Toward an Anecdotal History of Ukrainian Politics

February 26, 2012

By Mykola Riabchuk

The second anniversary of Viktor Yanukovych’s presidency passed on February 25, and his presidency can be briefly defined in three possible ways: as a period of authoritarian consolidation, of imitative “reforms,” or of permanent and pervasive scandals. The latter definition is perhaps the best since it sheds revealing light on the previous two. In February, there were at least four major scandals – dramatic for their participants, anecdotal for outsiders, and highly instructive, in many ways, for political scientists and cultural anthropologists.

First of all, Roman Zabzaliuk, a member of the Parliament from the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, who switched sides at the end of the last year and joined the governing coalition, revealed the typical mechanism of recruiting opposition MPs by Yanukovych’s cronies. He confessed that he had acted as an “undercover agent” on behalf of his party leadership and, therefore, simulated acceptance of a tempting offer to join the pro-Yanukovych faction “Reforms for the [sake of the] Future,” at an impressive price of $450,000, plus an additional monthly allowance of $20,000 in cash for proper voting (http://www.telekritika.ua/doc/images/news/69665/page%2012-15.pdf).

The news by itself was hardly revealing since many other MPs have reported similar offers made to them at various times by Yanukovych’s people. The practice was not invented yesterday and certainly not by the Party of Regions. Observers remember how the pro-Kuchma majority was forged in the parliament in 2002, when two pro-presidential parties won only 20 per cent of votes but mustered eventually a formidable majority of both “independents” and opposition defectors.

Enormous and largely unrecorded and uncontrolled wealth accumulated by post-Soviet oligarchs enabled them to buy a host of officials, MPs, judges, journalists, et al. at dizzying prices. This is why an amendment was made to Ukrainian constitution in 2004 that required the pro-government majority in the parliament to be formed by factions and not by single MPs, i.e. defectors from other factions. In March 2010, Yanukovych’s supporters blatantly violated this law, which resulted in a sort of parliamentary coup d’etat and paved the way to further violations of Ukrainian laws and creeping usurpation of power by the increasingly autocratic ruler.

The only new thing in Zabzaliuk’s revelations is that he recorded his conversations with Mr. Ihor Rybakov, head of the faction “Reforms for the Future,” who allegedly gave him a bribe and discussed with him some other delicate matters. Thus, we can learn from the horse’s mouth not only the price-list for various deeds that can be considered immoral at best and criminal at worst but also how “Mr. Rybakov” (the real Mr. Rybakov, of course, denies any authenticity of the records) encourages Mr. Zabzaliuk to attract more defectors from the opposition and, most interesting, to recruit more “slaves” (in his words) in Western Ukraine in particular to work for the ruling party in the local electoral commissions as fake representatives of the opposition. This is a clear hint, one of many, at how the regime is going to stage the parliamentary elections later this year. Actually, the incumbents have little choice given that the popularity of the president and his party has fallen to the low teens and their staunch desire to stay in power indefinitely.

Zabzaliuk’s accusations were predictably downplayed by the government and pro-government media. The audio-clips are worthless since Ukrainian law does not consider unauthorized records as evidence. The fingerprints on “Rybakov’s money” are also no proof since he and his friends have already admitted they collected $100,000 for Mr. Zabzaliuk at his request, allegedly for a treatment abroad. And Mr. Pshonka, the prosecutor general (and president’s soldier, in case anyone has forgotten his earlier self-designation), announced that he saw no reason for a criminal investigation in this case since it was merely an internecine quarrel among MPs.

Zabzaliuk passed the money on to the Kyiv Children’s Hospital, but the major TV channels, predictably, ignored his generous move. Although the Tyzhden weekly that did report the story in detail and illustrated it graphically with fragments of “Rybakov’s conversation,” it was immediately withdrawn from the newsstands by some enigmatic order “from above” (http://www.telekritika.ua/news/2012-02-17/69665).

This might be considered the second biggest scandal of the month but since the official reaction of the Tyzhden managers to the incident is not yet clear, we can illustrate the creeping censorship in Yanukovych’s Ukraine with a no less revealing event. On February 14, Judge Olha Salamon of the Desniansky district court in Kyiv suspended the popular website “Dorozhny kontrol” (roadcontrol.org.ua) in response to a libel action by Hennady Hetmantsev, a traffic police officer, who had abused and humiliated a driver and then denounced the website for publicizing the video-record of his misbehavior. Remarkably, the judge shut down the site by a simple order, not by a court decision. Moreover, she closed all the content, not just the material in question. Still worse, she suspended the site for the whole period of court deliberations, which could last, in practice, for years. This is how multiple ways to destroy independent media in Ukraine are perfected.

Hetmantsev, one of the heroes of this ugly story, attained notoriety a year ago in Odesa after he tried to intimidate the Roadcontrol activists who had filmed his colleague Oleksandr Shvets insulting a Ukrainian-speaking driver by calling his speech a “cow language.” After the scandal, Shvets was reportedly dismissed from the traffic police, whereas Hetmantsev survived and retaliated as promised (http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2012/02/15/6958817/).

There are probably no business or personal ties between Mr. Hetmantsev and Judge Salamon. Her responsiveness to his groundless demand reflects not only widespread incompetence of Ukrainian judges in legal matters (it is an open secret that many of them simply buy their university diplomas and court positions), but also the arbitrariness of the entire system and its fundamental bias for the government against members of society. The judges, police, and prosecutors protect primarily the state and the authorities – with all their privileges and entitlements—but not the rights and freedoms of Ukrainian citizens.

The third scandal in February was related, once again, to the new government nominations. This time, Viktor Yanukovych surprised everyone by appointing Ihor Kalinin head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), and Dmitri Salamatin as Minister of Defense. Neither is a personal friend of the president nor a native of the Donbas region, as has been the norm for appointments over the past two years. Both of them seem to be acts of patronage by the president’s older son Oleksandr, a dentist who has emerged as a successful businessman. Last year, he reportedly placed his acolytes in the upper echelons of the National Bank, Ministry of Interior, and National Tax Administration (http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2012/02/3/6951682/).

None of them as yet gained prominence as major specialists in their fields. But this is probably not why they were hired (http://dt.ua/POLITICS/oy_ti,_ksivonko_moya_bogatirskaya-97141.html). Ihor Kalinin was a Russian KGB officer and Afghan war veteran who in 1992 for unknown reasons moved from Moscow to Kyiv and made a career in the SBU – all the way to the top, which may give Ukrainians pause for thought about Vladimir Putin’s dictum that KGB agents are appointed for life. Salamatin lacks even such dubious professional credentials. His entire experience in defense, to the best of our knowledge, amounts to a couple of scuffles with opposition MPs in the parliament during which he skillfully broke a few noses and jaws of his political opponents, and was rewarded henceforth by the president with the position of the head of the State Arms Trade Agency.

Born in Kazakhstan, Salamatin moved to Ukraine in 1999 as a Russian citizen and how he acquired Ukrainian citizenship remains a mystery. Even less clear is whether he relinquished his Russian citizenship, as Ukrainian law requires. Thus his appointment has led some observers to speculate on the “Russian hand” in Ukrainian politics and Yanukovych’s readiness to cave in to Moscow (http://tyzhden.ua/Politics/42594). More likely, however, is that Yanukovych does not trust his fellow-oligarchs and party bosses any longer, relying instead on a kind of Praetorian Guard. Or, as Alexander Motyl suggests, Yanukovych’s reliance on “complete outsiders can only mean that [he] is expecting serious trouble at home in the coming year and doesn’t think native cadres can do the job” (http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/alexander-j-motyl/yanukovych-brings-russian-thugs-back).

The fourth scandal is probably the most interesting and unusual. Earlier this month, in Odesa, customs officers confiscated 38 kilos of cocaine worth $7.5 million, hidden in pineapples and transported from Costa-Rica inside a refrigerator. The unusual part of the story is that the incident should not have happened because the cargo was “supervised” by one of four “fashionable” (as they are euphemistically called in Odesa) broker companies that de facto control the green corridor at the seaport. They have, reportedly, such influential patrons in Kyiv that neither customs nor security service officers dare to interfere in their business. At the moderate price of $10,000-$15,000 in kickbacks, therefore, they provide clients with a virtually customs-free access to the Ukrainian market (http://www.segodnya.ua/news/14340652.html).

There are two explanations of why the fashionable company failed to protect its client’s cargo from customs on this occasion. One story is that the power supply was disconnected from the refrigerator for a few days and the customs officers were surprised that the cargo owners were unconcerned. A more realistic version is that the cargo was tracked by the American anti-drug service from the outset and the search in Odesa was made at their request.

And here the unusual part of the story ends and the interesting part begins. The scandal was reported in detail by the popular tabloid Segodnia, owned by Rinat Akhmetov, the leading Ukrainian oligarch and Yanukovych’s main sponsor in the past. Whereas analysts muse on the real meaning of this publication – either Akhmetov is doing a favor for the Americans to persuade them to grant him finally a U.S. visa, or else he is fighting some business competitors, or merely tries to distance himself from the potentially damaging affair: no one (!) believes that the Ukrainian customs merely did their job, that it was a case of business as usual, and they caught the smugglers. And this is the point.

We live in the country in which no one believes the mass media simply report the news, customs take care of smugglers, and law-enforcement agencies protect the citizens rather than themselves and their real masters. Viktor Yanukovych is certainly not the main culprit and did not invent this system. But he is definitely someone who does his best to exploit its faults rather than to fix them. And, frankly, there are no reasons to believe that the next three years of his presidency are likely to be any different.


Beyond sticks and carrots: Western policy towards Ukraine

August 6, 2011

Iryna Solonenko and Peter Rutland

The publication of a letter from a dozen academics titled “EU should get tough now with Yanukovych [11]” in the Kyiv Post on June 16 has triggered a lively debate [12] about Western policy towards Ukraine. Taras Kuzio, Lucan Way, Serhiy Kudelia and half-a-dozen colleagues argue that the West must apply pressure on President Viktor Yanukovych to halt the erosion of democratic freedoms that has taken place since he took office in February 2010. They propose a visa-ban on top Ukrainian officials, and a halt to the introduction of a free-trade area with the European Union, unless what they see as the politically inspired trials of former officials such as ex-premier Yulia Tymoshenko are dropped. 

In response, Alexander Motyl [13] and Adrian Karatnycky [14] have argued that keeping Ukraine out of Moscow’s orbit should be the main priority shaping Western policy. They argue that the application of sanctions would merely help Yanukovych consolidate his authoritarian regime and push him even further in the direction of close ties with Russia.

“It is not unusual for Western foreign policy to be pulled between promoting democratic values on one hand and defending the West’s geopolitical interests on the other. However, the debate over Ukraine has an artificial quality in that it contributes to the over-personalization of politics in this country of 46 million people, reducing it to a personal battle between Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko.”

Even though most of the initial letters’ signatories are based in North America, it is interesting that they focus their call for sanctions on the European Union and not the US government. This reflects the perception that nowadays Brussels, not Washington, holds the key to Ukraine.

The context for this debate is that by the end of this year the EU and Ukraine are supposed to conclude talks on an Association Agreement [15] (AA) that have been under way for four years. The advocates of sanctions are concerned that such an agreement would give the Yanukovych government a free hand to manipulate the parliamentary elections that will take place in fall 2012.

It is not unusual for Western foreign policy to be pulled in two directions, between promoting democratic values on one hand and defending the West’s geopolitical interests on the other. However, the debate over Ukraine has an artificial quality in that it contributes to the over-personalization of politics in this country of 46 million people, reducing it to a personal battle between Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko. This is not to deny that a gross miscarriage of justice does seem to be under way in the Tymoshenko trial [16] – just that this factor alone should not bring Western policy towards Ukraine to a grinding halt.

The international record on sanctions of all types has been mixed, at best: on average, they work about half the time. One relevant success story would be the sanctions imposed on Slovakia before 1998. They did succeed in triggering a social mobilization that ousted Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and set Slovakia on the path to EU entry.

At this juncture, however, the chances that sanctions on Ukraine’s top leaders would cause a radical shift in their political style, or mobilize society against them, are slim. The sanctions advocates don’t really explain why they think these sanctions would work. Conditionality only works if the benefits of complying with external requirements outweigh the costs of reforms. Ukraine’s ruling elites (like politicians everywhere) think short-term. In the short-term perspective the incumbent elites might consider they have more to lose from having free elections than they will gain from the long-term benefits the AA offers. Indeed, it would take up to 10-15 years for the deep and comprehensive free trade area between the EU and Ukraine, a core component of the AA, to become a reality, while in the short run the costs of adaptation will need to be paid. Added to which, Moscow can also exercise leverage, and try to neutralize Western initiatives.

Rather than play the carrots and sticks game, trying to influence leaders’ decisions, it is better to wager on society. This means seeing through to their conclusion the negotiations. The sanctions debate overlooks the potential transformative effect the AA will have on Ukraine. Signing the agreement would mean that Ukraine enters serious commitments to reform itself. Since the major barriers to EU-Ukraine bilateral trade are non-tariff, access to the EU market will require Ukraine to adopt up to 1,500 pages of acquis communautaire regulations. The AA will be a legally binding arrangement, meaning that the EU and European companies can bring Ukraine to the European Court of Justice if provisions of the agreement have been violated, and vice versa.

This type of engagement will encourage domestic reform-minded actors to push for change from inside. It will unlock the potential of numerous groups and individuals that are interested in reform, but have limited tools to push for them under present conditions. These actors include both civil society groups and businesses, who will be able to use the AA procedures to push for a more competitive environment and above all a fairer judicial process in Ukraine.

It is true that the EU runs the risk of being seen as compromising the values on which it wants the partnership with neighboring countries be based. When announcing the successful conclusion of AA talks this December, the EU should make it clear that it expects democratic norms to be upheld in Ukraine. But refusing to sign the agreement altogether would likely bring no policy change at all.

Failure to conclude the AA would not only be a blow to Ukraine, but also a nail in the coffin of the EU’s already embattled Eastern Neighborhood Policy – which is built on the premise that there are common values uniting the EU and its eastern neighbors.

Smart engagement, including increased flows of trade, mobility of people and growing interdependence, which the AA offers, is the way to go. Post-war Europe started with functional and technocratic integration, with no sign of political union in sight. What the EU is today, even with the current crisis, is still impressive. This tried and proven path of long-term integration is the best hope for success with Ukraine and other Eastern neighbors. Engagement will produce a critical mass of institutions, practices and individuals that will inevitably challenge the current regimes in the longer run. There is no short-term quick fix to the deficiencies in Ukraine’s political culture.

Links:
[1] http://www.opendemocracy.net/themes/russia-theme
[2] http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia
[3] http://www.opendemocracy.net/topics/international-politics
[4] http://www.opendemocracy.net/topics/democracy-and-government
[5] http://www.opendemocracy.net/countries/ukraine
[6] http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia/topics/politics
[7] http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia/topics/human-rights
[8] http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia/topics/foreign
[9] http://www.opendemocracy.net/author/iryna-solonenko
[10] http://www.opendemocracy.net/author/peter-rutland
[11] http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/106920/
[12] http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/mykola-riabchuk/ukraine-blackmail-and-bluff
[13] http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/new/blogs/motyl/Integrating_an_Authoritarian_Ukraine_into_Democratic_Europe
[14] http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/108653/print/
[15] http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/109355/
[16] http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/natalia-sedletska/ukrainian-politics-on-trial
[17] http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/iryna-solomko/yuri-lutsenko-views-from-prison-cell
[18] http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/aleksey-matsuka/dispatch-from-donetsk
[19] http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/olena-tregub/ukraine-europe-its-brightest-hope
[20] http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/david-marples/ukraine-crisis-of-self-identity
[21] http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/mykola-riabchuk/viktor-yanukovych-pandora%E2%80%99s-box-and-moscow-orchestra
[22] http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
[23] http://www.opendemocracy.net/about/syndication

This article was originally published by our partner organization, Open Democracy, 4 August 2011 and is reissued here with permission.


Pandora’s Box and the Moscow Orchestra

April 4, 2011

Mykola Riabchuk

On February 25, on the first anniversary of his presidency, Viktor Yanukovych invited his three predecessors to his office to “discuss current issues and the future development of the Ukrainian state” http://www.president.gov.ua/news/19454.html. This brief item of information on the president’s official website was illustrated with a photo of the smiling participants at the meeting—Viktor Yushchenko on the left, Leonid Kravchuk on the right, and Leonid Kuchma across the round-table from the incumbent. None of them, with the exception probably of the host, realized that behind its cheerful façade, the meeting resembled one of those Byzantine banquets that would end with the poisoning, slaughtering, or impaling of the distinguished guests.

A month later, one of the participants of the meeting, ex-president Leonid Kuchma, may understand that metaphor. On March 24, he was summoned for interrogation to the prosecutor’s office charged with the abuse of power and implicated in the killing of investigative journalist Heorhy Gongadze back in September 2000. In Yanukovych’s Ukraine, where the judiciary is just a part of the executive fully subordinated to the president, and where the Prosecutor General is his bosom buddy (“a member of president’s team,” as he characterized himself proudly in public), hardly anyone believes that the case against Leonid Kuchma was launched without the direct blessing of Yanukovych.

Speculation revolves mostly around the question why Yanukovych has made this dubious step and what consequences may follow. The alleged reasons typically include Yanukovych’s desire to divert public attention from his domestic and international failures, to disprove accusations against his government about selective justice, and to intimidate opponents and mobilize supporters by proving that the president is tough but just.

Yulia Mostova highlights another reason why Yanukovych might want to prosecute Kuchma: revenge for the perceived humiliation during the Orange Revolution, when the incumbent refused to use force against the protesters and pass on the office to the president-elect, opting instead for negotiation and compromise that ended up with the repeated second round of the election and Yanukovych’s defeat. If the price of becoming the pick-up successor to Leonid Kuchma was 400 million thanks, as Mostova implies, the reasons for revenge might be even more serious http://www.dt.ua/articles/78263.

Remarkably, not a single expert or commentator expressed the opinion that Yanukovych was driven in his decision by some idealistic desire for justice or the practical need for house-cleaning. In view of all Yanukovych’s other deeds, it is really difficult to sell such a nice story to anyone, either at home or abroad. This does not preclude, however, a smart usage of all these arguments by some people around Yanukovych to persuade him to launch the case against Leonid Kuchma. This might well be in the interests of these people but is hardly in the interests of Yanukovych himself for the following reasons.

First, because the propaganda effect of this step, in terms of positive image-building for Yanukovych, is negligible. No one considers it an act of justice and proof of the equality of all Ukrainian citizens before the law. All the policies of Ukrainian authorities suggest the opposite from all regions and walks of life – every day and every hour.

Second, Kuchma can hardly be sentenced by any court, however “executive” they are in Ukraine, because all the people to whom he may have given a direct order (or “suggestion”) to kill Gongadze, are dead and would not be able to testify. And the records, presumably gathered from the tape recordings by Kuchma’s guard Mykola Melnychenko, even if accepted as evidence (that itself is very problematic), do not contain any direct order to carry out murder.

Third and most important, by initiating the murder case, Yanukovych very unwisely draws public attention to his own conversations with Kuchma recorded by Melnychenko, which are not just deplorable but definitely merit a criminal investigation (intimidation of judges, blackmail, bribery, large-scale corruption, etc). Deputy Prosecutor General Renat Kuzmin, who mentioned Melnychenko’s records among the possible evidence against Kuchma, has inadvertently opened a Pandora’s box since this very evidence could be used against dozens of Ukrainian officials who discussed a variety of criminal plans with Kuchma. (Almost all are alive and well, and now follow their new master, Yanukovych). There is little surprise that opposition MP Yuri Hrymchak has already submitted an official request to the Prosecutor General demanding an investigation of many more episodes recorded by Melnychenko that testify to criminal conspiracy and activity of other members of Kuchma’s team, including current Prime Minister Mykola Azarov and Yanukovych himself http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2011/03/25/6054029/.

And, finally, Yanukovych apparently has created the precedent of prosecuting ex-presidents that may eventually be applied against him (at least as a tool of psychological pressure and possible blackmail) http://www.dt.ua/articles/78776.

So, if the trial does not serve reliably Yanukovych’s personal interests and if the public interests are not, in principle, his concern, the question arises who is most likely to benefit from the dubious special operation and how?

Dr. Andrij Zhalko-Tytarenko, former head of the Ukrainian Space Agency and the former Ukrainian Director of the Science and Technology Center of Ukraine in Kyiv, considers the entire “Melnychenko affair” (“Kuchma-gate”) a provocation of the Russian secret services aimed at establishing full control over Leonid Kuchma. The theory is barely new since many experts have argued that Kuchma had no real reasons to physically destroy Gongadze and that he was merely framed by some powerful and influential enemies seeking to compromise him. The only weak element in this theory is the involvement of the leading Ukrainian police officers, including the late Minister of Interior Yury Kravchenko, in Gongadze’s abduction and killing. None would have dared to play into Russian hands without blessing from above—if not from Kuchma, at least from the minister who may have acted (or pretended to act) on Kuchma’s behalf. He could probably have done so only with a clear perspective to replace Kuchma as president, which seems very unlikely under those circumstances.

Zhalko-Tytarenko hypothesizes that the current re-launch of the Gongadze case is part of the Russian domestic power game. According to his theory, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev may be planning to run for a second term and needs to convince the two-time former president, Vladimir Putin, not to run. “If Kuchma will face murder charges (it is too late for abuse of power charges), he will have no choice but to provide all the names that he certainly knows from Ukrainian secret service reports.” This may hold a certain grain of truth provided that Melnychenko’s records contain, inter alia, some very unpleasant information for Mr. Putin discovered by the SBU about his connections with the notorious Semion Mogilevich and involvement in laundering drug money through the St.-Petersburg company SPAG http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/P_Koshiw_Danyliw07.pdf.

Zhalko-Tytarenko might be right about Medvedev’s sophistication and even ambitions but hardly about his real influence and use of independent resources to launch such a complicated manipulative game. Rather, the Russian element in the story is simpler and more traditional. The Kremlin people in Yanukovych’s team persuaded him to make one more self-defeating step—exactly in the same way they persuaded him to give ministerial posts to Messrs. Yezhel, Tabachnyk, and Khoroshkovsky, to promote the Russian church in Ukraine at the cost of all other denominations, to suppress the Ukrainian language, culture, and identity, to violate and manipulate the constitution, to make a Russian citizen the head of his bodyguards, to detain one of Angela Merkel’s men at Kyiv’s Boryspil airport on the eve of his own official visit to Germany, and to make many more stupid maneuvers that not a single professional politician would ever commit. The goal of the manipulators is clear: to undermine Yanukovych’s authority, to compromise him both domestically and internationally, and to render him another “Lukashenko,” ostracized by the West and completely dependent on Moscow.

Taras Chornovil, Yanukovych’s former insider, defines these people as the “Moscow Quartet”: Serhy Liovochkin, Valery Khoroshkovsky, Dmytro Firtash, and Yury Boyko. All are reportedly involved in murky gas deals with Russia, fully controlled by Putin and Mogilevich as Gazprom’s shadow owners. We can hardly obtain proof of these speculations but we are likely to see the results of this and many more «special operations” carried out by the “Moscow Orchestra” (rather than a humble “quartet”).

The Kuchma murder case will not end in the foreseeable future, but will rather be used to compromise (and probably to blackmail) the entire “elite,” including Yanukovych himself. This might be well a part of the strategy of “directed chaos” that includes also the creation of fake “nationalist” and “extremist” groups, planting bombs (the explosions at apartment blocks in Russia in 1999 that preceded Putin’s election provide a fitting precedent) and many more http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/100803/. Back in 2004, the Moscow “political technologists” tried to implement such a strategy in Ukraine to promote the candidacy of Leonid Kuchma for a third presidential term. The “directed chaos,” however, veered out of their control and resulted in an authentic mass uprising, i.e. the Orange Revolution. Remarkably, one of the leading Moscow “technologists” of that time, Igor Shuvalov, serves today as an “adviser” to Serhy Liovochkin and, at the same time, to the leading Ukrainian TV channel “Inter” owned—inevitably—by SBU chief Valery Khoroshkovsky http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2011/04/1/6073286/.

Besides the clear political goal—to strengthen the authoritarian power of a rogue president completely dependent on Moscow—the team may pursue a more practical and palpable goal: to eliminate as many political-cum-economic players as possible from the forthcoming privatization of Ukraine’s last asset, its arable land (the protracted moratorium on its sale is expected to be lifted at the appropriate moment).

In a recent interview, Leonid Kravchuk, a former communist apparatchik and perhaps the smartest of all Ukrainian presidents, suggested that: “the system has already gnawed away Yanukovych’s legs and is approaching his belly.” So, he must “either destroy the system or concentrate all power in his hands and become a totalitarian leader” http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2011/04/4/6077221/. The latter, Kravchuk believes, is unlikely because Ukrainians would not accept it. He may be right but the problem is that Yanukovych is listening not to Ukraine’s first president, but rather to the Moscow Orchestra.


They Will Not Sing

February 11, 2011

Mykola Riabchuk

During my schooldays, I heard an interesting account of the etymology of the word “shantrapa” (šantrapá), broadly used in Soviet slang to define petty thugs or, as a dictionary more politely suggests, “worthless persons.” The word had arguably come from the French ne chantera pas, meaning will not sing. It referred to actors who lacked a singing voice and were used in operas as mere figureheads – just to give the appearance of a huge chorus on the stage. In actuality, one dictionary claims, the word originated from the Czech šantrok, šаntrосh (“liar”) and old German santrocke (“fraud”).

Whatever the truth, the word has regained broad currency in Ukraine within the past year, referring both to the ruling elite and to the habits they reintroduce and reinforce at all levels of societal life. One of the notable luminaries who deployed the term recently was Taras Chornovil, a defector from the Orange camp and ardent supporter of Viktor Yanukovych during the Orange Revolution. Some time ago, he left the Party of Regions after a serious disagreement with Yanukovych’s personnel policy but he still remains a member of the pro-government majority in the parliament and, in his own words, “support[s] the government and tr[ies], as far as possible, to avoid fighting with the president.” In sum, he is neither a clear-cut loyalist nor a member of the opposition. This might be a good position for rather impartial observations of political shenanigans, especially if combined with insider knowledge of both camps.

“Yanukovych,” Chornovil says, “gave shantrapa a free hand. Even under Yushchenko, shantrapa did not behave so defiantly; there was someone who supervised them… There was no control from the top, but at least at the middle level, there were some people authorized by Yushchenko who took care of something, more or less. And, from time to time, they attacked shantrapa, keeping them at bay. Now it’s gone. And shantrapa reigns unchecked. First, they pillage en masse, and second, they shut up all opponents… Here we have an absolute lawlessness (bespredel) at the level of local authorities, law-enforcement agencies, and so on” http://from-ua.com/politics/c3bdfdac02c3c.html.

The phenomenon is barely new. Long ago, it was observed in Russia where critics of Putin’s regime argued that he created an atmosphere of lawlessness and brutality, so familiar and convenient for the post-Soviet elite that he did not necessarily need to commission the murder of Politkovskaya, or Estemirova, or other human rights activists. He just signaled to society that revolutionary expediency, not the law, reigned supreme, and that all the enemies of the regime should be cooled off in “cesspools.” This was a clear message to all the thugs both inside and outside the government that they had a free hand to decide arbitrarily who was the enemy and when and how they should be cooled off.

This is exactly what is happening now in Ukraine. All the shantrapa who were somewhat unnerved by the revolution and had kept a rather low profile under Yushchenko’s feckless rule, are now taking revenge, encouraged by Yanukovych’s comeback and his unscrupulous words and deeds. Try to imagine how post-Soviet officials (rather Soviet, than post-) feel when they see that corruption is tolerated at the top and only political disloyalty causes a problem; or when they hear the president warning opposition mayors that he will (literally) tear off their legs and screw off their heads. This is a clear signal to all the loyalist bureaucrats, police officers, judges and prosecutors, to all the unreformed host of homo sovieticus to tear and screw off whatever they wish and whoever they feel appropriate.

And they do. The number of violent crimes against journalists within the past year increased exponentially; the number of cases of tortures and obscure deaths in custody, recorded by the reputable Kharkiv Human Rights Group, doubled and tripled; the number of illegal searches, arrests, detentions and politically motivated interrogations exceeded everything that had happened within the previous two decades.

What kind of restraints can officials feel after they see how thugs from the ruling party (real thugs placed on the list of the Party of Regions as former drivers and body-guards of oligarchs) savagely beat opposition MPs (many of which were hospitalized with broken limbs)? What conclusion would a policeman make after listening to the description of the incident in the parliament made by one of the Regions’ bosses Mykhaylo Chechetov: “There was no beating. Probably they broke their own heads against the wall and now try to accuse us” http://glavred.info/archive/2010/12/17/170622-9.html.

It is no surprise that the number of detainees in Ukrainian prisons (not necessarily political inmates) who “beat and injure themselves,” and commit very unusual “suicides” has dramatically increased since Yanukovych’s installment. Some reports from police precincts sound like black humor: in Kharkiv, the Loziv district police department acquired some fame when within a week of their arrest, two detainees fell from the fourth floor window during interrogation, allegedly committing suicide – even though in both cases the relatives claim the victims were severely beaten beforehand http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine_police_brutality/2296124.html.

Yanukovych’s spin-doctors, international lobbyists, and Ukrainian diplomats work hard to whitewash his image and to downplay the systemic and escalating character of abuses of power under his presidency. One of them, smartly enough, has recognized recently that “the corruption here is a precondition of doing business,” “the judiciary in Ukraine is a disaster,” “the mentality of the SBU is not helpful,” and so forth. Nonetheless, he assured readers, Ukraine is headed in the right direction, and “most of the embarrassing, stupid and somewhat cruel actions are random, there is no pattern,” and, perhaps most encouraging, “people in Yanukovych’s administration aren’t really bad people. Maybe they lack confidence, maybe they are poorly educated, and a bit provincial, without good knowledge of the laws and the Constitution. But they are not stone-cold killers and these are not the kind of people that try to establish an authoritarian state” http://www.day.kiev.ua/303062.

One may recollect here a similar revelation of George W. Bush who claimed some time ago to have discovered a “true democrat,” having gazed into the deep, snake-like eyes of Vladimir Putin. But we will not engage in reminiscences about the past. We just note that the features observed above in Yanukovych’s administration by his American lobbyist are exactly what political shantrapa is about. And the low-level shantrapa sense the mood and respond accordingly. If the president can nominate an outspoken Ukrainophobe, Dmytro Tabachnyk, as minister of education, one should not be surprised when a traffic policeman somewhere in Odesa responds to a citizen who approaches him in Ukrainian that he doesn’t speak that “cow language” – an insult to a Ukrainian, that can be compared to calling someone in the U.S. the N-word.

Like masters, like servants.

Whatever the PR-specialists might claim about the “random” character of multiple abuses of power in Ukraine, the sheer statistics collected by human rights NGOs, both domestic and international, demonstrate the opposite: they are ubiquitous, definitely systemic, and growing dramatically in number and scope since Yanukovych assumed power. In other words, this is not a deviation, but rather is typical of the sort of lawless, authoritarian “normality” that is being introduced in Ukraine.

In such a context, all talk about “order,” “stability,” and the “fight against corruption” sound hypocritical. And all attempts at “reforms” – without the rule of law – are futile.

Maybe Yanukovych’s lobbyists are right: he is not a bad man, and his associates are not “stone-cold killers,” as Mr. Bruce Jackson puts it, and some of them perhaps are even smart enough to “be running a software company in Washington state.” I don’t know. I know, for sure, however, that “they will not sing.


Flawed by Design: the Local Elections in Ukraine

November 8, 2010

By Mykola Riabchuk

On the eve of Ukrainian local elections scheduled for October 31 relatively few people and virtually no experts believed they would be free and fair – and with good reason. The first shot at the optimists’ hopes was fired shortly after the presidential elections, as the new parliamentary majority and new government were created in a patently unconstitutional way under the leadership of President Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions. One of their first decisions, rubber-stamped by the now-obedient parliament without any discussion, was cancellation of local elections scheduled by the Ukrainian Constitution to be held in May and their eventual (and, again, absolutely illegal) rescheduling in October.

The reason behind this delay was patently obvious. The victorious team was not ready yet to begin another triumphant campaign after taking office in March. They needed some time to fix the playing field in the most beneficial way for themselves. Step by step, they changed radically the electoral law, stacked both central and local electoral commissions with their loyalists, subordinated completely the administrative courts that are in charge, inter alia, of solving electoral disputes, replaced all the governors and local presidential representatives that supervise the process, placed unscrupulous allies in charge of all the law-enforcement agencies, and hired even more unprincipled hacks to run national TV and radio.

Yet, even more importantly, they sent clear symbolic signals to both their supporters and opponents, but primarily to those who stood on the sidelines, reluctant and hesitant. The signals left little doubt about who was coming back to power and what kind of policies would be implemented. The police, for the first time since the Orange revolution, encroached upon people’s constitutional right for peaceful protests, restraining arbitrarily, on many occasions, their freedom of assembly. The secret police harassed demonstratively journalists, scholars, and NGO activists. Tax authorities intimidated disobedient businessmen, including media-owners, suggesting that there would be problems for those who would not tow the line. And prosecutors, in the best traditions of selective application of law, have arrested a number of opposition figures on corruption charges, all of which, so far, have been broadly trumpeted but poorly substantiated.

In brief, the new authorities have effectively redeployed all the mechanisms of Kuchma’s notorious “blackmail state” that had been abandoned but never disbanded after the revolution by President Yushchenko and his team. Now, the entire nation is paying the price for the inability of the Orange leaders to clean house, eradicate corruption, and introduce the rule of law.

As the elections neared and all the power was being concentrated increasingly in the hands of Yanukovych and his lieutenants, the dirty electoral tricks from the Kuchma era resurfaced conspicuously. Here and there, reports surfaced about the most inconvenient opposition candidates who were either barred from running, or bribed or intimidated to withdraw their candidacy, or stand aside. The most incompliant were arrested on the traditional “corruption” charges that could not necessarily be proved but would certainly eliminate the rival from the impending elections.

Tymoshenko and her “Batkivshchyna” party were considered the main rivals of the incumbent authorities, so the dirtiest tricks were directed primarily against them. The most outrageous was probably the creation of bogus parties under the same name that were slavishly registered by the election commissions, while the authentic “Batkivshchyna” documents were rejected. As a result, Tymoshenko’s party was effectively excluded from the elections in at least three crucial regions – Lviv, Kyiv, and Ternopil.

The far-right “Svoboda” appeared to be the main beneficiary of this game. They won a plurality of 30-35% in the three oblasts of Halychyna and mad significant advances in the Kyiv oblast, accumulating a respectable 5% on the national scale that, if repeated eventually in the 2012 parliamentary elections, would qualify them for seats in the Rada. For the Party of Regions it was actually a win-win situation. Having no chance to beat Tymoshenko in her western strongholds, they used “Svoboda” to undermine her strength and, at the same time, to discredit the opposition – both domestically and internationally – as dangerous radicals, nationalists, even crypto-fascists. At the same time, they understand well that “Svoboda,” unlike “Batkivshchyna,” has no chance of expanding significantly beyond Western Ukraine to challenge the Party of Regions in its traditional strongholds. Therefore, all the national TV channels (otherwise effectively censored by the authorities) hosted eagerly the “Svoboda” leaders in their political talk shows while Tymoshenko and her close associates were effectively blacklisted from the same “pluralistic” programs.

The day of the elections did not bring much violence but it brought considerable chaos. Long lines queued outside the polling stations and many voters gave up the wait, rendering the turnout unusually low for Ukraine, while many more remained at home because the bulletins disseminated by the authorities seemed to indicate there was no real choice of candidates. An unusually high number of voters (7%) voted against all candidates – probably for the same reason. In at least two places, Yasynovata (Donetsk oblast) and Kamyanets-Podilsky, where popular local leaders supported by opposition were barred from standing, the “against all” vote reached 30%. The disorder was exacerbated at various polling stations as uncounted bulletins were found and observers expelled; some members of the commissions left, or were locked out, or reportedly bribed or forced to sign fixed protocols, and more.

The final results had not been announced a week later, when this article went to press. Local results were announced wholesale by the district commissions rather than at each polling station as required by law. In all the districts where the exit polls showed the Party of Regions candidates lagging closely behind their rivals (for example, in Odesa, Luhansk, and Kharkiv), the official results reversed those standings.

Impartial observers are unanimous: “Ukraine’s Oct. 31 local elections did not meet standards for openness and fairness set by the presidential elections earlier this year.” Or, as the Kyiv Post editor put it more straightforwardly: “Yanukovych, still hobbled by his complicity in fraudulent elections during the era of ex-President Leonid Kuchma, had a chance to show he is a democratic leader. Instead, the president showed he’s the same old conniver unworthy of leading a great nation of 46 million people.” Alas, that’s true.

But what does this unpleasant result mean for the country?

First, the Party of Regions has advanced further in monopolizing all branches of power and consolidating its authoritarian rule. In terms of the popular vote it received a mere plurality of around 36% – much less than its candidate Viktor Yanukovych attained nine months ago in the second round of the presidential elections (49%), but roughly the same proportion he got in the first round. Yet, in practical terms, the electoral system adjusted by the Party of Regions to their particular needs, gives them multiple advantages. Only half of the local deputies are elected from the party lists. The first-past-the-post system apparently enhances the authority of Yanukovych’s party as it is the biggest one and endows it with a vested interest in splitting and cloning the opposition parties as much as possible, as well as in rigging election results because even minor manipulations of such a system can be crucial.

The remaining half of the elected local deputies are the so-called “independents,” even though they are nominated by different parties. Most of them are local officials or businessmen highly vulnerable to official blackmail, bribery, and intimidation. The majority, as we know from the Kuchma era, end up in the government camp – the only place where they can secure their business.

So, the Party of Regions has a good chance to create a majority not only in its traditional strongholds in the south east but also in most oblasts and towns of central Ukraine, governed until recently by “Batkivshchyna” and other “Orangists.” In some cases, the Communists who gained their usual 5%, will be employed as allies, in other cases Tigipko’s “Strong Ukraine” (4%) or Yatseniuk’s “Front of Changes” (7%) might be lured into a coalition. In any case, the Party of Regions will be able to increase its grip over the country, which will likely result in further crackdowns on the independent mass media, NGOs, political opposition, and disloyal (or not loyal enough) businesses.

Yet, this outcome may not make Yanukovych’s life easier. As Yulia Mostova remarked poignantly in a recent issue of Dzerkalo tyzhnia, by eliminating the opposition he becomes his own worst enemy (http://www.dt.ua/1000/1550/70762/). He cannot satisfy the Westerners who expect from him the promised reforms, not just moribund authoritarian “stability.” Nor can he satisfy the Kremlin, which requires more “integration” moves from him and demands that more and more national assets be given up. Something should be certainly done for the radical reform of the country but the incumbent president’s ability to achieve anything other than augmenting rampant corruption looks even less feasible than before the elections.


WE PROTEST AGAINST THE HARASSMENT OF A HISTORIAN BY THE UKRAINIAN SECRET SERVICE, OR SBU

September 15, 2010

On 9 September 2010 the SBU detained the historian Ruslan Zabilyi and confiscated his research material. Now the SBU is seeking to launch a criminal case against him.

Whether we share Ruslan Zabilyi’s views or not, we consider it absolutely impermissible for a security service to harass researchers and obstruct intellectual activities.

Many of us are signing this petition in spite of the fact that we seriously disagree with Ruslan Zabily’s politics and his views of Ukrainian history. Even while we abhor the politicization of history that has become so evident in the recent years of Orange versus anti-Orange debates, we believe that the resolution of scholarly disputes depends upon the free flow of ideas, and free access to historical sources no matter how controversial they may be.

We believe that a truly democratic and independent Ukraine needs and facilitates full and free inquiry into its history. Such an enquiry can only take place with the broadest access to Ukrainian archives.

Given the record of denial of access to archives and libraries, suppression of dissenting views, denial of academic freedom, and isolation of Ukraine from the international scholarly community in the past, any Ukrainian government must be especially vigiliant not to revive such practices.

Against this background, the treatment of Ruslan Zabilyi points to a reversion to regrettable and dangerous practices of the totalitarian past. We find this incident extremely worrying, especially in view of earlier illegitimate uses made of the SBU in the realm of academia and civil society under the new Ukrainian government.

Even strong disagreements about Ukraine’s past and its politics of memory and history cannot be solved by methods that amount to harassment and intimidation. Ukraine’s reputation is also bound to suffer very severely from such methods.

We call on the SBU and the Ukrainian government to show responsibility.

We call on Ukraine’s public and its scholarly community not to tolerate the intrusion of blatant police methods where research, scholarly dispute, and public debate should be the means of resolving – or living with – differences. We urge the Ukrainian public and the Ukrainian and international scholarly community to join us in supporting Ruslan Zabilyi and in censuring the use of police methods to try to quash scholarly discussion.

Висловлюємо протест проти переслідування історика з боку Служби безпеки України (СБУ)

9 вересня 2010 року СБУ затримала історика Руслана Забілого і вилучила у нього дослідницькі матеріали. Зараз СБУ шукає способу розпочати проти нього кримінальну справу.

Багато хто з нас підписує цю петицію попри те, що ми ніяк не погоджуємося з тією політичною лінією, прибічником якої є Руслан Забілий, та з його поглядами на українську історію. Рішуче виступаючи проти політизації історії, яка стала особливо помітною в останні роки, під час «помаранчево-біло-блакитних» дебатів, ми, однак, переконані, що успіх наукових дискусій залежить передовсім від вільного обігу ідей і доступу до історичних джерел, хай якими контроверсійними вони є.

Ми переконані, що справді демократична й незалежна Україна повинна знати всю правду про свою історію і сприяти вільному її вивченню. Таке дослідження історії може відбуватися лише за умови широкого доступу до українських архівів.

З огляду на факти, що мали місце у минулому – заборона допуску до архівів та бібліотек, переслідування інших поглядів, заперечення академічної свободи, ізоляція України від міжнародної академічної спільноти, – кожен український уряд повинен бути особливо уважним, щоб не допустити відродження подібної практики.

Саме тому трактування Руслана Забілого сигналізує про повернення до сумної і небезпечної практики тоталітарного минулого. Ми вважаємо цей інцидент особливо тривожним на тлі попередніх незаконних дій СБУ стосовно академічної спільноти та громадянського суспільства, які розпочалися в Україні із приходом нової влади.

Серйозні розходження стосовно українського минулого, політики пам’яті й історії не можна розв’язувати методами, які зводяться до утисків і залякування. Такі дії завдають великої шкоди репутації України.

Ми звертаємося до СБУ та українського уряду із закликом виявити відповідальність у цьому питанні.

Звертаємося до української громадськості та наукової спільноти із закликом не миритися із застосуванням неприпустимих поліційних підходів у сфері, де проблеми повинні розв’язуватися шляхом дослідження, наукової дискусії, громадських обговорень, а також прийняття існування різних поглядів.

Наполегливо закликаємо громадськість України, українську й міжнародну наукову спільноту приєднатися до нас – виявити підтримку Руслану Забілому і засудити використання поліційних методів, що є спробою перешкодити науковій дискусії.

Signatures/Підписи:

Felix Ackermann, European University Viadrina Geschichtswerkstatt Europa
Tarik Cyril Amar, Assistant Professor, Columbia University
Melanie Arndt, Dr., Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung, Potsdam
Jars Balan, Kule Ukrainian Canadian Studies Centre, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta
Omer Bartov John P. Birkelund Distinguished Professor of European History, Brandeis University
Jan Behrends, Research Fellow, Social Science Research Center Berlin
Karel Berkhoff, Associate Professor, Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Amsterdam
Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, Professor Emeritus, Manhattanville College and Johns Hopkins University
Tim Buchen, Center for the Research on Antisemitism, Technische Universität Berlin
Jeffrey Burds, Associate Professor of Russian & Soviet History, Northeastern University
Tetyana Bureychak, Associate Professor, Department of History and Theory of Sociology, I. Franko National University, Lviv
Marco Carynnyk, Writer, Toronto
Istvan Déak, Seth Low Professor Emeritus, Columbia University
Roman Dubasevych, Ernst-Moritz-Arndt-Universität Greifswald
Oles Fedoruk, Research Fellow, Taras Shevchenko Institute of Literature, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
Rory Finnin, Lecturer in Ukrainian Studies, University of Cambridge
Michael S. Flier, Director,Oleksandr Potebnja Professor of Ukrainian Philology, Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University
Elena Gapova,Associate Professor, Western Michigan University/European Humanities University
Alexandr Gogun, PhD student, Humboldt University, Berlin
Semion Goldin, The Chais Center for Jewish Studies in Russian, The
Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Israel
George G. Grabowicz, Professor, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, Harvard University
Sofia Grachova, PhD Candidate in History, Harvard University
Andrea Graziosi, Professor, University of Naples
Borys Gudziak, Rector, Ukrainian Catholic University
Mark von Hagen, Professor, Director, SHPRS, Arizona State University, President of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies
Lubomyr Hajda, Associate Director, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute
Elizabeth V. Haigh,.Professor Emeritus, Saint Mary’s University Halifax, Canada
Karl Hall, Associate Professor, Director of Undergraduate Programs,
Central European University, Budapest
Patricia Herlihy, Professor Emerita, Brown University; Louise Wyant Professor Emerita, Emmanuel College, Boston; Adjunct Professor, Watson Institute for International Studies,Associate, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute
John-Paul Himka, Professor, University of Alberta
Alexandra Hrycak, Associate Professor and Chair, Department of Sociology
Reed College, Portland, Oregon
Halyna Hryn, Editor, Harvard Ukrainian Studies
Dr Liudmyla Hrynevych, Institute of History,National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
Dr Vladyslav Hrynevych, Professor, Senior Researcher, Institute of Political and Ethno-National Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
Yaroslav Hrytsak, Professor, Ukrainian Catholic University, Director, Institute for Historical Research, Lviv University
Maciej Janowski, Professor, Institute of History, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw/Central European University, Budapest
Oksana Kis, Historian, Senior Reserach Fellow, Institute of Ethnology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
Bohdan Klid, Assistant Director, Canadian institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta
Zenon E. Kohut, Professor, Department of History and Classics, Director, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies
Boris Kolonitskii, Professor, European University, St. Peterburg; Institute of History, St. Peterburg Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences
Ihor Kosyk, PhD student, Vienna University
Mark Kramer, Director, Cold War Studies Program, Harvard University
Alexander Kratochvil, PhD, Exzellenzcluster “Kulturelle Grundlagen von Integration”, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz
Kravchenko, Volodymyr, Professor, President of the International Association for the Humanities
Sergei Kravtsov, Senior Researcher, Center for Jewish Art, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Serhiy Kudelia, Assistant Professor, National Univeristy “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”
Serhij Kvit, Rector, National University “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”
Maria Lewicka, Professor, University of Warsaw
André Liebich, Professor, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva
Torsten Lorenz, Institute of History, Humboldt University, Berlin
Paul Robert Magocsi, Professor, University of Toronto
Еmil Majuk, Stowarzyszenie “Panorama Kultur”, Poland
Liudmyla Males, Associate Professor, Sciology, Taras Shevchenko University, Kyiv
Ihor Markov, Political Scientist, Director of the Department for Ethno-National Studies, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
David R. Marples, Distinguished University Professor, Department of History & Classics, University of Alberta
Terry Martin, George F. Baker III Professor of Russian Studies, Department of History, Harvard University
Igor Martynyuk, Ph.D. Ab Imperio Quarterly
Jarred McBride, PhD Candidate (UCLA)
Askold Melnyczuk, Associate Professor,University of Massachusetts, Boston
Oleksandr Melnyk, PhD Candidate, University of Toronto
Joanna B. Michlic, Ph.D.,Director Project on Families, Children and the Holocaust, Brandeis University
Marina Mogilner, PhD, Editor for Russian and NIS, Ab Imperio, Kazan
Alexander Motyl, Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University-Newark
Iryna Musiienko, Associate Professor, National Technical University “Kharkiv Polytechnical Institute”
Krzysztof Michalski, Professor, Director of the Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna
Eleonora Narvselius, Centre for European Studies, Lund University
Larissa Onyshkevych, Ph.D.,Princeton Research Forum
Vitalii Perkun, Research Fellow, Insitute of History, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern,Associate Professor, Director, the Crown Family Center for Jewish Studies,Northwestern University
Dieter Pohl , Professor, Institut für Geschichte, University of Klagenfurt, Austria
Antony Polonsky, Albert Abramson Professor of Holocaust Studies at Brandeis University and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.
Andriy Portnov, Ukraina Moderna Journal, Kyiv
Anna Procyk, Professor, City University of New York
Roman Procyk, Ukrainian Studies Fund, New York
Wojciech Przybylski, Res Publica Nowa, Chief Editor
Robert Pyrah, CEELBAS Postdoctoral Research Fellow, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London
Vasyl Rasevych, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Ukrainian Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
Shimon Redlich, Prof. Emeritus of History, Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva
Inna Reut, PhD student, Graduate School for Social Research, Warsaw
Bohdan Rubchak, Professor Emeritus, Unversity of Illinois at Chicago
William Risch, Associate Professor, Georgia College and State University
Malte Rolf, Osteuropäische Zeitgeschichte, Leibniz Universität Hanover
Per Anders Rudling, Ernst-Moritz-Arndt-Universität Greifswald
Natalka Rymska, Essayist, Translator, Lviv
Roman Senkus, Director, CIUS Publications Program,Toronto Office, University of Toronto
Ostap Sereda, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Lviv, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
Viktoria Sereda, Assistant Professor, Ivan Franko University
Oxana Shevel Assistant Professor Tufts University, Department of Political Science
Christopher Stroop, Ph.D. Candidate,Stanford University
Andrzej Szeptycki, Dr., University of Warsaw
Volodymyr Sklokin, kandydat istorychnykh nauk, International Solomon University, Kharkiv
Iryna Sklokina, Ph.D. student, V.N.Karazyn Kharkiv National University
Ihor Skochylias, Dean, Ukrainian Catholic University
Regina Smyth, Associate Professor of Political Science, Indiana University
Timothy Snyder, Professor, Department of History, Yale University
Mykola Soroka, PhD, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta
Myron Stachiw, Historian, Director, Fulbright Program in Ukraine
Lidia Stefanowska, Assistant Professor, Warsaw University
Jan Surman, MMag., PhD Student, Institute of History, University of Vienna
Frank Sysyn, Director, Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Research,
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta
Roman Szporluk, Professor emeritus, Harvard University and University of Michigan
Philipp Ther, Professor, European University Institute, Florence
Iryna Vushko PhD, Yale University
Anna Wylegała, PhD student, Graduate School for Social Research, Warsaw
Theodore Weeks, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale
Amir Weiner, Associate Professor of Soviet History, Stanford University
Andrew Wilson, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London/European Council for Foreign Relations
Dr. Sergei Zhuk, Associate Professor, Ball State University, Muncie
Arsen Zinchenko, Insitute of History, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

Additional Signatures
Protest against SBU Harassment of Ruslan Zabilyi (as of 16 September, 14.30)

Dr. Vitaly Chernetsky, Associate Professor, Dept. of German, Russian & East Asian Languages, Director, Film Studies Program, Miami University
Natalia Khanenko-Friesen, Associate Professor, University of Saskatchewan, College of St. Thomas More, Canada, Director of Prairie Centre for the Ukrainian Studies.
Natalya Lazar, Candidate of Political Sciences, Doctoral Student, Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Clark University, USA
Olga Linkiewicz, PhD, Tadeusz Manteuffel Institute of History, Polish Academy of Sciences
Michael Moser, Prof. Dr. habil., Vienna, Munich, Piliscsaba
Serhii Plokhii, Professor of Ukrainian History, Harvard
Professor Natalia Pylypiuk, PhD, Dept. of Modern Languages & Cultural Studies, University of Alberta, Chair of the International Committee of the Canadian Association of Slavists
Dr. Steven Seegel, Assistant Professor of History, University of Northern Colorado
Dmytro Shtohryn, Professor-Emeritus of Slavic Languages & Literatures and Library Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Dr. Oleh Turiy, Vice-Rector for Research, Ukrainian Catholic University

Additional signatures, 19 September 2010

Łukasz Adamski, Programme coordinator for Bilateral Relations in Europe,Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw
Jakub Biernat, Journalist, Polish Television TVP, Warsaw
Dr. Vitaly Chernetsky, Associate Professor, Dept. of German, Russian & East Asian Languages, Director, Film Studies Program, Miami University, President of the American Association for Ukrainian Studies.
Jeffrey C. Goldfarb, Michael E. Gellert Professor, Department of Sociology, New School for Social Research
George E. Jaskiw, M.D., Professor of Psychiatry, Case Western Reserve University
Cleveland
Igor Hałagida, Professor, Uniwersytet Gdański
Professor A. Kamenskii, Chair, Department of History, Higher School of Economics, Moscow
Prof. Dr. Andreas Kappeler, Institut für Osteuropäische Geschichte der Universität Wien
Mag. Klemens Kaps, Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter, Doktoratskolleg “Das österreichische Galizien und sein multikulturelles Erbe”, Institut für Osteuropäische Geschichte, Universität Wien
Andrzej Leder , Prof., IFiS PAN
Roman Lozynskyi, PhD student, Geography Department, Ivan Franko University, Lviv
Klaus Nellen, Permanent Fellow, Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna
Victor Ostapchuk, Associate Professor, Department of Near and Middle Eastern Civilizations, University of Toronto
Bohdan Pechenyak MSW/MPH Student, Temple University, Philadelphia

Additional Signatures, 29 September 2010

Łukasz Jasina – historia – “Kultura Liberalna”.
Thomas M. Prymak, PhD, Research Associate, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Toronto, Book Review Editor, ‘Journal of Ukrainian Studies.’
Grzegorz Rossolinski-Liebe
Dr Kataryna Wolczuk, Senior Lecturer in East European Politics, Centre for Russian and East European Studies (CREES), The University of Birmingham
Valerii Zema, Research Fellow, Institute of Ukrainian History, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine


On the Importance of Being Candid

August 14, 2010

Mykola Riabchuk

Dmytro Potekhin, an activist of the youth movement that played an important role during the Orange Revolution, has recently circulated a number of questions that may look rhetorical at first glance but, like the childish questions of Voltaire’s Candide, they deserve serious consideration.

“Isn’t it strange”, he wrote, “that in a country where
1) the government is not legitimate since it was formed by unconstitutional majority;
2) the parliament is not legitimate since the majority did not result from a revote nor was it dissolved and reelected;
3) the court system is not legitimate since it operates under the new ‘law’ passed by the ‘parliament’;
4) the ‘president’ is not legitimate since he has done nothing either with the ‘parliament’ or with the ‘government’ to reestablish constitutional rule,
- the key human rights activists are complaining that the ‘minister’ of interior is not gathering the public council to hear about human rights abuses, while saying nothing about the unconstitutional nature of the whole situation;
- the key freedom movement is ‘against censorship’, while its activists – journalists keep calling all these people who took over the institutions ‘president’, ‘prime minister’, ‘minister’ projecting their legitimacy;
- the bloggers wonder why the security service is removing posts from their blogs, but still call it Security Service of Ukraine, not Security Service of Usurpers;
- the businesses are complaining that the taxes are too high, while they are taken by a bunch of organized people who in the early 90s were called racketeers;
- the opposition is going to take part in the elections under the ‘law’ passed by a bunch of MPs still calling themselves deputies, none of whom get out of this fake Verhovna Rada […]
People, what are we talking about?!”*

To put it simply, why has a de-facto parliamentary coup d’etat and eventual usurpation of power by a minority clique been tacitly accepted by both the political opposition and society at large?

There are many answers that largely explain, albeit not justify, the odd situation.

First, the dubious takeover of power was approved by the Constitutional Court – even though the same Court a year and a half ago passed the opposite decision on a similar issue. Actually, the credibility of the Court was undermined long ago, in 2003, when the constitutional pundits recognized that Leonid Kuchma could run for presidency for the third time because his first term did not count – he had served it arguably under the old constitution. The Orange leaders put much more efforts into subduing the Court than making it really efficient and independent. Society never voiced strong concerns about this – and now we all are duly punished for our passivity and opportunism.

Secondly, the coup d’etat was accepted by Western governments with a benign neglect that placed the Ukrainian opposition in an odd situation: they had to deny the legitimacy of the government whose validity, in fact, was recognized (or at least not questioned) internationally.

And thirdly, the misrule of the Orange leaders has discredited not only them – as today’s opposition, but democracy in general. This boosted the attractiveness of the authoritarian alternative within one part of the society, and frustrated, demoralized, and alienated the other part, hindering its ability to resist. In such a situation, a minority party with sufficient resources and determination can easily capture the state – as happened in Italy or Germany long ago, and more recently in Russia.

So, I would say that the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government is recognized by default – simply because there is no other government (since Tymoshenko unexpectedly easily stepped down in March, passing authority to the usurpers), nor is there any viable alternative (since the opposition is still in disarray, and society either frustrated with everything or still trustful in the new duce).

In this regard, David Marples is probably right when questioning Alexander Motyl’s prediction of the imminent collapse of the Yanukovych presidency in Ukraine – probably by the year 2012 (Edmonton Journal, Aug. 9, 2010). It looks really overoptimistic – but not because of “perceptible economic recovery and increasing popularity of the Yanukovych leadership”, as Dr. Marples suggests. Neither “recovery” nor “popularity” are actually viable. The former is mostly connected to the post-crisis recovery of the entire world economy and to a very low base for comparison. The latter is related to the ‘honeymoon’ period of Yanukovych’s presidency and still high expectations of his electorate (actually, Yushchenko’s popularity at the time was even higher but has since fallen dramatically). So far, there are no economic reforms in sight to secure sustainable growth. And austerity measures designed to support this growth do not target officials or friendly oligarchs, so would hardly sustain the president’s popularity in the near future.

Motyl might be wrong for another reason. He expects that the 2012 parliamentary and 2015 presidential elections will be free and fair – as they used to be within the past five years. Not necessarily. Given the pace and direction of political and legal “reforms” introduced by the new regime, we may have Russia-style ‘managed democracy’ in Ukraine very soon. Actually, the local elections this Fall will provide a good litmus test for Ukraine’s democratic procedures and institutions. So far, the changes of the electoral law rubber-stamped by the parliament to advantage the ruling party a few months before the elections do not evoke much optimism. They introduced a number of retroactive requirements that should have been abolished by any impartial court if it happened to exist in Ukraine. And they confirmed once again the strong intention of the government to play with rules rather than play by rules.

So now might be a proper time to come back to the candid questions raised by Dmytro Potekhin and to remind the king and his court that they are naked. They got some carte-blanche, however dubious, to introduce law and order and much needed reforms. But instead, they bring even more lawlessness and disorder, and introduced very peculiar “reforms” that satisfy mostly their oligarchic friends and Moscow patrons. For the beginning, I suggest to mention, wherever possible, their titles and positions within the quotation marks or with the words “so called”.

Potekhin is right – we do not have a legitimate government, legitimate parliament, legitimate Court. We have people who call themselves “ministers”, “deputies”, and “judges”. Let them do it. But we should not accept their claims at face value.

*Potekhin’s text has been modified slightly for grammatical reasons. DRM


Yanukovych’s Gleichschaltung and Ukraine’s Future

July 7, 2010

By Mykola Riabchuk

It seems neither Ukrainian society nor international observers have come yet to terms with what really happened in the country within the last half a year. Back in February, when Viktor Yanukovych, a notorious villain of the 2004 Orange revolution, scored a narrow victory (49 vs 46 per cent) against the incumbent prime-minister Yulia Tymoshenko, no one expected much good from his comeback but very few people considered it as a national catastrophe either.

The predominant experts’ view, including my own, was that the new president would probably pursue a Kuchma-style “multi-vector” policy internationally and a “Kuchma-lite” policy domestically. It seemed to be “lite” not because Yanukovych was any more committed to the rule of law, or had weaker authoritarian inclinations, but because presidential authority became much weaker these days than it used to be under Kuchma – due to the constitutional amendments made in 2004. So, for the time being, the Byzantine intrigues at the top were likely to continue and a dysfunctional Ukrainian democracy was likely to persist.

What virtually no one could have predicted back in February, was the blatant violation of the Constitution, the de-facto parliamentary coup d’etat completed by the new president and his Party of Regions, with the tacit acceptance – ‘benign neglect’ – of Western governments. Alexander Motyl has gone so far as to compare Yanukovych’s “coordinating” government with the Nazi’s 1933 Gleichschaltung. Certainly he did not mean there are any ideological similarities between both leaders and parties or the subsequent developments in Germany and Ukraine. He simply stressed the Bolshevik ‘revolutionary expedience’ that facilitated, in both cases, a swift and bold takeover of state institutions in a very arbitrary, semi-legal, or absolutely illegal way.

The main miscalculation of both Ukrainian and international observers came from the fact that Yanukovych’s Party of Regions, even with two minor satellites – the Communists and the Lytvyn Block – did not have a majority in the parliament to create a legitimate government. The Ukrainian constitution stipulates that the government is created not by a simple majority of MPs but also by factions that have a sufficient number of MPs on their list to create such a majority. Such a restriction might look strange from the western point of view but in Ukraine it was enshrined deliberately in the Constitution in 2004 to restrict parliamentary corruption – the retail purchasing of single MPs from other factions. Hence, the only legitimate way to create a new government, for the Party of Regions, was to form a coalition either with Yushchenko’s ‘Our Ukraine’ or Tymoshenko’s Bloc. Or, if those negotiations failed, he could announce new parliamentary elections. Yanukovych and his Party of Regions did not bother themselves with undoing the knot but simply cut it.

This resulted not only in the rapid creation of the new government endorsed by a fully obedient parliamentary majority. This was also a highly important symbolic message – both to Yanukovych’s supporters who typically despise democracy with all its boring procedures and who appreciate a ‘strong hand’, and to the opposition, which was in disarray through infighting, demoralized by the electoral defeat, and completely shocked by the unconstitutional move of the ‘Regionals’. Yet, the most important message was sent to the population at large: “We are back, with all our practices tried and tested in Donbas; we are serious guys, no jokes, it’s just the beginning”.

Within a few months, Yanukovych and his team have effectively subordinated all branches of the government, marginalized opposition, and consolidated their authoritarian rule largely based on the mechanisms of a ‘blackmail state’. In this regard, Yanukovych’s regime is not much different from that of Leonid Kuchma. What makes him different, however, is his much stronger and unabashed pro-Moscow orientation (if not subordination) in external policies, and much more divisive (if not overtly Ukrainophobic) stance in domestic issues. Leonid Kuchma pursued the so-called ‘multi-vector’ international politics, flirting with both Moscow and the West, and benefitting personally from such a shuttling. Internal politics was also manipulative: Kuchma assumed a peace-keeping role between east and west, left and right, and Russophones and Ukrainophones, sending mixed messages to different sides and reacting opportunistically to different challenges. This was the essence of post-Soviet ‘pragmatism’ that satisfied both the president and the ruling oligarchy in their need for stability and personal enrichment.

So far, Yanukovych exposes a striking absence of such ‘pragmatism’. He takes a lot of steps that can be deemed irrational in every way. One can list a huge number of dubious deals with Russia that are rightly perceived as one-sided, non-reciprocal concessions. There are also a lot of symbolical gestures, personnel nominations, divisive policies, and provocative decisions that bring no benefits to the nation or to the ruling oligarchy and the president himself. This makes many Ukrainian observers wonder whether Yanukovych is really a mediocre puppet of Ukrainian oligarchs, as many used to believe, or a much more dangerous puppet of the Russian security services and their powerful lobby in today’s Ukrainian government.

Whatever the real role of Russian intelligence in Ukraine might be, Yanukovych’s team is certainly not monolithic. It consists of various groups which can be roughly subsumed under two headings – pro-Moscow hawks connected to the notorious RosUkrEnergo and probably FSB/SVR; and ‘pragmatic’ doves pursuing a Kuchma-style multi-vector, quasi-centrist policy. So far, the hawks’ policies seem to prevail. They strongly alienate not only committed Ukrainophones who feel their identity under pressure, but also civil society at large, which finds civic freedoms under serious threat. The small and medium business sector is also set against the new economic and, in particular, fiscal policies of Yanukovych’s government. And some signs of anxiety emerge even among Ukrainian oligarchs who are increasingly dissatisfied with Russian dominance in all areas. The last straw might be the ultimate disappointment of Yanukovych’s rank-and-file pro-Russian electorate with economic and anti-corruption promises that are very unlikely to be delivered.

A regime change looks rather inevitable – if the next, 2012 parliamentary elections are free and fair, as they have been in Ukraine in the past five years. But here the main question dwells: how far will the incumbent government proceed in curbing media freedom, suppressing the opposition, subjugating the courts, bribing and intimidating civil servants, and using violence against protesters? If allegations of Russian involvement hold true, the puppet government may proceed beyond any limits. Ramzan Kadyrov of Chechnya might be a graphic example. Western benign neglect in this case would be not only self-deceiving but also self-defeating.

Mykola Riabchuk is a Ukrainian cultural and political analyst. His last collection of essays “Mrs Simpson’s Favorite Gun” (in Ukrainian) was published in 2009 in Kyiv.


If Yanukovych does not change course, he may inspire revolution

April 7, 2010

Alexander J. Motyl

As Ukraine’s recently elected President Viktor Yanukovych prepares to visit Washington this month, he will aim to project an image of stability, confidence and control. In reality, Yanukovych has committed a series of mistakes that could doom his presidency, scare off foreign investors and thwart the country’s modernization. Yanukovych’s misrule is courting a second Orange Revolution.

Yanukovych’s first mistake was to violate the Constitution by changing the rules according to which ruling parliamentary coalitions are formed, making it possible for his party to take the lead in partnership with several others, including the Communists. That move immediately galvanized the demoralized opposition that clustered around his challenger in the presidential elections, former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.

His second mistake was to appoint as prime minister his crony Mykola Azarov, a tough bureaucrat whose name is synonymous with government corruption, ruinous taxation rates, and hostility to small business. The appointment dispelled any hopes Ukrainians had that Yanukovych would promote serious economic reform.

His third mistake was to agree to a cabinet consisting of 29 ministers as opposed to 25 before — an impossibly large number that will only compound its inability to engage in serious decision making. That the cabinet contained not one woman — Azarov claimed that reform was not women’s work — only reinforced the image of the cabinet as a dysfunctional boys’ club.

His fourth mistake was to appoint two nonentities — a former state farm manager, and an economics graduate from a Soviet agricultural institute — to head the ministries of economy [Vasyl Tsushko] and finance [Fyodor Yaroshenko]. Meanwhile, he created a Committee on Economic Reform, consisting of 24 members, to develop a strategy of economic change. The size of the committee guarantees that it will be a talk shop, while the incompetence of the two ministers means that whatever genuinely positive ideas the committee develops will remain on paper.

His fifth mistake was to appoint the controversial Dmytro Tabachnyk as minister of education. Tabachnyk has expressed chauvinist views that democratically inclined Ukrainians regard as deeply offensive to their national dignity, such as the belief that west Ukrainians are not real Ukrainians; endorsing the sanitized view of Soviet history propagated by the Kremlin; and claiming that Ukrainian language and culture flourished in Soviet times.

Unsurprisingly, many Ukrainians have reacted in the same way that African-Americans would react to Ku Klux Klan head David Duke’s appointment to such a position — with countrywide student strikes, petitions, and demonstrations directed as much at Yanukovych as at Tabachnyk.

These five mistakes have effectively undermined Yanukovych’s legitimacy within a few weeks of his inauguration. The 45.5 percent of the electorate that voted against him now feels vindicated; the 10-20 percent that voted for him as the lesser of two evils now suspect that their fears of Tymoshenko’s authoritarian tendencies were grossly exaggerated.

And everyone worries that Yanukovych and his band of Donbas-based “dons” are ruthlessly pursuing the same anti-democratic agenda that sparked the Orange Revolution of 2004, which denied Yanukovych the fruits of a rigged presidential election.

Several other key dismissals and appointments have only reinforced this view. The director of the State Security Service archives — a conscientious scholar who permitted unrestricted public access to documentation revealing Soviet crimes — has been fired. The National Television and Radio Company has been placed in the hands of a lightweight entertainer [Yehor Benkendorf], who is expected to toe the line.

Most disturbing perhaps, several of Yanukovych’s anti-democratically inclined party allies have been placed in charge of provincial interior ministries — positions that give them broad scope to clamp down on the liberties of ordinary citizens.

Democratically inclined Ukrainians are increasingly persuaded that Yanukovych wants to become Ukraine’s version of Belarus’s dictator, Alexander Lukashenko. But Yanukovych’s vision of strong-man rule rests on a strategic, and possibly fatal, misunderstanding of Ukraine.

First, the Orange Revolution and five years of Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency empowered the Ukrainian population, endowing it with a self-confidence that it lacked before 2004 and consolidating a vigorous civil society, consisting of professionals, intellectuals, students and businesspeople with no fear of the powers that be. Yanukovych’s efforts to establish strong-man rule already are, and will continue to be, resisted and ridiculed by the general population.

Second, Ukraine’s shambolic government apparatus cannot serve as the basis of an effective authoritarian government. Tough talk alone will fail to whip a bloated bureaucracy into shape. Worse, Ukraine’s security service and army are a far cry from those in Belarus. Yanukovych may try to emulate Lukashenko, but without a strong bureaucracy and coercive apparatus, he will fail.

Third, with an ineffective cabinet, all decision-making will be concentrated in Yanukovych’s hands. Even if one ignores his deficient education and poor grasp of facts, Yanukovych’s appointment of Tabachnyk demonstrates that Ukraine’s president is either completely out of touch with his own country, or arrogantly indifferent to public opinion.

Fourth, Ukraine is still in the throes of a deep economic crisis. If Yanukovych does nothing to fix the economy, Ukraine may soon face default, and mass discontent among his working class constituency in the southeast is likely. If Yanukovych does embark on serious reforms, that same constituency will suffer and strikes are certain.

So negotiating the crisis will require popular legitimacy — which Yanukovych is rapidly squandering, a strong government — which he does not have, and excellent judgment — which is also missing from the equation.

Indeed, if Yanukovych keeps on making anti-democratic mistakes, he could very well provoke a second Orange Revolution. But this time the demonstrators would consist of democrats, students, and workers.

The prospect of growing instability will do little to attract foreign investors, while declining legitimacy, growing incompetence, and tub thumping will fail to modernize Ukraine’s industry, agriculture and education. Yanukovych could very well be an even greater failure as president than Yushchenko.

Although the outlook is grim, it is not yet hopeless for Ukraine’s new president. He could still grasp a modest victory from the jaws of an embarrassing defeat by ruling as the president, not of Donetsk, but of all Ukraine.

All he has to do is restrain his appetite for power and learn to rule with the opposition and with the population. It’s not so complicated — it’s democracy.

Alexander J. Motyl is professor of political science at Rutgers University in New Jersey. This article originally appeared in the Wall Street Journal and is reprinted with the author’s permission.


EU admonishes Ukraine for lack of reforms

December 10, 2009

David Marples

It was billed as a pivotal moment in Ukraine’s integration into Europe, a December 4 summit between the country and the European Union in Kyiv, ending with the long anticipated signing of an association agreement. It didn’t happen. Instead, the EU leaders criticized Ukraine for its lack of progress in reforms, withheld a substantial loan and postponed any free trade and accession agreements for the foreseeable future.

At the summit, President Viktor Yushchenko asked for “political understanding” from the EU, maintaining that the delay in signing the association agreement was a result of weariness over further expansion and the consequences of the world recession. He also stated that the Ukrainian government had failed to meet its obligations with “international financial institutions” and parliament had failed to pass various laws.

However, he added, if elected, the integration process would continue and he is the only candidate entering the January 17 presidential elections firmly committed to Ukraine’s eventual acceptance in the EU. All the problems, he assured his audience “are temporary.”

One senses the complete disillusionment of the European leaders with Ukraine, and particularly Yushchenko. European Commission President, Jose Manuel Barroso told the Ukrainian president that reforms were needed, and that bold words were not being followed up with appropriate actions. He urged Ukraine’s leaders to end their perpetual bickering and work together.

Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt, whose country is the current president of the European Union, expressed his desire for Ukraine’s president, government, and parliament to make a joint effort to reform the economy and the energy industry. At the heart of the EU’s concern is the secure supply of Russian gas, in transit through Ukraine.

Yushchenko’s self-appraisal seems misguided. More than any other figure, he has not only failed to address current problems, but also undermined the efforts of his Prime Minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, to introduce reforms.

Tymoshenko not only averted another gas crisis as a result of a meeting with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, but also removed the corrupt intermediary RosUkraineEnergo (Russian-Ukrainian Energy) from the equation. However, the president cannot work with her and has frequently preferred to collaborate with his former rival, Regions Party leader Viktor Yanukovych, against his Prime Minister.

Ukraine’s economic standing today has fallen to an all-time low. Fitch Investors’ Service, for example, has reduced its ranking to B-, six levels below the investment grade. According to Bloomberg.com, Ukraine is the world’s second-least credit worthy country. The currency is in a tailspin, and both the IMF and EU have suspended credit tranches that are badly needed to offset the effects of the recession.

The vast majority of Ukrainian residents put the blame on Yushchenko for current problems. Society is polarized between ostentatiously rich entrepreneurs and a majority that is barely subsisting. Virtually all the oligarchs of 2004 are still present. For example, Viktor Pinchuk, the son-in-law of former president Leonid Kuchma—whose corrupt and secretive leadership was partly responsible for the Orange Revolution—recently consolidated six Ukrainian television companies into a single holding.

Yushchenko is reported to earn about US$5,000 per month. But a year after his election his son Andrey, aged 19, was driving a BMW valued at almost US$200,000, the only such car in Kyiv according to the newspaper Ukrains’ka Pravda. Such stories suggest that the president was not sincere about ending corruption in Ukraine.

Earlier this year, however, Yushchenko presented a list of his accomplishments as president: the creation of a democratic state with a free media, and serious pretensions to join the EU and NATO. In reality, as the electorate perceives, these achievements are undermined by negative acts and extraordinary pettiness toward those considered his rivals.

One should add that Yushchenko’s enemies, chief among which are the leaders of Russia, have deliberately tarnished his image. But the Russians did not need to invent much.

Ironically, the Europeans prefer to deal with Belarus’s authoritarian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka, once the pariah of the continent who ruled what one US strategist called “an outpost of tyranny.” Belarus is less corrupt and politically more stable than Ukraine, partly because the country lacks an effective opposition. But it does not flatter to deceive.

Where does this leave Ukraine?

First, no agreements with the Europeans will be ratified until after the presidential elections. The EU will then take stock with the new president—likely either Tymoshenko or Yanukovych. Like Russia, they are waiting for Yushchenko to leave office.

Second, Ukraine’s political elite seems as firmly entrenched as the Communist Party once was. That fact is hardly surprising given that it took advantage of the collapse of the USSR to take over Ukraine’s economic assets, especially steel. Only a united leadership can end this hegemony, and the realistic solution would be to nationalize the major industrial companies.

Third, it seems self-evident that Ukraine has to determine its own economic and political path, one that is not dictated by the IMF, Russia, or the European Union. Its leaders might heed the advice of the Swedish Prime Minister and focus on cooperation rather than squabbling. The impasse of the past five years cannot be repeated.

(First published in the Edmonton Journal, (December 2009)


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