Canned Democracy

April 6, 2013

Halya Coynash

It was a bad week for democracy in Ukraine with formal democratic processes as close to the real thing as canned laughter on a TV show to genuine mirth.

The door to Europe, and specifically the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement was all but slammed shut by the rejection on Wednesday of former Interior Minister Yury Lutsenko’s cassation appeal.  Ukraine’s High Specialized Court upheld the outcome of a trial, which, as repeatedly pointed out by the EU and the democratic community, “did not respect international standards as regards fair, transparent and independent legal processes.

Rule of law was just as removed from a courtroom in Zaporizhzhya, which on 2 April convicted two former sacristans of the Svyatopokrovsk Church and the brother of one of them to 15 and 14-year prison sentences over the bomb blast in the Church on 28 July 2010.  Judge Minasov ignored the fact that there was no evidence in the case aside from multiple “confessions” made without proper defence, and almost certainly under physical and psychological pressure.  The confirmation of this by two forensic psychologists was ignored, while a third report which interpreted smiles, gestures etc during the night interrogations as evidence of an “inclination to crime”  was quoted in detail in the judgement.  Minasov had rejected applications to have all forensic psychologists summoned to give evidence.  The list of irregularities in this case is as long as that in the trial of Lutsenko, and widely believed to be linked with the fact that President Yanukovych at the time demanded arrests within the week.

In both these cases, as well as the ongoing attempt to charge former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko with murder, few believe that the judges – or prosecutor – in the cases are acting autonomously.

The case against Tymoshenko encountered a bump on 2 April with a key witness Serhiy Taruta testifying that at the time of the killing of MP and businessman Shcherban, there was no conflict between him and Tymoshenko.

The case is so dodgy that inconvenient bleeps may not overly worry those pulling the strings.  Renat Kuzmin, Deputy Prosecutor General, whose trips abroad to justify the trials of opposition leaders are organized by such PR companies as Burson-Marsteller, will simply accuse all critics, including authoritative western observers of defamation if they suggest any political motivation.

There were plenty of other uncomfortable subjects during the week.  They included the President’s income declaration which, for the second year in a row, declared 15 and a half million UAH in “royalties.”  The latter must be understood very loosely since the President did not publish a single word in 2012.  In fact, had he published even one book the royalties received per word would quite possibly outdo many international bestseller writers. The amount would also instantly bankrupt most publishing houses, at least in Ukraine.  Not, however, the Donetsk publisher Novy Svit which in 2011 paid 16.4 million UAH for all President Yanukovych’s works, past, present and future.  It now transpires that this was only the first instalment of an ongoing fee.

The use of the rightwing VO Svoboda Party to present the Party of the Regions as antidote to creeping fascism and xenophobia had a novel application on Wednesday with a number of Svoboda activists detained by police in Kyiv and interrogated for many hours.  The events had seemed to promise high drama with a Party of the Regions MP Iryna Horina reporting on Tuesday that after the close of the Verkhovna Rada’s evening session she and other women MPs had been pelted with snowballs, ice and dirt by members of a political protest.  She later apparently claimed that there had been an attempt to kill her.

A criminal investigation is underway, and the police felt no need to follow the restrictions of the new Criminal Procedure Code on how many hours witnesses can be interrogated. From a PR point of view, a trial would be as much of a loser as trying now to bring charges of hooliganism against the young man who so famously felled the then presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych with an egg in 2004.

Thursday was a full-on day for Ukraine’s MPs though few of the events bore much relation to parliamentary democracy.  With the opposition continuing to block the Verkhovna Rada tribune, the Party of the Regions, Communists and others who vote with the government decided to attempt a kind of outreach parliament – in the premises of the parliamentary committees on Bankova St.   There was supposedly a vote on this with 244 in favour (226 is a simple majority), however leader of the Batkivshchyna faction in parliament, Arseny Yatsenyuk asserted that only 168 MPs were actually present.

It was one side’s word against the other’s since opposition MPs were not allowed into the building on Bankova St.

Interpretation of the Parliamentary Regulations also depends on which side you listen to, and how one is to understand “exceptional circumstances”.

This is of enormous importance since the pro-government MPs (in person, or in name and MP card alone) managed to vote on 22 laws, one of which changed the 2013 State Budget.  All of this without open discussion and without the presence of the opposition who numerically cannot override a government vote, but can at least point to dangers in the laws passed.

What is particularly disturbing is that analysts asked by the Deutsche Welle Ukrainian Service considered the votes to be illegitimate, but were not at all confident that they would be revoked. Former MP Yury Klyuchkovsky pointed out that there had been similar situations during the 2000s and the laws passed, however dubiously, remained in force.  The Constitutional Court then refused to consider submissions from MPs asking for the laws to be declared unconstitutional.  In this regard it’s worth noting that the Constitutional Court in March for the fourth time refused to consider the highly controversial language law signed into force by President Yanukovych in August 2012.  This law effectively ignores the constitutional norm stipulating that Ukrainian is the sole official language and significantly increases the role of the Russian language.

Another specific smell from Ukraine’s parliamentarianism comes from turncoats or, in the Ukrainian, “tushki” (carcases).  On Thursday Speaker Rybak announced that four Batkivshchyna faction MPs had changed sides.  Interpretation of motives and / or incentives will inevitably depend on whose version you trust, however the phenomenon cannot under any circumstances be considered healthy.

It is also difficult to see it as democratic. Even during the last elections where 50% of the candidates entered parliament on party lists and 50% stood for election on an individual basis, the vast majority of voters would have voted for the party.

If MPs can then choose where the grass for them is greener, the voters’ electoral choice is rendered meaningless, like so many other fundamental components of democracy increasingly treated as cosmetic props.


The Viktors Go to Brussels

March 7, 2013

David Marples and Myroslava Uniat

After the February 25 16th EU-Ukraine summit in Brussels, Ukraine’s chances of signing an Association Agreement later this year in Vilnius appeared as uncertain as they were before the meeting. What is lacking is a single unequivocal statement from President Viktor Yanukovych that he is prepared to meet the EU halfway and agree to the preconditions that have been outlined and reiterated numerous times by various leaders of Brussels. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s relations with the Russian-led Customs Union seem equally as ambivalent, but continue in parallel form in the background.

The Europeans have made it plain that the continuing imprisonment of opposition politicians Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuri Lutsenko is part of the equation. If the EU has compromised, then it may be on the issue of the former. While Brussels-based politicians condemn the escalation of the charges against Ukraine’s former Prime Minister, there is less emphasis today than hitherto that the release of Ms Tymoshenko is an essential prerequisite for the signing of the agreement. Regarding Lutsenko, on the other hand, the situation is simply confusing. Evhen Balitskiy, a deputy from the Regions Party, speaking on Ukraine’s Channel 5 on February 21, stated firmly that the two detained figures would be released only when they had completed their sentences, and that Ukraine would not cave into outside pressure for an early end to their confinement (http://www.unian.net/news/554646-regional-otpuskat-timoshenko-i-lutsenko-ranshe-sroka-nikto-ne-sobiraetsya.html).

Another report of February 23 suggested that Yanukovych was indeed willing to compromise on both cases, but without setting a time frame (http://www.unian.net/news/555201-ukrainskiy-interes-anketa-evrointegratsii-i-ansambl-dlya-igryi-na-trube.html). Lutsenko’s wife expressed her view that the president had paid close attention to issues dealing with her husband and that his detention was a political matter, i.e. that he had been imprisoned for criticizing the government (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/22/6984173 ). Just three days later, a report from the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, maintained that after his meeting with the presidents of Poland and Slovakia, Yanukovych had promised to release Lutsenko in order to demonstrate Ukraine’s commitment to joining Europe. But the press service of the Polish president Bronislaw Kororowski would neither deny nor confirm the statement (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/25/6984254/).

Meanwhile EU politicians were expressing optimism both before and after the Brussels summit. European Commission president Jose Manuel Barroso enunciated his vision of Ukraine as future member of the European Union and expressed his faith that Ukraine has a European future. The effort to get an Association Agreement signed in November at the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius was endorsed not only by Barroso, but also by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton, and European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy Stefan Fule. They did add the proviso, however, that Ukraine should resolve the issue of “selective justice” and remove “deficiencies” in the conducting of parliamentary elections (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?kerivnitstvo_yes_hoche_shhob_ukrayina_stala_chlenom_yevrosoyuzu&objectId=1279188).

There was, however, another familiar Ukrainian visitor in the Belgian capital. Prior to the summit, at an evening meeting with Barroso that lasted over an hour, former president Viktor Yushchenko commented that the Tymoshenko case should not hold up proceedings (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?yushhenko_pered_samitom_govoriv_z_barrozu_pro_ukrayinu_i_timoshenko__zmi&objectId=1278974). The future of the Ukrainian state, stated Yushchenko, should not be a hostage of the “Tymoshenko affair.” Whether the Europeans still perceive Yushchenko as a credible authority is a moot point. The former president has rarely missed an opportunity to denounce his former Prime Minister, whose lengthy jail sentence was due in part to his testimony, and he appears content to serve the Regions government in his new role as an informal negotiator.

The delayed visit of Yanukovych to Moscow, on the other hand, finally took place on March 4, following its postponement last December. The main topics on the agenda were cooperation in energy, trade, and the economic sphere, particularly the conditions on which Ukraine might join the Customs Union. In addition Yanukovych returned to an old conundrum of the Kuchma era, namely the notion that there could be a joint Ukrainian-Russian venture to rent out Ukraine’s gas transportation system (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?yanukovich_u_rosiyi_zaproponuye_stvoriti_spilne_pidpriyemstvo__taran&objectId=1279284; http://www.rferl.org/content/putin-yanukovych-moscow/24918397.html ). Russia, however, is insisting that Ukraine recognize the validity of previous agreements, which include not only the unfortunate 2009 deal on gas prices negotiated by Tymoshenko, but also cooperation and progress toward the integration of the Russian and Ukrainian nuclear industries in accordance with the July 12, 2012 memorandum signed in Yalta. One possible component of this agreement is joint construction of units 3 and 4 of the VVER nuclear power station at Khmelnyts’kyi (http://www.unian.net/news/556804-yanukovich-i-putin-pogovoryat-o-gaze.html ).

 In April 2011 Yanukovych suggested that Ukraine might join the Customs Union in a 3+1 format precluding its full integration. That notion received qualifiede support from Regions deputy and Deputy Prime Minister Serhiy Tihipko, a former chair of the National Bank of Ukraine. Tihipko observed that Ukraine’s entry into the Customs Union has been under negotiation since 2010 and that the proposed treaty details are about 1,000 pages in length. Good progress has been made in his view. But neither side has started to work seriously on the 3+1 idea, an approach that he would not reject. Still, the EU market is seven times larger, which renders it more interesting for the Ukrainian economy (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/22/6984174 ). Implicitly therefore the Customs Union is a viable back-up plan should negotiations with Brussels result in failure.

 If, as seems plausible, Yanukovych is using talks with Russia to persuade Brussels to void the various conditions for signing the Associaton Agreement, he is demonstrating remarkable political naivety. The outcome could be the failure of the November meeting with the EU and equally unfruitful negotiations with Russia, which has considerable sway over the immediate future of Ukrainian energy policy in several of its major spheres, but especially oil, gas, and nuclear power. Andrew Wilson of the European Council of Foreign Relations commented that if the president was a wise man, then he would at least agree to release Lutsenko, but [he] «is not wise» (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?yes_pidpisav_bi_ugodu_pro_asotsiatsiyu_navit_z_timoshenko_v_tyurmi__ekspert&objectId=1278880 ). Valery Chaliy of the Kyiv-based Razumkov Center maintains that the chances of the Association Agreement being signed are no better than 20%. And Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt declared that «To put it mildly, the current signs of progress in Ukraine are quite limited» (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?imovirnist_pidpisannya_ugodi_pro_asotsiatsiyu_z_yes__20__ekspert&objectId=1278849).

 The EU has no doubt taken into consideration the overwhelming support for Ukraine’s European aspirations in the Ukrainian Parliament and the fact that even the government, despite its vacillations and the lack of firm directions at the level of the presidency, is generally in favor. It should take note, however, that negotiations on the side of Kyiv are not taking place with sincerity or even an evident willingness to compromise. All too often the vindictiveness toward former enemies and fear of retribution at some future date for more conciliatory policies, particularly in dealing with the Tymoshenko and Lutsenko cases, mean that at best, the Europeans will see no more than sluggish and very reluctant steps to comply with even modest requests. As Wilson has noted, however, a failure in November could seriously undermine the very existence of the Eastern Partnership. Ukraine might then have no immediate options other than the Customs Union, either in the so-called 3+1 formation or deeper integration on terms emanating from Moscow.


UKRAINE: AN UNSEEN IMBROGLIO?

February 21, 2013

David Marples and Myroslava Uniat

The administration of President Viktor Yanukovych and Prime Minister Mykola Azarov appears to be in confusion. On the one hand it faces a large bill from Russia’s Gazprom for portions of unused gas, along with intense pressure from the Russian government to join the Customs Union. On the other, it awaits a significant summit with the EU in Brussels on February 25 to discuss an Association Agreement, a prelude to its potential signing at the EU Eastern Partnership in November in Vilnius, without first meeting preconditions requested by the Europeans. In fact the president seems blandly oblivious of the tightrope he is walking, assuming that in the world of realpolitik, it is Ukraine rather than Brussels that holds most of the cards. The Ukrainian leader’s logic is that the Kyiv government can operate between the EU and Russia, which are also limited in their bargaining power: Russia, because it needs Ukraine to make the Union work, and the EU because by isolating Ukraine, it would push that country firmly into the Russian orbit. He has witnessed similar maneuvers by the president of Belarus, after all, who has survived largely unscathed to date and remained in power for almost two decades.

In reality, however, Ukraine’s position seems much weaker than the Yanukovych-Azarov team imagines or acknowledges. Russian pressure is constant. The former deputy of United Russia, Sergey Makarov, commented that if Ukraine joined the Russian-led Customs Union—it currently comprises Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan has expressed a wish to join—then the $7.09 billion fine for unused gas will simply be waived. Joining would also mean more chances that gas prices would be reduced (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/8/6983116/). In brief: join us and your troubles are over! Understandably, the Ukrainian side baulks at Gazprom’s demand, partly because it has denounced the 2009 agreement, signed between former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and then Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in 2009, which failed to anticipate the fall of gas prices and committed Ukraine to paying for the full amount of imported gas, whether or not it was actually needed. Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Yuri Boyko met with Chairman of the Gazprom Board Aleksey Miller in early February and stated that he did not think it appropriate for Ukraine to pay such a sum (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/8/6983148/).

Meanwhile, the Regions Party has not responded to a variety of requests from the Europeans to fulfill what are seen as essentially minimal requirements for the signing of the Association Agreement in November. The Dutch Ambassador to Ukraine, Pieter Jan Wolthers, has commented that there is no guarantee that the Association Agreement will be signed because all depends on the Ukrainian side meeting the terms, which include dealing with the issue of selective justice (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/9/6983182/). Likewise, Lithuanian president Dalia Grybauskaite, whose country takes over the presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of this year, informed Yanukovych during his working visit to Lithuania on February 6, that she believes the imprisonment of two former opposition leaders, Tymoshenko and former Interior Minister Yuri Lutsenko, to be politically motivated. She also took Yanukovych to task over the Customs Union, pointing out to him that the simultaneous signing of agreements with the EU and the Customs Union was impossible, because the two contradict each other (http://postup.brama.com/usual.php?what=75559). Therefore it is necessary for Ukraine to choose one or the other. British analyst Andrew Wilson posits that Yanukovych is ignorant of how the EU works, believing that the crucial matter is a balance of power and that the EU’s concern for Tymoshenko is ritualistic. Wilson’s view is that Yanukovych expects at some point that the EU will simply stop making demands and sign the Association Agreement, whereas in reality Ukraine is becoming isolated (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?u_yes_rozdratovani_nevikonanimi_obitsyankami_yanukovicha&objectId=1278035 accessed Feb 17).

For his part, Yanukovych is defending himself and casting stones simultaneously. First of all, he informed European Commissioner Stefan Fule on February 7, his Regions Party has already introduced draft proposals to meet some of the EU’s demands starting in 2010. They are somewhat delayed because he has to deal with officials and politicians “who are used to living in the old way” (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/8/6983134/). He responded to Grybauskaite that Ukraine could not ignore the fact that trade with the members of the Customs Union currently amounts to more than $60 billion, and therefore he supports “simultaneous cooperation” with the EU and the Customs Union. He also blamed the EU Energy Community, which Ukraine joined in 2010, for its failure to intervene to defend Ukraine when Russia made the demand for $7.09 billion for gas, a comment to which director of the Community Secretariat Janez Kopač responded with surprise, noting that Ukraine has to date never requested such assistance (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?u_yees_zdivovani_zakidami_yanukovicha_pro_vidsutnist_dopomogi&objectId=1277536).

Other officials simply blame the parliamentary opposition for the lack of progress on meeting EU requests. Thus Cabinet and Regions Party member Olena Lukash stated that five projects have been submitted to parliament, dealing with improvement in laws to combat corruption, and increasing penalties for corruption offenses. The president has submitted two bills dealing with the ratification of the UN protocol against the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms. She hopes therefore that the opposition will provide its support for the adoption of European laws and confirm its choice of European integration (http://www.day.kiev.ua/uk/news/090213-v-uryadi-zapevnyayut-shcho-pracyuyut-na-ievrointegraciyu). The opposition in turn has blocked the parliamentary tribune in an effort to demand individual voting of each deputy (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/8/6983114/), ending the practice of multiple voting through the voting cards of absent MPs. On February 20, however, it supported the Parliament’s draft statement on implementing Ukraine’s goals for integration with Europe and signing of the Association Agreement.

The subplot behind these issues is the continuing detention of Tymoshenko and Lutsenko cited above, and the recent introduction of new criminal charges against the former for the murder of former parliamentary deputy Evhen Shcherban in 1996, together with the then Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko, who is still under house arrest in the United States serving a sentence for money laundering. One possibility widely discussed is that Yanukovych could conceivably pardon Lutsenko, a secondary figure who would be unlikely to pose a political challenge, if he received such a request. The former minister has been diagnosed with cirrhosis of the liver and portal hypertension, and political analyst Volodymyr Fesenko surmised that his release could happen prior to the EU-Ukraine summit on February 25. Lutsenko’s wife, however, thought that her husband would not request such a pardon, which would imply an acknowledgement of guilt (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?yanukovich_ukazom_mozhe_zvilniti_lutsenka__nardep&objectId=1277817). But without any such concessions, it seems inconceivable that the Europeans would be very welcoming toward the Ukrainian leaders in Brussels.

The irony of these complex discussions and internal wrangling is that even a leader as out of touch with the world around him as Yanukovych, and his trusted aide Azarov, would not have to do much to assuage the anger emanating from some capitals of Europe. The early release of Lutsenko, with or without a pardon, would cost the president nothing, but would be perceived as a positive step from the EU’s perspective. Moreover, the oligarchs within and outside the Regions Party have little to gain from Ukraine being drawn into the Customs Union, which would curtail their control over a lucrative part of the domestic economy as well as reducing Ukraine’s political independence. At times the president does appear to perceive where future policy should lie. All too often he appears simply to be unaware of the limitations of his position, which unfortunately affects not only to his administration, but the Ukrainian state, which has a limited number of options. Despite the growing authoritarianism and corruption of his government and in the country at large, Yanukovych has an opportunity to move closer to the EU. It is one that requires decisive and prompt action.


Casus Vynnychukus and Freedom of Speech

February 1, 2012

Mykola Riabchuk

On January 23, 2012 two policemen approached writer Yuri Vynnychuk at his home in the Western Ukrainian city of L’viv and demanded from him a written explanation of the poems he had presented a few months earlier in Kyiv at the “Night of Erotic Poetry” festival. The policemen said they were authorized to do so by the prosecutor general who had received a complaint from the Communist MP, Leonid Hrach, which unabashedly qualified Vynnychuk’s poems as “pornography” and a “call for the violent overthrow of Ukraine’s government” (http://world.maidan.org.ua/2012/statement-on-the-political-persecution-of-the-ukrainian-writer-yuri-vynnychuk).

Yuri Vynnychuk is a renowned author with some international fame, so he has not been arrested, beaten, and forced to confess, as happens on a daily basis all over Ukraine to his less fortunate and not so famous compatriots. Oleksiy Cherneha, for instance, a young activist of the “Patriot of Ukraine” from the provincial town of Vasyl’kiv (Kyiv Oblast), recollects his encounter with the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) officers as follows:

Immediately after I was detained [on August 23, 2011], I was taken to the regional SBU center where I was held without charge or sanction from the investigator or court until Aug. 27, much longer than the 72 hours allowed by law […]
While I was at the regional SBU center, I was questioned around the clock. During the interrogation, physical methods were used against me repeatedly – I was beaten on my neck and the soft parts of the body, forced to do the splits, humiliated, threatened with physical violence and also mocked with accusations of pedophilia.
The SBU officers also tried to force me to give untruthful evidence against my acquaintances… After I had refused to give this untruthful evidence, I was shackled and they continued to beat me.
For four days I was interrogated and not allowed to sleep or eat.
During the torture and humiliation I repeatedly demanded to be told my official status in the case and also information about the examination of the things found at my place during the search. But I received no answer to any of my questions. I was also refused a meeting with my lawyer, and all interrogations happened without his presence.
While I was in custody, I informed the SBU that I had been diagnosed with epilepsy and that the doctors had recommended that I stick to a sleep pattern and eat regularly, because not to do so could affect my health and even lead to death.
However, the SBU officers ignored this and for four days I was interrogated without sleep or food. Such behavior is a flagrant violation of human rights and guarantees of respect for dignity contained in the Constitution.
During interrogation on Aug. 25, SBU officers forced a compact disk into my hand which had allegedly been found at the place on Hrushevskogo Street on Aug. 22.
There, like at my residence, the SBU alleged it had found information about assembling a homemade explosive device and a video of child pornography.
Afterward I was told they had “evidence” against me and in a similar way they could create any “evidence,” and for this not to happen I had to write that my acquaintances Shpara and Bevz had left the things in my room that had been found during the search.
When I refused, painful injuries were inflicted on me.
On the night of Aug. 26, I was informed that I would be released if I signed a few documents. I was forced to sign a letter to the head of the SBU saying that no physical coercion had been applied to me and that I voluntarily consented to give evidence from Aug. 23 to Aug. 27.
I assert that all signatures that I made during that time were extracted in ways banned by the Code of Criminal Procedure (
http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/112476/). (See also: Katya Gorchinskaya, “Allegations of SBU horrors recall cruel Stasi methods,” 15 September 2011: http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/112911/.)

Stories like this are typical in Yanukovych’s Ukraine. They vary in detail but have one thing in common: rampant lawlessness that reigns supreme in the country and unscrupulous use of law-enforcement agencies for the regime’s political goals. The Kyiv Post editorial aptly described Ukraine’s judicial system as “broken, corrupt and manipulated by oligarch-controlled politicians, chief among them president Viktor Yanukovych”:

Police still beat, torture, falsify evidence and extract false confessions. They conduct armed raids with masks with the permission of the manipulated courts.
Prosecutors operate in a web of secrecy in which they are accountable to no one but the chief prosecutor, who is appointed by Yanukovych.
Judges cannot exercise independence for fear of losing their jobs – or worse.
The presumption of guilt replaces the presumption of innocence through the pre-trial jailing of suspects for up to 18 months in horrible conditions, the denial of bail and adequate legal representation, the denial of speedy trial by jury and so on
(http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/editorial/detail/114769/).

Yuri Vynnychuk predictably rejected the accusations as absurd and stated that the interference in literary matters by politicians, prosecutors and other officials was illegal and anti-constitutional. The story got broad publicity in the mass media; Ukrainian PEN-center endorsed a protest; the writer himself used a public commemoration of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch’s birthday in downtown L’viv to read his subversive poems to his cheerful fans. And finally, the sweetheart Hanna Herman, Yanukovych’s advisor and a writer herself, called a L’viv colleague and apologized for the excessive zeal of her boss’s subordinates (http://life.pravda.com.ua/person/2012/01/30/93822/).

Personally, I would prefer her to call Mr. Cherneha, or Ms. Hanna Synkova, or many other victims of the regime’s brutality, and to deal with the officers that tortured and humiliated them rather than the two pathetic policemen sent by their dull bosses to Yuri Vynnychuk’s place. So far, it looks like a Bad Cop versus Good Cop show. However it ends, it should not obscure the much more serious, brazen, innumerable cases of human rights violations in Yanukovych’s Ukraine. The very addition of “pornography” to the alleged “call for a violent overthrow of the government” tends to make the entire story farcical, to downplay and de-contextualize the political message of Vynnychuk’s work. Yet, whatever the initial intentions of both the writer and his opponents, the actual implications of the conflict seem to be broader and more complex.

First of all, the poem in question is certainly not Vynnychuk’s chef d’oeuvre, nor is it an exemplary case of political correctness. There are two English translations of this poetical pamphlet, one of which is entitled “Kill the Bugger” and the other “Kill the Pidaras” (http://durdom.in.ua/uk/main/news_article/news_id/27029.phtml).

The former translation is a much better reflection of the poem’s idea, yet the latter renders properly the ambiguity that exists in the original. The obscenity “pidaras” borrowed from Russian criminal slang has a sexual (actually sexist) connotation related to “pederast,” but in a colloquial speech it means typically a sodomite or a “total idiot” (therefore the female form “pidaraska” can also be used). Nevertheless, the underlying sexist connotation makes the text rather tasteless and implicitly homophobic, even though it clearly hints that the Ukrainian government and the incumbent president may well be considered sodomites rather than homosexuals.

The slogan “kill” (whoever) is also distasteful, though it should not be interpreted literally. The poet may mean symbolic/political “killing,” or even refer to Anton Chekhov’s famous dictum: “to kill a slave within ourselves,” and to Shevchenko’s classical “Testament”: to “wake up and rise up, and break the shackles, and sanctify freedom with the enemy’s evil blood.” Still, in the society with a weak tradition of tolerance and political liberalism, and deeply rooted tradition of homophobia, xenophobia, and daily coercion, all these ambiguities and provocative slogans may reverberate and fuel even more hatred and brutality rather than the desired purification.

As a vice-president of the Ukrainian PEN-centre assigned by the colleagues to draft the protest, I was really in a difficult position. I had to condemn the police interference in literary matters and, at the same time, distance myself and the center from the controversial poem, which I would have certainly advised the author neither to read, nor to publish or produce – at least in its current form. I attempted to solve the dilemma by placing the case in the broader context of the government’s systemic infringement of the freedom of speech and political persecution of writers, scholars, journalists, and civic activists. At the same time, in a personal conversation, I expressed to the author (a friend) disapproval of his dubious text.

The point seems to be obvious: we may profoundly disagree with a writer’s views and forms of their expression but we should guarantee him/her the right to express those views without censorship and political pressure. It is up to the public and literary critics to evaluate the text, not the police, prosecutors, and security service. We defend the general principle, and not a specific author or text. A few years ago, I happened to disapprove of then president Viktor Yushchenko’s intention to criminalize the denial that the Great Famine of 1932-33 in Ukraine was Genocide. By the same token, I staunchly disagree with similar decisions of some other governments to make the denial of Armenian and other genocides a criminal offense. People should have a right to express the most ugly and stupid ideas as long as they do not call directly for illegal and violent actions against other people. This is particularly true about the writers and artists who may bear moral, political, professional, and, in some cases, administrative responsibility for their words but definitely should not be considered criminals. It seems self-evident, but I have noticed from pending public debates the subtle difference between the defense of a general principle and of specific texts. It is usually blurred and politicized.

Yuri Vynnychuk’s case, in a way, resembles that of Yulia Tymoshenko. Here, again, we protest against her political persecution not because we support her politically, share her views or consider her own governmental policies consistent with liberal democracy and rule of law. We simply believe that political decisions should not be criminalized – exactly like poems, novels, or artistic performances.

So, the second question emerges: why does President Yanukovych commit or, rather, allow his lieutenants to perpetrate the blunders that compromise him and his regime both domestically and internationally? The simple answer is that no authoritarian regime can survive without some lawlessness and coercion. However, it is one thing to torture inmates in provincial prisons, to harass young and as yet unknown civic activists, or to take over one’s opponents’ businesses via sheer racket or kangaroo courts. It is quite another to attack outstanding figures whose ordeal draws immediately broad and sometimes even exaggerated public attention.

Viktor Yanukovych may be neither wise enough to adequately understand politics, or diligent enough to keep a careful eye on his political menials. But he has a huge apparatus, doubled in size and salaries since Yushchenko’s times, and he should have no problems with professional analysis, political advice and ultimate decision-making. And this is the point. So far, after two years of his presidency, he has been moving from bad to worse in all his decisions, and steadily losing his popular rating from over 60 percent to single-digit figures. If his advisors are as incompetent as their leader, it is very unfortunate. If they are smart but manipulate him in a cowardly fashion –for Moscow’s or their personal benefits, or both – it could be catastrophic.

The Vynnychuk affair might have been initiated by a senile communist, who felt insulted by the writer’s mockery of Communist rhetoric and paraphernalia. At least, this is what Hanna Herman suggested. One may wonder however to what degree the communists in Ukraine are independent players. So far, they behave like government puppets assigned to do the dirtiest jobs that the government prefers not to engage in openly. Smearing Ukrainian NGOs as subversive agents of the West might be the most graphic example. Neither the Kuchma nor the Yanukovych governments dared to do this themselves since this might have undermined their fake “pro-European” rhetoric. Yet, remarkably, they provided the communists with full logistic support, publicity, and the needed votes in the parliament to pass the anti-NGO laws.

In the Vynnychuk case the manipulators could play one more game and try to capitalize on the president’s fears and phobias. Viktor Yanukovych, indeed, seems to be preoccupied with his personal security. This may stem from his unfortunate 2004 presidential campaign when he was attacked by an egg and became so terrified that he lost consciousness. Taras Chornovil, Yanukovych’s ally and former close adviser, claims that the president’s phobias originate from his peculiar experience in the Donbas region – dubbed the Ukrainian Sicily. Yanukovych sincerely believes that “someone wants to kill him,” Chornovil says http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/116724/.

The President’s paranoia might be an excellent tool for those in his entourage who know how to use it. And Vynnychuk’s poem “Kill the Pidaras” fits them well. Back in September, there was a huge scandal in Kyiv when people wore teeshirts that featured the slogan: “Thanks to inhabitants of Donbas for the [election of the] president-pidaras.” Police raided the store, confiscated the T-shirts, and forced the businessman who produced them to flee abroad. The word “pidaras,” however, has acquired one more connotation hardly unknown to either Yuri Vynnychuk or Viktor Yanukovych.

The Vynnychuk case, even though on a much smaller scale, is as ambiguous as that of Tymoshenko. Both shed a light on the lawlessness that reigns in the country. But both can be used also be used to obscure the scale of repressions and to trivialize the political essence of the events. Therefore, whatever we think about both heroes and their work, we should remember the broader context and perceive the general tendency rather than unpleasant, albeit isolated, incidents.


IS UKRAINE LEAVING THE EUROPEAN ENERGY COMMUNITY?

December 15, 2011

David Marples

As Ukraine’s relationship with the EU continues to flounder over human rights issues, the imprisonment of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and the lengthy detention of former Interior Minister Yuri Lutsenko, there are signs that the government is prepared to flout existing laws to gain closer association with Gazprom and the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The consequences could be not only the loss of links with the European Energy Community (hereafter EEC) but also the undermining of sovereignty.

On December 4, Russia’s Ambassador to Ukraine Mikhail Zurabov announced that the new gas agreement between the two states would have the status of an international agreement, rather than a business arrangement between the two responsible companies, Gazprom and Naftohaz. Russia is evidently responding to the EU’s plans for closer integration with Ukraine and greater transparency in the transit of gas from Russia to Western Europe. Analyst Maksim Alinov comments that the results of the inter-state agreement proposed by the Russian ambassador would override current Ukrainian laws, which make it illegal to transfer Ukraine’s transit system to Russian control—a similar sale to Gazprom occurred recently in Belarus. Alinov also believes that the flouting of the agreement in place would also give Russia significant influence over the internal economic and political situation in Ukraine (Zerkalo Nedeli, Dec 9).

Another analyst, Maksim Honchar, goes further, maintaining that Kyiv’s apparent reversal of policy on the EEC would violate the July 1, 2010 law “Concerning the main principles of domestic and foreign policy,” Article 7 of which stipulates that Ukraine’s oil, gas, and electricity networks should be operating according to EU rules. In his view this indicates a willingness to surrender national interests, which would be an even more serious threat to Ukraine’s pro-European policy than the imprisonment of Tymoshenko. It would also strengthen considerably the position of Gazprom, a monopolist enterprise that seeks to deploy energy as an instrument of political control. Ukraine would acquire cheap gas but gradually lose its sovereignty, rendering the Association Agreement with the EU obsolete and leading to the next stage, which would be a defensive alliance with Russia (Zerkalo Nedeli, Dec 9).

The EU meanwhile continues to demand the release of Tymoshenko as a prequel to the initializing of the Association Agreement, though with diminishing hopes and growing frustration. Wilfred Martens, President of the European People’s Party, stated that Ukraine, like Poland, could be an important EU player, and that without its addition the EU project could not be complete. However, as a prerequisite to the start of the process leading to the Agreement, the Party of Regions must release Tymoshenko, Lutsenko, and other political prisoners (UN IAN, Dec 7). However, Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Hryshchenko demurred, stating that Tymoshenko could not be used as a bargaining chip in trade relations and that her situation was a matter for the Ukrainian Judiciary. To discuss the issue in this way, he added, would be tantamount to indicating that the latter is not an independent body (UNIAN, Dec 7).

Although the ruling group of Ukraine faces several serious economic dilemmas and recently rejected for a second time the IMF’s demand to raise energy prices, it does not seem to be facing a serious threat from the opposition. Indeed, the political situation seems relatively unaffected by the Tymoshenko saga. Analyst Kost Bondarenko maintains that the population has lost interest in the struggle between Tymoshenko and the ruling elite, while Vadim Karasev considers that the apparent lack of public sympathy for Tymoshenko reflects the general perception of her as a former representative of the political establishment (Segodnya, Dec 7, and ff.). In general therefore that is a positive sign for the authorities and a signal that the arrest of Tymoshenko has not affected ratings for the president and the Regions Party.

The latter seems to be calculating each step in cynical fashion, taking action and then monitoring the response. Karasev also notes that the leadership thinks the release of Tymoshenko would be seen as a sign of weakness. Also the Ukrainian leaders are watching closely political events in Russia, where the rise of oppositional activities could have a domino effect in Ukraine. Various polls denote that Yanukovych remains the leading individual politician with ratings between 17.4 and 20.7%, whereas the ratings of Tymoshenko, the only serious contender, range from 13 to 14.1% (polls by KMIS, Social Monitoring, “Rating,” and Sotsis). Yatsenyuk in third place has, at most, 9.9% support. In short, there is no longer a serious contender from the opposition as with Tymoshenko out of the picture.

The ruling group may also consider that in the year 2011 it could have expected to see its popularity drop because of the introduction of unpopular measures such as pension and taxation codes, whereas the new year may bring better fortunes, not least through the hosting of the popular soccer competition, Euro-2012. Perhaps of more importance is the evident tolerance of the EU for the abuses of power in Kyiv, in contrast to the sanctions it has applied in Belarus. Ukraine has moved rapidly from one of the most democratic of post-Soviet states to a position well down the scale. At the same time the corruption that has long pervaded the Ukrainian economy has not diminished.

Adding to the contentedness of the ruling group in Ukraine, the United States is preoccupied with other issues and unlikely to engage with Ukraine at the highest level until after the 2012 presidential election, according to former US ambassador to Ukraine, Steven Pifer (http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2011/1208_ukraine_pifer.aspx?p=1). Thus Yanukovych and the Regions have in effect carte blanche to continue the current path. The EEC agreement appears to have been jettisoned.

However, for the second time since the January 2010 election (the first being the Kharkiv Accords on the Black Sea Fleet), they are posing serious threats to the sovereignty of Ukraine, relinquishing hard-won rights for the immediate prospect of cheap gas and permitting a much more powerful role for Russian agencies like Gazprom to step in and purchase Naftohaz. The next logical stage would be for Ukraine to join the Customs Union (with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus). Only a year ago that would have been unthinkable, but it is now a serious possibility.


CORRUPTION AT THE TOP–DISAFFECTION BELOW. [STASIUK BLOG NOTES 2/11]

October 31, 2011

David Marples

The most recent survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre, conducted from over 2,000 respondents in all regions of Ukraine between 29 September and 4 October, i.e. prior to the conviction of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko on 11 October, indicates that the approval rate of President Viktor Yanukovych is falling. Only 10% of those surveyed “fully support” his policies, compared to 14.3% for Tymoshenko, 11.9% for Arsenii Yatsenyuk, and 10.2% for boxing champion Vitalii Klychko (better known in the Western media as Vitali Klitschko). Other politicians are to be found even further down the list, including Serhii Tigipko and Anatolii Grytsenko with 5.8% each, Dmytro Tabachnyk at 2.6%, and former president Viktor Yushchenko at 1.5%.

Those who answered “I do not support” showed negative ratings for both Tymoshenko (56.7%) and Yanukovych (54.6%), as well as for Yushchenko (80.4%). Not a single figure had a high rating in “fully support” than in “do not support,” suggesting the disillusionment of the electorate with the current crop of leaders (Zerkalo Nedeli, 18 Oct). Another poll also shows that more residents of Ukraine prefer integration with the European Union than the Russian-led Customs Union, particularly in the western regions where 76.9% support Euro-integration compared to only 6.2% who favor joining the “Common Economic Space” with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Overall 43.7% of those polled support integration with the EU and 30.5% the Customs Union, both relatively high figures. Support for the former is highest among young people between 18 and 29, and lowest among those over 60. Those who favor the Customs Union offer a reverse generational demography, with backing highest among those over 50 and lowest among those 18-29 years of age (news.zn.ua, 25 Oct).

The behavior of the ruling administration continues to elicit concern both inside and outside Ukraine. Following the postponement of a scheduled visit of Yanukovych to Brussels, the European Parliament expressed regrets that the European Commission and Yanukovych would not have the chance to reestablish “a constructive dialogue” that could have resulted in an Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU. The European Parliament “deplored” the sentencing of Tymoshenko to seven years in jail, noting that the law by which she was convicted dates back to Soviet times, and other laws do not conform to EU standards (Interfax Ukrainy, 27 Oct). The scheduled EU-Ukraine summit in December may deal with some of these issues. In general the EU response to the sentencing of Tymoshenko was relatively mild, perhaps because the Eastern Partnership group, which recently gathered in Warsaw, is preoccupied with the situation in neighboring Belarus, which was notably excluded from its decisions and about which a separate statement was issued by the Joint Declaration on 29-30 September (Council of the European Union, press release, 30 Sept).

However, little seems to improve as far as Ukraine’s ruling group is concerned. In late October, there appeared a report from Mariupol that employees of the giant Azovstal’ and the Illich Corporation, both of which are owned by tycoon Rinat Akhmetov, were being forced to take out membership in the Party of Regions. Employees were given two forms, one for membership in the PR and the other about payment of membership dues and asked to return the forms to the heads of their sections. Membership dues were said to be 1 UAH monthly for workers, 3 for engineers, 5 for senior foremen, and 10 for the head of the shop floor. Azovstal’ employs over 15,000 people, so the annual amount collected would be around 250,000 UAH annually, or double the budget of the Mariupol branch of the Party of Regions. Those who are reluctant to join could also be punished by deprivation of “bonuses” that account for as much as 40% of regular salaries. The report also indicated that those who were unwilling to join the PR and pay such dues could lose their jobs through reorganization of branches of the company. There were similar stories from Zaporizhzhya and Kharkiv, and in the latter city similar pressure was placed on students of the Skovoroda University (Ukrains’ka Pravda, Oct 26).


Tymoshenko’s Case versus the Ukrainian Cause

October 19, 2011

Mykola Riabchuk

The pessimists were right: the Pechersk district court has fully approved the criminal charge against Yulia Tymoshenko, the former prime-minister of Ukraine, and sentenced her to seven years in prison. This is the maximum term provided by the respective article of the Criminal Code. Additionally, Ms Tymoshenko was barred from occupying any public office within three consecutive years, and fined $190 million for the damages to the Ukrainian economy that she arguably incurred in 2009 by signing an unfair gas contract with her Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin.

A few weeks ago, rumors emerged in Kyiv that the decision on Tymoshenko’s case had been decided in advance by President Viktor Yanukovych himself, and that the court had only to rubber-stamp the maximum prison term for his arch-rival. Even though Yanukovych defeated her narrowly last year in the presidential election, Tymoshenko still is the leader of the opposition and his main challenger. Whether the rumors were based on accurate information leaked from the president’s office or merely a gloomy intuition of Tymoshenko’s supporters, optimists had some reason to expect that the Western criticism of the kangaroo process would not be completely ignored by the Ukrainian authorities. The president who boasts of his “pragmatism” would surely not put at risk the entire project of Ukraine’s European integration for the dubious purpose of personal vengeance.

The additional three-year ban on taking a public office imposed by the court on Yulia Tymoshenko, suggests that the main driving force behind Yanukovych’s decision was not only vengeance but also fear. Tymoshenko is believed to be not merely the strongest challenger for the incumbent regime but also its real nemesis who would not hesitate to pay them in kind, and would likely do so on much stronger legal grounds. Now, through the court ruling, she is effectively excluded from both the 2015 presidential election with Mr. Yanukovych and the 2020 competition with his likely handpicked successor.

The court decision, announced on 11 October, provoked a storm of protest in Western capitals, especially in the European Union. The EU leaders, indeed, placed high stakes on pending negotiations about the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) and Association Agreements with Ukraine and expected to finalize them by the end of the year. On many occasions, they warned Kyiv that they would hardly be able to maintain close relations with a country that applies selective justice against the leaders of the political opposition and criminalizes legitimate decisions of the previous government. That the warnings have been ignored has filled the Westerners with sheer indignation. Leaving diplomatic courtesy aside, they state clearly now that no Association agreement, with DCFTA as part of it can be signed until Ukraine proves its full commitment to European values.

It signifies not only a demand to release Yulia Tymoshenko and other political prisoners but also to stop government pressure on civil society, harassment of independent media, manipulation of laws (the election law in particular), and so on. The government seems to be lost. Its leaders apparently do not understand why a minor, in their view internal, issue has caused such a huge international furore, and how to get out of this lose-lose situation. Ironically, the Westerners themselves have greatly contributed to the current confusion. Since March 2010, they have benignly neglected the growing roughness and lawlessness of Yanukovych’s regime, starting with a de facto parliamentary coup d’etat and ending up with the shamelessly manipulated local elections and even more unscrupulous changes of the national constitution. In fact, the Europeans sent Yanykovych and his associates a very wrong signal: guys, as long as you can restore and maintain some order in this chaotic country, we don’t care much about law and democracy in your fiefdom. What the Westerners offered as a benefit of doubt, the Ukrainian authorities took as a carte blanche.

Now, the both sides are badly surprised and bitterly disappointed. The Westerners simply do not understand why Yanukovych ignored so defiantly their quite clear message to leave Tymoshenko in peace. And Yanukovych seems to be equally puzzled why they decided finally to react, having accepted tacitly all his tricks throughout a year and a half. He may believe, quite sincerely, that the EU reaction is just a show staged by the smart Western politicians for their candid electorate – exactly like the Tymoshenko trial is staged by his “goodfellas” for domestic purposes.

Whatever the rationale, Yanukovych seems not to fully understand that his reprisal on Tymoshenko is not the main reason for ostracizing him but just the last straw that broke the camel’s back, i.e. the patience of the EU leaders. One may speculate how many of them are truly concerned about Ukraine’s democracy and how many (likely the majority) that are using the case as the pretext to exclude a nuisance like Ukraine from the European project and, inter alia, to please the old pal Vladimir http://dt.ua/POLITICS/vin_pilyae_suk_pid_soboyu_a_vpade_krayina-89690.html. The fact is that the Ukrainian government has crossed the red line and entered uncharted land where they no longer receive the benefit of doubt and benign neglect for thuggish behavior, cheating and bluffing, for whatever reason.

In a way, Yanukovych committed the same mistake as his former boss Leonid Kuchma. He delegitimized himself, both domestically and internationally. He has lost credibility and, henceforth, will be seen not as a leader trying to fix a dysfunctional democracy, but as an arrogant autocrat who is striving to dismantle the remnants of political pluralism and genuine competition inherited from his predecessor Viktor Yushchenko. Hitherto, to maintain good relations with the EU, Yanukovych needed only to prove that he is not completely hopeless and autocratic – a not so difficult task in the context of post-Soviet sultans, dictators, and “national leaders.” After the Tymoshenko conviction a minimum pass will no longer suffice. A strong “C” is required, and this is a sea change since neither mentally nor institutionally are the Ukrainian authorities able to qualify.

Yanukovych may pardon Yulia Tymoshenko now, as some experts suggest; or may push the new Criminal Code through the parliament that decriminalizes Tymoshenko’s transgressions, as he hinted himself; or, vice-versa, he may open a new criminal case against her, as the Security Service of Ukraine has already announced http://news.dt.ua/POLITICS/sbu_spravu_za_borgi_pered_rf_porusheno_proti_timoshenko_i_lazarenka-89574.html. In either case, he would remain a lame duck president, despised at home and distrusted abroad, squeezed between the EU and Russia, and torn between two mutually exclusive but equally unreliable strategies of survival. One of them means submitting to the EU demands and accepting European values and respective behavior. This sounds promising, but looks very unlikely since neither the president nor his oligarchic team understands what those values mean and how they can be treated seriously, nor are they ready to accept fair play and expose themselves to free political and economic competition.

The alternative strategy is much more likely – to play possum as long as possible, defy the European Union’s pressure, to look for support in the Kremlin, to promise and not to deliver, to be smart like Aliaksandr Lukashenka, or at least Leonid Kuchma. The problem however is that Yanukovych is not that smart, nor are Ukrainians obedient enough, nor is the Kremlin eager to support all these smarties for a song. And last but not least, the Ukrainian officials-cum-oligarchs are not very happy with the looming prospect of being blacklisted in the EU like their Belarusian brethren.

The most probable scenario is that Yanukovych’s regime will make another attempt to cheat the Westerners. To this end, they may release Tymoshenko in order to continue reprisals against opposition, civil society, and the independent mass media, with the implicit goal to monopolize all the political and economic power http://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2011/10/14/6665143/. If society resists the latter, they will employ coercion; if the EU applies sanctions against Ukraine, they will turn to Moscow.

Paradoxically, the same people who nurtured Yanukovych might become his political gravediggers. The Ukrainian oligarchs are very unlikely to follow the president in his drift to Moscow, and even less so his break with the EU. This group, however, is highly opportunistic and would never oppose the president openly until and unless society demonstrates its strength and the West steps up pressure.


Yanukovych’s Motives Murky

October 16, 2011

David Marples

The news that imprisoned former Premier of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko is now facing charges of embezzlement, linked to her time as the president of United Energy Systems of Ukraine in the 1990s, raises questions about the motivations of the Ukrainian government and President Viktor Yanukovych in particular.

Why was she jailed in the first place? And why has an old issue, linked to a time when virtually all the Ukrainian oligarchs had their hands in the public trough, suddenly resurfaced?

On October 10, Tymoshenko received a 7-year prison sentence for her part in a gas deal negotiated with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in 2009 that was “disadvantageous for Ukraine.” Throughout the trial she had expressed her contempt for the judge and prosecutor and argued that the procedure was politically motivated. Virtually all the Western governments concurred while Russia was furious that the 2009 agreement had been so publicly reopened.

Yanukovych, supposedly, wished to rid himself of his main political opponent before the parliamentary elections scheduled for October 2012. However, the trial and verdict endangered Ukraine’s chances of signing an Association Agreement with the European Union, which has been under negotiation for some time. Some critics, such as David Kramer of Freedom House, maintain that the discussions should be postponed until Tymoshenko and other opposition leaders have been released and pardoned.

But why was she tried and imprisoned at all?

One suggestion, offered by Dominique Arel, Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Ottawa, is that Yanukovych persecuted Tymoshenko because he believed he could get away with it. The premise is that for the Europeans, relations with Ukraine are too important to be imperiled by a domestic quarrel.

Writing in a Russian source, analysts Maksim Logvinov and Vladislav Zhukovsky, think that the goal of the original trial was to force Russia to revise the price of gas sold to Ukraine. They also maintain that targeting Tymoshenko was a means to divert blame from the government for the economic crisis that Ukraine will face shortly because of the high prices of gas. However, the gamble failed because all the relevant parties—Russia, the EU, and the United States—took the side of Tymoshenko and criticized the Ukrainian authorities. In many ways the trial became a cause célèbre for the embattled Ukrainian opposition.

Yet the actions of Yanukovych still lack rationale and these analyses perhaps attribute a degree of Machiavellianism and political astuteness to the president that have not always been evident, despite his triumphant election victory in January 2010.

Ukrainian analyst Vitalii Portnikov has provided the most logical explanation: the initiatives in the Tymoshenko case are not coming from the president but from a “party of war” within the leadership that includes the head of the Secret Service (SBU), Valery Khoroshkovsky, Serhii Yevochkin of the presidential administration, the Energy Minister Yury Boyko, prominent businessman Dmytro Firtash, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Kostyantyn Hryshchenko. Their goal is to isolate Yanukovych and undermine any plans for integration with the EU or the Russian-led Customs Union. Both are perceived as threats to their own power.

The presence within this group of Firtash is possibly the most significant. An ally of former president Viktor Yushchenko, he established a position for his company RosUkrEnergo as an intermediary in the bitter gas war between Russia and Ukraine. Firtash offered to buy the gas from Russia and resell it to Ukraine.

Tymoshenko, a woman of formidable business acumen, cut Firtash out of the equation with the 2009 agreement. He is now officially back in business (he also controls much of Ukraine’s titanium industry), and out for revenge. The goal appears to be to ensure the complete demise of his rival.

As for the new charges, there is little question that Tymoshenko—then known as the “gas princess”—benefited from state patronage. From 1995 to 1997, when she was president of United Energy Systems of Ukraine, she was given highly lucrative government contracts—including control over imported gas from Russia—by then Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko, who was later convicted for money laundering and wire fraud by a US court. Yet the list of those who could be tried for past crimes in Ukraine is a long one that includes many current oligarchs, and one past president.

It seems safest to assume that either Yanukovych is far more scheming than many have surmised hitherto, or else (and more likely) he is being prodded and pushed by powerful interest groups whose goal is to keep Ukraine free from economic ties so that they are left free to amass wealth.

Such “freedom” requires the obliteration of the opposition and its leader, manipulation of elections, and systematic deployment of the SBU against their critics. In Arel’s view, by targeting Yulia Tymoshenko the Ukrainian government has demonstrated it has the wherewithal to stop opponents from challenging the president. The main casualty is democratic Ukraine.

But few of the “party of war” are likely to lose sleep over that.

This article first appeared in the EDMONTON JOURNAL, 15 October 2011


The Tip of the Iceberg

September 25, 2011

Mykola Riabchuk

The farcical trial of Yulia Tymoshenko, the former prime minister and main political rival of incumbent president Viktor Yanukovych, seems predictably to be drawing to a farcical end. The final decision is as yet unclear even for the chief organizers of the court facade. Thus far, they are trying desperately to fulfill two opposite and essentially incompatible demands – to free “Yulia,” at the demand of the international community, and, at the same time, to eliminate her as the most dangerous rival of Yanukovych from the next parliamentary (2012) and presidential (2015) elections.

The government, squeezed by two mutually exclusive imperatives, has a really difficult choice – either to forget about the pending Association Agreement with the EU and probably about the DCFTA (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement), or to face harsh political competition from a rival who may not only win the forthcoming elections but also could potentially dispatch all her current persecutors to jail with much more serious and better substantiated criminal accusations. The costs-and-benefits calculation of either decision is incredibly difficult for the incumbent regime – partly because there are too many unknown variables in the calculation, and partly because the regime is not homogenous, and various factions perceive their own costs and benefits differently.

Some “pragmatic” observers argue that Tymoshenko is just a loose cannon and her re-emergence on the political scene would weaken and split the opposition, and effectively prevent the emergence of new and more dangerous anti-oligarchic leaders from civil society that may challenge the entire corrupt system. They refer to some classified opinion polls that predict Yanukovych’s victory over Tymoshenko if an election were held today, but give him slim chances against other candidates like Arseniy Yatseniuk.

Another group of experts and politicians claims, rather cynically, that the EU will sign the agreements with Ukraine anyway because the country is too big and strategically important, and the Westerners would not allow it to be swallowed alternatively by Russia.

And finally, there is a sizable group of people around Yanukovych who have multiple interests in Russia and basically do not care about, and do not believe that any serious international sanctions will be imposed on the regime, regardless of its neo-Soviet roughness and repressiveness.

All these groups press the weak and incompetent leader in different directions but a consensus emerges from this seemingly chaotic chorus that will be examined further in more detail.

Remarkably yet, all the discussions about the Tymoshenko affair pay little if any attention to the factual side of her “crime.” Even pro-government experts and politicians, in various articles, talk-shows and interviews, speculate primarily about the political expediency of the trial, about its costs and benefits for both the government and Tymoshenko herself, but not about the specific decisions, signatures, documents, figures, and agreements she negotiated with her Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin.

It seems that even the government is not especially concerned to make a case that the trial is really a criminal and not a political affair. Hanna Herman, the outspoken advisor of Yanukovych, goes so as far as to suggest that her boss was merely framed by some unspecified conspirators who arrested Yulia Tymoshenko without the president’s blessing: “If [Viktor] Yanukovych had made his own decision on the issue, he would not have carried out such a great injustice. It was done when Yanukovych was on his holidays, when he did not have information… If I only knew who had done this, who made this decision, I would have strangled him with my own hands” http://gazeta.ua/articles/400435.

The issue appears here as a matter domestic intrigue within the ruling clique rather than a genuinely legal case. Yet, an even better portrait of the Ukrainian “justice” system and the legal consciousness of the Ukrainian political “elite” emerges from a recent interview with former Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma who back in 2001 arrested Yulia Tymoshenko, then a deputy prime minister, because of some murky gas deal from the mid-90s, when she was a major business partner of the notorious Pavlo Lazarenko.

Q. “Don’t you regret that you also happened to imprison Yulia Tymoshenko? Her popularity ratings rocketed after that.”
A. “I never ordered anyone to imprison her, and you know this!”
Q. “Really?”
A. “If I have ordered it, she wouldn’t have been released!” http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2011/09/17/6594851/

No comments are necessary.

In the absence of an independent judiciary in Ukraine any decision on a politician’s destiny would be political and, most likely, ascribed to the president’s whim since he has accumulated almost autocratic power in his hands. The “pragmatists” seem to have already persuaded Mr. Yanukovych to release his main nemesis and let her play the role of a political spoiler on the opposition playing field. The EU will be satisfied, the agreements signed, the sanctions avoided, the opposition silenced, and the heavyweight Russian pressure counter-balanced by a traditional “Western vector” and mostly virtual “Euro-Atlantic integration.” The only problem remains how to bring to an end the farcical “Yulia show” in a more or less convincing if not necessarily decent way.

The solution found by the president’s legal pundits and political spin-doctors looks smart. The parliament is reconsidering whether the old Soviet (1962) Criminal Procedure Code is legally valid in Ukraine, which inter alia would eliminate the article that criminalizes Tymoshenko’s alleged wrongdoing. Two birds would be killed thereby with one stone: Tymoshenko would be released without a formal dismissal of accusations (thus she would have a criminal record), and the incumbent regime would receive a perfect cart-blanche for similar wrongdoings in the future. Notably, the Ukrainian parliament controlled by Yanukovych’s Party of Regions has refused to make some critical amendments to the outdated Code that run against their authoritarian views and needs. For example, the MPs refused to forbid legally any pressure on priests to disclose information obtained during confessions. Or to stipulate clearly in the Code that advocates, notaries, doctors and psychologists may not disclose any confidential information received from their clients without their written permission http://maidan.org.ua/2011/09/rada-dozvolyla-dopytuvaty-svyaschenykiv-schodo-spovidi/.

These childish attempts to manipulate the Criminal Code are further proof that the Ukrainian “elite” is still playing with rules rather than by the rules. Yet, as similar cynical games in Moscow are accepted internationally at the highest level, the Ukrainian rulers should not be embarrassed too much.

The main problem with all these post-Soviet crooks is that they not only distrust the so-called “European values” but, in most cases, they simply do not understand them. By and large, they believe that the politics is all the same everywhere and all the discourse about human rights, rule of law, and other “blah-blah” is merely a Western trick, a trump-card invented by a stronger player to gain some advantages over weaker counterparts and force them to make some additional concessions. On many occasions, they refer to various Western missteps and inconsistencies, like Schroeder’s corruption, Berlusconi’s extravagancies, or Bush’s Iraq affair, just to prove that the only difference between “them” and “us” is that they can get away with it.

The ultimate results of the Tymoshenko affair might be two-fold. The first, less likely but still possible, scenario is that the firebrand Yulia is sentenced and thereby eliminated from the eventual elections. In this case, the EU would certainly not sign the nearly finalized agreements with Ukraine – under the clearly articulated pressure of Germany, Italy, France and some other countries that have never had much interest in Ukraine’s democracy, human rights and European integration, but have always highly respected Moscow’s “privileged interests” in what they believe is its “backyard.” None of these friends of Tymoshenko raised their voice last year when the illegitimate government was formed in March after the Regionnaires carried out a coup d’etat in parliament, the constitutional court was reshuffled, local elections illegally postponed and eventually falsified, the 2004 constitutional amendments abolished with multiple procedural violations, and so forth. For those “friends of Ukraine” everything was fine in the country until court proceedings began that encroached upon the interests of Gazprom and Mr. Putin. “It is not just wrong but amoral,” is how Mykola Azarov, prime minister of Ukraine, condemned Westerners’ attempt to connect “the serious global issues like the free trade agreement with a specific court case” http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/1262493-azarov-svyazyvat-podpisanie-soglashenij-ob-associacii-s-es-i-process-nad-timoshenko-amoralno.

This will probably be the predominant rhetoric of the Ukrainian officialdom if Tymoshenko is sentenced and the agreements are not signed. The strong anti-Western campaign and gradual “Belarusization” of Ukrainian politics is the most probable result of this scenario.

More likely, however, is that Tymoshenko will be released, the agreements signed, and the Ukrainian “elite” will have further proof of how smart they are and how easily they can cheat the stupid Westerners. So far, indeed, there are no signs they are going to reconsider their profound contempt for democracy, human rights, and all those trumpeted and really boring “European values.” Tymoshenko’s case is just the tip of the iceberg, but it distracts attention from rampant lawlessness all over the country, including innumerable accounts of police and security service brutality, blackmail and intimidation, harassment of civic activists, the shutdown of the independent mass media, destruction of “disloyal” businesses, and many other misdeeds that have become habitual practices of the Ukrainian authorities.

As long as they are allowed to cheat and not punished for it like their Belarusian brethren, they will cheat wherever and whenever possible –with or without the EU agreements, and regardless of whether Yulia Tymoshenko is at large or in detention.


Ukraine at 20

August 29, 2011

David Marples

Twenty years ago, the Ukrainian parliament declared independence, following a failed putsch in Moscow. The dramatic move virtually guaranteed the end of the Soviet Union, as Mikhail Gorbachev admitted. It also raised hopes that the new state of 52 million people would emerge as a democratic and strong country through its strategic location in central Europe.

The late 1980s saw a cultural revival and a popular movement led by leading writers who spearheaded the move to independence. Catalyzed by the USSR’s failure to respond to the 1986 Chornobyl disaster, it revisited “blank spots” of the past, such as the tragic famine of 1932-33 and Stalin’s purges. Fueled by activists from a plethora of informal associations—environmental, political, and religious—it signaled real hope for Ukraine, a resource-rich country endowed with valuable agricultural land. The future seemed bright.

However, two decades of independence have brought deep disappointment. Ukrainian intellectuals are virtually falling over each other with cynical remarks about the rates of corruption, alcoholism, infectious diseases, and lack of freedoms (see Mykola Riabchuk’s article on this site).

Conversely, Western analysts seem slightly more upbeat, if only because they compare Ukraine favorably with other former states of the USSR like Russia and Belarus, or the monolithic dictatorships of Central Asia. Despite difficulties, the economy has returned to positive growth. And, the mere fact of survival is an achievement, the longest period of independence in Ukrainian history.

It is impossible, however, to avoid an impression of fading optimism.

On the eve of Independence Day, the government banned any public demonstrations other than the official celebration.

Yulia Tymoshenko, a former prime minister and a co-leader of the 2004 Orange Revolution, remains on trial for making a 2008 gas deal with Russia, despite coming down with a debilitating illness. Her onetime ally and former president Viktor Yushchenko testified against her at the trial, further testimony to the disintegration of the democratic forces.

The president, Viktor Yanukovych, has filled the cabinet with cronies from the Donbas, few of whom even speak Ukrainian. He appears every inch the Soviet bureaucrat, thuggish and vindictive, and actively using the security forces against his enemies.

The failure to live up to early expectations can be attributed to several factors.

First, there were inevitable teething problems. The parliamentary chair, Leonid Kravchuk, former ideological secretary of the Communist Party, became Ukraine’s first president on December 1, 1991. By declaring independence on August 24, the Communists managed to retain power and remained strong during the following years, paralyzing government and opposing their former mentor, Kravchuk.

Second, Ukraine’s eastern cities were a stronghold of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Nikita Khrushchev made his political career in Donetsk; Leonid Brezhnev was born in Kamenskoe—today known as Dniprodzerzhinsk after the founder of the Soviet secret police (latterly the KGB), Felix Dzerzhinsky.

These cities fought for supremacy after independence, struggling for control of vital resources in coal mining, ferrous metallurgy, and chemicals. The Dnipropetrovsk group triumphed in the mid-90s with Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko and his Deputy Energy Minister Tymoshenko. But the notoriously corrupt Lazarenko looted an estimated $200 million from Ukraine in 1996-97 and was eventually tried and convicted in USA.

Today it is the Donetsk group that wields power. It suffered a severe setback with the Orange triumph, but the leniency of the Yushchenko presidency ensured its recovery. There is a notable continuity from former Soviet bosses to the current “clan” leaders of the region. Backed by magnates like Rinat Akhmetov, the Yanukovych regime is interested in empowerment rather than democratic ideals. Above all it wishes to prevent a return to the Orange movement of 2004.

Third, and crucially, the Yushchenko presidency (2005-10) became mired in fractious disputes and failed to build on the energy created in the streets of Kyiv. Not only did it avoid addressing corruption, it failed to bring to trial the main transgressors, and restored Yanukovych to eminence by, improbably, making him Prime Minister in August 2006.

Fourth, neither the European Union nor Russia under Putin and Medvedev has supported Ukraine adequately. The EU failed to live up to its promises for early membership during the Orange Revolution, whereas Russia started a war over gas prices with the Yushchenko administration, and today is an uncomfortable and intrusive neighbor that seeks much tighter integration with Kyiv.

Critically, the government of Ukraine has failed to enunciate a national vision for Ukraine. On the contrary, Yanukovych and his associates encourage regionalism, divisions, and extremism in order to pose as the voice of moderation. The growing authoritarianism poses a serious threat to democracy that can no longer be ignored by European leaders or by Ukrainians themselves.

This article appeared simultaneously in the Edmonton Journal, Ottawa Citizen, and Vancouver Province, 24 August 2011


Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 68 other followers