The Viktors Go to Brussels

David Marples and Myroslava Uniat

After the February 25 16^th EU-Ukraine summit in Brussels, Ukraine’s chances of signing an Association Agreement later this year in Vilnius appeared as uncertain as they were before the meeting. What is lacking is a single unequivocal statement from President Viktor Yanukovych that he is prepared to meet the EU halfway and agree to the preconditions that have been outlined and reiterated numerous times by various leaders of Brussels. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s relations with the Russian-led Customs Union seem equally as ambivalent, but continue in parallel form in the background.

The Europeans have made it plain that the continuing imprisonment of opposition politicians Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuri Lutsenko is part of the equation. If the EU has compromised, then it may be on the issue of the former. While Brussels-based politicians condemn the escalation of the charges against Ukraine’s former Prime Minister, there is less emphasis today than hitherto that the release of Ms Tymoshenko is an essential prerequisite for the signing of the agreement. Regarding Lutsenko, on the other hand, the situation is simply confusing. Evhen Balitskiy, a deputy from the Regions Party, speaking on Ukraine’s Channel 5 on February 21, stated firmly that the two detained figures would be released only when they had completed their sentences, and that Ukraine would not cave into outside pressure for an early end to their confinement (http://www.unian.net/news/554646-regional-otpuskat-timoshenko-i-lutsenko-ranshe-sroka-nikto-ne-sobiraetsya.html).

Another report of February 23 suggested that Yanukovych was indeed willing to compromise on both cases, but without setting a time frame (http://www.unian.net/news/555201-ukrainskiy-interes-anketa-evrointegratsii-i-ansambl-dlya-igryi-na-trube.html). Lutsenko’s wife expressed her view that the president had paid close attention to issues dealing with her husband and that his detention was a political matter, i.e. that he had been imprisoned for criticizing the government (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/22/6984173 ). Just three days later, a report from the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, maintained that after his meeting with the presidents of Poland and Slovakia, Yanukovych had promised to release Lutsenko in order to demonstrate Ukraine’s commitment to joining Europe. But the press service of the Polish president Bronislaw Kororowski would neither deny nor confirm the statement (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/25/6984254/).

Meanwhile EU politicians were expressing optimism both before and after the Brussels summit. European Commission president Jose Manuel Barroso enunciated his vision of Ukraine as future member of the European Union and expressed his faith that Ukraine has a European future. The effort to get an Association Agreement signed in November at the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius was endorsed not only by Barroso, but also by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton, and European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy Stefan Fule. They did add the proviso, however, that Ukraine should resolve the issue of “selective justice” and remove “deficiencies” in the conducting of parliamentary elections (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?kerivnitstvo_yes_hoche_shhob_ukrayina_stala_chlenom_yevrosoyuzu&objectId=1279188).

There was, however, another familiar Ukrainian visitor in the Belgian capital. Prior to the summit, at an evening meeting with Barroso that lasted over an hour, former president Viktor Yushchenko commented that the Tymoshenko case should not hold up proceedings (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?yushhenko_pered_samitom_govoriv_z_barrozu_pro_ukrayinu_i_timoshenko__zmi&objectId=1278974). The future of the Ukrainian state, stated Yushchenko, should not be a hostage of the “Tymoshenko affair.” Whether the Europeans still perceive Yushchenko as a credible authority is a moot point. The former president has rarely missed an opportunity to denounce his former Prime Minister, whose lengthy jail sentence was due in part to his testimony, and he appears content to serve the Regions government in his new role as an informal negotiator.

The delayed visit of Yanukovych to Moscow, on the other hand, finally took place on March 4, following its postponement last December. The main topics on the agenda were cooperation in energy, trade, and the economic sphere, particularly the conditions on which Ukraine might join the Customs Union. In addition Yanukovych returned to an old conundrum of the Kuchma era, namely the notion that there could be a joint Ukrainian-Russian venture to rent out Ukraine’s gas transportation system (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?yanukovich_u_rosiyi_zaproponuye_stvoriti_spilne_pidpriyemstvo__taran&objectId=1279284; http://www.rferl.org/content/putin-yanukovych-moscow/24918397.html ). Russia, however, is insisting that Ukraine recognize the validity of previous agreements, which include not only the unfortunate 2009 deal on gas prices negotiated by Tymoshenko, but also cooperation and progress toward the integration of the Russian and Ukrainian nuclear industries in accordance with the July 12, 2012 memorandum signed in Yalta. One possible component of this agreement is joint construction of units 3 and 4 of the VVER nuclear power station at Khmelnyts’kyi (http://www.unian.net/news/556804-yanukovich-i-putin-pogovoryat-o-gaze.html ).

 In April 2011 Yanukovych suggested that Ukraine might join the Customs Union in a 3+1 format precluding its full integration. That notion received qualifiede support from Regions deputy and Deputy Prime Minister Serhiy Tihipko, a former chair of the National Bank of Ukraine. Tihipko observed that Ukraine’s entry into the Customs Union has been under negotiation since 2010 and that the proposed treaty details are about 1,000 pages in length. Good progress has been made in his view. But neither side has started to work seriously on the 3+1 idea, an approach that he would not reject. Still, the EU market is seven times larger, which renders it more interesting for the Ukrainian economy (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/22/6984174 ). Implicitly therefore the Customs Union is a viable back-up plan should negotiations with Brussels result in failure.

 If, as seems plausible, Yanukovych is using talks with Russia to persuade Brussels to void the various conditions for signing the Associaton Agreement, he is demonstrating remarkable political naivety. The outcome could be the failure of the November meeting with the EU and equally unfruitful negotiations with Russia, which has considerable sway over the immediate future of Ukrainian energy policy in several of its major spheres, but especially oil, gas, and nuclear power. Andrew Wilson of the European Council of Foreign Relations commented that if the president was a wise man, then he would at least agree to release Lutsenko, but [he] «is not wise» (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?yes_pidpisav_bi_ugodu_pro_asotsiatsiyu_navit_z_timoshenko_v_tyurmi__ekspert&objectId=1278880 ). Valery Chaliy of the Kyiv-based Razumkov Center maintains that the chances of the Association Agreement being signed are no better than 20%. And Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt declared that «To put it mildly, the current signs of progress in Ukraine are quite limited» (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?imovirnist_pidpisannya_ugodi_pro_asotsiatsiyu_z_yes__20__ekspert&objectId=1278849).

 The EU has no doubt taken into consideration the overwhelming support for Ukraine’s European aspirations in the Ukrainian Parliament and the fact that even the government, despite its vacillations and the lack of firm directions at the level of the presidency, is generally in favor. It should take note, however, that negotiations on the side of Kyiv are not taking place with sincerity or even an evident willingness to compromise. All too often the vindictiveness toward former enemies and fear of retribution at some future date for more conciliatory policies, particularly in dealing with the Tymoshenko and Lutsenko cases, mean that at best, the Europeans will see no more than sluggish and very reluctant steps to comply with even modest requests. As Wilson has noted, however, a failure in November could seriously undermine the very existence of the Eastern Partnership. Ukraine might then have no immediate options other than the Customs Union, either in the so-called 3+1 formation or deeper integration on terms emanating from Moscow.

UKRAINE: AN UNSEEN IMBROGLIO?

David Marples and Myroslava Uniat

The administration of President Viktor Yanukovych and Prime Minister Mykola Azarov appears to be in confusion. On the one hand it faces a large bill from Russia’s Gazprom for portions of unused gas, along with intense pressure from the Russian government to join the Customs Union. On the other, it awaits a significant summit with the EU in Brussels on February 25 to discuss an Association Agreement, a prelude to its potential signing at the EU Eastern Partnership in November in Vilnius, without first meeting preconditions requested by the Europeans. In fact the president seems blandly oblivious of the tightrope he is walking, assuming that in the world of realpolitik, it is Ukraine rather than Brussels that holds most of the cards. The Ukrainian leader’s logic is that the Kyiv government can operate between the EU and Russia, which are also limited in their bargaining power: Russia, because it needs Ukraine to make the Union work, and the EU because by isolating Ukraine, it would push that country firmly into the Russian orbit. He has witnessed similar maneuvers by the president of Belarus, after all, who has survived largely unscathed to date and remained in power for almost two decades.

In reality, however, Ukraine’s position seems much weaker than the Yanukovych-Azarov team imagines or acknowledges. Russian pressure is constant. The former deputy of United Russia, Sergey Makarov, commented that if Ukraine joined the Russian-led Customs Union—it currently comprises Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan has expressed a wish to join—then the $7.09 billion fine for unused gas will simply be waived. Joining would also mean more chances that gas prices would be reduced (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/8/6983116/). In brief: join us and your troubles are over! Understandably, the Ukrainian side baulks at Gazprom’s demand, partly because it has denounced the 2009 agreement, signed between former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and then Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in 2009, which failed to anticipate the fall of gas prices and committed Ukraine to paying for the full amount of imported gas, whether or not it was actually needed. Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Yuri Boyko met with Chairman of the Gazprom Board Aleksey Miller in early February and stated that he did not think it appropriate for Ukraine to pay such a sum (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/8/6983148/).

Meanwhile, the Regions Party has not responded to a variety of requests from the Europeans to fulfill what are seen as essentially minimal requirements for the signing of the Association Agreement in November. The Dutch Ambassador to Ukraine, Pieter Jan Wolthers, has commented that there is no guarantee that the Association Agreement will be signed because all depends on the Ukrainian side meeting the terms, which include dealing with the issue of selective justice (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/9/6983182/). Likewise, Lithuanian president Dalia Grybauskaite, whose country takes over the presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of this year, informed Yanukovych during his working visit to Lithuania on February 6, that she believes the imprisonment of two former opposition leaders, Tymoshenko and former Interior Minister Yuri Lutsenko, to be politically motivated. She also took Yanukovych to task over the Customs Union, pointing out to him that the simultaneous signing of agreements with the EU and the Customs Union was impossible, because the two contradict each other (http://postup.brama.com/usual.php?what=75559). Therefore it is necessary for Ukraine to choose one or the other. British analyst Andrew Wilson posits that Yanukovych is ignorant of how the EU works, believing that the crucial matter is a balance of power and that the EU’s concern for Tymoshenko is ritualistic. Wilson’s view is that Yanukovych expects at some point that the EU will simply stop making demands and sign the Association Agreement, whereas in reality Ukraine is becoming isolated (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?u_yes_rozdratovani_nevikonanimi_obitsyankami_yanukovicha&objectId=1278035 accessed Feb 17).

For his part, Yanukovych is defending himself and casting stones simultaneously. First of all, he informed European Commissioner Stefan Fule on February 7, his Regions Party has already introduced draft proposals to meet some of the EU’s demands starting in 2010. They are somewhat delayed because he has to deal with officials and politicians “who are used to living in the old way” (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/8/6983134/). He responded to Grybauskaite that Ukraine could not ignore the fact that trade with the members of the Customs Union currently amounts to more than $60 billion, and therefore he supports “simultaneous cooperation” with the EU and the Customs Union. He also blamed the EU Energy Community, which Ukraine joined in 2010, for its failure to intervene to defend Ukraine when Russia made the demand for $7.09 billion for gas, a comment to which director of the Community Secretariat Janez Kopač responded with surprise, noting that Ukraine has to date never requested such assistance (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?u_yees_zdivovani_zakidami_yanukovicha_pro_vidsutnist_dopomogi&objectId=1277536).

Other officials simply blame the parliamentary opposition for the lack of progress on meeting EU requests. Thus Cabinet and Regions Party member Olena Lukash stated that five projects have been submitted to parliament, dealing with improvement in laws to combat corruption, and increasing penalties for corruption offenses. The president has submitted two bills dealing with the ratification of the UN protocol against the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms. She hopes therefore that the opposition will provide its support for the adoption of European laws and confirm its choice of European integration (http://www.day.kiev.ua/uk/news/090213-v-uryadi-zapevnyayut-shcho-pracyuyut-na-ievrointegraciyu). The opposition in turn has blocked the parliamentary tribune in an effort to demand individual voting of each deputy (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/8/6983114/), ending the practice of multiple voting through the voting cards of absent MPs. On February 20, however, it supported the Parliament’s draft statement on implementing Ukraine’s goals for integration with Europe and signing of the Association Agreement.

The subplot behind these issues is the continuing detention of Tymoshenko and Lutsenko cited above, and the recent introduction of new criminal charges against the former for the murder of former parliamentary deputy Evhen Shcherban in 1996, together with the then Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko, who is still under house arrest in the United States serving a sentence for money laundering. One possibility widely discussed is that Yanukovych could conceivably pardon Lutsenko, a secondary figure who would be unlikely to pose a political challenge, if he received such a request. The former minister has been diagnosed with cirrhosis of the liver and portal hypertension, and political analyst Volodymyr Fesenko surmised that his release could happen prior to the EU-Ukraine summit on February 25. Lutsenko’s wife, however, thought that her husband would not request such a pardon, which would imply an acknowledgement of guilt (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?yanukovich_ukazom_mozhe_zvilniti_lutsenka__nardep&objectId=1277817). But without any such concessions, it seems inconceivable that the Europeans would be very welcoming toward the Ukrainian leaders in Brussels.

The irony of these complex discussions and internal wrangling is that even a leader as out of touch with the world around him as Yanukovych, and his trusted aide Azarov, would not have to do much to assuage the anger emanating from some capitals of Europe. The early release of Lutsenko, with or without a pardon, would cost the president nothing, but would be perceived as a positive step from the EU’s perspective. Moreover, the oligarchs within and outside the Regions Party have little to gain from Ukraine being drawn into the Customs Union, which would curtail their control over a lucrative part of the domestic economy as well as reducing Ukraine’s political independence. At times the president does appear to perceive where future policy should lie. All too often he appears simply to be unaware of the limitations of his position, which unfortunately affects not only to his administration, but the Ukrainian state, which has a limited number of options. Despite the growing authoritarianism and corruption of his government and in the country at large, Yanukovych has an opportunity to move closer to the EU. It is one that requires decisive and prompt action.

IS UKRAINE LEAVING THE EUROPEAN ENERGY COMMUNITY?

David Marples

As Ukraine’s relationship with the EU continues to flounder over human rights issues, the imprisonment of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and the lengthy detention of former Interior Minister Yuri Lutsenko, there are signs that the government is prepared to flout existing laws to gain closer association with Gazprom and the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The consequences could be not only the loss of links with the European Energy Community (hereafter EEC) but also the undermining of sovereignty.

On December 4, Russia’s Ambassador to Ukraine Mikhail Zurabov announced that the new gas agreement between the two states would have the status of an international agreement, rather than a business arrangement between the two responsible companies, Gazprom and Naftohaz. Russia is evidently responding to the EU’s plans for closer integration with Ukraine and greater transparency in the transit of gas from Russia to Western Europe. Analyst Maksim Alinov comments that the results of the inter-state agreement proposed by the Russian ambassador would override current Ukrainian laws, which make it illegal to transfer Ukraine’s transit system to Russian control—a similar sale to Gazprom occurred recently in Belarus. Alinov also believes that the flouting of the agreement in place would also give Russia significant influence over the internal economic and political situation in Ukraine (Zerkalo Nedeli, Dec 9).

Another analyst, Maksim Honchar, goes further, maintaining that Kyiv’s apparent reversal of policy on the EEC would violate the July 1, 2010 law “Concerning the main principles of domestic and foreign policy,” Article 7 of which stipulates that Ukraine’s oil, gas, and electricity networks should be operating according to EU rules. In his view this indicates a willingness to surrender national interests, which would be an even more serious threat to Ukraine’s pro-European policy than the imprisonment of Tymoshenko. It would also strengthen considerably the position of Gazprom, a monopolist enterprise that seeks to deploy energy as an instrument of political control. Ukraine would acquire cheap gas but gradually lose its sovereignty, rendering the Association Agreement with the EU obsolete and leading to the next stage, which would be a defensive alliance with Russia (Zerkalo Nedeli, Dec 9).

The EU meanwhile continues to demand the release of Tymoshenko as a prequel to the initializing of the Association Agreement, though with diminishing hopes and growing frustration. Wilfred Martens, President of the European People’s Party, stated that Ukraine, like Poland, could be an important EU player, and that without its addition the EU project could not be complete. However, as a prerequisite to the start of the process leading to the Agreement, the Party of Regions must release Tymoshenko, Lutsenko, and other political prisoners (UN IAN, Dec 7). However, Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Hryshchenko demurred, stating that Tymoshenko could not be used as a bargaining chip in trade relations and that her situation was a matter for the Ukrainian Judiciary. To discuss the issue in this way, he added, would be tantamount to indicating that the latter is not an independent body (UNIAN, Dec 7).

Although the ruling group of Ukraine faces several serious economic dilemmas and recently rejected for a second time the IMF’s demand to raise energy prices, it does not seem to be facing a serious threat from the opposition. Indeed, the political situation seems relatively unaffected by the Tymoshenko saga. Analyst Kost Bondarenko maintains that the population has lost interest in the struggle between Tymoshenko and the ruling elite, while Vadim Karasev considers that the apparent lack of public sympathy for Tymoshenko reflects the general perception of her as a former representative of the political establishment (Segodnya, Dec 7, and ff.). In general therefore that is a positive sign for the authorities and a signal that the arrest of Tymoshenko has not affected ratings for the president and the Regions Party.

The latter seems to be calculating each step in cynical fashion, taking action and then monitoring the response. Karasev also notes that the leadership thinks the release of Tymoshenko would be seen as a sign of weakness. Also the Ukrainian leaders are watching closely political events in Russia, where the rise of oppositional activities could have a domino effect in Ukraine. Various polls denote that Yanukovych remains the leading individual politician with ratings between 17.4 and 20.7%, whereas the ratings of Tymoshenko, the only serious contender, range from 13 to 14.1% (polls by KMIS, Social Monitoring, “Rating,” and Sotsis). Yatsenyuk in third place has, at most, 9.9% support. In short, there is no longer a serious contender from the opposition as with Tymoshenko out of the picture.

The ruling group may also consider that in the year 2011 it could have expected to see its popularity drop because of the introduction of unpopular measures such as pension and taxation codes, whereas the new year may bring better fortunes, not least through the hosting of the popular soccer competition, Euro-2012. Perhaps of more importance is the evident tolerance of the EU for the abuses of power in Kyiv, in contrast to the sanctions it has applied in Belarus. Ukraine has moved rapidly from one of the most democratic of post-Soviet states to a position well down the scale. At the same time the corruption that has long pervaded the Ukrainian economy has not diminished.

Adding to the contentedness of the ruling group in Ukraine, the United States is preoccupied with other issues and unlikely to engage with Ukraine at the highest level until after the 2012 presidential election, according to former US ambassador to Ukraine, Steven Pifer (http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2011/1208_ukraine_pifer.aspx?p=1). Thus Yanukovych and the Regions have in effect carte blanche to continue the current path. The EEC agreement appears to have been jettisoned.

However, for the second time since the January 2010 election (the first being the Kharkiv Accords on the Black Sea Fleet), they are posing serious threats to the sovereignty of Ukraine, relinquishing hard-won rights for the immediate prospect of cheap gas and permitting a much more powerful role for Russian agencies like Gazprom to step in and purchase Naftohaz. The next logical stage would be for Ukraine to join the Customs Union (with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus). Only a year ago that would have been unthinkable, but it is now a serious possibility.

Selective Justice

Mykola Riabchuk

A prison cell might be not the best place to spend the New Year and Christmas holidays. But for a good number of top Ukrainian officials, including former Interior Minister Yuri Lutsenko and former Minister of Economy Bohdan Danylyshyn, this was exactly the place where they had to relax and meditate on the whims of fortune. It comes as little surprise that virtually all of them belong to the “Orange” camp that is today’s political opposition. Their leader, the former Prime-Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, was also summoned to the prosecutor’s office but was spared arrest on condition she would not leave the city during the pending investigation.

The tough measures against corrupt Ukrainian officials might be well received, both domestically and internationally insofar as Ukraine is one the most corrupt countries in the world and the least attractive country in Europe for foreign investors. Any cause for cheer, however, soon fades away once we take a closer look at the who, how, and why of the allegedly anti-graft measures.

Who?

The entire Party of Regions can be broadly perceived as a mafia-style organization with tight inner discipline and immeasurable shadow resources. And its power base, the Donbas region, has a well-earned reputation of a local Sicily. Whatever might have been the past of the Party and of this region there are no signs that their present is any different.

The president, Viktor Yanukovych, has never been absolved from the murky privatization of a huge government-owned estate near Kyiv, nor has he managed to cast off a parvenu lust for luxury cars, helicopters, and other overpriced things bought with government money – despite broadly trumpeted austerity measures.

Like master, like servants. His ministers, governors, mayors, and other clerks have no restraint in their love for dolce vita – apparently at the expense of the state. Every day the Internet carries something new about their extravagance, both at home and abroad. The deputy head of the president’s administration wears diamond watches worth $50,000 each and claims candidly that this is just an innocent birthday present from her party comrades, one of which, incidentally, happens to be the Mayor of Kharkiv, and the other a Deputy Prime Minister. Another mayor purchases benches for the city metro at $8,000 each – so that another diamond watch as a gift would certainly not be a problem. The head of DUSia (a Soviet relic that runs multiple facilities and supplies for the ruling nomenklatura) purchased a lawnmower for the MPs hospital at a cost of half a million. One can guess how many lawnmowers he could buy for this money on the free market.

Few care about the fact that the head of the National Security Service runs effectively multiple private businesses; the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of investment and innovation endorses 300 million hryvnia for his own enterprises; the Prime Minister responds favorably to the request of the Orthodox bishop (Moscow Patriarchate) lobbying for trade preferences for some Russian company, and so on. No one is prosecuted, fired, or even reprimanded.

The only rebuke that has occurred to date would make one laugh – or cry, depending on one’s sensitivity. It comes from a conversation between the two ministers recorded secretly by a journalist in the parliament. One of them, Mr. Kliuyev, was in charge of construction of a fast road for the president to his rancho. He naturally used the occasion to stretch the road for a dozen more kilometers to his own estate. Mr. Kolesnikov, his colleague, can be overheard chastising him – but not for the embezzlement of state funds. On the contrary, Mr. Kliuyev’s faux pas was much worse. He failed to extend the super highway for a few more kilometers to Mr Kolesnikov’s dacha nearby.

This probably says enough about the team that is fighting corruption in Ukraine as well as about the ultimate prospects of this fight. Yet, one more actor of this tragicomedy should be mentioned. Viktor Pshonka, the new Prosecutor-General, heralds from Donetsk, as do most top officials. There, reportedly, he made his career under Yanukovych’s governorship, providing a reliable legal service for good people. In 2000, he became notorious as a person who allegedly tried to cover up the brutal murder of investigative journalist Ihor Aleksandrov. A vagrant was found who confessed to the crime but no serious evidence was presented in court, and the poor man was released, only to die shortly afterward under mysterious circumstances. Remarkably, the last case investigated by Ihor Aleksandrov before his death was about alleged connections between Pshonka’s son Artem and local criminal bosses.

Even if these allegations are false, the very way in which Mr Pshonka understands his professional duty and the essence of the judiciary within the power structure leaves little doubt concerning his current and perspective role in Ukraine. In a recent TV discussion, he stated frankly: “As the Prosecutor-General, I am a member of the president’s team [eager] to implement all his decisions.” Enough said.

How and Why?

The answer to this question comes mainly from the answer to the previous one. On the one hand, it is quite clear that the ruling team members, including the president, are not going to refrain in any noticeable way from their deeply rooted habits. On the other, it is also clear that the Ukrainian prosecutor – as a loyal member of this very team – would be neither willing nor able to restrain those habits from the outside.

Political opposition and an independent mass media might be the only obstacles for the ruling team in its drive for uncontrolled accumulation of wealth and power. So, its destruction is a strategic goal for all branches of the government that are fully subordinated now to the president. The more this destruction can be represented as a fight against corruption, the better. The government is effectively killing two birds with one stone. It represses and destroys the opposition on seemingly non-political grounds and, at the same time, it distracts people’s attention from its own misdeeds and even wins some popularity for purportedly reestablishing law and order. The short-term gains of this policy are undeniable. The long-term goals are simply not on the agenda of this band of political leaders.

The selective application of law is the main feature of the system they have built. It is at the heart of the institutionalized blackmail whimsically employed as a tool of state domination. The system was correctly analyzed more than ten years ago by Keith Darden as consisting of three major elements: (1) widespread corruption that is tolerated and even encouraged by the authorities; (2) tight surveillance that enables the authorities to collect compromising materials against everyone and keep each subject on the hook; (3) selective punishment of any politically disloyal subject for seemingly non-political wrongdoings.

Former President Leonid Kuchma had gradually constructed such a model. The Orange Revolution shook the system but failed to dismantle it and replace it with functional democratic institutions based on the rule of law. Hence, the old system did not work because it required the full control of all branches of power by the executive that neither Yushchenko nor Tymoshenko had. Yet, no new system was introduced instead. So, the country became, as a result, virtually unmanageable.

Yanukovych has successfully monopolized power, subordinated all the branches of government, the parliament and judiciary to his office, and reestablished a kind of order. He has made institutions more or less manageable, but this has meant moving back towards Kuchma’s authoritarianism than any step forward towards functioning democracy. Stagnation, backwardness, lawlessness, and rampant corruption are likely to be preserved and entrenched in such an environment. The only conclusion Yanukovych seems to have made from Kuchma’s failure is that the system was not repressive enough. Indeed, Kuchma lost because he had not completely marginalized opposition—as Putin or Lukashenko did—and had not prevented his allies from overt and covert defection to the opposition camp. So, we are likely to witness more clampdowns on opposition and independent media, disguised as a “fight with corruption” and “restoring order” and, of course, “reforms”.

The red line, however, that separates Ukrainian authoritarians from their Russian, Belarusian, and Central Asian counterparts has not yet been crossed. So far, the government in Ukraine, unlike elsewhere in the CIS, can be changed peacefully, in more or less democratic elections. Yanukovych and his associates seem to be rather reluctant to cross that line despite a very strong temptation. Remarkably, all the criminal accusations against their predecessors and political opponents concern some misuse of funds (which was actually typical for all Ukrainian governments, with traditionally low budget discipline), but not their appropriation and personal enrichment. This means that the punishment for these crimes, if they are proven, would be rather mild, with the sentences probably suspended. They may reflect an informal agreement among Ukrainian elites to avoid harsh penalties against their opponents, simply because of a fear that the wheel may turn around and today’s opponents might become tomorrow’s authorities that would implement the same harsh measures against them for the same misdeeds. Not a single Ukrainian top official has been imprisoned over the past two decades, no matter what accusations of theft, embezzlement, and money laundering have been raised.

If we happen to see this informal agreement broken, it would mean that Ukraine has become either a full-fledged democracy based on the rule of law, or a full-fledged authoritarianism with a firmly entrenched repressive regime that would never step down peacefully. The first development under the current regime looks unlikely. The second is possible but still uncertain. The sentences given to Tymoshenko and her associates will probably signal the real political ambitions – and perspicacity – of today’s rulers.

Circus at the Rada

Zenon Zawada
Kyiv Bureau Editor
The Ukrainian Weekly

The latest opposition protest at the Verkhovna Rada, on September 7, resembled a three-ring circus that revealed the increasing radicalization and tension in Ukrainian politics, which appears to be poised for a nasty eruption as predicted by numerous observers.

About 10,000 demonstrators (I estimate about 2,500 pro-government and 7,500 opposition) arrived from throughout Ukraine, despite extensive efforts by the police to prevent the arrival of demonstrators. Any bus companies found to be transporting opposition protestors automatically have their transportation license confiscated. All the dozen or so protestors I spoke with today either arrived by train or their own cars. They all said bus companies declined to transport them.

Only three parties were represented at the protest: Batkivschyna (led by Yulia Tymoshenko), the Svoboda nationalists (led by Oleh Tiahnybok) and the People’s Rukh of Ukraine (Narodnyi Rukh) led by Borys Tarasyuk. Viktor Yushchenko has vanished from the Ukrainian political scene and Our Ukraine is extinct, as well as the orange color, which Ukrainians now associate with the Donetsk Shakhtar soccer team more than anything else.

Previous protests were marred by Svoboda nationalists shouting down more moderate voices, who yelled “Tiah-ny-bok!” even as prominent leaders such as Tymoshenko spoke. It was no different this time around. The protest meeting was marred by hundreds of radicalized Svoboda youths in their 20s attempting to shout down most other speakers, including Borys Tarasyuk and former police chief Yurii Lutsenko.

Lutsenko is not a popular figure in Ukrainian politics, having been among those who most betrayed the Orange ideals. Yet the fact he was shouted down demonstrates the aggressiveness of Svoboda supporters, who didn’t seem to be interested in joining the unification of opposition forces, but causing enmity.

When demonstrators attempted to take away their megaphones, in order to stop them from southing down other speakers, the Svoboda boys shoved and even punched back, continuing to repeat over and over, “Tiah-ny-bok!” Soon enough, their zombie-like fanaticism for Tiahnybok led other demonstrators to accuse them of either being at the protest for money, as paid provocateurs, or intentionally causing division among the opposition forces at the behest of the Party of Regions.

Indeed many Ukrainian patriots suspect that the Svoboda party engages in ethnically and politically motivated provocations and aggressive behavior in order to benefit the Party of Regions. Today’s behavior of the young male supporters, many in their 20s, only contributed to that view.

After the rally, Tiahnybok insisted to those gathered around him (including me) that he didn’t spur his supporters into shouting his name or disrupting the rally. He said they were upset because the demonstration’s organizers, the Committee to Defend Ukraine, denied him an opportunity to speak. However another party leader, Iryna Farion, was allowed to address the crowd, so the behavior of the Svoboda crowd seemed unreasonable.

Additionally, the Svoboda nationalists appeared as if they came to the rally prepared to attack Tymoshenko (and anyone besides their own leaders, for that matter), having arrived with printed placards with slogans that taunted her, such as “Who made (natural) gas serfs out of Ukrainians?”

In her speech, Tymoshenko hammered on the government’s unpopular decisions to increase natural gas prices, increase utility bills by 30 percent, increase the pension age, and increase the Kyiv subway fare (from 22 cents to 25 cents). She also referred to the government as Ukrainophobes, citing its Russification policies.

Farion is among the most radical politicians in Ukraine, so it can as no surprise that she called for “Ukraine for Ukrainians” and ridding the nation of the “animals in government.” She used very loaded language, calling upon the protesters “to shoot them up with their voting ballots” at the October 31 elections and speaking of a “final catharsis” that will soon arrive.

Similar language was used by the Committee to Defend Ukraine chairman Dmytro Pavlychko, who said openly that Ukraine “is headed for an explosion.” That does seem to be the direction of events as such protests draw more supporters. And the Yanukovych administration does seem to be provoking the opposition into a violent confrontation, with its radically pro-Russian cultural policies that denigrate the dignity of ethnically conscious Ukrainians.

It’s apparent the government is even laying the groundwork for such a violent confrontation, which it can use as a pretext to impose a full-scale authoritarianism as evidenced in Belarus and even some form of martial law. If the opposition enters into an “explosion,” as Mr. Pavlychko suggested, then it better plan the right strategy to ensure that it emerges as the winner, not the defeated.

The techniques used by the government to deal with the opposition are getting fiercer. While earlier allowing protestors to line up along Hrushevskoho Street on the side opposite of the parliament building, this time they weren’t allowed to walk along the street at all. Once again, the government surrounded the parliament building with thousands of Party of Regions supporters, who were comfortably shielded by metal barricades and hundreds of police. Their fanaticism and bizarre behavior is accelerating as fast as the radicalization of the opposition, which was forced to hold its meeting at the Mariyinskiy Palace, adjacent to the parliament building.

It came as no surprise to see more than a thousand Russian Orthodox radicals marching in columns around the parliament building, holding icons and wooden crosses and singing Church Slavonic hymns. This has been a common sight at the barricades that have surrounded the parliament at protests since Yanukovych came to power.

I should note that never was religion integrated into political activity to such an extent as the Yanukovych administration is currently exploiting it. The Orange forces never invoked religion during their reign in the government or their role in the opposition. This leads to the conclusion that the Party of Regions is truly fearful of the opposition and has resorted to extreme measures to extend their grip on power, such as manipulating the Orthodox devoted into defending their authoritarian rule.

It shocked me to see hundreds of Party of Regions supporters participating in a Orthodox moleben ceremony led by Orthodox priests within their barricaded fortress, directly in front of the parliament building just as the opposition was meeting. I had never seen such a direct infusion of religion in politics, which has very dangerous potential because it introduces a new irrational element to the conflict. Politics is supposed to offer rational, compromised solutions to disputes. Religion is irrational and therefore can lead people to do highly irrational things.

The scene inside the parliament was just as bizarre as abut a dozen deputies of the Tymoshenko Bloc led a blockade of the podium. Yet the pro-Russian coalition was voting on and approving legislation during this “blockade,” rendering it wholly ineffective and largely a ploy for television cameras.

The most hopeful sign is that the opposition forces are swelling and gaining support among the population. Today’s anti-government protest was the largest since the Yanukovych administration took power.

Yet it was very disheartening to see the opposition forces so divided. (What else is new?) It seems as though Ukrainians are incapable of uniting, no matter how compelling the conditions might be. While I once reserved sympathy and admiration for the Svoboda nationalists and their fierce devotion to the Ukrainian cause, I lost much sympathy and respect for them after today’s protest. They demonstrated such unconstructive narrow-mindedness and hostility towards the other opposition parties that I’m starting to believe they’re more of a hindrance than a benefit to the Ukrainian cause. Their radical positions on many issues aren’t capable of unifying the country, and play into the hands of the Party of Regions in reinforcing the Soviet stereotype of western Ukrainians as “fascist,” hostile, intolerant and dangerous.

The consensus is that Yanukovych and the Party of Regions are seeking the same authority in Ukraine that Putin enjoys in Russia and Lukashenko in Belarus. They will tighten the screws of their authoritarian rule following the October 31 elections, which will no doubt be falsified and rigged in many cities. The amended election law approved on August 30 only enhances the government’s ability to falsify the vote, as detailed in The Ukrainian Weekly last week.

The latest episode in the Yanukovych nightmare is the September 7 announcement by Yevhen Bystrytskyi, the executive director of the Renaissance Foundation in Ukraine, that the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) is reviewing its work in Kyiv. While George Soros is no angel and no one to be admired, the Renaissance Foundation offers much support to many of Ukraine’s democracy-building institutions. As we recall, Vladimir Putin supported legislation in the Russian Duma in 2006 limiting the ability of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to operate in Russia. No doubt, Yanukovych would also like to restrict the presence western NGOs which offer financial support to organizations committed to democracy-building and Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration. The Renaissance projects targeted by the SBU so far are not political, yet it’s clearly the strategy of the current government to slowly and gradually eliminate the Western presence. If the Renaissance Fund is strangled, so go many Ukrainian NGOs.

The election campaign in Ukraine is already underway

Ukraine takes a decisive step closer to parliamentary elections after 155 Verkhovna Rada deputies surrender their mandates.

By Ilya Khineyko

On June 15 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the 5th session ceased to exist. By the morning of that day, 151 deputies from Our Ukraine and the Tymoshenko bloc had submitted their resignation papers to Oleksandr Moroz, bringing the total number of parliamentarians below the necessary quorum of 300. Later that same day, four more resignations were announced.
The de-facto dissolution of the Verkhovna Rada was carried out through the resignations of opposition deputies in accordance with the May 27 agreement of the Big Three, which ended the two-months-long political crisis in Ukraine. It happened in spite of the obstructionist maneuvers on the part of Oleksandr Moroz, who stands to lose most from the dissolution of the current parliament. Also, many rank-and-file opposition deputies were extremely reluctant to relinquish their mandates. As Ukrains’ka Pravda reports, before the resignations list was read out loud at the Verkhovna Rada session, “many MPs [had] asked not to have their names put in the top ten of the list because in the event that dissolution of parliament fails they would never have a chance to return to the Verkhovna Rada.”