Shades of Grey Shroud Orange Anniversary

David Marples

Saturday, November 21, marked five years since the start of the Orange Revolution that saw protesters mass in the streets of Kyiv to protest a flawed vote in the second round of the presidential elections that favored incumbent Prime Minister, Viktor Yanukovych. After a series of events and the intrusion of the Constitutional Court, that round was re-run and challenger Viktor Yushchenko was elected president of Ukraine. He formed a coalition of Orange forces that included his Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and Speaker of Parliament, Oleksandr Moroz.

Five years on and into another election campaign, the Orange camp is in a sorry mess. Moroz has left. Although Tymoshenko is in her second term as Prime Minister, she faces a large opposition in parliament and feuds constantly with the president. She is running against Yushchenko for the presidency in January 2010. Yanukovych, leader of the Regions Party, is back once again, intent on sabotaging the Tymoshenko campaign as well as opposing fiscal measures to deal with the recession.

Very little makes sense in Ukrainian politics, which are so intricate, corrupt, and mutable that few can unravel events to make a pertinent analysis.

Recently, for example, the International Monetary Fund, which last year provided a loan of $16.4 billion to help Ukraine, withheld a tranche of $3.8 billion. The reason was that the president and the parliamentary opposition (Yanukovych) backed a rise in minimum wages of 20% next year, thus contravening IMF conditions for continuing the loans. Perhaps they acted from humanitarian motives, but more likely they simply wished to undermine the position of the Prime Minister.

The president has also vetoed a law that would have provided about $125 million to combat H1N1 in Ukraine, which recently reached epidemic proportions with 189 deaths. There is little logic to him agreeing to wage increases but ignoring the flu virus.

One of the ironies of the president’s approval of the pay rises is that Yushchenko is known as a fiscal conservative, who lambasted Tymoshenko’s 2009 budget for its free-spending profligacy. Rumors in Kyiv now suggest that the president’s office would like to secure the release of former Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko, currently under arrest in the United States for money laundering. The reason is that his return to Ukraine would undermine the position of his former Deputy PM, Tymoshenko, then known as the ‘gas princess’ in an era of runaway corruption.

Tymoshenko for her part has campaigned hard to improve her position. Without doubt she has spent the most money—according to Yushchenko she has exploited the office of Prime Minister to finance her campaign. This week she met with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in Yalta and secured an agreement on gas prices in 2010, which would mean that Ukraine would not be penalized for purchasing less gas than agreed. This was a major coup given the interruptions to gas supplies to Europe last year as a result of a Russian-Ukrainian impasse. It also signals to voters that under a Tymoshenko presidency, relations with Russia would improve dramatically.

At the same time, Yushchenko hosted Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili in Kyiv. According to the Ukrainian media, Tymoshenko and Putin enjoyed a few jokes at the expense of the two chief leaders of the color revolutions of the early 21st century. Russia has accused Ukraine’s president of supporting the Georgians in the August 2008 conflict.

Polls suggest that Tymoshenko is catching up with Yanukovych as the election’s frontrunner. A poll conducted by Ukrainian Project System on November 12, indicated that Yanukovych has the backing of 21.4% of voters to her 18.1%. Arseny Yatseniuk, in third place, has only 8% and is no longer a serious contender.

The most recent poll of the Razumkov Centre on a potential runoff between Tymoshenko and Yanukovych suggests that it would be a very close call. Tymoshenko would win easily in Western Ukraine, by a lesser margin in the Centre, and Yanukovych is well ahead in the south and east.

The choice for voters seems rather stark. Yanukovych is still the arch apparatchik, fumbling and inarticulate, and bankrolled by Ukraine’s main oligarch Rinat Akhmetov. The Western media describe him as pro-Russian, but he is essentially a tool of eastern oligarchs, people who wish to maintain their influence and power over resources and industry. There is no question that Prime Minister poses a threat to such forces.

Tymoshenko, on the other hand, is a ruthless politician with few clearly delineated principles other than her own advancement and power. In her first period as Prime Minister in 2005—it lasted only 9 months—she alienated most of her Cabinet. In the second, she has struggled to deal with the economic crisis. IMF funds have cushioned the blow, but the Ukrainian economy shrank by almost 16% in the third quarter of 2009. The steel industry will take years to recover from a dramatic drop in trade abroad.

The next president will not only need to introduce radical economic measures, he/she will need to work with Parliament. To date, the failure to form a workable coalition in the legislature, added to unseemly squabbles between the main leaders, has resulted in deadlock. In 2004, Yushchenko was the outsider, a potential candidate to end the rampant corruption in Ukraine and make a new beginning. In 2010 voters face a bleaker choice and the alternatives seems less clear-cut.

(Edmonton Journal, 23 November 2009)

UKRAINIANS PREFER STRONG LEADERS

David Marples

Two recent opinion polls by the Research and Branding Institute in Kyiv provide some startling revelations about political opinions in Ukraine, just as Parliament has approved new presidential elections on January 17.

A June 2009 poll with over 2,000 respondents from all regions of Ukraine is declared to have a margin of error of 2.2%. It provides a plethora of data about the leading candidates for president. Former Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, who lost in the 2004 elections to current president Viktor Yushchenko, leads with the support of 26.8% of respondents, followed by Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko at 15.8%, and former Foreign Minister and chairman of parliament Arsenii Yatsenyuk, 12.3%. President Yushchenko is backed by a meager 2.1%.

If the election, as seems likely, requires a second round, then Yanukovych would triumph over either of his main challengers: against Tymoshenko by 38.8 to 28.8%; and against Yatsenyuk by 36.7 to 30.8%. If the second round were between Yatsenyuk and Tymoshenko, the former would eke out a narrow victory.

The emergence of Yatsenyuk as a serious contender is a recent phenomenon. A former protégé of President Yushchenko, he reportedly has financial backing from two controversial figures: Dmitrii Firtash, a leading stockholder in the RosUkrEnergo company that mediated in the dispute over the price for the sale of Russian gas to Ukraine; and Viktor Pinchuk, the son-in-law of former President Leonid Kuchma, who owns four Ukrainian TV channels. A native of Chernivtsi, Yatsenyuk is of Jewish origin and turned 35 on May 22, the minimum age at which one can run for the post of president.

At present, 51.2% of those polled will definitely participate in the elections, while 24% may exercise their right to vote. As there is speculation that parliamentary elections may take place simultaneously, the standing of the major political parties is also of relevance: the Regions Party leads among respondents with 29.3%, followed by the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc with 15.5%, and the Yatsenyuk Bloc with 10.6%.

Recently, a move to form a coalition between the two largest blocs (Regions and Tymoshenko) failed after Yanukovych ultimately rejected the idea. At one point the Regions leader had suggested changing the minimum age to run for president to 50, which would have removed Tymoshenko and Yatsenyuk from the contest.

A poll conduced by the same organization in May focused on attitudes of residents of Ukraine to other countries and blocs. These results are perhaps even more enlightening, given the general synopsis in Western media that Ukraine is Western leaning or pro-Europe.

Over 35% of those polled would prefer to see Ukraine join a Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; 20% would like Ukraine to join a United Europe (European Union); and 23% want the country to remain independent without joining any such formation. Incidentally, support for joining the EU is much higher in Belarus than in Ukraine.

In terms of attitudes to leaders of former Soviet republics, 58% hold a positive attitude toward Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, 56% feel the same way about hard-line Belarusian president Alyaksandr Lukashenka, and 55% have a favorable attitude toward Russian president Dmitry Medvedev. By contrast only 11% feel positive about Georgian president Mikeil Saakashvili.

Western leaders are considerably less popular. The highest rated is US President Barack Obama (31%), followed by Angela Merkel of Germany (29%), and Frances’ Nicolas Sarkozy and Poland’s Lech Kaczynski (tied at 22%). Notably, however, both Obama and Merkel received higher totals than Ukraine’s leading candidate Yanukovych.

Lastly, looking at attitudes toward other countries, the results were as follows: 57% of respondents feel positively toward Russia, 45% toward Belarus, and 20% toward Germany. Only 3% feel positively about Georgia, which was supported firmly by President Yushchenko during its August 2008 war with Russia.

Some deductions can be made from these results, which are consistent with findings of Western researchers such as Stephen White at the University of Glasgow.

First, the economic downturn has not affected significantly the political attitudes of Ukrainian residents. Ukrainian citizens appear to favor strong leaders over weak, albeit more democratic–leaning statespersons. They are generally pro-Russian and skeptical toward both the United States and the EU.

Second, the chances of success of Prime Minister Tymoshenko in the January 2010 elections are slim. Her popularity has fallen in recent months after the seemingly endless squabbles with the president and what is perceived as her single-minded pursuit of the highest office. At one point she clearly intended to push through a constitutional change to elect the next president through the parliament, but such a maneuver today would only work in favor of Yanukovych.

Third, regionally there is a marked contrast between attitudes in western regions and the rest of Ukraine. Western Ukraine is more pro-Europe and anti-Russian, with political support divided between Tymoshenko (23.4%) and Yatsenyuk (23.2%). However, Western Ukrainians make up only one-fifth of Ukraine’s population.

Fourth, Ukrainians are deeply unhappy with the current president, an increasingly isolated figure who seems incapable of communicating in any meaningful way with his electorate. A realist might opt not to run and campaign for newcomer Yatsenyuk, notwithstanding the credibility of some of his financial backers. But Yushchenko seems intent on running again, even though every indicator suggests that he is unelectable.

This article appeared originally in the EDMONTON JOURNAL on 27 June 2009.

Blockading the Verkhovna Rada

Kateryna Malyhina

For nearly a month Ukraine’s legislature has been paralyzed. The Party of Regions (PR) is blocking the work of the Parliament. The cause is the secret letter to NATO about Ukraine’s accession to the Membership Action Plan that was signed by the Head of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine A. Yatsenyuk. The PR claims that such an action was not sanctioned by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and therefore lacks the approval of the Ukrainian people. As a result Yatsenyuk had no right to put his signature to such an important document. Both de facto and de jure, they are right. But what in reality stands behind such an action?

At a first glance, the Party of Regions has dual benefits. On the one hand, it has raised its credibility in the eyes of people, showing that it acts as a true opposition, which seeks to ensure that those who are in power do not violate laws. On the other hand, referring to the “desire of the Ukrainian nation” and demanding a referendum on Ukraine’s accession to NATO, the PR does not explicitly oppose NATO, but at the same time strengthens the position among its traditional voters, who had already begun to doubt the ability of the PR, to defend their interests.

However, the list of the benefits for the PR in this situation does not end here. Having failed to gain power, the PR needs to fulfill its most important current task: that is, to prevent the normal functioning of Tymoshenko’s government, but not to advocate expressly for her resignation. There are two reasons why the PR will not take this latter step. First, by distributing social benefits, she is at the peak of popularity now and direct actions will only enhance her popularity. Second, it will benefit Yanukovych to let Tymoshenko “work” now, make mistakes, and thus show that her government is unable to lead Ukraine into a “bright future.”

By blocking parliament, the PR seized the opportunity to impede Tymoshenko’s plans, while acting within the law. Tymoshenko’s government urgently needs money in order to continue its mega-project named “compensation of lost deposits in the USSR Savings Bank.” The quickest and easiest way to obtain money is through re-privatization of companies, which has already been proven to work. Why put all one’s efforts in developing the economy, when one can quickly “redistribute” everything, referring to the unfair privatization in the 90s. That is why the Prime Minister has already made attempts to dismiss the Head of the State Property Fund Valentyna Semenyuk. Tymoshenko needs her own man for such a responsible position (incidentally, Andrei Portnov from BYUT was thought to be the replacement for Semenyuk). But this turned out to be far from easy. According to Article 85 §12 of the amended Constitution, the right to appoint and dismiss the Head of the State Property Fund has been allocated to the Verkhovna Rada. And the legislature is not functioning at this time.

But as the Ukrainian saying goes, “too much of something can be harmful.” The PR cannot block the parliament indefinitely. It is also highly unlikely that the PR will succeed in forcing through its own terms–to vote on the commencement to the Membership Action Plan only after a referendum–because it cannot at present gain a majority in parliament. To further block the work of the Verkhovna Rada will soon no longer be profitable. First, while the “30 days” before the President has the duty to dissolve the parliament (according to the Art. 90 §3 of Ukraine’s Constitution) are already counting down, Yatsenyuk has already stated that he will not let the Verkhovna Rada work for half a day and be blocked again afterwards. Therefore the only possibility to start the countdown from day one is when the parliament will be fully “unblocked.” Second, if the PR continues blocking the parliament, time will start to work against it in a while. The PR will be blamed for a new political crisis. Moreover, Tymoshenko will declare once again that she has been prevented from working, which will only improve her image.

There is one more risk when prolonging the conflict. The President may start exercising legislative functions directly from his office. Indeed, Article 93 of the Constitution states that the President of Ukraine has the right of legislative initiative; and according to Article 106 the president then issues decrees and orders, which are mandatory for execution, and Article 113 indicates that the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is still accountable to the President of Ukraine. Thus, there is a risk of introducing the “direct” presidential rule: Yushchenko would issue the decrees that Tymoshenko’s government need, bypassing the parliament. There is no question that the Party of Regions recognizes this possibility.

Therefore, it is likely that conflict will be soon resolved and the Verkhovna Rada must resume its work in the nearest future. By permitting this to happen and despite the technical defeat, the Party of Regions will still remain the winner. After all, the problem is not NATO.

First published at ХайВей// HighWay on February 19, 2008
http://h.ua/story/84206/

Ukraine Elections 2007 Analysis

By David Marples

The 2007 parliamentary elections in Ukraine saw sweeping gains by the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (YTB), but the Regions Party of Ukraine maintained its standing as the largest and most popular party bloc. Overall, the Party of Regions won just over 8 million votes or 34.37% of the total. The Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko was in second place with 7.16 million votes or 30.71%, and the Our Ukraine-People’s Self-Defense (NUNS) alliance placed third with 3.3 million votes, or 14.15%. Only two other parties crossed the 3% threshold needed for seats in the assembly: the Communist Party of Ukraine (1.25 million, 5.39%), and the Bloc Volodymyr Lytvyn (924,538, 3.96%).

If broken down by region, the outcome might be interpreted somewhat differently. The Tymoshenko Bloc was the only party to secure significant votes in almost all regions of Ukraine, and was the winning party in 16 out of Ukraine’s 25 regions and 2 cities (Kyiv and Sevastopol). By contrast, the Regions Party was successful in only 10 regions, most notably in Luhansk (73.53%) and Donetsk (72.05%). Regions finished dead last in Ternopil’ with only 20,000 votes (3% of the total) and failed miserably in all areas of Western Ukraine. Our Ukraine-People’s Self-Defense, backed by President Viktor Yushchenko, won in just one region–Transcarpathia–and even there it held only a very narrow lead over the Tymoshenko Bloc (31.1 and 28.8% respectively).

Left-leaning parties are now on the periphery of the political spectrum as the Regions Party appears to have occupied the ground once held by the Communists and Socialists in the east and south of Ukraine. The Socialists narrowly failed to make it into the new Parliament. The Communists’ best result was in the city of Sevastopol, where they placed second with 10.3% of the popular vote, and in Luhansk, where they obtained 8.48%. Their fifth place finish in the city of Kyiv is reflective of their declining influence. Ukraine now has two large political parties that are unlikely to find common ground: Regions and YTB; and two smaller parties that might traditionally be allied with these two: the Communists with the Regions and Our Ukraine-People’s Self-Defense with YTB.

The problems are clear enough. The shaky YTB-NUNS coalition has a majority of just two seats in the new Parliament, unless it can persuade members of the Lytvyn Bloc to join forces with them–on the face of things it appears an unlikely ally given Lytvyn’s past close links with the former Kuchma regime There are already several potential defections if, as expected, Tymoshenko is reappointed Prime Minister, the position she held in the first Yushchenko Cabinet. If she does not receive this position–and she has reportedly made several concessions as to whom she would appoint to her Cabinet–then the YTB would once again become the main opposition and Tymoshenko would run for president in 2009 as a strong candidate, more or less forcing Yushchenko to step aside. The president no longer has the mass support to back up a second term in office.

If Tymoshenko is accepted as Prime Minister, the Regions Party can cause a variety of problems for her. Regions has the backing of Ukraine’s most prominent businessmen. The party has already demonstrated its willingness to test both the will of the president and the loyalty of Ukraine’s militias and security forces. Its maneuvers in the former Parliament doubtless impelled Yushchenko to suggest initially the formation of a broader coalition. Such a coalition would also provide the president with a role as a viable political player of influence, a position that would not ensue were Tymoshenko the key figure.

Two parliamentary elections in two years have not brought about a decisive result for Ukraine. The country, certain media reports notwithstanding, is not polarized along a pro-Russian and pro-Western divide, but it has two regions that define the extreme positions on either side: Western Ukraine and particularly Galicia, is Western leaning, pro-EU, and demands exclusive rights for the Ukrainian language. It has a perception of the past that is markedly anti-Soviet and even anti-Russian. The Donbas (Luhansk and Donetsk) regions by contrast are pro-Russian, support equal status for the Russian language (a policy frequently cited by Yanukovych in all three elections since 2004), and have a jaundiced view of what is perceived as Western influence over and intrusions into Ukraine. Some regions of the south–particularly Crimea and the city of Sevastopol–express a similar though somewhat more flexible outlook.

However, elections are not usually about the extreme positions, they are about finding a middle ground, and that is where most residents of Ukraine stand. The decline of the Communists and eclipse of the Socialists removes an element from the Parliament that was divisive in the past. They had very little to offer. The electorate would most likely be satisfied with a government that could ensure current growth rates continue and that standards of living are maintained. Both the YTB and the Regions’ election materials focused on the financial and economic benefits to be derived from their respective victories. Economic concerns were of far more importance than ideology.

On the other hand leaders of both these parties have shown a tendency to focus on personal power rather than build coalitions. Both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko will be thinking ahead to the 2009 presidential elections. The former politician has made an impressive comeback after his catastrophic presidential election campaign of 2004. However, whether his individual leadership will continue to receive sponsorship from such influential backers as Rinat Akhmetov remains to be seen. Likely Ukraine’s most wealthy oligarch will consider other possible candidates over the next few months. As for Tymoshenko, the electorate has shown growing support for her eponymous party. Given her party’s achievement in late September, she deserves a second chance in the Prime Minister’s post. But she also will need to show more flexibility and perhaps adopt a less confrontational style if she is to build on her success in the current elections.

The 2007 Parliamentary Elections: Winners, Losers, and Coalition Prospects

By Ilya Khineyko

On 30 September, for the second time in two years, Ukraine held parliamentary elections, which were recognized as free and fair by international observers from the West and Russia. Five blocs and parties: the Our Ukraine – People’s Self-Defense (OU-PSD, NUNS in the Ukrainian acronym), the Tymoshenko bloc, the Party of Regions (PofR), the Communist Party, and the Lytvyn bloc garnered more than the 3% required to get into the new parliament. It is, however, far from certain when the political forces represented in the new Rada will be able to form a parliamentary majority and appoint a new government. As it stands, the political crisis that has permeated the Ukrainian political scene since last spring is far from over. Some unexpected political alliances might emerge from the protracted political discussions that are likely to follow the announcement of the final results on 15 October. The Party of Regions has the largest percentage and highest number of seats, followed closely by the Tymoshenko Bloc, while the pro-presidential OU-PSD is a distant third. The two other factions in the new parliament have less than fifty seats combined, but it is widely expected that the smallest faction, the Lytvyn Bloc, could play the role of a kingmaker in the new parliament.

Results of 2006 Parliamentary Elections

Party Seats Percentage

Party of Regions 175 34.37
Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko 156 30.71
NUNS 72 14.5
Communist Party 27 5.39
Bloc Volodymyr Lytvyn 20 3.96

In assessing these results, a background of the events leading up to this election is useful. The election season in Ukraine began on 2 April when President Yushchenko issued a decree dissolving the previous convocation of the Verkhovna Rada. What seemed a last resort on the part of the President came after the ruling coalition of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych and Speaker Oleksandr Moroz had successfully wooed a handful of opposition deputies to switch sides, leading to talks on forming a constitutional majority, a move that would have rendered the president a purely ceremonial figure. Opinion polls indicated that the early elections would not change the status quo as the Party of Regions was expected to retain its high standings, while the fortunes of Our Ukraine seemed bleak. Indeed, the Party of Regions managed to increase slightly its percentage of the vote as did the OU-PSD bloc. However, both parties stand to lose a handful of seats each in the new parliament, due to the dramatic surge of the Tymoshenko bloc, the biggest winner in the elections. Tymoshenko’s parliamentary faction will expand from 129 to 156 deputies as a result of gaining 8% more votes than it received compared to the 2006 results. The combined tally of the OU-PSD and the Tymoshenko Bloc (228 seats) is enough to form a parliamentary majority and establish a new ‘Orange’ government. The events seemed to be following this course on election night when a jubilant Yulia Tymoshenko was greeted by leader of PSD and leading candidate on the OU-PSD candidate list, Yuri Lutsenko. During a joint press-conference both leaders vowed to stay true to the “ideals of the Maidan” and honor the pre-election agreements to form a coalition of democratic forces. However, on 3 October, President Yushchenko caused consternation among the Orange campwhen he issued a statement urging all political forces to “seek a compromise” and consider forming a broad coalition that would include the Party of Regions as well.

Why did the President decide to contradict the leader of his party and what lies behind the call for unity and compromise? Several observers pointed out that a Yulia Tymoshchenko government would seriously undermine if not completely dash Yushchenko’s hopes to run for the presidency again in 2008. By becoming the Prime Minister now, Yulia Tymoshenko would be able to use the powers of the office to boost her profile at the expense of Yushchenko to the point where nominating her as the presidential candidate of the Orange forces would be the only choice left to defeat Yanukovych or any other presidential hopeful from the Party of Regions. It appears in retrospect that Viktor Yanukovych made a huge political blunder by attempting to strip the president of the last vestiges of real power instead of forging a meaningful alliance with Our Ukraine that would relegate the Tymoshenko Bloc to the opposition benches. As the prominent Ukrainian pundit Yulia Lymar pointed out, “The problem of Yanukovych lies in the fact it took too long for him, that is until now, to realize that he needs Yushchenko as much as Yushchenko needs him… Unfortunately, this card cannot be played any more”

Yet, there is no unity within the OU-PSD bloc concerning Tymoshenko’s current candidacy. Whereas business groups in Our Ukraine represented by Yuri Yekhanurov are vehemently opposed to the possibility of Tymoshenko becoming Prime Minister as evidenced in a memo published by Ukrains’ka pravda, Yuri Lutsenko and his People’s Self-Defense group are clearly in favor of such a step. It is likely that if Yanukovych retains his prime-ministerial post, Lutsenko’s party members will break away from Our Ukraine and join forces with BYuT. Furthermore, the Orange electorate remains deeply antagonistic to the figure of Yanukovych, so Our Ukraine risks losing even more electoral support to the Tymoshenko Bloc if an alliance between Yushchenko and Yanukovych becomes a reality. In this light, the standings of Viktor Yanukovych within the PofR might not be as solid as they appear. As Ukrains’ka pravda’s analysis reveals, the Party of Regions candidate list was filled by people loyal to Rinat Akhmetov who is much more willing to seek rapport with Yushchenko in order to stop Yulia Tymoshenko even if it would mean changing the leadership of the party.

The prospect of an Orange coalition remains a more feasible option. After a closed door meeting with President Yushchenko on 4 October, Yuri Lutsenko opined that the Orange coalition might be formed by 15 October when the Central Electoral Committee is scheduled to announce the official results. However, given the factors described above, Ukrainian politics may yield more surprises in the coming weeks.

Published by the Stasiuk Program for the Study of Contemporary Ukraine, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. This article may be reproduced with appropriate acknowledgement.

The election campaign in Ukraine is already underway

Ukraine takes a decisive step closer to parliamentary elections after 155 Verkhovna Rada deputies surrender their mandates.

By Ilya Khineyko

On June 15 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the 5th session ceased to exist. By the morning of that day, 151 deputies from Our Ukraine and the Tymoshenko bloc had submitted their resignation papers to Oleksandr Moroz, bringing the total number of parliamentarians below the necessary quorum of 300. Later that same day, four more resignations were announced.
The de-facto dissolution of the Verkhovna Rada was carried out through the resignations of opposition deputies in accordance with the May 27 agreement of the Big Three, which ended the two-months-long political crisis in Ukraine. It happened in spite of the obstructionist maneuvers on the part of Oleksandr Moroz, who stands to lose most from the dissolution of the current parliament. Also, many rank-and-file opposition deputies were extremely reluctant to relinquish their mandates. As Ukrains’ka Pravda reports, before the resignations list was read out loud at the Verkhovna Rada session, “many MPs [had] asked not to have their names put in the top ten of the list because in the event that dissolution of parliament fails they would never have a chance to return to the Verkhovna Rada.”