Prospects for New Leadership in Ukraine

David R. Marples
for EDMONTON JOURNAL, 17 September 2008

There seems to be no immediate solution to the political crisis in Ukraine, which on September 16 brought about the final collapse of the Orange coalition established after the 2004 Orange Revolution. The electorate can hardly welcome the fall of the current parliament, leading to the third parliamentary election in only three years. But is that the only alternative? What are the causes of the crisis? Why does Ukraine seem to stutter from one bitter internal conflict to another?

One reason is a deep clash of personalities. The two key figures—President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko—do not get along. To listen to the president of late, an uninformed observer would gain the impression that Tymoshenko is a traitor who has sold out Ukraine to the Russians. Yushchenko has deployed his chief of staff, Viktor Baloha, a Rusyn from Transcarpathia, on a mission aimed at curtailing the career of the flamboyant Prime Minister. According to one account Baloha has forwarded documents to the Ukrainian Security Service that reportedly show Tymoshenko has committed acts of treason.

Tymoshenko is not only the most popular politician in Ukraine, she is—according to an annual ranking of the country’s most notable 100 individuals published in Korrespondent (August 22)—the most influential person as well. Lately she has made a number of maneuvers that seem contradictory: she has supported (with the backing of the Regions Party) the empowerment of parliament over the office of the president; she has expressed a wish to re-form the Orange coalition as the best way out of the current impasse; and she has approached the Regions faction with the goal of forming a new parliamentary majority coalition.

Yushchenko accuses her of joining Regions in supporting Russian actions in Georgia, undermining his own overt support for Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili. The president believes she has taken such steps in order to acquire Russian sponsorship for her candidacy in the 2010 presidential election. However, if the Constitution is indeed amended to give more power to the legislature, then the presidency would be reduced to a ceremonial office.

The ambition of the Prime Minister has always been evident. At times there seems to be a contrast between her lifestyle and public appearance and her avowed goal to eliminate corruption or take on the oligarchs. But equally significant is her refusal to take orders from Yushchenko and become a compliant figure. Her initiatives to promote privatization and to carry out reforms through the Parliament with cooperation from various factions rankle with the conservative Yushchenko, who lacks both her drive and charisma.

Four years on from the Orange Revolution that swept him to power, the president is deeply unpopular within his own country (like Gorbachev he is much more respected outside it), and an article in Ukrains’ka pravda in early September declared him “politically dead.” He has issued a decree giving Baloha the authority to inspect internal troops that led some observers (Yuri Butuzov in Zerkalo Nedeli, for example) to suspect that he wishes to impose direct presidential rule. The Parliament has demanded (323 deputies in favor, well more than the 226 required) that the president dismiss Baloha for obstructing parliament as well as alleged illegal land dealings.

Ultimately, a president needs to reflect the sentiments of the public. Yushchenko’s avowed pro-Georgian, pro-NATO, and increasingly anti-Russian policies do not have overwhelming support in Ukraine. In fact they serve to highlight the regional divisions. On Georgia especially a consensus is plainly lacking.

Thus an August poll conducted by the Razumkov Center asked a sampling of respondents in the different regions of Ukraine which country they perceived as the aggressor in the Russian-Georgian conflict (a question that would have received a unanimous verdict in neighboring Poland). In western Ukraine, 55.2% saw Russia in this role, 15.1% both countries, and 7% Georgia. The center was evenly divided. However, Eastern Ukraine perceived Georgia as the main aggressor (37.2% to 13.8%), and in southern Ukraine almost 57% maintained the same, with only 13.8% citing Russia.

Though the same Center’s webpage does not offer a recent poll on NATO membership, a June 2008 survey indicated that 60% of respondents opposed it, with 20.9% in favor. Incidentally in June 2002, according to this same source, 32% supported accession to NATO. Thus as a policy it has lost its attraction, in part because of the war in Iraq.

Yushchenko’s policies are becoming erratic, and his public utterances, particularly about his Prime Minister increasingly far-fetched. The key question is whether a parliamentary coalition could actually work. Western analyst Taras Kuzio pointed out recently that a substantial portion of the Regions’ deputies opposed Russian actions in Georgia. There is thus no necessity to associate the entire faction with the pro-Russian stance of its leader.

If a coalition between the Tymoshenko Bloc and the Regions is possible, then Ukraine might establish the more stable leadership it requires during a time of political crisis and growing tension in its relationship with Russia.

Ukraine between Elections: Out of the Blue?

FRIDE Backgrounder

Balazs Jarabik

Four months after parliamentary elections Ukraine has seemingly slipped back into business as usual. The opposition is obstructing the work of the parliament, Russia has threatened Ukraine with rockets, and with cutting off its gas supply over alleged debts, and the extremely narrow Orange majority strains everyday thanks to battles between the Orange Government and the Orange Presidential Administration.

Nevertheless, the three constitutional leaders signed a letter in January asking NATO to provide a Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Ukraine at its Bucharest summit in April, initiating public debate on the issue of NATO membership for the first time. Ukraine was admitted to the WTO on February 5, thereby creating the best framework so far for the process of European integration while also improving the prospects for more foreign investment. Last, but not least the Tymoshenko government has moved to tackle corruption by targeting VAT refunds and customs operations, which lack transparency, and trying to remove RosUkrEnergo from gas dealings between Russia and Ukraine – although there are few indications of long-promised judicial and constitutional reform.

Conversely, the Yulia Tymoshenko Blok (BYuT) is placing its own sponsors in positions of power. Although divided on the issue of MAP, most Western diplomats lack genuinely positive intentions with regard to the Ukrainian request. The question remains unanswered of whether Tymoshenko has a serious plan to move Ukraine forward, or is merely implementing a series of populist measures intended to boost her rating before the upcoming presidential elections in 2009?

Getting used to braids and new ideas?

Ukrainians take their time to act. The new Ukrainian parliament first assembled on November 23, almost two months after the elections. The deal to hold new elections in September was negotiated by Viktor Baloha, Chief of Staff at the Presidential Secretariat and Ivan Pliushch, the Head of the National Security Council with their main negotiating partner in the Party of the Regions, Rinat Akhmetov, who is also Ukraine’s richest man. Many believed that the same group made a deal for a post-election grand coalition.

But then the elections came. BYuT’ss results gave the Orange forces yet another chance to lead Ukraine “out of the Blue”. The new speaker, the “polite young technocrat” Arseny Yatsenyuk was elected on December 4, while Prime Minister Tymoshenko was confirmed by an open vote on December 18 on the second attempt. However the everyday turmoil in the parliament has sent a strong signal that Prime Minister Tymoshenko has a majority of only two from the renewed “Orange Coalition”, while even in the Cabinet not all ministers are following her guidance.

The Presidential Secretariat, which has become a powerful institution under Viktor Baloga, returning to Kuchma-style policy making, is providing a constant policy and administrative “alternative” to the Cabinet. The same kind of tug-of-war, which previously existed between the two Viktors and led to early elections, is now developing between the Orange President and the Orange Government. This time, however, Yuschenko has a more direct influence as his party, Our Ukraine-Peoples’ Self Defense (NUNS), is in the ruling coalition. In addition, the President nominates the ministers of defence and foreign affairs , while Yuriy Melnyk, the only member of the Yanukovych cabinet who continues to serve under Tymoshenko, has also been installed by the Presidential Secretariat. Seemingly Yuschenko has been building up a kind of “de facto grand coalition” with the Party of Regions outside the parliament. Raisa Bogatyrova, a prominent member of PRU was named as secretary of the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) . These cadres are effectively backed by the Prosecutor General Medvedko, who maintained his position after the government tried to call him back into parliament thanks to NUNS being divided on this issue.

The strategy of the Presidential Secretariat seems intended to give time to the government, while also designing clear opposing tactics and strategies to slow down Tymoshenko’s drive and determination. President Yushchenko came up with a package of bills aimed at diminishing the role of the Prime Minister and the government, and made Moscow his first visit after the elections .

Nevertheless, the agenda of the second Tymoshenko government looks similar to that of the first. Given that there were not too many achievements from previous reforms, perhaps there is no need for new ideas, but rather to implement the old ones. There is a debate over whether Tymoshenko has a real plan, as she is often seen carrying a green dossier which she frequently quotes with journalists or at Cabinet meetings. She certainly has determination, though. There are several economic, social and anti-corruption initiatives outlined by the new government such as the “Tymoshenko Transparency Initiative” (TTI), the “Contract with Investors”, “Contraband, Stop”, the new Council of Foreign and Domestic Advisors, and the rather controversial compensation programme. All these make great headlines but only time will tell whether these steps suffice to put Ukraine on the reform track, or whether they will be used simply to further boost Tymoshenko’s popularity, especially in Eastern Ukraine.
Besides the “alternative” offered by the Presidential Secretariat, obstruction from the opposition and a less-than-overwhelming majority, inflation might be the most serious enemy of the Tymoshenko government. According to last year’s official figures consumer prices rose by 16.6 percent. If its 2005 tenure is anything to go by, no price controls or export controls can be expected from the new government , however, and the new compensation program, worth $1.2 billion, may push inflation even higher this year. If pessimistic scenarios are confirmed this would be more likely to lead to the downfall of the government than any actions of the Presidential Secretariat or obstruction from the parliamentary opposition.
At least under the TTI the government has taken initial steps to tackle corruption, targeting customs as well as the previous government’s practice of selling value-added tax refunds to exporters at a “commission” of 20–30 percent, and especially the gas trade with Russia. Removing the intermediary RosUkrEnergo, and its half-owned Ukrainian subsidiary, UkrGazEnergo, which is serving to siphon money to a number of prominent Russians and Ukrainians, is a popular goal, but there are others who claim Tymoshenko may want to let her own sponsors take a slice of this lucrative pie. Although the removal may not be opposed by the Kremlin, as this would mean higher gas prices, there has so far been no debate within the government over liberalising the domestic gas market. Without such a move it will be hard to save the Ukrainian state oil and gas corporation, Naftogaz Ukrainy, which is on the verge of bankruptcy.

Beside the compensation program the question of privatisation remains another grey area. Notably, the first Tymoshenko government’s re-privatisation policy met with the harsh criticism from foreign experts in 2005. The new Ukrainian government published a list of 19 state-owned companies slated for privatisation this year, with a total value estimated at $5 billion . Sensibly, the new government has abandoned its predecessor’s tactic of selling very small posts, instead offering large majority posts in three major companies, including Ukrtelecom, Ukraine’s old fixed-line monopoly. The new government also intends to adopt the necessary legislation to facilitate land trade. Nevertheless, Yushchenko immediately asked Tymoshenko to drop her privatisation plan for 2008, arguing that a law to make privatisation more transparent should be passed first.

Speed and determination made the new government’s start impressive, although plans are still vague to reform the constitution and judiciary, the two single biggest issues prior to the elections. Without these the Orange agenda cannot be completed. This is especially true given that the Tymoshenko government could build such a reform initiative on the election platform, where both NUNS and the PRU campaigned extensively with reform promises in both areas.

The reform drive of the new government might be overshadowed by Tymoshenko’s efforts to increase her popularity rating nationwide. Targeting Eastern Ukraine seems to be a long-term strategy, which has already borne some fruit in the 2007 parliamentary elections as BYuT was able to attract new voters in the East. The announcement of the compensation policy in Dnipropetrovs’k and Yulia’s campaign meetings conducted in Russian in the East signals this effort. This nationwide outreach is in stark contrast to the President’s rather Kuchma-like policy-making or the PRU’s obstructionist approach. Nevertheless, the Paul Manafort-led effort to polish the image of the PRU has had some positive impacts as it accepted the election results and has set up a shadow government to monitor governmental activities,. Nevertheless, there are indications that the financier Rinat Akhmetov is moving closer to the president by preparing a new political party, GART, allegedly to be headed by the Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration, Baloga. That would mean that Doneck drops Viktor Yanukovych as unelectable in 2009 and moves to back Yuschenko against Tymoshenko.

The two coalition partners have divided the Cabinet posts, so that BYuT controls the economy while NUNS retains foreign policy, security, and culture. A certain structural balance of power between the President and the Prime Minister meanwhile seems to be emerging out of their persistent power struggle. In Dnipropetrovs’k on January 14th Tymoshenko made it clear that she is happy to carry on as Prime Minister, but she may consider running for President “if the Cabinet is limited by certain restrictions, if they start putting forward certain conditions”. Moreover, she hinted at the possibility of a coalition between BYuT and PRU. Thus, this new power clash between the President and the Prime Minister may continue longer than was expected after the elections. Tymoshenko is likely to decide later whether 2009 will see one or two Orange presidential candidates, in accordance with which position offers the stronger influence.

Integration: glass half empty, half full

Immediate post-election expectations pointed towards the continuation of pro-European rhetoric, while rather symbolic and small steps towards integration were taken. Such an approach would be feasible save for the fact that the EU is not willing to give prospective membership to Ukraine. Moreover, such foreign policy “stagnation” will not be opposed by the majority of Ukrainians until the economy is stronger.

It was rather surprising, therefore, that on January 18 President Yushchenko, Prime Minister Tymoshenko and Speaker of Parliament Yatsenyuk made public a joint letter to NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer declaring Ukraine’s readiness to advance on a Membership Action Plan (MAP) with NATO and requesting a decision on the matter from the Alliance at its Bucharest summit in early April. As a rationale the Presidential Secretariat argued that the intensified dialogue of 2004-2007 had been fully utilised and had almost exhausted its potential. Many Western diplomats would disagree with this assessment, if only behind the scenes.

While there is a consensus between the new government and the Presidential Secretariat over NATO membership, the declared commitment has not been reflected in the deeds of the government or the President himself. A referendum on NATO has been the Achilles heel of the request, although the Presidential Secretariat communicated this could have a consultative nature only). In fact the latest opinion polls suggest a sharp increase from about 20 percent to 31 percent in favour. This increase probably owes something to the absence of an anti-NATO campaign, which was a remarkable achievement of the 2007 parliamentary elections among all political parties. Moreover, the article in Profile magazine by Taras Chornovil, one of the prominent members of the PRU, signalled that any future government would accept the MAP for the sake of continuity in foreign and defence policy. The reaction of Russia’s President Putin in his annual press conference, warning that Russia would target NATO military bases in Ukraine with its rockets, is perceived to be only the beginning in the run-up to presidential elections in March. It may prove useful for Ukrainian pro-NATO campaigners, as it is likely that the more Russia beats its chest, the more Ukrainian support towards NATO will increase.

More serious problems include the Annual Target Plan for 2008, which is yet to be approved, the less-than-impressive track record of the “Intensified Dialogue”, and the President’s nomination of Yuri Yekhanurov, instead of Anatoly Hritsenko, as defence minister. These provide evidence of a lack of proper management, and the necessary actions towards NATO on the part of the Ukrainian political elite. Western countries are divided on the issue because of these factors and concerns over regional stability (read: Russia). The social democrat-led Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany, in particular, is trying to convince the Ukrainian elite as well its Western partners that it is too early for MAP.

With so many divisions both within Ukraine and in the West, this remains a classic case of the glass being half empty or half full. With the aforementioned letter Ukraine at least managed to raise the issue within NATO and likely succeeded in opening a door to NATO accession in the long term. The West must, however, be aware of the sensitivity of the Ukrainian elite and the delicate details of the NATO question within Ukraine and thereby make a decision about the MAP in order to keep Ukraine firmly on the Euro-Atlantic integration track.

The situation with other integration processes is different from the overly-politicised NATO issue. Admission to the World Trade Organisation, at the meeting of the WTO General Council, which has been the biggest integration success story of the post-Orange Revolution period, went almost unnoticed in Ukraine. One reason for this is that Ukrainians waited twelve years for this integration process to complete itself, as the country began the application process in 1993. This symbolical last touch , according to Hrihory Nemyria, the Deputy Prime Minister for European and International Integration, reflects the Tymoshenko government’s efforts to reach out to foreign investors. The first foreign trip of Prime Minister Tymoshenko was to Brussels, where she confirmed that her main priority in terms of integration would be foreign investment, and offered cooperation with the EU on European energy security in order to ensure alternative energy supplies from Russia. The focus on foreign investment was confirmed in a big meeting with investors in Kyiv. Proving that the new government has a plan and backing, several studies were published including one by the Washington-based Rand Corporation’s International Security and Defense Policy Center which was co-authored by the Nemirya-headed Kyiv-based Center for European and International Studies (CEIS).

Tymoshenko’s Brussels trip signaled greater cooperation with the EU, as this represents yet another point of competition with the President, bringing more openness, more contacts and more exchanges. Meanwhile despite Ukraine officially disliking it, the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument has been an effective mechanism for imposing conditionality and opening many new socialisation channels. The visa facilitation agreement, along with the proposal of opening community programmes, energy integration and increasing people-to-people contacts, are placing Ukraine ahead of other ENP countries and making it a testing ground for this policy. However, the EU must increase its incentives as a challenge to the entire elite, utilising the current positives and this new, competitive integration environment in Ukraine. In contrast to the highly politicised NATO issue, Ukrainian bureaucrats actually run the EU process, while politicians have to catch up with the technical process. Negotiations on a new enhanced agreement are being held and the talks on “deep free trade” will be launched by the visit of Commissioner Mandelson in February 2008. As one high-level EU diplomat put it, Ukraine is aware that the EU cannot provide membership status at this moment, but it acts as if it were unaware; while the EU is aware that Ukraine does not like the ENP, but acts as if it were oblivious to the fact. Indeed, as there is not much talk about either the membership perspective or the Neighborhood Policy, the technical process of integration might be moving faster than ever.

Conclusions: Cherchez la femme

Although Ukraine’s politics remains driven by the same three strong personalities, Prime Minister Tymoshenko is so far keeping the public policy process firmly in hand through a series of new initiatives. Her government has made an impressive start. With so many much-publicised campaigns against corruption, and the WTO negotiations completed, creating room for foreign investment within just a few weeks, the implication is that an initial plan, at the very least, did exist. However, with efforts to boost her popularity nationwide also firing on all pistons, the ultimate question is when will these two dynamics, one for reforms and the other for popularity, come into conflict.

Nevertheless, the second Tymoshenko government seems much more modern than the reactive policy-making of President Yuschenko or the obstructionist opposition led by Viktor Yanukovych. So far Ukraine, between the 2007 parliamentary and 2009 presidential elections, is about the cherhez la femme… High inflation, which some predictions put at 19 percent for this year, may kill all these plans. Although the new framework of the Orange President and the Orange Prime Minister seem to act as balancing counterweights for each other’s power, the impressive reform drive might be scuppered by the thus far absent plans for reform of the judiciary and the constitution.

Nevertheless, the Tymoshenko government seems to be pushing the international integration process forward more than any other previous government. The hotly debated issue of NATO membership makes the glass seem half empty or half full, depending on who you ask, and the West must remember that policy making and the taking of any serious decisions takes time in Ukraine. Without the most serious incentive, the promise of EU membership, the most strategically important country in Eastern Europe will continue to hover between East and West. However, the increasing aggressiveness of Russia, along with slowly but surely implemented technical integration processes to the WTO (completed) and to the EU (underway), will further convince the majority of Ukrainians that dropping anchor in a Western harbor is still better than acting as a buffer state. The Ukrainian elite must understand that it is time to back up pro-European rhetoric with concrete actions and also make the case for Europeanisation at home as well as in the West.

Ukraine Elections 2007 Analysis

By David Marples

The 2007 parliamentary elections in Ukraine saw sweeping gains by the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (YTB), but the Regions Party of Ukraine maintained its standing as the largest and most popular party bloc. Overall, the Party of Regions won just over 8 million votes or 34.37% of the total. The Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko was in second place with 7.16 million votes or 30.71%, and the Our Ukraine-People’s Self-Defense (NUNS) alliance placed third with 3.3 million votes, or 14.15%. Only two other parties crossed the 3% threshold needed for seats in the assembly: the Communist Party of Ukraine (1.25 million, 5.39%), and the Bloc Volodymyr Lytvyn (924,538, 3.96%).

If broken down by region, the outcome might be interpreted somewhat differently. The Tymoshenko Bloc was the only party to secure significant votes in almost all regions of Ukraine, and was the winning party in 16 out of Ukraine’s 25 regions and 2 cities (Kyiv and Sevastopol). By contrast, the Regions Party was successful in only 10 regions, most notably in Luhansk (73.53%) and Donetsk (72.05%). Regions finished dead last in Ternopil’ with only 20,000 votes (3% of the total) and failed miserably in all areas of Western Ukraine. Our Ukraine-People’s Self-Defense, backed by President Viktor Yushchenko, won in just one region–Transcarpathia–and even there it held only a very narrow lead over the Tymoshenko Bloc (31.1 and 28.8% respectively).

Left-leaning parties are now on the periphery of the political spectrum as the Regions Party appears to have occupied the ground once held by the Communists and Socialists in the east and south of Ukraine. The Socialists narrowly failed to make it into the new Parliament. The Communists’ best result was in the city of Sevastopol, where they placed second with 10.3% of the popular vote, and in Luhansk, where they obtained 8.48%. Their fifth place finish in the city of Kyiv is reflective of their declining influence. Ukraine now has two large political parties that are unlikely to find common ground: Regions and YTB; and two smaller parties that might traditionally be allied with these two: the Communists with the Regions and Our Ukraine-People’s Self-Defense with YTB.

The problems are clear enough. The shaky YTB-NUNS coalition has a majority of just two seats in the new Parliament, unless it can persuade members of the Lytvyn Bloc to join forces with them–on the face of things it appears an unlikely ally given Lytvyn’s past close links with the former Kuchma regime There are already several potential defections if, as expected, Tymoshenko is reappointed Prime Minister, the position she held in the first Yushchenko Cabinet. If she does not receive this position–and she has reportedly made several concessions as to whom she would appoint to her Cabinet–then the YTB would once again become the main opposition and Tymoshenko would run for president in 2009 as a strong candidate, more or less forcing Yushchenko to step aside. The president no longer has the mass support to back up a second term in office.

If Tymoshenko is accepted as Prime Minister, the Regions Party can cause a variety of problems for her. Regions has the backing of Ukraine’s most prominent businessmen. The party has already demonstrated its willingness to test both the will of the president and the loyalty of Ukraine’s militias and security forces. Its maneuvers in the former Parliament doubtless impelled Yushchenko to suggest initially the formation of a broader coalition. Such a coalition would also provide the president with a role as a viable political player of influence, a position that would not ensue were Tymoshenko the key figure.

Two parliamentary elections in two years have not brought about a decisive result for Ukraine. The country, certain media reports notwithstanding, is not polarized along a pro-Russian and pro-Western divide, but it has two regions that define the extreme positions on either side: Western Ukraine and particularly Galicia, is Western leaning, pro-EU, and demands exclusive rights for the Ukrainian language. It has a perception of the past that is markedly anti-Soviet and even anti-Russian. The Donbas (Luhansk and Donetsk) regions by contrast are pro-Russian, support equal status for the Russian language (a policy frequently cited by Yanukovych in all three elections since 2004), and have a jaundiced view of what is perceived as Western influence over and intrusions into Ukraine. Some regions of the south–particularly Crimea and the city of Sevastopol–express a similar though somewhat more flexible outlook.

However, elections are not usually about the extreme positions, they are about finding a middle ground, and that is where most residents of Ukraine stand. The decline of the Communists and eclipse of the Socialists removes an element from the Parliament that was divisive in the past. They had very little to offer. The electorate would most likely be satisfied with a government that could ensure current growth rates continue and that standards of living are maintained. Both the YTB and the Regions’ election materials focused on the financial and economic benefits to be derived from their respective victories. Economic concerns were of far more importance than ideology.

On the other hand leaders of both these parties have shown a tendency to focus on personal power rather than build coalitions. Both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko will be thinking ahead to the 2009 presidential elections. The former politician has made an impressive comeback after his catastrophic presidential election campaign of 2004. However, whether his individual leadership will continue to receive sponsorship from such influential backers as Rinat Akhmetov remains to be seen. Likely Ukraine’s most wealthy oligarch will consider other possible candidates over the next few months. As for Tymoshenko, the electorate has shown growing support for her eponymous party. Given her party’s achievement in late September, she deserves a second chance in the Prime Minister’s post. But she also will need to show more flexibility and perhaps adopt a less confrontational style if she is to build on her success in the current elections.

The 2007 Parliamentary Elections: Winners, Losers, and Coalition Prospects

By Ilya Khineyko

On 30 September, for the second time in two years, Ukraine held parliamentary elections, which were recognized as free and fair by international observers from the West and Russia. Five blocs and parties: the Our Ukraine – People’s Self-Defense (OU-PSD, NUNS in the Ukrainian acronym), the Tymoshenko bloc, the Party of Regions (PofR), the Communist Party, and the Lytvyn bloc garnered more than the 3% required to get into the new parliament. It is, however, far from certain when the political forces represented in the new Rada will be able to form a parliamentary majority and appoint a new government. As it stands, the political crisis that has permeated the Ukrainian political scene since last spring is far from over. Some unexpected political alliances might emerge from the protracted political discussions that are likely to follow the announcement of the final results on 15 October. The Party of Regions has the largest percentage and highest number of seats, followed closely by the Tymoshenko Bloc, while the pro-presidential OU-PSD is a distant third. The two other factions in the new parliament have less than fifty seats combined, but it is widely expected that the smallest faction, the Lytvyn Bloc, could play the role of a kingmaker in the new parliament.

Results of 2006 Parliamentary Elections

Party Seats Percentage

Party of Regions 175 34.37
Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko 156 30.71
NUNS 72 14.5
Communist Party 27 5.39
Bloc Volodymyr Lytvyn 20 3.96

In assessing these results, a background of the events leading up to this election is useful. The election season in Ukraine began on 2 April when President Yushchenko issued a decree dissolving the previous convocation of the Verkhovna Rada. What seemed a last resort on the part of the President came after the ruling coalition of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych and Speaker Oleksandr Moroz had successfully wooed a handful of opposition deputies to switch sides, leading to talks on forming a constitutional majority, a move that would have rendered the president a purely ceremonial figure. Opinion polls indicated that the early elections would not change the status quo as the Party of Regions was expected to retain its high standings, while the fortunes of Our Ukraine seemed bleak. Indeed, the Party of Regions managed to increase slightly its percentage of the vote as did the OU-PSD bloc. However, both parties stand to lose a handful of seats each in the new parliament, due to the dramatic surge of the Tymoshenko bloc, the biggest winner in the elections. Tymoshenko’s parliamentary faction will expand from 129 to 156 deputies as a result of gaining 8% more votes than it received compared to the 2006 results. The combined tally of the OU-PSD and the Tymoshenko Bloc (228 seats) is enough to form a parliamentary majority and establish a new ‘Orange’ government. The events seemed to be following this course on election night when a jubilant Yulia Tymoshenko was greeted by leader of PSD and leading candidate on the OU-PSD candidate list, Yuri Lutsenko. During a joint press-conference both leaders vowed to stay true to the “ideals of the Maidan” and honor the pre-election agreements to form a coalition of democratic forces. However, on 3 October, President Yushchenko caused consternation among the Orange campwhen he issued a statement urging all political forces to “seek a compromise” and consider forming a broad coalition that would include the Party of Regions as well.

Why did the President decide to contradict the leader of his party and what lies behind the call for unity and compromise? Several observers pointed out that a Yulia Tymoshchenko government would seriously undermine if not completely dash Yushchenko’s hopes to run for the presidency again in 2008. By becoming the Prime Minister now, Yulia Tymoshenko would be able to use the powers of the office to boost her profile at the expense of Yushchenko to the point where nominating her as the presidential candidate of the Orange forces would be the only choice left to defeat Yanukovych or any other presidential hopeful from the Party of Regions. It appears in retrospect that Viktor Yanukovych made a huge political blunder by attempting to strip the president of the last vestiges of real power instead of forging a meaningful alliance with Our Ukraine that would relegate the Tymoshenko Bloc to the opposition benches. As the prominent Ukrainian pundit Yulia Lymar pointed out, “The problem of Yanukovych lies in the fact it took too long for him, that is until now, to realize that he needs Yushchenko as much as Yushchenko needs him… Unfortunately, this card cannot be played any more”

Yet, there is no unity within the OU-PSD bloc concerning Tymoshenko’s current candidacy. Whereas business groups in Our Ukraine represented by Yuri Yekhanurov are vehemently opposed to the possibility of Tymoshenko becoming Prime Minister as evidenced in a memo published by Ukrains’ka pravda, Yuri Lutsenko and his People’s Self-Defense group are clearly in favor of such a step. It is likely that if Yanukovych retains his prime-ministerial post, Lutsenko’s party members will break away from Our Ukraine and join forces with BYuT. Furthermore, the Orange electorate remains deeply antagonistic to the figure of Yanukovych, so Our Ukraine risks losing even more electoral support to the Tymoshenko Bloc if an alliance between Yushchenko and Yanukovych becomes a reality. In this light, the standings of Viktor Yanukovych within the PofR might not be as solid as they appear. As Ukrains’ka pravda’s analysis reveals, the Party of Regions candidate list was filled by people loyal to Rinat Akhmetov who is much more willing to seek rapport with Yushchenko in order to stop Yulia Tymoshenko even if it would mean changing the leadership of the party.

The prospect of an Orange coalition remains a more feasible option. After a closed door meeting with President Yushchenko on 4 October, Yuri Lutsenko opined that the Orange coalition might be formed by 15 October when the Central Electoral Committee is scheduled to announce the official results. However, given the factors described above, Ukrainian politics may yield more surprises in the coming weeks.

Published by the Stasiuk Program for the Study of Contemporary Ukraine, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. This article may be reproduced with appropriate acknowledgement.

Ukrainians Are Neither Clearly Pro-Western Nor Pro-Russian

By Mykola Riabchuk

The wise man who distinguished the truth, the lie, and statistics, might well have included among the latter opinion surveys — at least as they function in Ukraine. David Marples’s article in the “Edmonton Journal” (Monday, July 30: “Ukraine’s ties with Russia run deep, and that’s not about to change”) is highly dependent on recent opinion polls. They seem to support firmly not only the first part of the title, which is rather obvious, but the second part as well, which is rather debatable.

David Marples perfectly captures the essence of Ukraine’s East-West dilemma in his conclusions. “Ukrainians,” he contends, “are not pro-Western today partly because the example set by Western democracies in recent times has hardly provided a model to emulate: beginning with NATO’s attack on Serbia in 1999 and culminating with the invasion of Iraq. Many also have been alienated by the EU’s negative response to Ukrainian desires for membership. And Ukrainians are for the most part pro-Russian because they see Russia as a strong counterforce to the United States and a nation with which they have more in common than with either the new democracies of Eastern Europe or the long-established democracies that no longer seem capable of providing fitting examples to follow.”

The only big “but” in this case, however, is that virtually all notions and terms in Ukraine are quite vague and fluid. For example, the concepts “pro-Western” and “pro-Russian” do not have the same meaning in the positivistic West and the highly ambivalent and ambiguous post-Soviet Ukraine. True, if being “pro-Russian” or “pro-American” means a sort of Realpolitik, a pragmatic approach to the inherited geopolitical, cultural-linguistic, and economic reality, then Ukrainians (for the most part) are certainly more “pro-Russian” than “pro-Western.” They simply prefer one bird in hand to two in the bush. They prefer the status quo because they feel that — in a country with feeble institutions and no rule of law, weak mechanisms for conflict resolution, low Western support and strong Russian pressure — any instability is dangerous. They opt for a bad peace over a good war just because they do not believe that a good peace is possible.

This does not mean, however, that they absolutely oppose a good peace, i.e., the EU or even membership in NATO, as the opinion surveys purportedly reveal. The surveys point out only that a good peace is not on the agenda (to paraphrase the standard response of Eurocrats to Ukrainians’ claims for EU membership prospects). Ukrainians, therefore, merely choose between the lesser of two evils. Yet again, these “evils” are not the West and Russia per se, but the most likely results people expect in their own cost-benefit analysis. Obviously, the benefits from Ukraine’s western integration would be much higher — but they appear largely unachievable; the costs, i.e., punishment for such attempts by Russia, are rather real and palpable.

To clarify this psychological mechanism, one must refer to the two referendums Ukrainians held in 1991. In March of that year, 70 per cent supported Gorbachev’s idea of a “renewed federation,” in other words, the preservation of the USSR. A few months later, in December, 90 per cent of Ukrainian voters endorsed national independence. This was not some mystical insight or miraculous breakthrough. In March they were quite supportive of independence — but not to the point of rocking the boat and putting their relative well-being and stability at risk. The cost-benefit balance sheet in March was unfavorable for independence. Yet by December, when the Soviet Union de facto collapsed and national independence — declared by the Ukrainian parliament — was a fait accompli, people felt that to oppose independence was more risky, i.e., more destabilizing, than supporting it.

Another graphic example comes from 2002 when president Kuchma, cornered by internal and international scandals, declared Ukraine’s resolve to join NATO. This was a clear attempt to reduce tensions with the US and to counter Ukraine’s growing international ostracism. (Today, few people remember that it was not Yushchenko, the “pro-Western” President, who made NATO membership a national strategic goal, but rather his allegedly “pro-Russian” predecessor). This strategic decision, and the equally strategic choice of sending Ukrainian troops to Iraq — again, made by the “pro-Russian” Kuchma, while the “pro-American” Yushchenko eventually withdrew them — did not evoke any serious protests in Ukraine or even lead to substantial public debate. Ukrainians simply do not much care about such things. Other opinion surveys reveal that such issues as membership in NATO or strengthening/weakening of the status of the Russian language are not among the top ten (and even top twenty) issues of importance to Ukrainians. Moreover, up to 90 per cent of Ukrainians surveyed confess they know nothing or very little about NATO. A few years ago, Ukrainian journalists contrived a nice hoax: they asked the same people about their attitude towards both “NATO” and the “North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” Apparently, in most cases the latter was evaluated much more positively.

This reveals two more problems with opinion surveys in countries like Ukraine: the low political awareness of the people being surveyed and the widespread misunderstanding (and misuse) of terms. The Russian language question serves as a good example of such ambiguity. Thus far there has been no real public debate setting out clearly for everyone what official bilingualism might mean, how it might work in practice, and what legal and other mechanism would be needed to facilitate it. Some people have a Soviet understanding of “two state languages”; they view this as a right of the dominant Russophone group not to learn, and never to use, Ukrainian — an idea that is graphically made real in today’s Belarus. Other people understand the idea in a Western, liberal manner: as a legally prescribed duty of all post-Soviet bureaucrats (predominantly Russian-speaking) to communicate with all citizens — understood as “clients” and as taxpayers — in the language of their choice — and not vice versa, as was the case with Soviet “bilingualism.”

In short, opinion polls in a society such as Ukraine primarily reveal confusion and a secret desire to maintain the status quo — because change is precarious, with easily predictable high costs but mostly indeterminate benefits. Ukrainian society, however, can be considered not only a glass that is half empty — namely, lacking civic maturity, national unity and strong commitment to Western values — but also half full. Forty four per cent of Ukrainians believe that democracy is the best state system, while only 17 per cent opt for authoritarianism; this is actually a good result for a nation that has had very limited experience with a functioning democracy, and even less experience with national independence and self-rule. Neither in Russia nor Belarus can one find anything approaching this.

And the fact that 93 per cent of surveyed Ukrainians opted for “order” as the most needed commodity, while only 25 per cent opted for “liberalism,” does not prove an “authoritarian” preference. It only proves the lack of “order” in the country, and the need to fix a feckless democracy rather than dismantling it in the Russian or Belarusian manner. In this sense, the Orange Revolution, indeed, was not about “pro-Western” or “pro-Russian” orientations, as David Marples rightly suggests, but about the way the country should be run. In other words, it was about values. But if one examines the values of the Kuchma regime, which were opposed by the Revolution, one will see that exactly those values still dominate Russia and other post-Soviet states. Conversely, if one looks at the values defended by the Revolution, we will see that they are the very principles upon which the West is built.

Consequently, the Orange Revolution was clearly pro-Western in its spirit, if not necessarily in political rhetoric and in actual geopolitical programs. So far, it has brought mixed results but, in most terms, post-revolutionary Ukraine is much closer to the fledgling democracies of Eastern Europe than to the consolidated authoritarianisms of post-Soviet “Eurasia.” Thus, the title of Marples’s article might be usefully paraphrased to read: “Ukraine’s ties with Soviet attitudes run deep, but they are changing.”

[Mykola Riabchuk is a Ukrainian writer and political and cultural analyst. He is the author of seven books available in English, French, German, Polish, and other languages. This academic year, he will be teaching at the University of Alberta (in the departments of Modern Languages & Cultural Studies and History & Classics) as the Stuart Ramsay Tompkins Visiting Professor.]

The election campaign in Ukraine is already underway

Ukraine takes a decisive step closer to parliamentary elections after 155 Verkhovna Rada deputies surrender their mandates.

By Ilya Khineyko

On June 15 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the 5th session ceased to exist. By the morning of that day, 151 deputies from Our Ukraine and the Tymoshenko bloc had submitted their resignation papers to Oleksandr Moroz, bringing the total number of parliamentarians below the necessary quorum of 300. Later that same day, four more resignations were announced.
The de-facto dissolution of the Verkhovna Rada was carried out through the resignations of opposition deputies in accordance with the May 27 agreement of the Big Three, which ended the two-months-long political crisis in Ukraine. It happened in spite of the obstructionist maneuvers on the part of Oleksandr Moroz, who stands to lose most from the dissolution of the current parliament. Also, many rank-and-file opposition deputies were extremely reluctant to relinquish their mandates. As Ukrains’ka Pravda reports, before the resignations list was read out loud at the Verkhovna Rada session, “many MPs [had] asked not to have their names put in the top ten of the list because in the event that dissolution of parliament fails they would never have a chance to return to the Verkhovna Rada.”

UKRAINE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS DEEPENS

David Marples

The bewildering series of events in Ukraine over the past two months have led to a compromise between the two main factions: the office of the president led by Viktor Yushchenko and the Parliament led by Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich. A third figure, Speaker of the Parliament Oleksandr Moroz, also added his signature to the new agreement. However, most analysts concur that the real struggle is yet to come.

From the Brink of Civil Strife to a New Election Campaign

By Ilya Khineyko

The most recent agreement by the three branches of government in Ukraine to hold elections on September 30, 2007 may not spell the end of the political crisis, which has plagued the country for the last two months.

“Today we can say that the political crisis is over,” Viktor Yushchenko told the Italian newspaper Corriere Della Serra on May 28, a day after Yushchenko, Oleksandr Moroz, and Viktor Yanukovych signed a joint statement, agreeing to set a date for early parliamentary elections on September 30. One cannot help but feel a strong sense of déjà vu regarding such confident pronouncements. After all, the political crisis in Ukraine, which began on April 2 when a presidential decree on the dissolution of the parliament was issued, was supposed to come to an end on May 4 when the president and prime minister agreed to hold early parliamentary elections. However, two important things were missing in the agreement: no definite election date was set and the signature of the third party, Verkhovna Rada speaker Moroz. At the time, it appeared that the Party of Regions had simply ‘disposed’ of the wily speaker whose party stood little chance of getting into the new Rada. These machinations, perhaps, provide a clue to understanding the tumultuous events of the last week that led to the Sunday agreement of the “Big Three.”

The crisis is over?

Yushchenko and Yanukovych agree to go to the polls this summer.

by Ilya Khineyko

On May 4, the political crisis in Ukraine evidently came to an end. As the BBC reported “Ukraine’s president and prime minister have agreed to hold early parliamentary elections in a bid to end weeks of political deadlock.” Later that day, speaking to his supporters on the Maidan premier Yanukovych urged all citizens of Ukraine to vote in the upcoming elections.

“Those who want to hold elections, those who initiated them will receive an answer from you. You will decide who should be in power in this country. You will be able to give the mandate to politicians in the near future.”