Russian Duma’s Discussion of Second World War Revisionism in the Near Abroad States

By Ilya Khineiko

In Russia as well in other post-Soviet states, history, particularly the history of the Second World War, is not merely a matter of academic debate. Politicians from the highest echelons of power often find it instrumental to dwell on controversial historical issues. Last October, in a letter sent to the Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev weighed in on the proper interpretation of the Ukrainian Famine, the Holodomor. In December 2008, the Russian parliament decided to move in a similar direction, creating a working group to draft a new law against the rehabilitation of Nazism and Nazi collaborators in the post-Soviet states. Chaired by deputy head of the Duma’s Committee for CIS Affairs, Konstantin Zatulin, the group produced a legislative draft proposal with a lengthy title “On the countermeasures against the rehabilitation of Nazi criminals and their facilitators in the new independent states on the territory of the former Soviet Union.” It was published by the pro-government news agency Regnum on 20 April 2009 (full Russian text is available here: http://www.regnum.ru/news/1153517.html).

Probably the most striking feature of the bill is the issue of jurisdiction as it explicitly targets Russia’s neighbors. While the notion of universal jurisdiction has gained ground in the past decade, an attempt to direct domestic legislation against a specific set of countries represents a novel approach to international law. Furthermore, according to a Russian legal expert quoted in the Moscow Times, the proposed legislation would violate the Russian Criminal Code as it “only allows penalties for crimes committed in Russia.”

However, even the stated intention to focus on all former Soviet republics is somewhat misleading. In an interview with Radio Liberty, Konstantin Zatulin singled out Latvia, Estonia, and Ukraine where “the attempts to rehabilitate Nazi criminals and their facilitators… have become a matter of state policy”. He admitted that any similar actions in other, more remote, countries, such as Australia for example, would be of no concern to the bill’s authors. According to Radio Liberty, many Verkhovna Rada deputies are convinced that the bill is directed primarily against Ukraine. This comes as no surprise as Zatulin’s troubled relationship with Ukrainian authorities is well known. In July 2008 he was denied entry into Ukraine. Ukrainian Security Chief Valentyn Nalyvaychenko later explained that Zatulin had violated a Ukrainian law on the status of a foreigner during a previous visit to Ukraine when he made statements regarding the country’s territorial integrity.

The reaction of Ukrainian parliamentarians has been uniformly negative. Yuri Kostenko from Our Ukraine sharply criticized the bill, saying that it would turn Russia into a new “gendarme of Europe.” Even members of the ostensibly pro-Russian Party of Regions were not impressed. According to Valery Konovalyuk, as far as the international law is concerned, such legislative initiative does not represent a sound approach. In the context of Russian-Ukrainian relations, the bill can be considered a response to the draft law against Holodomor denial that President Viktor Yushchenko submitted to the Verkhovna Rada in December 2008. Although the Ukrainian bill does not attempt to prosecute people outside Ukraine, it proposes to imprison those who deny the genocidal character of the Holodomor against the Ukrainian people, an interpretation vigorously contested by Russia’s authorities and most Russian historians.

Perhaps the most ambiguous and controversial aspect of the new legislation is its definition of what constitutes a rehabilitation of Nazism and who should be deemed Nazi facilitators. The draft states that a Nazi facilitator (posobnik) is someone who served in or collaborated with the German occupation administration on the territory of the USSR voluntarily or as a result of mobilization (sic! – I.Kh.). Rehabilitation of Nazism is defined as “any actions aimed at… the reinstatement of rights, glorification, [as well as any attempts] to restore reputation of Nazi criminals and facilitators and their organizations by bestowing them with benefits, state or societal awards and to deny Nazi genocide and crimes against humanity”. This incredibly vague definition leaves a lot of room for interpretation, and obfuscates the true intentions of the bill’s authors, namely to criminalize any opinion that questions the role of the USSR in the Second World War. According to Konstantin Zatulin, “There were no third forces in the Second World War. The logic of war compelled people either to side with Nazi Germany and then start shooting at Soviet soldiers or to choose the side of the anti-Hitler coalition.” Zatulin’s definition does not differ substantially from the old Soviet line that equated anti-Soviet resistance with Nazi collaborationism. That the struggle against alleged ‘rehabilitation of Nazism’ is being used to defend the Soviet past and its remaining symbols is revealed in Zatulin’s statement made in early April. In an interview with the Russian news agency RIA-Novosti, he called the dismantling of the statue of the Soviet Soldier in the city of Stryj in Lviv oblast an outrageous act and promised to accelerate work on the appropriate legislation.

While the draft bill purports to target equally Russian citizens and citizens of other post-Soviet states, it is unlikely that the legislation would be ever applied against the rise of pro-Nazi sentiment in Russia itself. In an ironic twist of events, a few days after the bill’s publication, fans of the Russian soccer club Spartak Moscow unveiled a banner commemorating the anniversary of Hitler’s birthday during a game in the Russian Premier League. Understandably, such an act caused outrage among the Russian public and was roundly condemned. However, a Duma representative, Gennady Gudkov, stated that the perpetrators could only be fined under the current legislation, being seemingly unaware of the proposed bill that seeks to criminalize precisely such actions. Indeed, should this bill be adopted, its main brunt will likely be directed not at individuals but at ‘hostile’ states. As such it will just serve as another weapon in the growing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, in which history is just another battlefield.

Blockading the Verkhovna Rada

Kateryna Malyhina

For nearly a month Ukraine’s legislature has been paralyzed. The Party of Regions (PR) is blocking the work of the Parliament. The cause is the secret letter to NATO about Ukraine’s accession to the Membership Action Plan that was signed by the Head of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine A. Yatsenyuk. The PR claims that such an action was not sanctioned by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and therefore lacks the approval of the Ukrainian people. As a result Yatsenyuk had no right to put his signature to such an important document. Both de facto and de jure, they are right. But what in reality stands behind such an action?

At a first glance, the Party of Regions has dual benefits. On the one hand, it has raised its credibility in the eyes of people, showing that it acts as a true opposition, which seeks to ensure that those who are in power do not violate laws. On the other hand, referring to the “desire of the Ukrainian nation” and demanding a referendum on Ukraine’s accession to NATO, the PR does not explicitly oppose NATO, but at the same time strengthens the position among its traditional voters, who had already begun to doubt the ability of the PR, to defend their interests.

However, the list of the benefits for the PR in this situation does not end here. Having failed to gain power, the PR needs to fulfill its most important current task: that is, to prevent the normal functioning of Tymoshenko’s government, but not to advocate expressly for her resignation. There are two reasons why the PR will not take this latter step. First, by distributing social benefits, she is at the peak of popularity now and direct actions will only enhance her popularity. Second, it will benefit Yanukovych to let Tymoshenko “work” now, make mistakes, and thus show that her government is unable to lead Ukraine into a “bright future.”

By blocking parliament, the PR seized the opportunity to impede Tymoshenko’s plans, while acting within the law. Tymoshenko’s government urgently needs money in order to continue its mega-project named “compensation of lost deposits in the USSR Savings Bank.” The quickest and easiest way to obtain money is through re-privatization of companies, which has already been proven to work. Why put all one’s efforts in developing the economy, when one can quickly “redistribute” everything, referring to the unfair privatization in the 90s. That is why the Prime Minister has already made attempts to dismiss the Head of the State Property Fund Valentyna Semenyuk. Tymoshenko needs her own man for such a responsible position (incidentally, Andrei Portnov from BYUT was thought to be the replacement for Semenyuk). But this turned out to be far from easy. According to Article 85 §12 of the amended Constitution, the right to appoint and dismiss the Head of the State Property Fund has been allocated to the Verkhovna Rada. And the legislature is not functioning at this time.

But as the Ukrainian saying goes, “too much of something can be harmful.” The PR cannot block the parliament indefinitely. It is also highly unlikely that the PR will succeed in forcing through its own terms–to vote on the commencement to the Membership Action Plan only after a referendum–because it cannot at present gain a majority in parliament. To further block the work of the Verkhovna Rada will soon no longer be profitable. First, while the “30 days” before the President has the duty to dissolve the parliament (according to the Art. 90 §3 of Ukraine’s Constitution) are already counting down, Yatsenyuk has already stated that he will not let the Verkhovna Rada work for half a day and be blocked again afterwards. Therefore the only possibility to start the countdown from day one is when the parliament will be fully “unblocked.” Second, if the PR continues blocking the parliament, time will start to work against it in a while. The PR will be blamed for a new political crisis. Moreover, Tymoshenko will declare once again that she has been prevented from working, which will only improve her image.

There is one more risk when prolonging the conflict. The President may start exercising legislative functions directly from his office. Indeed, Article 93 of the Constitution states that the President of Ukraine has the right of legislative initiative; and according to Article 106 the president then issues decrees and orders, which are mandatory for execution, and Article 113 indicates that the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is still accountable to the President of Ukraine. Thus, there is a risk of introducing the “direct” presidential rule: Yushchenko would issue the decrees that Tymoshenko’s government need, bypassing the parliament. There is no question that the Party of Regions recognizes this possibility.

Therefore, it is likely that conflict will be soon resolved and the Verkhovna Rada must resume its work in the nearest future. By permitting this to happen and despite the technical defeat, the Party of Regions will still remain the winner. After all, the problem is not NATO.

First published at ХайВей// HighWay on February 19, 2008
http://h.ua/story/84206/

Ukraine’s Fast Track to NATO Too Quick for Many in Nation

David Marples

Ukraine has been accepted as the latest member of the World Trade Organization after fifteen years of negotiations. WTO membership is expected to accelerate Ukraine’s prospects of joining the European Union. Further, Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko has requested that Ukraine be permitted to participate in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), and ultimately to be accepted as a full member of NATO. What has been the impact of these events and what are the likely consequences?

WTO membership should bring some benefits to the Ukrainian economy, particularly for the steel industry, which faced prohibitive export tariffs from EU countries hitherto. The resulting free competition and reduction of barriers are expected to boost industrial growth and ensure the production of more high quality products in this nation of 46 million. However, it may also increase foreign competition in a number of sectors, such as banking and machine building. Ukraine’s acceptance preceded that of Russia, which is on the waiting list. Officially Ukraine supports Russian membership, since problematic issues such as Russian gas prices could then be resolved under the WTO umbrella rather than bilaterally.

There should be no problems with the Ukrainian parliament’s ratification of WTO membership. The same cannot be said of the bid to take part in MAP, which has aroused angry responses from the Party of Regions and from Russia. Over the past week, MPs from the large opposition party have blocked the rostrum in the Rada, refusing to allow debate on the issue of NATO membership. Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych has stated that on this issue there can be no compromise, membership is inconceivable without a national referendum, and a majority of Ukraine’s residents are firmly opposed to the country joining the defensive alliance.

For Russia too, the issue is a thorny one. Russian president Vladimir Putin is still smarting from Poland’s agreement to accept a US anti-missile base on its territory which, allied with a radar station in the Czech Republic, would serve as an interception point for missiles aimed at the United States by a rogue state (the inference is Iran). Russia has accepted NATO membership of former Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. Ukraine is a different matter entirely.

Putin, who is due to step down as president next month, points out that whereas Russia has dismantled military bases in areas like Cuba and Vietnam, the United States has established new sites in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, in addition to the anti-missile site slated for Poland. NATO’s eastward expansion to include Ukraine and Georgia is seen as a bid to surround Russia with hostile bases and to commence a new arms race.

Ukraine is a particularly sensitive case for Russia. Under Putin, Russian-Ukrainian relations were very close prior to the Orange Revolution in 2004, at which time Yanukovych, Russia’s choice for president, was defeated in a third run-off election. Though Putin’s likely successor Dmitry Medvedev has not engaged in anti-Western rhetoric, he is expected to echo Putin’s concerns over new perceived threats to Russian security.

NATO leaders, who meet in Bucharest in April, have welcomed the potential membership of Ukraine. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer noted that Russia’s protests would not be a factor when making a decision whether to accept Ukraine. The rationale behind further NATO expansion, however, has rarely been outlined. The implication is clearly that new members require protection from a real or potential external enemy, which could only be Russia. The latter country has not helped its case by its belligerence toward its neighbors. Estonian president Toomas Ilves stated recently that in making a decision on the future membership of Ukraine and Georgia, NATO members should not give into Russian threats and blackmail.

The danger for Ukraine lies in the precarious position of the Tymoshenko government. With a majority of just two deputies, it has embarked on a campaign to integrate Ukraine with Euro-Atlantic structures without further delay, including membership of the EU, which ostensibly has been boosted by WTO membership. But it is not in a position to join NATO without alienating a large segment of the population. While most residents of Ukraine welcome WTO and future EU membership, they do not feel the same way about the country joining the alliance. NATO has a poor reputation associated with past actions in Serbia and the Near East.

Others are concerned about the impact on relations with Russia, a country with which trade turnover totaled $30 billion in 2007–the next highest turnover, with Germany, was $5 billion. Ukraine’s plans to ease dependence on Russian resources by building pipelines from Turkmenistan seem based on wishful thinking rather than reality. Ukraine has a number of serious issues to discuss with post-Putin Russia, including the future of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the port of Sevastopol. And Russia has never hesitated to use its greatest state-owned resource–gas– as a means of maintaining its former Soviet-era ties to Ukraine.

In short, whereas the government’s initiatives toward Europe seem logical, there are grounds to question the wisdom of a fast-track Ukrainian entry into NATO, particularly without a sustained internal debate on the issue first.

[This article was first published on 13 February 2008 by the Edmonton Journal, along with the subtitle: "But other initiatives toward Europe seem logical, enjoy wide appeal." Copyright is owned by CanWest and the article may be cited but cannot be reproduced without
permission]

Ukraine Elections 2007 Analysis

By David Marples

The 2007 parliamentary elections in Ukraine saw sweeping gains by the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (YTB), but the Regions Party of Ukraine maintained its standing as the largest and most popular party bloc. Overall, the Party of Regions won just over 8 million votes or 34.37% of the total. The Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko was in second place with 7.16 million votes or 30.71%, and the Our Ukraine-People’s Self-Defense (NUNS) alliance placed third with 3.3 million votes, or 14.15%. Only two other parties crossed the 3% threshold needed for seats in the assembly: the Communist Party of Ukraine (1.25 million, 5.39%), and the Bloc Volodymyr Lytvyn (924,538, 3.96%).

If broken down by region, the outcome might be interpreted somewhat differently. The Tymoshenko Bloc was the only party to secure significant votes in almost all regions of Ukraine, and was the winning party in 16 out of Ukraine’s 25 regions and 2 cities (Kyiv and Sevastopol). By contrast, the Regions Party was successful in only 10 regions, most notably in Luhansk (73.53%) and Donetsk (72.05%). Regions finished dead last in Ternopil’ with only 20,000 votes (3% of the total) and failed miserably in all areas of Western Ukraine. Our Ukraine-People’s Self-Defense, backed by President Viktor Yushchenko, won in just one region–Transcarpathia–and even there it held only a very narrow lead over the Tymoshenko Bloc (31.1 and 28.8% respectively).

Left-leaning parties are now on the periphery of the political spectrum as the Regions Party appears to have occupied the ground once held by the Communists and Socialists in the east and south of Ukraine. The Socialists narrowly failed to make it into the new Parliament. The Communists’ best result was in the city of Sevastopol, where they placed second with 10.3% of the popular vote, and in Luhansk, where they obtained 8.48%. Their fifth place finish in the city of Kyiv is reflective of their declining influence. Ukraine now has two large political parties that are unlikely to find common ground: Regions and YTB; and two smaller parties that might traditionally be allied with these two: the Communists with the Regions and Our Ukraine-People’s Self-Defense with YTB.

The problems are clear enough. The shaky YTB-NUNS coalition has a majority of just two seats in the new Parliament, unless it can persuade members of the Lytvyn Bloc to join forces with them–on the face of things it appears an unlikely ally given Lytvyn’s past close links with the former Kuchma regime There are already several potential defections if, as expected, Tymoshenko is reappointed Prime Minister, the position she held in the first Yushchenko Cabinet. If she does not receive this position–and she has reportedly made several concessions as to whom she would appoint to her Cabinet–then the YTB would once again become the main opposition and Tymoshenko would run for president in 2009 as a strong candidate, more or less forcing Yushchenko to step aside. The president no longer has the mass support to back up a second term in office.

If Tymoshenko is accepted as Prime Minister, the Regions Party can cause a variety of problems for her. Regions has the backing of Ukraine’s most prominent businessmen. The party has already demonstrated its willingness to test both the will of the president and the loyalty of Ukraine’s militias and security forces. Its maneuvers in the former Parliament doubtless impelled Yushchenko to suggest initially the formation of a broader coalition. Such a coalition would also provide the president with a role as a viable political player of influence, a position that would not ensue were Tymoshenko the key figure.

Two parliamentary elections in two years have not brought about a decisive result for Ukraine. The country, certain media reports notwithstanding, is not polarized along a pro-Russian and pro-Western divide, but it has two regions that define the extreme positions on either side: Western Ukraine and particularly Galicia, is Western leaning, pro-EU, and demands exclusive rights for the Ukrainian language. It has a perception of the past that is markedly anti-Soviet and even anti-Russian. The Donbas (Luhansk and Donetsk) regions by contrast are pro-Russian, support equal status for the Russian language (a policy frequently cited by Yanukovych in all three elections since 2004), and have a jaundiced view of what is perceived as Western influence over and intrusions into Ukraine. Some regions of the south–particularly Crimea and the city of Sevastopol–express a similar though somewhat more flexible outlook.

However, elections are not usually about the extreme positions, they are about finding a middle ground, and that is where most residents of Ukraine stand. The decline of the Communists and eclipse of the Socialists removes an element from the Parliament that was divisive in the past. They had very little to offer. The electorate would most likely be satisfied with a government that could ensure current growth rates continue and that standards of living are maintained. Both the YTB and the Regions’ election materials focused on the financial and economic benefits to be derived from their respective victories. Economic concerns were of far more importance than ideology.

On the other hand leaders of both these parties have shown a tendency to focus on personal power rather than build coalitions. Both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko will be thinking ahead to the 2009 presidential elections. The former politician has made an impressive comeback after his catastrophic presidential election campaign of 2004. However, whether his individual leadership will continue to receive sponsorship from such influential backers as Rinat Akhmetov remains to be seen. Likely Ukraine’s most wealthy oligarch will consider other possible candidates over the next few months. As for Tymoshenko, the electorate has shown growing support for her eponymous party. Given her party’s achievement in late September, she deserves a second chance in the Prime Minister’s post. But she also will need to show more flexibility and perhaps adopt a less confrontational style if she is to build on her success in the current elections.

Ukrainian President declares national day to remember victims of communist repressions

On the 70th anniversary of the Great Terror Yushchenko signs a decree to honor the memory of the victims of communist repressions

By Ilya Khineyko

In the midst of his continuing standoff with the Verkhovna Rada, President Viktor Yushchenko took a step that supersedes the current political crisis. In a presidential decree signed on May 21 the president proposed to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Great Terror of 1937-1938 by making the third Sunday of May an annual Day of Remembrance for the victims of political repressions by the Soviet regime. The announcement was made the next day when Yushchenko visited the Bykivnia memorial site on the outskirts of Kyiv where those executed by NKVD were buried between 1936 and 1941. It was during the Perestroika era when the information regarding mass burials of the victims of Stalinist terror such as Kurapaty in Belarus or Levashovo near Leningrad was made public, which ultimately played an important role in the unraveling of the Soviet system.