat Akhmetov who is much more willing to seek rapport with Yushchenko in order to stop Yulia Tymoshenko even if it would mean changing the leadership of the party.

The prospect of an Orange coalition remains a more feasible option. After a closed door meeting with President Yushchenko on 4 October, Yuri Lutsenko opined that the Orange coalition might be formed by 15 October when the Central Electoral Committee is scheduled to announce the official results. However, given the factors described above, Ukrainian politics may yield more surprises in the coming weeks.

Published by the Stasiuk Program for the Study of Contemporary Ukraine, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. This article may be reproduced with appropriate acknowledgement.

The election campaign in Ukraine is already underway

Ukraine takes a decisive step closer to parliamentary elections after 155 Verkhovna Rada deputies surrender their mandates.

By Ilya Khineyko

On June 15 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the 5th session ceased to exist. By the morning of that day, 151 deputies from Our Ukraine and the Tymoshenko bloc had submitted their resignation papers to Oleksandr Moroz, bringing the total number of parliamentarians below the necessary quorum of 300. Later that same day, four more resignations were announced.
The de-facto dissolution of the Verkhovna Rada was carried out through the resignations of opposition deputies in accordance with the May 27 agreement of the Big Three, which ended the two-months-long political crisis in Ukraine. It happened in spite of the obstructionist maneuvers on the part of Oleksandr Moroz, who stands to lose most from the dissolution of the current parliament. Also, many rank-and-file opposition deputies were extremely reluctant to relinquish their mandates. As Ukrains’ka Pravda reports, before the resignations list was read out loud at the Verkhovna Rada session, “many MPs [had] asked not to have their names put in the top ten of the list because in the event that dissolution of parliament fails they would never have a chance to return to the Verkhovna Rada.”

From the Brink of Civil Strife to a New Election Campaign

By Ilya Khineyko

The most recent agreement by the three branches of government in Ukraine to hold elections on September 30, 2007 may not spell the end of the political crisis, which has plagued the country for the last two months.

“Today we can say that the political crisis is over,” Viktor Yushchenko told the Italian newspaper Corriere Della Serra on May 28, a day after Yushchenko, Oleksandr Moroz, and Viktor Yanukovych signed a joint statement, agreeing to set a date for early parliamentary elections on September 30. One cannot help but feel a strong sense of déjà vu regarding such confident pronouncements. After all, the political crisis in Ukraine, which began on April 2 when a presidential decree on the dissolution of the parliament was issued, was supposed to come to an end on May 4 when the president and prime minister agreed to hold early parliamentary elections. However, two important things were missing in the agreement: no definite election date was set and the signature of the third party, Verkhovna Rada speaker Moroz. At the time, it appeared that the Party of Regions had simply ‘disposed’ of the wily speaker whose party stood little chance of getting into the new Rada. These machinations, perhaps, provide a clue to understanding the tumultuous events of the last week that led to the Sunday agreement of the “Big Three.”