Basic Instinct

Mykola Riabchuk

The Party of Regions was set to win the parliamentary elections for a number of reasons. First of all, it is not only a party but also a powerful political machine that has merged almost inseparably with big business and the state apparatus. Within the past two years, it has established full control over the judiciary and major mass media, adjusted the national constitution and numerous laws for its personal benefit, and multiplied its enormous financial resources extracted rapaciously from both the state budget and shadow economy. Inter alia, its leaders re-crafted the electoral playing field to suit their own needs: changed the election law, gerrymandered the districts, reshuffled election commissions, and endorsed a carte-blanche for all forms of illegal agitation to their loyalists.

On the other side, the opposition failed to endorse single candidates in majority districts, which was a crucial task under the first-past-the-post system. Still worse, they failed to rebrand themselves as a profoundly new political force that had deduced proper conclusions from the orange defeat, removed corrupted and inefficient leaders, and brought new people, ideas, and ethos into the political domain. The demand for new faces in Ukrainian rotten politics is very high, and the spectacular success of newcomers – Vitaly Klychko’s UDAR party and right-wing Svoboda – largely reflects the popular need for political forces not connected to the establishment and its discredited practices. The “old” opposition – Yulia Tymoshenko’s “Fatherland” party and Arseny Yatseniuk – ran with traditional candidates and slogans that could bring them support from the core electorate but barely exceeded the 25 per cent limit.

In Ukraine, where politics is largely identity-based and elections are identity-driven, the incumbents can also rely on some 25 per cent of the core electorate that would always prefer the perceived “lesser evil”: “our bad boys” over “theirs.” With some extra-legal means, they can always get a plurality that could be transformed eventually, by similar means, into majority. In a purely proportional system, such a transformation is more problematic, so, predictably, Party of Regions replaced it with a mixed system that ushers MPs to a half of the parliament from territorial districts on the first-past-the-post basis.

All the opinion polls predicted the Party of Regions would win about 30 per cent from the party list and many more from the single-mandate districts where, in most cases, voters are highly vulnerable to bribery and intimidation, and where even minor falsifications can be decisive. The main problem experts discussed on the eve of elections was not who was going to win the contest but how strong that victory would be and how solid a majority the Party of Regions would be able to secure with its notorious sticks and carrots.

The October 28 poll largely confirmed the experts’ forecasts in the voting for party lists. The Party of Regions got 30%, the United Opposition, despite Yulia Tymoshenko’s imprisonment, 25.5%, Vitaly Klychko’s UDAR 14%, Communist Party 13.2%, and far-right Svoboda  10.4%.  All these results were fairly close to the election-day exit polls, with the only exception being in some Donbas districts where the turnout was much higher on paper than in reality. The pre-election opinion surveys looked a bit different but all the changes can be rationally explained.  UDAR got less votes than predicted probably because of a low turnout of its core youth electorate. And the radicals from Svoboda and Communist Party got more than expected because they were able to channel a substantial part of the “protest vote” (“against all”) into their pots. (Another explanation includes the possible reluctance of some surveyed people to acknowledge openly their sympathy for radicals).

In sum, even though the playing field was not level and the election campaign was heavily manipulated by the authorities, the government had a very good chance to legitimize the elections as basically free if not fair, and to achieve some alleviation of the international isolation imposed upon the Ukrainian leadership after last year’s imprisonment of Tymoshenko.

It seems, however, that the government missed this opportunity because the majority-seat part of the elections did not occur as smoothly as the proportional part. In at least a dozen districts in which opposition candidates took an unexpected lead the worst practices of vote rigging from the late Kuchma era were applied. In some of them, even after a week of counting, the results had not been announced. In some places, astonished observers witnessed the destruction of ballots, distortion of tabulations, forging of protocols, attacks of unidentified skinheads on polling stations, the use of tear gas, and intervention of riot police to confiscate ballot boxes, arguably to protect them.

It is still unclear why Ukrainian authorities employed these excessive measures (or at least allowed their loyalists to employ them) for such a minor and hardly needed gain of a dozen more seats in the parliament. First of all, because of scarcely legal changes to the Ukrainian constitution in 2010, the country became, once again, a super-presidential republic, and the role of the parliament was effectively marginalized. And secondly, by all preliminary calculations, the Party of Regions could easily muster the needed majority through an alliance with the Communists (traditional satellites) and many of “independents,” so that a dozen MPs from the controversial districts were not much needed.

Besides the conspiracy theories suggesting the “Russian hand” intended to compromise Ukraine internationally, one may look for more rational explanations of the Ukrainian incumbents’ irrational behavior. First, the losers may act without the authorities’ consent because they invested substantial personal funds in the election campaign and could not accept such a double defeat. Second, local authorities could have been eager to achieve the demanded results by all possible means; fear of punishment for non-delivery is apparently stronger in Yanukovych’s Ukraine than fear of punishment for the violation of law.  And third, and most important, the stakes might be higher than they appear. The Party of Regions needs not a simple but qualified majority (of two thirds MPs) in the parliament to change the national constitution and secure the 2015 re-election of Viktor Yanukovych in the parliament instead of a highly uncertain popular national vote.

They can hardly forget that Leonid Kuchma, who also had plenty of sticks and carrots to offer, had nearly mustered the much-needed majority to amend the constitution but failed by a meager six votes in the decisive vote. The oligarchs are unreliable. They are good allies to keep the opposition at bay and loot the country. But at some point thy may feel that their own interests are under threat, especially when the president and his “family” grab too much power and property, or when the parliament and its stakeholders may become obsolete.

Actually, there might be a fourth reason for the seemingly irrational behavior of Ukrainian rulers. Most of them are from the Donbas, the region that has never experienced any political, cultural, or economic pluralism. Many of them came from the criminal underworld where no tolerance, or compromise, or power sharing has ever been valued. They know perfectly well that the winner gets all, might makes right, goals justify means, and those who are not with us are against us. They are not accustomed to lose because losers, in their Darwinist world, are extinguished. They cannot recognize someone’s victory, especially by a small margin. All their instincts are opposed to such a phenomenon. They see any compromise as a symbol of weakness, and any retreat as capitulation.

This attitude suggests there is little chance of Tymoshenko being released until Yanukovych is ousted, and only a slim possibility for more open, inclusive, consensual politics in Ukraine in the near future. The conflict between the government and society is likely to escalate, culminating in Yanukovych’s inevitable and legitimate defeat in 2015 or his complete usurpation of power for years to come.

So far, Ukrainians have won a few minor battles but not the war. They proved, at least in some electoral districts, including the remarkable case of Kyiv, that civic spirit, courage, and unity could withstand brutal force, lying, cheating, and bribery. The Party of Regions, so far, has failed to establish complete control over the parliament. This does not mean its leaders will not try to attain such predominance within the next two years. They are very unlikely to curb their basic instincts unless and until society itself becomes civil enough to civilize them.

UKRAINE’S PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: LITTLE TO SATISFY REGIONS PARTY

David Marples

With 99.6% of the votes counted, Ukraine’s election results are very similar to those of the exit polls released on October 28. In terms of popular vote, Regions lead with 30.03%, with Batkivshchyna at 25.51%, UDAR 13.94%, the Communist Party of Ukraine 13.18%, and Svoboda 10.44%. These five parties are the only ones to clear the 5% minimum threshold. Projected seats in the new parliament, as published in Ukrains’ka Pravda on November 1 (http://www.pravda.com.ua), are Regions 186 (114 in individual constituencies), Batkivshchyna 104 (42), independents 44, UDAR 40, Svoboda 37 (including 12 in individual constituencies), and KPU 32.

Although there have been reports from the OSCE and Canadian sources of serious electoral violations (http://www.interfax.com.ua/eng/press-conference/123721/), and a statement from Yuliya Tymoshenko that this was the “most unfair election in the history of Ukraine” and that she would go on a hunger strike in her prison cell (http://www.interfax.com.ua/eng/main/124638/ )  the results of the seats contested by proportional representation appear to reflect, more or less, the views of the voters. The same cannot be said of the results in single-mandate constituencies where Regions won an outright majority. The reinsituted dual system, as noted by Taras Kuzio, has worked in favor of the authorities, just as it did in previous elections (http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40030). In 2002, for example, a disastrous showing for President Leonid Kuchma’s For a United Campaign was offset by the accumulation of seats in the single constituencies, thus preventing Our Ukraine from winning an outright majority.

Several preliminary comments can be made. First, Batkivshchyna did much better in the latter part of the campaign at which time its vote seemed to be declining. Correspondingly, support for UDAR seemed to fall away as the election approached, perhaps because of voters’ concern at the relative inexperience of its leader, the boxing champion Vitali Klitschko. Nevertheless, Klitschko has emerged as a viable opposition leader with an excellent showing for a first campaign but he is concerned about the emergence of Svoboda, and is unlikely to enter any form of coalition or alliance with them. Both the Communists on the left and Svoboda on the right fared well. Svoboda leader Oleh Tyahnybok maintained that the Ukrainian Security Service controlled the placement of data in the server of the Central Election Commission, thereby depriving his party of “every third vote” (Interfax-Ukraina, Oct 30). Compared to the exit polls, polling for Svoboda was down by between 1-2.6%, but still within the margin of error. Still, Ukraine now faces the likelihood of an even more fractious parliament in which extremist parties have gained a firm foothold

Overall it should be possible for the Regions Party to cobble together a majority with the assistance of the Communists and independent candidates. Not surprisingly given the prevalence of state propaganda, Regions performed much better in individual constituencies than those elected by proportional representation. In terms of the popular vote, 51.47% of those who took part preferred non-ruling parties and 43.21 backed the Regions or Communist Party. Though the latter party fared better than in the previous election, its leader Petro Symonenko has denounced the election campaign the “dirtiest” in the entire period of Ukraine’s independence, including blackmail and intimidation, and violations of legality in vote counting in the Luhansk region in particular (Interfax Ukraine, Oct 30).

There can be no room for complacency or even satisfaction from the perspective of President Viktor Yanukovych and his ruling party. Despite the arrests of Tymoshenko last year and former Interior Minister Yuri Lutsenko earlier in 2012, the opposition has maintained significant support. A prominent role is assured for the interim Batkivshchyna leader Arsenii Yatsenyuk, who is frequently dismissed as too intellectual or bookish and lacking in charisma (see for example Kuzio at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40030). But the question remains when Yulia Tymoshenko will be released and take up her role as leader of the opposition. Moreover, the election has failed to convince the Europeans in particular that there has been any moderation of recent authoritarian trends. Without the release of Tymoshenko and Lutsenko, there is unlikely to be much progress on Ukraine’s Association Agreement with the EU.

Above all, with a 58% turnout, less than 31% supported Regions, which gained significant victories only in the eastern areas, their traditional stronghold. In other words, 69% backed other parties and candidates, and only 18% of those eligible to vote backed the Regions. It is hardly an overwhelming mandate at a time when the country is threatened with a serious economic recession. In fact one would have to say, given the Regions’ overwhelming control of state institutions, their enormous financial backing and largesse, and their preponderance in the media, their supporters can only consider this election a failure. They cannot look forward to the next step in their consolidation of state power, namely the presidential elections of 2015. On the other hand, as the example of Belarus has demonstrated, it is often very hard to remove incumbents once they control the machinery of state.

 

Electoral Songs

Mykola Riabchuk

In three weeks’ time, on the last Sunday of October, Ukrainians will elect 450 members of the new parliament, half of them from the national party list, and half from territorial districts. Opinion polls reveal more or less equal support for both the pro-government forces (Party of Regions and Communists – 25 and 9 per cent respectively) and opposition (Yulia Tymoshenko’s Motherland and Vitaliy Klychko’s Udar – 15 and 17 per cent) http://www.gfknop.com/pressinfo/releases/singlearticles/010454/index.en.html.  This means that the remaining one third of votes will be cast for the plethora of minor parties that have virtually no chances to surpass the 5 per cent threshold. All these votes will be distributed proportionally among the winners. In fact, it is a gift for the incumbents since most of the minor parties below the threshold represent the opposition.

Lack of unity is a persistent problem of Ukrainian democrats, and is especially harmful vis-a-vis the monolithic unity of the authoritarian rulers. Admittedly, their unity is not based on any positive ideology but primarily on sharing the spoils and suppressing dissent by various means—from bribery and persuasion to media censorship and manipulation, blackmail, intimidation, and selective application of the law. Enormous resources extracted from budget loopholes and the shadow economy make the Party of Regions a formidable force, quite competitive on the party list (despite its disastrous social and economic policies) and unbeatable in the territorial districts where vote buying reigns supreme.

To make a bad situation worse, the new electoral law not only increased the threshold from 3 to 5 per cent, targeting primarily the opposition parties but also introduced the “first-past-the-post” system within the majoritarian districts that require a simple plurality, rather than a clear majority of votes to win. This system allows the incumbents not to worry too much about their popularity—20 per cent of their core electorate might suffice if their opponents are successfully split, dispersed, and pitted against each other. To this end, a numerous fake parties and “technical” candidates are registered with the goal to spoil the electoral process in multiple ways. As many as 3,109 candidates will compete for 225 mandates in the majoritarian districts: nearly 14 persons per seat. And, tellingly, there are only 389 women compared to 2,720 men, 67 less than five years ago when women were also badly underrepresented. Predictably, very few candidates are economists, lawyers, or professional policy makers. Instead, 1,082 of them are businessmen of different calibers, which is common practice in a country in which the only protection for businessmen is parliamentary immunity, and where the most profitable business is looting state resources and exploiting  legal loopholes http://dt.ua/POLITICS/mazhoritarka_desyat_rokiv_po_tomu-108785.html.

Whereas businessmen and various state officials are serious contenders, a huge number of drivers, secretaries, night guards, barmen, and unemployed persons (293 this time) are playing the traditional role of spoilers. Some of them, incidentally, have the same surnames and even full names as opposition frontrunners in their districts; many others play a modest auxiliary role by promoting their representatives into election commissions to ensure the total preponderance of the authorities in electoral bodies. And, on the party list, one may observe the same phenomenon: a group of unknown parties mushrooming during elections, often with very peculiar names like “Our Motherland” (surely not to be confused with Yulia Tymoshenko’s “Motherland”?).

Still, a simple majority in the parliament is hardly the main prize for which the Party of Regions deploys its unscrupulous methods. After the 2004 constitutional amendments were arbitrarily cancelled, Ukraine became once again a presidential republic with a minor role for the legislature. Second, as we already saw in 2002, 2006, and, most recently 2010, the Party of Regions can easily muster a parliamentary majority by carrots and sticks, neither of which are in short supply.

The real problem it faces face (not only in Ukraine) is the succession of power. One may easily win the first-past-the-post contest with a mere 20 per cent of vote if proper “technologies” are applied, but no technology can secure a victory in the nationwide elections of president where a clear majority of votes is required. For Viktor Yanukovych, with ratings below 20 per cent and little chance of rising, the only way to get re-elected for a second term and secure his “Family’s” dubious wealth is to change the national constitution and arrange his own re-election via an obedient parliament rather than through the electorate. It was with this goal in mind that the so-called constitutional assembly was created last year from the handpicked “specialists” (the opposition refused to participate, feeling the trap). Thus, most likely, we shall witness a bold attempt to muster a qualified majority of two-thirds of MPs in the next parliament, enabling it to change the constitution and solve Yanukovych’s problem of reelection in 2015.

The opposition is doomed to lose not only because the entire electoral field has been systemically fixed to the incumbents’ advantage and because most of the “independents” in the parliament will be (as usual) businessmen susceptible to the authorities’ blackmail and siding typically with the victors. The opposition is losing because it has committed too many mistakes, of which the most profound was the failure to draw the proper conclusions from the Orange defeat, to dismiss its leaders and reshuffle cadres, to change programs and rhetoric, and to pay due attention to grass-root movements and party-building. They failed to get rid of their own fat cats and dolce vita habits, to bring in new faces and develop a new image. They never bothered even to say “sorry” to their frustrated and disappointed electorate. The main problem of the Ukrainian opposition is that its leaders are broadly perceived as almost as bad as the incumbents; people may vote for them as a lesser evil, but are unlikely to be committed wholesale to their victory.

The strong advance of Vitaliy Klychko’s party Udar, which emerged from the blue as a one-person project, is clear proof of the popular need for new faces, new forces, and new policies completely detached from the corrupted and feckless practices of the past. In a recent survey, Udar (the “blow”–it is also the acronym of the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms) outran Tymoshenko’s Motherland, dogged by imprisonment of the leader, slandering in the pro-government media, and undermined by the enforced change of the name from the popular BUT (Yulia Tymoshenko Block) to the virtually unknown Motherland (after the new law barred electoral blocks from running). More and more people seem to invest their political hopes in the heavyweight boxer—hardly a charismatic figure— whose main advantage is that he has never belonged to the Ukrainian establishment, has no record of corruption, and seemingly represents a different, hopefully Western, political culture.

Klychko has received a significant advance payment from the electorate, but it remains to be seen how he and his party pay it back. He supports liberal-democratic ideas and insists on the need for a complete renewal of Ukrainian political life but, at the same time, avoids harsh rhetoric and personal attacks. This might be a signal not only to his supporters and allies but also to rivals, at least those who are tired and frustrated with current politics, unrestrained greed and lawlessness of the “Family,” and the increasing international isolation of the country. In one of Udar’s ads, a rapper sings about the kind of president Ukraine really needs. At present we are electing MPs, but the song sounds like another suggestion on how to solve the problem: 2015.

 

UKRAINE ON THE EVE OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

David Marples

A number of recent opinion polls shed light on the attitudes of residents of Ukraine to separation, the new language law, relations with Russia, and the forthcoming parliamentary elections. Overall they suggest that residents of Ukraine are relatively patriotic (including in the eastern regions), have not radically altered their outlooks as a result of the new language law, and though they are primarily oriented toward the European Union, they do not perceive the relationship with Russia as hostile, nor do they anticipate any serious threats to their country from the larger neighbor. The polls suggest a growing maturity and confidence among Ukrainians concerning the future of the independent state that is rarely highlighted in media reports that focus purely on politics and the elite. On the other hand, there remain significant differences in outlook between the east and the south vis-à-vis the western regions in almost every poll. But these divisions are less polarized than has been the case in the past.

Between August 8 and 18, the sociological group “Rating” conducted a poll on the territorial boundaries of Ukraine (http://news.liga.net/ua/news/politics/718720-10_zhitel_v_donbasu_khochut_v_dokremiti_galichinu_opituvannya.htm). In every area there was overwhelming opposition to changes to the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Thus 84% opposed the idea of separation of Galicia; 90% were against the loss of Crimea; and 90% rejected the notion of the separation of the Donbas region. Regarding the latter, in the Donbas region alone, only 8% support breaking ties with Kyiv. The poll embraced 2,000 respondents, 18 or over, in all parts of the country. At the same time, another poll indicates, residents have a jaundiced view of the police and judicial system. A Razumkov poll conducted in the spring of 2012 revealed that 69% of those polled have a negative attitude toward the courts, 64% toward organs of prosecution, and 69% for the militia. Even in the east the disapproval of the militia is 55% (http://ipress.ua/news/ukraintsi_druzhno_ne_lyublyat_militsiyu_ta_sudy_2557.html). This attitude appears to be unaffected by political leanings, and geographical location similarly has a limited impact on popular opinion.

There are analogous attitudes on the question of “freedom” in Ukraine, according to a Rating survey carried out from July 14 to 27 with 2,000 respondents. A disturbing 45% of Ukraine residents are of the view that there are encroachments of freedom in Ukraine, and between 43 and 46% feel that freedom of speech is under threat. These figures are highest in the West (over 60%), but significant in all regions, with over 40% holding this opinion in the East and Center. In the Donbas, however, the majority does not perceive the situation as deteriorating. That is the view, predominantly, of supporters of Svoboda (based in Western Ukraine) and the United Opposition (over 70%) and those of the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDar), led by heavyweight boxing champion Vitaliy Klychko (almost 60%). In other words supporters of the Regions Party and almost 50% of those backing the Ukrainian Communist Party do not consider that there is a threat to their freedoms currently (http://ratinggroup.com.ua/products/politic/data/entry/14015/).

Concerning the new language law, opinions are quite mixed, based on the results of several different polls. The Razumkov Center conducted a poll between June 16 and 25, 2012. It included 2,009 respondents from all regions of Ukraine. A clear majority considered that the law was linked to election strategy (65.1%). A very high number of Western Ukrainians believed that Ukrainian should be the only state language (84.4%), but elsewhere the picture was ambiguous. Overall, 25% of respondents maintained that Russian should have the status of an official language in certain regions, and 23.9% that it should be the second state language of the country, i.e. almost half of respondents backed this view. In eastern Ukraine (defined as Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhya, Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv), only 13.6% thought that Ukrainian should be the only state and official language, while about one-third believe that it should be the only state language. But there was minimal support for the view that Russian should replace Ukrainian as the main state or official language (http://razumkov.org.ua/ukr/news.php?news_id=400).

 A Ratings poll of July 2012 provides a broader picture of the language question. In Ukraine, 55% perceived Ukrainian as their native language and 40% Russian. Ukrainian was declared to be the native language of about 40% of eastern residents, although in the Donbas specifically, some 80% cited Russian as their native language, as did 70% of residents in the south. About 70% of the supporters of the Regions Party are Russian speakers, along with half of the members of the Communist Party. But for the most part, residents of Ukraine have had few language difficulties as far as official documentation is concerned and, for example, understanding medication instructions in Ukrainian, other than a few elderly people in the Donbas. Still, 45% of Donbas residents support increased protection for the Russian language; the opposite applies in the West where 80% think that it is necessary to provide more support for the Ukrainian language. Yet even among Regions supporters, only 40% consider that Russian needs more protection in Ukraine. Around 59% of native Russian speakers back the law introduced by deputies Kolesnichenko and Kivalov; 62% of Ukrainian speakers oppose it. Overall 42% are against the new law; 34% in favor (http://ratinggroup.com.ua/upload/files/RG_Movne_pytannia_072012.pdf). According to Iryna Bereshkina of the “Democratic Initiatives” Foundation, the new language law has had little impact on the election preferences of Ukrainian voters (http://news.dt.ua/POLITICS/zakon_pro_rosiysku_movu_niyak_ne_vplinuv_na_reytingi_regionaliv_i_opozitsiyi-108076.html).

The responses on the new language law are not particularly decisive in any respect. Support for it is lukewarm at best in all regions of Ukraine. Moreover, there are indications from other polls of the growing patriotism in Ukraine (not to be confused with nationalism) that embraces both eastern and western regions, as well as growing support for a pro-European Union direction rather than toward the Russian-led structures such as the Customs Union. The Ratings Poll cited above shows that the number of proponents of a united state with Russia has declined steadily (42% today, as opposed to 47-48% in January), and 54% are in favor of Ukraine joining the EU. Over the past six months, the number of Ukrainians considering themselves to be “patriots” has increased from 73 to 82%. The rise is especially notable in the east, including the Donbas oblasts, but not in the south. This leads a UNIAN analyst to conclude that the rise in patriotism is especially evident in the regions of Ukraine that hosted the Euro-2012 soccer competition, though elsewhere in the poll, only 12% equated patriotism with sporting victories. The place of one’s birth was the most significant factor behind patriotism in all regions, although supporters of Regions and the Communist Party were also tied to the historical past (presumably memories of the Soviet era) (http://www.unian.ua/news/521037-na-donbasi-zrosla-kilkist-patriotiv-opituvannya.html).

The rise in patriotic feeling, however, has not affected adversely Ukrainian attitudes to Russia, based on the survey of the Research and Branding Group undertaken earlier this year. The poll focused on the two cities generally considered to be the most polarized, Lviv and Donetsk. Almost half of the latter respondents see Russia as a friendly state and 0% as a hostile one. In Lviv, only 7% think that Russia is a fraternal nation, and 30% of those polled see it as simply a neighboring state without any close links. Yet very few even in Lviv considered that Russia was a rival (12%) or hostile (9%). In Donetsk about one-fifth of respondents regarded Russia as a strategic partner—hardly an overwhelming figure and 83% think that relations with the neighbor are friendly or a mixture of good and bad (http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/1331039-opros-zhiteli-donecka-i-lvova-vyrazili-svoe-otnoshenie-k-rossii). The consensus therefore on Ukrainian attitudes today would appear to include the following: an increasing affinity to Ukraine as an independent state that can maintain good relations with its neighbors, irritation rather than anger at the new language law, particularly in the western regions, and a slight preference for the EU over the Russian-led Customs Union.

Translated into votes in the parliamentary elections, the results may not differ profoundly from earlier polls. Clearly four political parties will gain seats in the new Parliament, having cleared the 5% barrier: the Party of Regions (21.5%), Batkivshchyna (18.5%), UDar (9.9%), and the Communists (9.1%) (http://news.dt.ua/POLITICS/vpevneno_prohodyat_u_radu,_yak_i_ranishe,_tilki_chotiri_partiyi-108633.html). None of the other major parties, such as Svoboda, Ukraina-Vpered! (which has only 3.1% support despite the ‘coup” of having Andriy Shevchenko on the party list), or Our Ukraine look likely to surpass the 5% figure. In the case of Our Ukraine, the party is for all intents and purposes defunct. The poll, conducted by Ratings, perceives a modest rise in support for the Regions Party, but clearly it is some way from anticipating a majority. Ukrainians have diverse views. They recognize the limitations of their freedoms, they are suspicious of the courts and the militia, and they are cynical toward the ruling Regions Party, but they have not embraced with any degree of enthusiasm or firmness any political alternatives to the ruling group. These attitudes could change if voters perceive the elections to have been manipulated or if the Parliament that results from them does not reflect the wishes of the voters.

 

 

Playing the Identity Card

Mykola Riabchuk

If one observes a significant number of politicians talking about the “protection of Russian language” and “closer ties with Russia,” one can be sure that an election campaign in Ukraine is in full swing. The goal of the rhetoric is not only to mobilize the numerous Russophile / Sovietophile electorate in the densely populated industrialized South East. Another goal is to send a proper signal to Kremlin and hook its powerful political, economic and propagandistic support. In a country divided almost equally between pro-Western and pro-Russian parts, anything that can tip the balance is readily employed.

The identity issue is strongly infused in Ukrainian politics, and language is merely part of it. Its role is primarily symbolical since virtually everybody in Ukraine has some command of both Ukrainian and Russian, and definitely everybody understands both languages. Conversation where one person speaks Russian and the other one speaks Ukrainian is not unusual, both in private or public spheres such as TV, and parliament or government offices. It is not the issue of communication actually, that causes the rift but a matter of attitude: either respectful or scornful. For years, Ukrainian was the language of the despised majority – enslaved peasants of tsarist nobleman or kolkhoz bosses. The more advanced, urbanized, educated world spoke Russian. This left a heavy imprint of superiority on one part of the population and inferiority on the other.

Today, the empathy with Ukrainian entails a whole set of attitudes toward the colonial past and national liberation, historical heroes and villains, symbols and narratives. Within this mindset, Russia is the main “Other” from which Ukrainians should decouple and emancipate, whereas Europe is the main “Us,” the civilizational space where Ukrainians presumably “always belonged” and now should “return.” The antithetical attitude stands typically for colonialism denial and normalization of all its legacies. The past is considered as the history of Russian-Ukrainian brotherhood rather than domination, Russification is seen as a natural process rather than a result of specific policies, and the West is perceived as the main “Other,” whereas Russia and all the post-Soviet space is the main “Us.” It is not ethnicity, language, political preferences or regional belonging that divide Ukrainians but, rather, values and attitudes, even though a significant correlation between all these markers can be easily found.

This leads to another Ukrainian paradox. On the one hand, as opinion surveys reveal, the language issue per se stands very low on the list of people’s concerns, far behind unemployment, poverty, criminality, and corruption that top the list. Yet, at the same time, nothing divides Ukrainians so much and sparks such heated debates as identity-related issues. This tempts politicians to play the language card, which is an easy task since no efforts to solve the real bread-and-butter issues are required in this case. It is sufficient to advertise themselves as “our bad boys” with the only virtue of being “ours.”

Ukraine is heading towards parliamentary elections scheduled by the end of October, and the Ukrainian language has already fallen prey to a highly unscrupulous election campaign. Back in July, shortly after the UEFA cup competition ended in Kyiv, the Ukrainian parliament passed the bill “On the fundamentals of the national language policy.” The document stipulates that any of 18 “regional and minority” languages spoken by 10 (and more) percent of the people in a certain administrative region can be used in that region as the “official” language alongside Ukrainian.

In fact, the law cares about only one language, Russian, which, ironically, does not need any protection since it dominates nearly all the territory and virtually all the spheres of public life in Ukraine. By the same token, one may protect English in Ireland or Spanish in Peru. The main goal of the document is not to secure the right of the Russophone citizens to use Russian since such a right is enshrined in Ukraine’s Constitution and in the 1989 “Law on Languages.” The main goal is to secure the right of post-Soviet bureaucracy not to learn and to use Ukrainian under any circumstances. No provisions require service for Ukrainophones in Ukrainian, or the use of Russian alongside Ukrainian rather than instead of it. The law gives a free hand to state officials to choose the language of work at their convenience, regardless of preferences of individual citizens, hence there is little doubt what the traditionally Russian-speaking and Soviet-thinking bureaucracy will choose.

Even though the sponsors of the new law refer to the Western experience of bilingualism, neither Finland nor Switzerland is a relevant analogue here. Rather, it is Belarus where a similar Soviet-style law and hypocritical “laissez-faire” policy have already transformed Belarusian speakers into second-class citizens and brought the Belarusian language to the verge of extinction. A similar law in Ukraine evoked very critical comments from the expert community, NGOs, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, and the Venice Commission. Its letter in many cases contradicts the Ukrainian constitution, its spirit runs against the relative balance of intergroup interests, and the way it was rubber-stamped in the parliament is outrageous since deputies considered no conclusions of the respective parliamentary committees or amendments discussed, and many procedural technicalities were violated.

The further irony of the story is that the controversial law, as new surveys reveal, brought the dominant Party of Regions very little electoral gain. Analysts wonder whether this step was another miscalculation of the provincial elite, unable to grasp the complex reality and predict the inevitable backfire and various side effects – something that also happened in 2010 when the Black Sea Fleet base was conceded to Russia for virtually nothing, or last year when former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko was imprisoned. Others argue, however, that this is a strategic move aimed at systemic emasculation of Ukrainian identity and, thereby, weakening the power base of the Orange opponents.

Both explanations may hold some truth but the main goal of the language law seems to be highly manipulative. It targets both supporters and opponents in the sense that it introduces false agenda into the election campaign. It shifts attention from the bread-and-butter issues on which the incumbents, with their disastrous social and economic policies, have little to say, toward issues concerning which any trickster and demagogue can pretend to be a “Great Leader.” Part of this plan is to make the opposition play this game: to defend language rather than the rule of law, and to fight remote Russia and its mythical “fifth column” rather than the real cheaters and robbers that run the country. Back in 2004, the Ukrainian people were victorious in a battle against the corrupt regime precisely because they rejected this false agenda and fought for fair elections and human dignity, for justice and decency, rather than language and other identity issues, however important they might be eventually. It remains to be seen whether the government’s manipulative strategies will be more successful this time.

 

DUPING THE PUSSY-CATS

Mykola Riabchuk

The last hopes some Ukrainians harbored for president’s veto over the highly divisive language bill, faded away on August 8, after Viktor Yanukovych signed it into law http://www.president.gov.ua/news/24960.html.

The result was largely predictable since the promotion of Russian language – at the cost of Ukrainian, as many critics opine – was a cornerstone of Yanukovych’s 2004 and 2010 presidential campaigns as well as of his Sovietophile Party of Regions. The propagandistic materials leaked from the party headquarters before the bill was even approved reveal a key role assigned to the language law by the party spin-doctors in the pending parliamentary elections campaign. And the brutal, extremely unscrupulous, and illegitimate way the bill was pushed through the parliament proves that the stakes are too high for the Party of Regions and, apparently, for the president.

Therefore, it was rather naïve to expect that the president would destroy what his team had been building so ruthlessly, breaching various laws and dismissing procedural subtleties. The calculation looks simple: whatever the president and his party do, they will not garner support from the democratic, Ukrainophile, and pro-European part of society. So, the main task is to mobilize the traditional, Sovietophile part of the electorate, which would probably never vote for the “democrats” perceived as “nationalists” and “Western hacks,” but may also reject the “Regionals” because of dissatisfaction with their disastrous social and economic policies. Some protest votes would probably benefit the Regionals’ satellites: the Communists on the virtual left and Natalia Korolevska’s “Avanti Ukraine!” in the quasi-liberal “center.” Still, the problem of mobilizing the Regionals’ core electorate remains topical since many of those people may simply ignore the elections, facilitating thereby the chances of the opposition.

The estimated size of the Sovietophile electorate in Ukraine is about 40%. This does not comprise a majority but the Party of Regions has good reason to believe that the half of the parliament elected from the territorial districts (not from the party lists) will bring them the much-needed majority thanks to the so-called independents. Most of them ultimately appear very dependent on the incentives or intimidation or both from the authorities and usually end-up in the pro-government camp.

The plot of the “Language Bill” was essentially clear but some dramatic devices were invoked to create an effective atmosphere of suspense and intrigue. First, there was last year’s precedent when the law on official use of the Soviet red flags was passed and even signed by the president but cancelled eventually by the hyper-loyalist constitutional court. (This actually may happen again but probably only after the parliamentary elections. The abandoned law would not bring Yanukovych much love and gratitude from Ukrainophiles anyway but would certainly give him an additional trump-card for some manipulative games in the future – something that his predecessor Leonid Kuchma understood perfectly).

Secondly, the head of the parliament Volodymyr Lytvyn refused to sign the bill citing multiple violations of the procedure http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2012/07/4/6967984. But his resignation was not accepted by the parliament and he was ultimately forced to comply, possibly blackmailed by the “Regionals” because of his alleged involvement in the Gongadze affair http://news.liga.net/ua/news/politics/707846-litvin_p_dpisav_skandalniy_zakon_pro_movi.htm.

Thirdly, the professional “doves” in Yanukovych’s team strained every sinew to convey to the public the president’s deep concern with the le controversies and his sincere desire to find a reasonable compromise that would not harm the Ukrainian language. Maryna Stavniychuk, his adviser, went so far as to recognize unequivocally that “the law was passed with flagrant violations of the articles 47, 116-122 and 130 of procedural statute (регламент) of the parliament, and many of its provisions contradicted the respective paragraphs of the Ukrainian Constitution and international documents ratified by Ukraine, including the European Charter of Regional and Minority Languages”http://obozrevatel.com/politics/16482-umovna-movna-krapka.htm. Moreover, Viktor Yanukovych himself recognized the controversial character of the law, referring to it as a crude document “splitting society” and therefore requiring “some improvements.”

And finally, on the very eve of the signing of the bill, President Yanukovych summoned a number of what still is called in Soviet newspeak “representatives of intelligentsia” to his summer residence in the Crimea to get their first-hand opinion on the hot issue. Next day the bill was signed into law to the great shock of the “representatives,” who justifiably considered themselves “tricked like kittens.” (The phrase became a popular description of the Party of Regions’ behavior after its informal parliamentary “director” Mykhaylo Chchetov used it boastfully to explain how they had cheated the opposition when pushing through the bill against all procedural requirements: “Мы их развели, как котят.” Remarkably, the Russian word “razvesti” – to sucker somebody – comes from the criminal jargon openly favored by the dominant Donetsk clan) http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2012/07/3/6967926.

To sweeten the pill, the president ordered the government to create an ad hoc working group that would elaborate proper changes to the law, with a stated goal to “ensure the full-fledged functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life over the entire territory of the country.” This belongs next to the initial intention of the document to “guarantee the free development and use of other mother tongues of Ukrainian citizens” http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/14941.html.  Raisa Bohatyriova, the deputy prime minister in charge of humanitarian issues, was assigned to head the group, while the president’s guests, a.k.a. “representatives of intelligentsia,” were invited to participate in the deliberations. Ironically, the same offer was made also to the bill’s sponsors, Messrs. Kivalov and Kolesnichenko – a decision that some Ukrainian journalists declared was rather like asking Himmler and Goebbels to work on a law of de-Nazification.

The excessive demonization of two petty swindlers and opportunists is hardly appropriate but the metaphor is actually not about ideological similarity. It refers primarily to the intolerant, aggressive, and arrogant approach of these two persons and their use of political force to resolve any issue that requires a dialogue and consensus building. Serhiy Kivalov was the cynical head of the Central Election Commission that falsified notoriously the 2004 presidential elections and provoked the popular uprising known as the “Orange Revolution.” Today, he reportedly owns the TV channel “Academia,” a source of pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian propaganda, with a flagship program “Background” full of unrestrained innuendos and overt propaganda of hatred http://rutube.ru/tracks/5357980.html.

Vadym Kolesnichenko, the other self-professed promoter of European charters and values in Ukraine, has a similar reputation as a professional crusader against “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism.” Since Soviet times, the term has been used exactly like “Zionism,”i.e. to denigrate all things Ukrainian and to criminalize any vestiges of national identity beyond ethnography. Kolesnichenko’s fame in the parliament is based primarily on his pugilism, parading with Russian state symbols, and making disparaging remarks about Ukrainian language and culture. A dense cloud of scandals accompanies his activity. Within the few past months, he managed to steal Timothy Snyder’s article from the New York Review of Books for his own “antinationalistic” collection http://news.liga.net/news/politics/669428-professor_yelskogo_universiteta_vozmushchen_postupkom_kolesnichenko.htm, to organize “mass approval” for his draft bill by forging “letters of support” from various academic and minority institutions http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2012/05/23/6965117, and to falsify quotations and references in the explanatory notes to the document he submitted with Mr. Kivalov http://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2012/07/30/6969744.

Perhaps the best characterization of this provocateur-at-large comes from his 2009 speech in the parliament where he lobbied for another “antinationalistic” bill: “On banning the rehabilitation and heroizing of fascist collaborators of 1933-1945.” To make his propagandistic speech more appealing to the fellow-MPs and especially for the general public, he embellished dry bureaucratic formulas with some personal details. At one point he referred not only to the UN documents and Nuremberg court decisions but also, as stated in the official stenogram, to the “bright memory of millions of Ukrainians who perished in their fight against fascism and bright memory of my father who burnt in a tank in Belarus defending the Soviet Motherland from the German-fascist occupants”” http://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2012/07/30/6969744.

The only problem with the credibility of this speech (and Mr. Kolesnichenko in general) is that the speaker was born in 1958, roughly 15 years after his father reportedly perished in Belarus. (One may recollect here a reputed similar statement by Aleksander Lukashenko who was also impassioned so much by his own rhetoric that forgot he was born seven years after the war and, moreover, had actually never heard anything about his father).

Now one may guess how the “kittens”, a.k.a. “representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia,” would cooperate with the two very peculiar personages on the expected improvements to the law that has been absolutely lawless – illegal and illegitimate – in its spirit and letter, causes and effects, inception and delivery. My bet is that the crusaders might tone down their Ukrainophobic zeal on the boss’s orders; the “representatives” would receive from the president soothing promises of further support for Ukrainian language and culture; the law would be amended to meet (more or less) provisions of the constitution; so that little will change in today’s ambiguous situation, which is determined primarily not by laws but by the authorities’ goodwill and political expedience. All this will happen, however, after the elections, when logic suggests Yanukovych will backtrack a little bit in order to have more space for the eventual political bargaining and maneuvering.

Today expediency means appeasing supporters and undermining opponents. Kivalov, Kolesnichenko, and Chechetov accomplished the first part of the project, while the “representatives of intelligentsia” helped to complete the other part. First, they ran, at the president’s whim, to his dacha and, second, they got virtually nothing. To enhance the humiliation, the information was leaked that all of these affluent citizens flew at the cost of Bohdan Havrylyshyn, a Swiss-Ukrainian businessman, fully in line with the Regionals’ propaganda that the Ukrainian language issue is merely a Diaspora hobbyhorse http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2012/08/7/6970338.

Even though most of the “representatives” are not directly connected to the political opposition (actually most of them have successfully cooperated with both Soviet and post-Soviet authorities), all of them represent, in the popular mind, the “Ukrainian party,” i.e., the opposition as it is broadly understood. To discredit the opposition on the eve of elections is definitely a favored policy, but probably even more important for the regime is to involve as many public figures as possible in its illegal activity. This helps to normalize things abnormal and legitimize the illegitimate. The cheaters become the partners; the swindlers assume the role of respectable statesmen. The story may resemble the classical parable about Faust and Mephistopheles. The only problem is that the Ukrainian Mephistos are merely petty crooks, and the Ukrainian Fausts are merely dull and insipid collaborators.

[Editor's note: the views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Stasiuk Program for the Study of Contemporary Ukraine]

On Brave Faces and a Sorry Business

Mykola Riabchuk

Shortly after the European football championship ended in Kyiv on July 1, a leading Ukrainian independent outlet, Ukrainska Pravda, featured a bitter article by Borys Bakhteyev that qualified the tournament as a great propaganda victory for the local authoritarian regime:

“Our authorities carried out a special operation aimed at a thorough elimination of Poland from the information context of Euro 2012. They imposed upon us the only possible answer to the question ‘Who hosted the championship?’ – Surely, Viktor Yanukovych, Mykola Azarov, Borys Kolesnikov and no one else! They celebrate now, and are not going to share their triumph with anyone. ‘Let Europeans not teach us how to handle our business’, they say. ‘Let them rather learn from us a little, from our excellent management of the tournament!’ The trouble is not that they carried out this special operation. The trouble is they succeeded” http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2012/07/4/6968065/.

Two days later, the same newspaper published an article by investigative journalist Mustafa Nayem based on the secret instructions sent by the ruling Party of Regions to its local headquarters on how to carry out the forthcoming election campaign and which arguments to employ in party propaganda. Three concepts are featured in the document: first, the so called “social initiatives” by the president, which basically are no more than populist slogans about various social benefits to be accrued from the empty state coffers; second, the language policy aimed at mobilization of the Russophone and Sovietophile portion of the electorate; and third, the alleged “success story” of Euro 2012 as proof of the government’s efficiency and good international standing http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2012/07/6/6968257/.

The first two may deserve a separate analysis, but the third one seems to confirm Borys Bakhteyev’s gloomy observations. The Party of Regions instructs its activists to praise extensively the country’s leadership for “rescuing the tournament, which was practically lost for Ukraine by the ‘orange’ predecessors,” and for the excellent management of the event despite the coordinated anti-government-cum-anti-Ukrainian campaign of domestic and international enemies. The attached slogans speak for themselves: “Chaos is overcome. Stability is achieved!”; “Euro 2012: a goal for Ukraine”; and “Tournaments pass, achievements remain.” Now, as these slogans are placed on billboards everywhere in Ukraine, with glamorous pictures of stadiums, airports, high-speed trains and airplanes, one may wonder whether the championship has actually been appropriated by the Party of Regions as a real success story and is boosting its popularity on the eve of the October parliamentary elections.

On the one hand, there is little doubt that, partial achievements and minor success stories notwithstanding, Euro-2012 was a wasted opportunity for Ukraine in terms of both substantial modernization and positive image making. While political instability and rampant corruption discouraged foreign investors—80 per cent of related bills had to be paid by the Ukrainian government (with reported 40 percent kickbacks from government-friendly contractors)—the political scandals, persecution of opposition, and reports of racist excesses at Ukrainian stadiums fundamentally undermined any possibility for the country’s positive rebranding. Indeed, as Janek Lasocki and Lukasz Jasina put it, international headlines were “clearly not encouraging investment or political cooperation, nor proving the country’s European credentials” http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/janek-lasocki-%C5%82ukasz-jasina/football-politics-legacy-of-euro-2012-in-ukraine.

The event that back in 2007 was envisaged to “help change Ukraine’s image from that of a gray, ‘semi-Russian’ backwater to a country that shared European values and strove for democracy” (http://www.tol.org/client/article/23201-ukraines-european-aspirations-meet-the-buzz-saw-of-post-soviet-habits.html), and to “symbolise common heritage and cooperation across the EU border, and a bright future for an ever-expanding Europe” (http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/05/18/guest-post-ukraines-boycott-blues), turned out to be a “public relations disaster for the Yanukovych regime,” “farce of the century,” and one the most expensive entries in the “Regionnaires’ remarkable chronicle of failures” http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/alexander-j-motyl/looming-soccer-disaster-ukraine.

Although all this is true, one cannot deny that, on the other hand, the Ukrainian government tries to capitalize, at least domestically, on the relatively smooth running of the championship, and that its propagandistic efforts were not entirely in vain. First, the propaganda campaign is facilitated by firm control over the domestic mass media, primarily television (the only independent Ukrainian channel TVi lost its airwaves to the government’s loyalists shortly after Viktor Yanukovych became president in 2010, and now has encountered even stronger pressure after the tax police raided its office on July 12, seized financial documents and opened a criminal case against its director Mykola Kniazhytsky based on scurrilous accusations).

Secondly, the western mass media had managed to create a favorable context for the Ukrainian regime to dismiss their criticism and to mobilize part of the population to support the government on presumably patriotic grounds: against indiscriminate accusations against Ukrainian society at large of indulging in endemic racism and xenophobia. (See Uilleam Blacker’s article on this site at http://ukraineanalysis.wordpress.com/2012/06/05/eastern-european-xenophobia-under-western-eyes-euro-2012-in-poland-ukraine). The campaign launched by the reputable BBC and supported by a number of British tabloids presented both Poland and, especially, Ukraine as dangerous places where crypto-fascist violence and intolerance reigns supreme and where visitors with a non-white skin are very likely to “come back in coffins” http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2150542/Nazi-mob-lies-wait-England-fans-Riot-police-march-battle-thugs-Euro-2012-terraces–turn-blind-eye-racist-chants-violence.html.

The accusations, however substantiated (at least in the BBC Panorama film “Stadiums of Hatred”), missed the point in two important respects. First, racism is certainly not the main problem that hounds Ukraine, and secondly, Ukraine is certainly not a European leader in terms of racism, fascism and football hooliganism – it lags far behind Russia where Asian immigrants are beaten and killed on regular basis.

Regretfully yet, the moderate voices that tried to present a more balanced view and tame the “anti-Ukraine overdrive” (as Brendan O’Neill defined it), remained largely unheard: “Like every other country in the world, Ukraine no doubt has some nasty racists – but British hacks have continually depicted the entire nation as a cesspit of xenophobic attitudes… What we’re really witnessing in the hysteria about Ukrainian attitudes is the expression of a prejudice against strange Easterners disguised as an enlightened anti-racist sentiment. If it is stupid for small numbers of Ukrainian football followers to sneer at blacks and Asians, it is also stupid for the British media to sneer at the whole of Ukraine” http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/brendanoneill2/100160992/the-fear-of-racist-ukraine-is-itself-xenophobic/.

The main problem, as Rory Finnin has correctly suggested, “was less media sensationalism than public knowledge about Ukraine. Reports of racism in the country were essentially made in a vacuum, with precious little beyond stories of made-man famines, environmental catastrophes, and feuding politicians to help frame them constructively. Ukraine is the largest country within the European continent… Yet after 20 years of independence, Ukraine remains badly known and poorly understood. It is Europe’s perennial terra malecognita” http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/dr-rory-finnin/ukraine-europes-terra malecognita_b_1653469.html.

As if such hyperbole was not enough, the Western mass media broadly discussed the idea to boycott not only Ukrainian leadership marred with corruption scandals and persecution of their political opponents, but Ukraine in general by removing the final stage of the tournament either fully to Poland or to some other country. This irresponsible appeal (which came too late to accomplish anyway) was effectively manipulated by the Ukrainian authorities in a similar way, as the wholesale accusations of Ukraine as racist: first, it was used to distract popular attention from the real (political) reasons for the international boycott of the Ukrainian leadership and to switch it to the alleged anti-Ukrainian bias of Westerners; and secondly, it helped to channel popular resentment against the opposition, which had arguably conspired with ugly Westerners and who sacrificed the national interests (Euro-2012) for the sake of some particularistic gains (liberation of Yulia Tymoshenko).

Angela Merkel’s notorious comparison of Ukraine with Belarus played directly into the hands of Mr. Yanukovych and his acolytes since the bias was obvious here to all, including the fiercest of Yanukovych’s opponents. The bias was even more pronounced given Merkel’s (and that of other European bigwigs) exchange of amiable hugs and smiles with much more authoritarian bosses in Moscow. There is a sad truth in the words of an unnamed German journalist quoted in Open Democracy by a Ukrainian colleague: “It’s quite easy for Merkel to attack Ukraine and demand respect for human rights. Unlike Russia, you have no oil or gas and you’re not as strong and influential as China. It’s convenient to criticise Ukraine and it does great things for [her] popularity rating” (http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/valery-kalnysh/are-european-calls-for-euro-2012-boycott-meaningless).  This truism may not strengthen significantly the position of Viktor Yanukovych but it definitely weakens those of his pro-Western opponents.

Viktor Yanukovych, as Michael Willard sarcastically remarks, “doesn’t seem to be losing much sleep due to the downward spiral of his country’s reputation in the eyes of the West or, apparently, even Russia.” The Western boycott of authoritarian rulers resembles hitting them with the proverbial wet noodle: “One feels it, but it doesn’t sting” http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op-ed/back-story-ukraine-proved-naysayers-wrong-in-euro-.html.

“Statements such as those made by Angela Merkel or Hillary Clinton are political, but they are only words, unless they are backed up by force, pressure, breaking contracts, isolation, refusal of entry visas and freezing officials’ bank accounts… The Ukrainian president does not understand hints. The language of diplomacy is completely alien to him… The EU and USA appeals will remain just that, appeals, heard only by those making them” http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/valery-kalnysh/are-european-calls-for-euro-2012-boycott-meaningless.

“The EU has more power than it thinks, and boycott is not the only weapon. A travel ban on officials linked to Tymoshenko’s jailing could rein in a few of Ukraine’s corrupt kleptocrats” http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/05/18/guest-post-ukraines-boycott-blues.

“Rather than staying way from Ukraine to no point (except to mollify their own domestic critics), Merkel, Barroso and the rest should use the very real powers they have to hit Kyiv where it really hurts” http://eastofcenter.tol.org/2012/05/yellow-bellied-european-pols-deserve-yellow-cards/.

It may take some time before experts’ opinion gains sufficient credibility and influence to prompt policymakers to apply tougher sanctions against the rogue government. The rigged parliamentary elections in October may catalyze the process. Yet, in the meantime, the president and his team can boast of their great victory, both against the sinister West and treacherous opposition. “A goal for Ukraine,” they claim, and might well be right, unless they mean “Ukraine c’est moi.”

LANGUAGE LAW A PLOY TO DISTRACT VOTERS

David Marples

On July 3, the Ukrainian Parliament passed the second draft of a language law that would grant official status to minority languages in areas in which they are spoken by at least 10% of the population. Its acceptance sparked furious protests outside Parliament, with riot police using batons and tear gas against demonstrators.

Some analysts maintain that the law would undermine the status of Ukrainian, which has been the only official state language since the country gained independence in 1991. Others anticipate a deepening of a regional divide between the Ukrainian-speaking Western regions, and the mainly Russophone areas of the south and east.

Yet as usual with events involving the ruling Regions Party and its president Viktor Yanukovych, there is more to this move than is at first evident.

The circumstances of the bill’s passing were calculated to inflame. It was introduced without forewarning, when many deputies and Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn were absent. It received votes from 248 deputies, well over the required minimum of 226. The Regions deputies were supported by the Communist Party and People’s Party. Speaker Lytvyn subsequently offered his resignation, but it was rejected by the assembly the following day. Seven deputies announced they were starting a hunger strike in protest. There were angry demonstrations in Kyiv and in the western Ukrainian city of L’viv, the heartland of Ukrainian speakers. Protests are also planned by the Ukrainian community abroad in centers like Toronto.

In theory the bill—it still requires the signatures of the President and Speaker before it becomes law—would mean that Russian would take on official status in 13 of Ukraine’s 27 designated regions, i.e. 11 “oblasts” (provinces) and the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol. In the far western area of Transcarpathia, Hungarian would gain official status. In Chernivtsi and southwestern Odesa, the same would apply to Romanian and Bulgarian. On the Crimean peninsula, the Tatar language would also gain such status. Altogether, Ukraine would have 18 “official languages”!

There is little logic to its sudden passing other than perhaps to enhance the electoral standing of the Regions Party in Russian-speaking regions prior to the parliamentary elections, anticipated in October. Language issues are hardly a priority in a state riddled with corruption and human rights issues, and suffering a sharp economic downturn. And although tempers are frayed, the number of protesters is small. A mere 1,000 turned out in central Kyiv on July 4, for example, barely enough to cause a flutter on the bustling Khreschatyk.

Also, should the law attain official status its implementation would be a bureaucratic and financial nightmare. Indeed, a representative of the Finance Ministry, Valentyna Brusylo, commented, perhaps indiscreetly, that it would likely cost some $1.5-$2 billion to introduce. Such expenses in an election year would be an issue of much greater contention than the language law itself. The Ukrainian government is in financial trouble: it recently agreed terms for a $3 billion loan from China’s Eximbank, payment for which will be partly in exports of grain up to 2.5 million tons per year.

Third, why do Regions deputies need to introduce a law formalizing the status of Russian, which already enjoys a privileged position? No doubt it will impress Russian president Vladimir Putin who visits Ukraine on July 12. But the question has been dragged up, by Yanukovych and earlier presidents, at every election and then ignored once a new president entered office.

The answer to all these questions appears to be that it is a calculated ploy to inflame and divide residents of Ukraine, a diversion from other issues that should be considered more urgent. The electorate has been sidetracked for the past month by Euro-2012, a successful but costly soccer competition that was well organized and won convincingly by the Spanish. The language law is the new diversion.

After its passing, as opposition deputies gathered in the streets to protest, the remaining 73 deputies passed a total of 20 new laws in a single day. These included new subsidies for the Donbas coal mines, which are at the center of Regions’ power base, a new rail connection to Kyiv international airport, and more funding for the Ministry of Justice and the Office of the State Prosecutor. The costs of the new laws amount to billions.

Because so few deputies were present, others simply voted in their place, pressing the “yes” button in the absentees’ seats in order to secure a majority for each new law. The strategy could be seen as cynical. But Regions deputies habitually pay lip service to the democratic process while finding ways to circumvent it.

The uproar over the language bill may be justified. But it is also a diversion, carefully calculated so that deputies are preoccupied and the rules of Parliament can be circumvented. In the meantime the ruling elite of Ukraine fritter away state funds without a care for the long-term consequences.

The language law is simply impractical, but it is not the main issue. Language does not divide the residents of Ukraine. The real problem is the ruling Regions Party, which treats the country as a personal fiefdom to be robbed at will and finds ingenious ways to ensure that it can continue to do so.

This article first appeared in the Edmonton Journal, 7 July 2012. [http://www2.canada.com/edmontonjournal/news/ideas/story.html?id=0a732fad-db3f-4777-b245-c73bcf13873f&p=2]

Back to Kuchmenistan

Mykola Riabchuk

On November 17, the Ukrainian parliament adopted a new electoral law for the conducting of the next parliamentary elections in October 2012 http://portal.rada.gov.ua/rada/control/en/publish/article/info_left?art_id=290355&cat_id=105995. So far, its draft is available only in Ukrainian http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb_n/webproc4_1?id=&pf3511=41814 . Besides some novelties and modifications, the law essentially reestablishes the mixed system under which half of the deputies are elected through first-past-the-post elections in single-member districts, and half through proportional representation in nationwide multi-member districts. Such a system had been employed in Ukraine until the Orange revolution but was replaced eventually with a purely proportional system of elections from the nationwide party lists.

Back in 2004, the reason for change was two-fold. First, it intended to encourage the development of the party system, promote coalition building in the parliament and in line with amendments to the constitution render the government more dependent on the specific parties and the parties more responsible for the government. The second goal was even of greater importance. The earlier mixed system, especially its “majoritarian” part, employed in Ukraine until 2004, turned out to be highly susceptible to all sorts of manipulation and abuse of power by unscrupulous authorities. The proportional system, instead, was to reduce corruption both in electoral districts where government-connected oligarchs bribed voters, and in the parliament where the “independents” (typically local officials or businessmen) became easy prey for governmental blackmail and bribery.

The 2002 parliamentary elections provide a graphic example of how the majoritarian system benefited the authoritarian government of Leonid Kuchma. Then, despite all the dirty tricks, the pro-presidential parties made up only 20% of votes in the nationwide district, whereas their opponents, Viktor Yushchenko’s and Yulia Tymoshenko’s blocs, won 30%. Yet, the second half of the parliament was made up of the “independents” from single-member districts, so, predictably, most of them succumbed to the multiple arguments provided by the omnipotent presidential administration, and joined the incumbents.

To make bad things worse, the Ukrainian version of the majoritarian system does not require the winner to get 50+ per cent of votes in his/her district. In the first-past-the-post elections reintroduced in Ukraine, victory can be secured by sheer plurality, not necessarily a majority of votes. It means that pro-governmental candidates, however unpopular, can win elections with 20% of votes and less if they manage successfully to split opposition (and votes), produce as many fake competitors as possible, and eliminate the most dangerous rivals by decisions of fully obedient courts subservient to the authorities.

This is exactly what happened in last year’s local elections where the government carried out a dry run of the new-old system. For instance, in the proportional representation part of the election to the Kyiv Regional Council, the Party of Regions got 26 percent of the vote. Yet, in the first-past-the-post contests, almost all of the party’s candidates won. As a result it controls 65.5 percent of the regional council http://www.tol.org/client/article/22303-blocking-out-its-rivals.html.

One may argue, of course, that the first-past-the-post system should not be a big problem for opposition if they manage to unite against the incumbents or at least to agree on a common single candidate in each district. There are two hurdles, however, of both an objective and subjective nature. First, democratic forces are never as consolidated and monolithic as authoritarians who care little for ideological subtleties and principled debates but do care a lot about mafia-style discipline supported by enormous resources, patronage networks, elaborate blackmail, and coercion. And secondly, even if the democrats manage to unite, the authoritarian incumbents are skilful in splitting them, multiplying the bogus alternatives and, in some cases, eliminating the potential or even actual winners by courts under the most ridiculous pretexts.

To further undermine the opposition’s ability to unite, the new electoral law bars electoral blocs from participation in elections. This brings an additional advantage to the authoritarian Party of Regions and delivers, in particular, a serious blow against the political force of Yulia Tymoshenko that is broadly known as her eponymous bloc, while her specific political party “Batkivshchyna” (Fatherland), even though the strongest within the bloc, is largely unknown. The increase of the electoral threshold from 3 to 5 percent also targets the opposition, which, unlike the incumbents, consists of many small parties unable to surpass that total. As a result, all the votes of the opposition parties that fail to reach the threshold will be distributed proportionally among the parties that manage to do it. In other words, the Party of Regions will get a significant share of opposition votes that otherwise would never go to them.

Remarkably, the Party of Regions in opposition was fairly satisfied with the proportional electoral system as well as all other amendments to the constitution http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2011/11/17/6760394/. It is not that the system was perfect. Its major flaw was voters’ inability to influence the sequence of candidates on party slates. This made parties akin to closed political clubs where the leaders had too much power and were prone to arrange the electoral party lists in a voluntaristic fashion, evaluating prospective candidates by their financial contribution rather than moral, political, or professional merits. But the problem was not insurmountable, as the experience of many consolidated democracies, e.g. neighboring Poland, graphically demonstrates. To improve the proportional system, both Ukrainian and international experts suggested the so-called “open lists,” which would provide people with an opportunity to vote not only for a specific party but also for the preferred candidate on the party’s list.

Ironically, Viktor Yanukovych himself supported this change during his 2010 presidential campaign but eventually backtracked to his current position of support for a mixed electoral system. The reason for this volte-face was allegedly a lack of support for the “open lists” system in the parliament.However, this argument is as preposterous as the president’s claims that Ukrainian courts are impartial and independent and he has no leverage to influence them. Even more laughable is the assumption that the president has no influence over his own Minister of Justice Oleksandr Lavrynovych, who dares today to ridicule his boss’ project from 2009: “Imposing open lists is a mockery of law, common sense, and citizens. It’s lobbied for by the opposition, while we offer a better mechanism, whereby people choose their own members of parliament” http://www.tol.org/client/article/22303-blocking-out-its-rivals.html.

All those who remember Yanukovych’s U-turn on the issue of Ukraine’s NATO membership (in 2002-2004, when he was Prime-Minister, he had no objections to it), should not be surprised by his latest opportunistic move. Neither the president nor his Party of Regions has ever had any political principles or ideology besides strong commitment to absolute power that can be converted into wealth and, in turn, more secure absolute power. They have no strategy, and all their moves are determined by short-term political-cum-business expediency. In this case, the ultimate goal of the Regionnaires is clear: not to improve the existing electoral law but, rather, to introduce a new law that offers them benefits and disadvantages the opposition.

As early as March 2011, the American experts from the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute suspended their cooperation with the Lavrynovych-led working group created back in 2010 by the president with the stated task to amend the elections law, and make it more coherent, transparent and acceptable for the both government and opposition. The Americans discovered that they were simply manipulated by the Ukrainian authorities, which were intent on legitimizing, with a help of reputable foreigners, their quasi-legalistic machinations.

More recently, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) and OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) submitted their detailed and rather critical analysis of Lavrynovych’s project, which contained a remarkable passage regarding the card-sharp tactics of the Ukrainian lawmakers: “The electoral system chosen in the draft law is not the one discussed by the Venice Commission representatives during their meetings with the Ukrainian authorities and not the one recommended by the Resolution 1755 (2010) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe” http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2011/CDL%282011%29059prov-e.pdf.

And finally, the International Foundation of Electoral Systems (IFES) sent an equally strong message to the Ukrainian authorities in its own expert analysis of proposed changes: “IFES notes that the draft law was developed in an atmosphere of considerable uncertainty and mistrust between the Government of Ukraine, political parties and civil society. Numerous concerns regarding the draft law, and the process by which it was created, were raised to IFES by members of opposition parties, civil society, electoral experts and the international community… IFES shares the concerns expressed by many Ukrainian and international stakeholders regarding the government’s decision to change the electoral system in the present political climate. Electoral systems can always be improved for the better, but given the lack of consensus in the country; the significant impact of the proposed changes on the political landscape; and relatively short timeline for implementing these changes, it is highly questionable whether it makes sense to change the system at the present time. While the newly proposed system may be a legitimate one, there is no major flaw in the current system that would require an immediate change without further discussion” http://ifes.org/Content/Publications/Papers/2011/Review-and-Analysis-of-the-Draft-Law-on-the-Election-of-Peoples-Deputies-of-Ukraine.aspx.

Even more surprising is that the new law was approved ultimately by 366 MPs (of 450 in the Ukrainian parliament), i. e., not only by the ruling majority but also a major part of the opposition. It seems that supported the lesser of two evils–-the draft law with some minor concessions for the opposition instead of the genuine, much more discriminatory draft that would have been passed by the Party of Regions anyway. This is probably true since the President and his allies have enough votes in the parliament to pass any decision they need. Yet, the reality is that the Party of Regions can muster a pro-presidential majority in the next parliament with or without the insignificant concessions they have made to their opponents. It is just a matter of a few seats they may not get in elections and a few extra millions they would have to spend eventually in the parliament to buy the needed number of “independents.” But this is quite a reasonable price to pay for the legitimization the new law, both domestically and internationally, with the precious help of the opposition.

Once again, the Ukrainian democrats “shot themselves in the foot,” helping the Regionnaires to dismantle the last achievement of the Orange revolution: the election system that precluded, more or less successfully, large-scale falsifications and vote buying. Now they may lay bets only on whether the Regionnaires can muster a simple majority (226+) in the future parliament or the qualified majority (300+) that would enable them to change the Constitution and, in 2015, to elect the president, with all his enormous powers, by a simple parliamentary vote. My bet is that this is exactly the main goal of Viktor Yanukovych and the major rationale of virtually all his policies to date.

The Tip of the Iceberg

Mykola Riabchuk

The farcical trial of Yulia Tymoshenko, the former prime minister and main political rival of incumbent president Viktor Yanukovych, seems predictably to be drawing to a farcical end. The final decision is as yet unclear even for the chief organizers of the court facade. Thus far, they are trying desperately to fulfill two opposite and essentially incompatible demands – to free “Yulia,” at the demand of the international community, and, at the same time, to eliminate her as the most dangerous rival of Yanukovych from the next parliamentary (2012) and presidential (2015) elections.

The government, squeezed by two mutually exclusive imperatives, has a really difficult choice – either to forget about the pending Association Agreement with the EU and probably about the DCFTA (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement), or to face harsh political competition from a rival who may not only win the forthcoming elections but also could potentially dispatch all her current persecutors to jail with much more serious and better substantiated criminal accusations. The costs-and-benefits calculation of either decision is incredibly difficult for the incumbent regime – partly because there are too many unknown variables in the calculation, and partly because the regime is not homogenous, and various factions perceive their own costs and benefits differently.

Some “pragmatic” observers argue that Tymoshenko is just a loose cannon and her re-emergence on the political scene would weaken and split the opposition, and effectively prevent the emergence of new and more dangerous anti-oligarchic leaders from civil society that may challenge the entire corrupt system. They refer to some classified opinion polls that predict Yanukovych’s victory over Tymoshenko if an election were held today, but give him slim chances against other candidates like Arseniy Yatseniuk.

Another group of experts and politicians claims, rather cynically, that the EU will sign the agreements with Ukraine anyway because the country is too big and strategically important, and the Westerners would not allow it to be swallowed alternatively by Russia.

And finally, there is a sizable group of people around Yanukovych who have multiple interests in Russia and basically do not care about, and do not believe that any serious international sanctions will be imposed on the regime, regardless of its neo-Soviet roughness and repressiveness.

All these groups press the weak and incompetent leader in different directions but a consensus emerges from this seemingly chaotic chorus that will be examined further in more detail.

Remarkably yet, all the discussions about the Tymoshenko affair pay little if any attention to the factual side of her “crime.” Even pro-government experts and politicians, in various articles, talk-shows and interviews, speculate primarily about the political expediency of the trial, about its costs and benefits for both the government and Tymoshenko herself, but not about the specific decisions, signatures, documents, figures, and agreements she negotiated with her Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin.

It seems that even the government is not especially concerned to make a case that the trial is really a criminal and not a political affair. Hanna Herman, the outspoken advisor of Yanukovych, goes so as far as to suggest that her boss was merely framed by some unspecified conspirators who arrested Yulia Tymoshenko without the president’s blessing: “If [Viktor] Yanukovych had made his own decision on the issue, he would not have carried out such a great injustice. It was done when Yanukovych was on his holidays, when he did not have information… If I only knew who had done this, who made this decision, I would have strangled him with my own hands” http://gazeta.ua/articles/400435.

The issue appears here as a matter domestic intrigue within the ruling clique rather than a genuinely legal case. Yet, an even better portrait of the Ukrainian “justice” system and the legal consciousness of the Ukrainian political “elite” emerges from a recent interview with former Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma who back in 2001 arrested Yulia Tymoshenko, then a deputy prime minister, because of some murky gas deal from the mid-90s, when she was a major business partner of the notorious Pavlo Lazarenko.

Q. “Don’t you regret that you also happened to imprison Yulia Tymoshenko? Her popularity ratings rocketed after that.”
A. “I never ordered anyone to imprison her, and you know this!”
Q. “Really?”
A. “If I have ordered it, she wouldn’t have been released!” http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2011/09/17/6594851/

No comments are necessary.

In the absence of an independent judiciary in Ukraine any decision on a politician’s destiny would be political and, most likely, ascribed to the president’s whim since he has accumulated almost autocratic power in his hands. The “pragmatists” seem to have already persuaded Mr. Yanukovych to release his main nemesis and let her play the role of a political spoiler on the opposition playing field. The EU will be satisfied, the agreements signed, the sanctions avoided, the opposition silenced, and the heavyweight Russian pressure counter-balanced by a traditional “Western vector” and mostly virtual “Euro-Atlantic integration.” The only problem remains how to bring to an end the farcical “Yulia show” in a more or less convincing if not necessarily decent way.

The solution found by the president’s legal pundits and political spin-doctors looks smart. The parliament is reconsidering whether the old Soviet (1962) Criminal Procedure Code is legally valid in Ukraine, which inter alia would eliminate the article that criminalizes Tymoshenko’s alleged wrongdoing. Two birds would be killed thereby with one stone: Tymoshenko would be released without a formal dismissal of accusations (thus she would have a criminal record), and the incumbent regime would receive a perfect cart-blanche for similar wrongdoings in the future. Notably, the Ukrainian parliament controlled by Yanukovych’s Party of Regions has refused to make some critical amendments to the outdated Code that run against their authoritarian views and needs. For example, the MPs refused to forbid legally any pressure on priests to disclose information obtained during confessions. Or to stipulate clearly in the Code that advocates, notaries, doctors and psychologists may not disclose any confidential information received from their clients without their written permission http://maidan.org.ua/2011/09/rada-dozvolyla-dopytuvaty-svyaschenykiv-schodo-spovidi/.

These childish attempts to manipulate the Criminal Code are further proof that the Ukrainian “elite” is still playing with rules rather than by the rules. Yet, as similar cynical games in Moscow are accepted internationally at the highest level, the Ukrainian rulers should not be embarrassed too much.

The main problem with all these post-Soviet crooks is that they not only distrust the so-called “European values” but, in most cases, they simply do not understand them. By and large, they believe that the politics is all the same everywhere and all the discourse about human rights, rule of law, and other “blah-blah” is merely a Western trick, a trump-card invented by a stronger player to gain some advantages over weaker counterparts and force them to make some additional concessions. On many occasions, they refer to various Western missteps and inconsistencies, like Schroeder’s corruption, Berlusconi’s extravagancies, or Bush’s Iraq affair, just to prove that the only difference between “them” and “us” is that they can get away with it.

The ultimate results of the Tymoshenko affair might be two-fold. The first, less likely but still possible, scenario is that the firebrand Yulia is sentenced and thereby eliminated from the eventual elections. In this case, the EU would certainly not sign the nearly finalized agreements with Ukraine – under the clearly articulated pressure of Germany, Italy, France and some other countries that have never had much interest in Ukraine’s democracy, human rights and European integration, but have always highly respected Moscow’s “privileged interests” in what they believe is its “backyard.” None of these friends of Tymoshenko raised their voice last year when the illegitimate government was formed in March after the Regionnaires carried out a coup d’etat in parliament, the constitutional court was reshuffled, local elections illegally postponed and eventually falsified, the 2004 constitutional amendments abolished with multiple procedural violations, and so forth. For those “friends of Ukraine” everything was fine in the country until court proceedings began that encroached upon the interests of Gazprom and Mr. Putin. “It is not just wrong but amoral,” is how Mykola Azarov, prime minister of Ukraine, condemned Westerners’ attempt to connect “the serious global issues like the free trade agreement with a specific court case” http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/1262493-azarov-svyazyvat-podpisanie-soglashenij-ob-associacii-s-es-i-process-nad-timoshenko-amoralno.

This will probably be the predominant rhetoric of the Ukrainian officialdom if Tymoshenko is sentenced and the agreements are not signed. The strong anti-Western campaign and gradual “Belarusization” of Ukrainian politics is the most probable result of this scenario.

More likely, however, is that Tymoshenko will be released, the agreements signed, and the Ukrainian “elite” will have further proof of how smart they are and how easily they can cheat the stupid Westerners. So far, indeed, there are no signs they are going to reconsider their profound contempt for democracy, human rights, and all those trumpeted and really boring “European values.” Tymoshenko’s case is just the tip of the iceberg, but it distracts attention from rampant lawlessness all over the country, including innumerable accounts of police and security service brutality, blackmail and intimidation, harassment of civic activists, the shutdown of the independent mass media, destruction of “disloyal” businesses, and many other misdeeds that have become habitual practices of the Ukrainian authorities.

As long as they are allowed to cheat and not punished for it like their Belarusian brethren, they will cheat wherever and whenever possible –with or without the EU agreements, and regardless of whether Yulia Tymoshenko is at large or in detention.