The Viktors Go to Brussels

David Marples and Myroslava Uniat

After the February 25 16^th EU-Ukraine summit in Brussels, Ukraine’s chances of signing an Association Agreement later this year in Vilnius appeared as uncertain as they were before the meeting. What is lacking is a single unequivocal statement from President Viktor Yanukovych that he is prepared to meet the EU halfway and agree to the preconditions that have been outlined and reiterated numerous times by various leaders of Brussels. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s relations with the Russian-led Customs Union seem equally as ambivalent, but continue in parallel form in the background.

The Europeans have made it plain that the continuing imprisonment of opposition politicians Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuri Lutsenko is part of the equation. If the EU has compromised, then it may be on the issue of the former. While Brussels-based politicians condemn the escalation of the charges against Ukraine’s former Prime Minister, there is less emphasis today than hitherto that the release of Ms Tymoshenko is an essential prerequisite for the signing of the agreement. Regarding Lutsenko, on the other hand, the situation is simply confusing. Evhen Balitskiy, a deputy from the Regions Party, speaking on Ukraine’s Channel 5 on February 21, stated firmly that the two detained figures would be released only when they had completed their sentences, and that Ukraine would not cave into outside pressure for an early end to their confinement (http://www.unian.net/news/554646-regional-otpuskat-timoshenko-i-lutsenko-ranshe-sroka-nikto-ne-sobiraetsya.html).

Another report of February 23 suggested that Yanukovych was indeed willing to compromise on both cases, but without setting a time frame (http://www.unian.net/news/555201-ukrainskiy-interes-anketa-evrointegratsii-i-ansambl-dlya-igryi-na-trube.html). Lutsenko’s wife expressed her view that the president had paid close attention to issues dealing with her husband and that his detention was a political matter, i.e. that he had been imprisoned for criticizing the government (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/22/6984173 ). Just three days later, a report from the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, maintained that after his meeting with the presidents of Poland and Slovakia, Yanukovych had promised to release Lutsenko in order to demonstrate Ukraine’s commitment to joining Europe. But the press service of the Polish president Bronislaw Kororowski would neither deny nor confirm the statement (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/25/6984254/).

Meanwhile EU politicians were expressing optimism both before and after the Brussels summit. European Commission president Jose Manuel Barroso enunciated his vision of Ukraine as future member of the European Union and expressed his faith that Ukraine has a European future. The effort to get an Association Agreement signed in November at the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius was endorsed not only by Barroso, but also by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton, and European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy Stefan Fule. They did add the proviso, however, that Ukraine should resolve the issue of “selective justice” and remove “deficiencies” in the conducting of parliamentary elections (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?kerivnitstvo_yes_hoche_shhob_ukrayina_stala_chlenom_yevrosoyuzu&objectId=1279188).

There was, however, another familiar Ukrainian visitor in the Belgian capital. Prior to the summit, at an evening meeting with Barroso that lasted over an hour, former president Viktor Yushchenko commented that the Tymoshenko case should not hold up proceedings (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?yushhenko_pered_samitom_govoriv_z_barrozu_pro_ukrayinu_i_timoshenko__zmi&objectId=1278974). The future of the Ukrainian state, stated Yushchenko, should not be a hostage of the “Tymoshenko affair.” Whether the Europeans still perceive Yushchenko as a credible authority is a moot point. The former president has rarely missed an opportunity to denounce his former Prime Minister, whose lengthy jail sentence was due in part to his testimony, and he appears content to serve the Regions government in his new role as an informal negotiator.

The delayed visit of Yanukovych to Moscow, on the other hand, finally took place on March 4, following its postponement last December. The main topics on the agenda were cooperation in energy, trade, and the economic sphere, particularly the conditions on which Ukraine might join the Customs Union. In addition Yanukovych returned to an old conundrum of the Kuchma era, namely the notion that there could be a joint Ukrainian-Russian venture to rent out Ukraine’s gas transportation system (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?yanukovich_u_rosiyi_zaproponuye_stvoriti_spilne_pidpriyemstvo__taran&objectId=1279284; http://www.rferl.org/content/putin-yanukovych-moscow/24918397.html ). Russia, however, is insisting that Ukraine recognize the validity of previous agreements, which include not only the unfortunate 2009 deal on gas prices negotiated by Tymoshenko, but also cooperation and progress toward the integration of the Russian and Ukrainian nuclear industries in accordance with the July 12, 2012 memorandum signed in Yalta. One possible component of this agreement is joint construction of units 3 and 4 of the VVER nuclear power station at Khmelnyts’kyi (http://www.unian.net/news/556804-yanukovich-i-putin-pogovoryat-o-gaze.html ).

 In April 2011 Yanukovych suggested that Ukraine might join the Customs Union in a 3+1 format precluding its full integration. That notion received qualifiede support from Regions deputy and Deputy Prime Minister Serhiy Tihipko, a former chair of the National Bank of Ukraine. Tihipko observed that Ukraine’s entry into the Customs Union has been under negotiation since 2010 and that the proposed treaty details are about 1,000 pages in length. Good progress has been made in his view. But neither side has started to work seriously on the 3+1 idea, an approach that he would not reject. Still, the EU market is seven times larger, which renders it more interesting for the Ukrainian economy (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/22/6984174 ). Implicitly therefore the Customs Union is a viable back-up plan should negotiations with Brussels result in failure.

 If, as seems plausible, Yanukovych is using talks with Russia to persuade Brussels to void the various conditions for signing the Associaton Agreement, he is demonstrating remarkable political naivety. The outcome could be the failure of the November meeting with the EU and equally unfruitful negotiations with Russia, which has considerable sway over the immediate future of Ukrainian energy policy in several of its major spheres, but especially oil, gas, and nuclear power. Andrew Wilson of the European Council of Foreign Relations commented that if the president was a wise man, then he would at least agree to release Lutsenko, but [he] «is not wise» (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?yes_pidpisav_bi_ugodu_pro_asotsiatsiyu_navit_z_timoshenko_v_tyurmi__ekspert&objectId=1278880 ). Valery Chaliy of the Kyiv-based Razumkov Center maintains that the chances of the Association Agreement being signed are no better than 20%. And Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt declared that «To put it mildly, the current signs of progress in Ukraine are quite limited» (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?imovirnist_pidpisannya_ugodi_pro_asotsiatsiyu_z_yes__20__ekspert&objectId=1278849).

 The EU has no doubt taken into consideration the overwhelming support for Ukraine’s European aspirations in the Ukrainian Parliament and the fact that even the government, despite its vacillations and the lack of firm directions at the level of the presidency, is generally in favor. It should take note, however, that negotiations on the side of Kyiv are not taking place with sincerity or even an evident willingness to compromise. All too often the vindictiveness toward former enemies and fear of retribution at some future date for more conciliatory policies, particularly in dealing with the Tymoshenko and Lutsenko cases, mean that at best, the Europeans will see no more than sluggish and very reluctant steps to comply with even modest requests. As Wilson has noted, however, a failure in November could seriously undermine the very existence of the Eastern Partnership. Ukraine might then have no immediate options other than the Customs Union, either in the so-called 3+1 formation or deeper integration on terms emanating from Moscow.

UKRAINE: AN UNSEEN IMBROGLIO?

David Marples and Myroslava Uniat

The administration of President Viktor Yanukovych and Prime Minister Mykola Azarov appears to be in confusion. On the one hand it faces a large bill from Russia’s Gazprom for portions of unused gas, along with intense pressure from the Russian government to join the Customs Union. On the other, it awaits a significant summit with the EU in Brussels on February 25 to discuss an Association Agreement, a prelude to its potential signing at the EU Eastern Partnership in November in Vilnius, without first meeting preconditions requested by the Europeans. In fact the president seems blandly oblivious of the tightrope he is walking, assuming that in the world of realpolitik, it is Ukraine rather than Brussels that holds most of the cards. The Ukrainian leader’s logic is that the Kyiv government can operate between the EU and Russia, which are also limited in their bargaining power: Russia, because it needs Ukraine to make the Union work, and the EU because by isolating Ukraine, it would push that country firmly into the Russian orbit. He has witnessed similar maneuvers by the president of Belarus, after all, who has survived largely unscathed to date and remained in power for almost two decades.

In reality, however, Ukraine’s position seems much weaker than the Yanukovych-Azarov team imagines or acknowledges. Russian pressure is constant. The former deputy of United Russia, Sergey Makarov, commented that if Ukraine joined the Russian-led Customs Union—it currently comprises Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan has expressed a wish to join—then the $7.09 billion fine for unused gas will simply be waived. Joining would also mean more chances that gas prices would be reduced (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/8/6983116/). In brief: join us and your troubles are over! Understandably, the Ukrainian side baulks at Gazprom’s demand, partly because it has denounced the 2009 agreement, signed between former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and then Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in 2009, which failed to anticipate the fall of gas prices and committed Ukraine to paying for the full amount of imported gas, whether or not it was actually needed. Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Yuri Boyko met with Chairman of the Gazprom Board Aleksey Miller in early February and stated that he did not think it appropriate for Ukraine to pay such a sum (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/8/6983148/).

Meanwhile, the Regions Party has not responded to a variety of requests from the Europeans to fulfill what are seen as essentially minimal requirements for the signing of the Association Agreement in November. The Dutch Ambassador to Ukraine, Pieter Jan Wolthers, has commented that there is no guarantee that the Association Agreement will be signed because all depends on the Ukrainian side meeting the terms, which include dealing with the issue of selective justice (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/9/6983182/). Likewise, Lithuanian president Dalia Grybauskaite, whose country takes over the presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of this year, informed Yanukovych during his working visit to Lithuania on February 6, that she believes the imprisonment of two former opposition leaders, Tymoshenko and former Interior Minister Yuri Lutsenko, to be politically motivated. She also took Yanukovych to task over the Customs Union, pointing out to him that the simultaneous signing of agreements with the EU and the Customs Union was impossible, because the two contradict each other (http://postup.brama.com/usual.php?what=75559). Therefore it is necessary for Ukraine to choose one or the other. British analyst Andrew Wilson posits that Yanukovych is ignorant of how the EU works, believing that the crucial matter is a balance of power and that the EU’s concern for Tymoshenko is ritualistic. Wilson’s view is that Yanukovych expects at some point that the EU will simply stop making demands and sign the Association Agreement, whereas in reality Ukraine is becoming isolated (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?u_yes_rozdratovani_nevikonanimi_obitsyankami_yanukovicha&objectId=1278035 accessed Feb 17).

For his part, Yanukovych is defending himself and casting stones simultaneously. First of all, he informed European Commissioner Stefan Fule on February 7, his Regions Party has already introduced draft proposals to meet some of the EU’s demands starting in 2010. They are somewhat delayed because he has to deal with officials and politicians “who are used to living in the old way” (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/8/6983134/). He responded to Grybauskaite that Ukraine could not ignore the fact that trade with the members of the Customs Union currently amounts to more than $60 billion, and therefore he supports “simultaneous cooperation” with the EU and the Customs Union. He also blamed the EU Energy Community, which Ukraine joined in 2010, for its failure to intervene to defend Ukraine when Russia made the demand for $7.09 billion for gas, a comment to which director of the Community Secretariat Janez Kopač responded with surprise, noting that Ukraine has to date never requested such assistance (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?u_yees_zdivovani_zakidami_yanukovicha_pro_vidsutnist_dopomogi&objectId=1277536).

Other officials simply blame the parliamentary opposition for the lack of progress on meeting EU requests. Thus Cabinet and Regions Party member Olena Lukash stated that five projects have been submitted to parliament, dealing with improvement in laws to combat corruption, and increasing penalties for corruption offenses. The president has submitted two bills dealing with the ratification of the UN protocol against the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms. She hopes therefore that the opposition will provide its support for the adoption of European laws and confirm its choice of European integration (http://www.day.kiev.ua/uk/news/090213-v-uryadi-zapevnyayut-shcho-pracyuyut-na-ievrointegraciyu). The opposition in turn has blocked the parliamentary tribune in an effort to demand individual voting of each deputy (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/8/6983114/), ending the practice of multiple voting through the voting cards of absent MPs. On February 20, however, it supported the Parliament’s draft statement on implementing Ukraine’s goals for integration with Europe and signing of the Association Agreement.

The subplot behind these issues is the continuing detention of Tymoshenko and Lutsenko cited above, and the recent introduction of new criminal charges against the former for the murder of former parliamentary deputy Evhen Shcherban in 1996, together with the then Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko, who is still under house arrest in the United States serving a sentence for money laundering. One possibility widely discussed is that Yanukovych could conceivably pardon Lutsenko, a secondary figure who would be unlikely to pose a political challenge, if he received such a request. The former minister has been diagnosed with cirrhosis of the liver and portal hypertension, and political analyst Volodymyr Fesenko surmised that his release could happen prior to the EU-Ukraine summit on February 25. Lutsenko’s wife, however, thought that her husband would not request such a pardon, which would imply an acknowledgement of guilt (http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?yanukovich_ukazom_mozhe_zvilniti_lutsenka__nardep&objectId=1277817). But without any such concessions, it seems inconceivable that the Europeans would be very welcoming toward the Ukrainian leaders in Brussels.

The irony of these complex discussions and internal wrangling is that even a leader as out of touch with the world around him as Yanukovych, and his trusted aide Azarov, would not have to do much to assuage the anger emanating from some capitals of Europe. The early release of Lutsenko, with or without a pardon, would cost the president nothing, but would be perceived as a positive step from the EU’s perspective. Moreover, the oligarchs within and outside the Regions Party have little to gain from Ukraine being drawn into the Customs Union, which would curtail their control over a lucrative part of the domestic economy as well as reducing Ukraine’s political independence. At times the president does appear to perceive where future policy should lie. All too often he appears simply to be unaware of the limitations of his position, which unfortunately affects not only to his administration, but the Ukrainian state, which has a limited number of options. Despite the growing authoritarianism and corruption of his government and in the country at large, Yanukovych has an opportunity to move closer to the EU. It is one that requires decisive and prompt action.

Moving West is ‘Lesser Evil’ for Ukraine

David Marples

On March 30, the EU and Ukraine initialed the text of a new agreement that includes a “deep and comprehensive free trade area.” Is Ukraine now moving irrevocably westward?

Of late, one finds many apocalyptic accounts about Ukraine: rampant corruption, likelihood of default on foreign loans, crackdowns on former leaders of the Orange administration such as Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuri Lutsenko, the manipulation of elections, and falling popularity for the ruling Regions Party and its president Viktor Yanukovych.

All these factors exist in part or fully, but the crucial question for Ukraine concerns foreign policy: does it move to the EU or become part of the Russian orbit? In the background to this debate is the key component of energy, and specifically payments for Russian gas and oil and whether Ukraine can come up with alternative strategies to its dependence on Moscow.

Evgeny Kurmashov, director of political programs at the Gorshenin Institute, surmises that in his third term Russia president Vladimir Putin will try to increase Russia’s political influence in neighboring states and integrate them into the Russian geopolitical sphere. The various means—the Customs Union, Eurasian Union, gas transit consortium, and CIS free trade zone—are all part of the same Kremlin puzzle.

Generally Ukrainian residents are reticent about a free trade agreement with Russia. A poll conducted among members of the parliament in March indicates that 45.4% of MPs oppose it, and only 21% support it without reservations. Analyst Yuri Matsiyevsky has observed that the reintegration of Ukraine into the post-Soviet space will block Ukraine’s move toward the EU. Yet Yanukovych continues to negotiate with the EU because, according to Matsiyevsky, the degree of antagonism toward it in eastern and southern regions is lower than the degree of rejection of cooperation with Russia in Western Ukraine. It is the “lesser evil” in other words.

Other reasons for a move to Brussels are evident. President Yanukovych and his government are seeking ways to avoid complying with the gas agreement signed by former Prime Minister Tymoshenko and Putin in early 2009 whereby Ukraine agreed to pay a base rate of $450 per thousand cubic meters, well above today’s world price. But the alternatives are problematic.

The exploration of shale gas in southern Ukraine is still being explored—it is prohibitively expensive to produce—but the most far-fetched scheme is one to re-export Russian gas from Germany to Ukraine through an agreement between Ukraine’s Naftohaz and the German company RWE, based in Essen.

Also, the attempt to replace Russian supplies of gas with those from Turkmenistan, following high-level talks between Ukraine and the Central Asian country, is premature. Until the completion of the Trans-Caspian pipeline, Turkmen gas can only reach Ukraine through Russia, thus supplies could be affected at any time.

Still, Ukraine is leaning toward the West, whatever the difficulties involved.

Its economic power structure essentially now comprises three main groups that have managed to prevent serious intrusions from Russian businessmen: these are influential Regions members Rinat Ahmetov and Borys Kolesnikov who control the metallurgy industry; the Rosukrenergo company, headed by Dmytro Firtash; and members of Yanukovych’s own family and friends, who are growing markedly in influence.

What these power bases have in common is a desire to trade with the EU and to avoid as far as possible economic takeovers by Russian oligarchs.

As for the Europeans, they have slowly brought Ukraine into the fold. In 2005, the EU and Ukraine signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Energy Cooperation that included an Action Plan. On 1 February 2011, Ukraine joined the Energy Community, and Ukraine has taken steps to improve the safety of its nuclear plants (especially in the wake of the Fukushima disaster), to integrate electricity and gas markets, and to improve safety and restructure the Ukrainian coal industry, which has been in decline since the 1980s.

Yet Ukraine is proving an awkward partner. The initialing of the association agreement was delayed because of the EU’s concern about the treatment of Tymoshenko. Ukraine, in short, has been behaving like Belarus, though thus far the EU has refrained from imposing sanctions.

Brussels is also concerned about the astounding scale of corruption in Ukraine, which has darkened a once promising economic outlook. Essentially the government is appeasing the population with higher wages and pensions while depleting foreign currency reserves and coming up with wild solutions to pay off enormous debts—around $15 billion to Russian and European banks, as well as the IMF—and to keep its domestic currency afloat.

A recent report from Kyiv by Zenon Zawada notes Prime Minister Mykola Azarov’s announcement on March 12 that he intended to pay back debt to the IMF by requesting another loan from the same agency—a comment later retracted, but revealing nevertheless of the far-fetched economic policies.

In these circumstances, the EU partner grows increasingly frustrated and the Russian side more hopeful; while the oligarchic clans are preoccupied with their internal struggle, a classic case of fiddling while Rome—in this case Kyiv—burns.

This article was first published in the Edmonton Journal, 31 March 2012.

Under Western Eyes

Mykola Riabchuk

Ironically, the annual EU-Ukraine summit held in Kyiv on December 19 overshadowed all other political events in Ukraine over the past few weeks, even though its actual results were close to zero. Moreover, the meager results had been rather predictable since the Ukrainian government had not indicated any intention to ease its multifaceted pressure on civil society, nor had the EU looked ready to condone Kyiv’s increasingly authoritarian behavior.

Yet, the drama under the title “Ukraine–EU Association Agreement” had been played for so long and by so many actors, that most of the viewers could not merely give it up. Some expected a miracle, but many more simply watched the ship sinking, taking down with it sheaves of toughly negotiated documents.

Still, the Ukrainian crew looked surprisingly cheerful and the foreign guests apparently unworried. Unlike the viewers, all the participants of the performance had got what they wished. Ukraine’s friends like Poland or Sweden left the door open, i.e., the Agreement negotiations pending, albeit at the lowest speed possible and with the slimmest chance of being completed in any form in the foreseeable future. Ukraine’s opponents, like France and Germany, got a plausible excuse not to initial the Agreement they had not wanted to sign anyway. And the Ukrainian president got one more opportunity for publicity photographs with the EU Big Bosses and could display them ad nauseam on all the loyalist TV channels and newspapers. Now, he can continue his “European” rhetoric with even greater confidence.

Very few people believe in this rhetoric but this is of little importance. The main goal of president’s talks is not to bring Ukraine closer to the EU, but rather to prevent his own and his cronies’ expulsion from this prestigious club. Most of them, on a personal level, integrated into the EU long ago, with their families, businesses, bank accounts, and all the daily habits like shopping, holidaying, or health and relaxation. They may dupe Moscow, Brussels, and their own electorate with ideas of a Russian-led Customs Union, Single Economic Space, or Eurasian integration. This is for fools’ consumption—for ‘lokhi’, as they say. But for the real men, the “krutye patsany,” as they define themselves, there is a much better place called “Europe.” And they have already joined it—with no action plans and association agreements, merely with some stolen assets, laundered money, and diplomatic passports that allow them, unlike common Ukrainian “lokhi,” to enter the Schengen fortress without visas.

“Lokhi’,” i.e. Ukrainian society, seems to be the only loser in this whimsical game between the Ukrainian government and EU bureaucracy. Half-measures and general incoherence badly hamper EU policies everywhere, not only in Ukraine. On the one hand, the EU was right to postpone the initialing of the Agreement for some technical reasons, and to condition its signing and eventual ratification with clear demands for restoration of democratic practices in Ukraine. On the other hand, this reasonable decision was not buttressed by a set of additional sticks and carrots. EU politicians seem to believe that the Association Agreement per se is a sufficient bonus for the Ukrainian leaders to strive toward. This might have been true if Mr Yanukovych et al cared a little about something they barely understand: the national interest. This is hardly the case, however. Therefore, a tougher approach is needed, something the feckless EU fails to apply even against bloody dictators from Central Asia.

Such an approach was clearly outlined by Andrew Wilson, a leading expert on Ukrainian affairs, in his policy memo for the European Council on Foreign Relations. He suggested the EU leaders adopt a twin-track approach: “The agreements cannot be formally signed, but should be kept alive until Ukraine is ready to implement the conditionality laid out in resolutions by the European Parliament and other bodies. But lecturing Ukraine on human rights at the summit will have little effect. The EU should also move towards sanctions that show its red lines have not been dropped; targeting the individuals most responsible for democratic backsliding and signaling more general vigilance against the Ukrainian elite’s free-flowing travel and financial privileges in the EU” http://www.ecfr.eu/page//UkraineMemo.pdf .

Since the EU has been reluctant to introduce any serious sanctions against the post-Soviet autocrats, especially in resource-rich countries like Russia, Kazakhstan, or Azerbaijan, their Ukrainian twins have very little to worry about. In December, Yanukovych and his Party of Regions continued their Gleichschaltung in both political life and the economy. First, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine approved (what a surprise!) the decision of the parliament that allows the government to pay social benefits to various categories of people at its whim—even though in past years the Court, not yet staffed with the president’s loyalists, twice rejected similar claims as a violation of the national constitution http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2011/12/27/6870668 . Second, the government of Crimea ceded 9,000 hectares of valuable land to a murky hunters’ society registered to three pals of the president http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2011/12/26/6868443/. Third, the President’s 38-year-old son acquired a few more industrial assets and entered the lists of Ukraine’s top hundred richest men http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38740. Fourth, the President’s friend and sponsor Rinat Akhmetov received a concession for the virtually monopolistic export of electricity http://www.epravda.com.ua/publications/2011/12/15/309807/, just as another friend and sponsor of the president, Yuri Ivanyushchenko, allegedly acquired a monopoly over the export of grain a few months ago http://lb.ua/news/2011/03/28/90044_Yura_Yenakiivskiy_stav_generalom.html. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has been completely emasculated and de facto subordinated to the presidential administration, under the pretext of the so-called judicial reform http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/119708/. And another band of “professionals” from Donbas has occupied several dozen top governmental positions in both Kyiv and other regions of Ukraine http://gazeta.ua/articles/politics-newspaper/_yanukovich-priznachae-na-posadi-lyudej-yakih-znayut-jogo-diti/409143.

Once again, Ukraine was downgraded in 2011 by various international agencies in terms of democracy, civil rights, freedom of speech, corruption, inequality and injustice, conditions for doing business, etc. This might be a part of a global anti-Yanukovych conspiracy, as his propagandists suggest, but domestic opinion surveys confirm the same tendencies. In May, a revealing poll was carried out nationwide by the reputable Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences. The respondents were asked how, in their opinion, the situation had changed in various social fields within the past few months. The answers (below) shed some light on the essence of Yanukovych’s “reforms” that arguably required some curbs on civic freedoms and democratic institutions:
Changed
for worse Not
changed Changed
for better
Economic situation in Ukraine in general 58.1 37.1 4.8
Level [standards?] of living 68.4 29.4 2.4
Level of corruption 37.2 59.8 3.0
Level of democracy in the country 33.1 63.9 3.0
Protection from authorities’ arbitrariness 36.1 61.4 2.5
Job guarantees and possibilities of employment 51.6 46.6 1.8
Source: Krytyka, 15:7-8 (2011), 6.

On December 21, at the annual Putin-style president’s press-conference, Mustafa Nayem from the news portal “Ukrainska Pravda” dared to put to Yanukovych the question that perplexes virtually all Ukrainians: “Viktor Fedorovych, you mentioned many times that the economic situation in the country is bad, people do not feel any improvements in their life, there are no money in state coffins for the victims of Chornobyl, or veterans of Afghanistan… At the same, we observe every day how your personal life is improving. We see how you rent a helicopter at $1 million [a year] from the company controlled by your son http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2011/07/20/6405659/. We know that in Mezhyhirya [Yanukovych’s 140-hectare estate near Kyiv, controversially privatized http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2011/11/16/6760109/%5D the construction work is continued by the companies controlled by your son. What is the secret of your success – why is everything so bad for the country and so good for you?” «I do not know what happy life and gossip about my family you are talking about,» responded the president, «I just want to say that I don’t envy you» http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/leschenko/4ef2403ec1268/view_print/.

It is not clear whether the president lost his temper and overtly threatened the journalist or just completed one his numerous linguistic faux pas. It is remarkable also that he completely ignored the essence of the Nayem’s question about corruption, nepotism, and lack of restraint, and interpreted everything as indiscreet interference in his family life. This is a minor story that tells, however, a lot about both intellectual and moral quality of the ruling “elite.”

One may praise the EU for its reluctance to make a deal with these people, but one should also censure the EU for still tolerating these people far too much.

IS UKRAINE LEAVING THE EUROPEAN ENERGY COMMUNITY?

David Marples

As Ukraine’s relationship with the EU continues to flounder over human rights issues, the imprisonment of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and the lengthy detention of former Interior Minister Yuri Lutsenko, there are signs that the government is prepared to flout existing laws to gain closer association with Gazprom and the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The consequences could be not only the loss of links with the European Energy Community (hereafter EEC) but also the undermining of sovereignty.

On December 4, Russia’s Ambassador to Ukraine Mikhail Zurabov announced that the new gas agreement between the two states would have the status of an international agreement, rather than a business arrangement between the two responsible companies, Gazprom and Naftohaz. Russia is evidently responding to the EU’s plans for closer integration with Ukraine and greater transparency in the transit of gas from Russia to Western Europe. Analyst Maksim Alinov comments that the results of the inter-state agreement proposed by the Russian ambassador would override current Ukrainian laws, which make it illegal to transfer Ukraine’s transit system to Russian control—a similar sale to Gazprom occurred recently in Belarus. Alinov also believes that the flouting of the agreement in place would also give Russia significant influence over the internal economic and political situation in Ukraine (Zerkalo Nedeli, Dec 9).

Another analyst, Maksim Honchar, goes further, maintaining that Kyiv’s apparent reversal of policy on the EEC would violate the July 1, 2010 law “Concerning the main principles of domestic and foreign policy,” Article 7 of which stipulates that Ukraine’s oil, gas, and electricity networks should be operating according to EU rules. In his view this indicates a willingness to surrender national interests, which would be an even more serious threat to Ukraine’s pro-European policy than the imprisonment of Tymoshenko. It would also strengthen considerably the position of Gazprom, a monopolist enterprise that seeks to deploy energy as an instrument of political control. Ukraine would acquire cheap gas but gradually lose its sovereignty, rendering the Association Agreement with the EU obsolete and leading to the next stage, which would be a defensive alliance with Russia (Zerkalo Nedeli, Dec 9).

The EU meanwhile continues to demand the release of Tymoshenko as a prequel to the initializing of the Association Agreement, though with diminishing hopes and growing frustration. Wilfred Martens, President of the European People’s Party, stated that Ukraine, like Poland, could be an important EU player, and that without its addition the EU project could not be complete. However, as a prerequisite to the start of the process leading to the Agreement, the Party of Regions must release Tymoshenko, Lutsenko, and other political prisoners (UN IAN, Dec 7). However, Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Hryshchenko demurred, stating that Tymoshenko could not be used as a bargaining chip in trade relations and that her situation was a matter for the Ukrainian Judiciary. To discuss the issue in this way, he added, would be tantamount to indicating that the latter is not an independent body (UNIAN, Dec 7).

Although the ruling group of Ukraine faces several serious economic dilemmas and recently rejected for a second time the IMF’s demand to raise energy prices, it does not seem to be facing a serious threat from the opposition. Indeed, the political situation seems relatively unaffected by the Tymoshenko saga. Analyst Kost Bondarenko maintains that the population has lost interest in the struggle between Tymoshenko and the ruling elite, while Vadim Karasev considers that the apparent lack of public sympathy for Tymoshenko reflects the general perception of her as a former representative of the political establishment (Segodnya, Dec 7, and ff.). In general therefore that is a positive sign for the authorities and a signal that the arrest of Tymoshenko has not affected ratings for the president and the Regions Party.

The latter seems to be calculating each step in cynical fashion, taking action and then monitoring the response. Karasev also notes that the leadership thinks the release of Tymoshenko would be seen as a sign of weakness. Also the Ukrainian leaders are watching closely political events in Russia, where the rise of oppositional activities could have a domino effect in Ukraine. Various polls denote that Yanukovych remains the leading individual politician with ratings between 17.4 and 20.7%, whereas the ratings of Tymoshenko, the only serious contender, range from 13 to 14.1% (polls by KMIS, Social Monitoring, “Rating,” and Sotsis). Yatsenyuk in third place has, at most, 9.9% support. In short, there is no longer a serious contender from the opposition as with Tymoshenko out of the picture.

The ruling group may also consider that in the year 2011 it could have expected to see its popularity drop because of the introduction of unpopular measures such as pension and taxation codes, whereas the new year may bring better fortunes, not least through the hosting of the popular soccer competition, Euro-2012. Perhaps of more importance is the evident tolerance of the EU for the abuses of power in Kyiv, in contrast to the sanctions it has applied in Belarus. Ukraine has moved rapidly from one of the most democratic of post-Soviet states to a position well down the scale. At the same time the corruption that has long pervaded the Ukrainian economy has not diminished.

Adding to the contentedness of the ruling group in Ukraine, the United States is preoccupied with other issues and unlikely to engage with Ukraine at the highest level until after the 2012 presidential election, according to former US ambassador to Ukraine, Steven Pifer (http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2011/1208_ukraine_pifer.aspx?p=1). Thus Yanukovych and the Regions have in effect carte blanche to continue the current path. The EEC agreement appears to have been jettisoned.

However, for the second time since the January 2010 election (the first being the Kharkiv Accords on the Black Sea Fleet), they are posing serious threats to the sovereignty of Ukraine, relinquishing hard-won rights for the immediate prospect of cheap gas and permitting a much more powerful role for Russian agencies like Gazprom to step in and purchase Naftohaz. The next logical stage would be for Ukraine to join the Customs Union (with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus). Only a year ago that would have been unthinkable, but it is now a serious possibility.

CORRUPTION AT THE TOP–DISAFFECTION BELOW. [STASIUK BLOG NOTES 2/11]

David Marples

The most recent survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre, conducted from over 2,000 respondents in all regions of Ukraine between 29 September and 4 October, i.e. prior to the conviction of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko on 11 October, indicates that the approval rate of President Viktor Yanukovych is falling. Only 10% of those surveyed “fully support” his policies, compared to 14.3% for Tymoshenko, 11.9% for Arsenii Yatsenyuk, and 10.2% for boxing champion Vitalii Klychko (better known in the Western media as Vitali Klitschko). Other politicians are to be found even further down the list, including Serhii Tigipko and Anatolii Grytsenko with 5.8% each, Dmytro Tabachnyk at 2.6%, and former president Viktor Yushchenko at 1.5%.

Those who answered “I do not support” showed negative ratings for both Tymoshenko (56.7%) and Yanukovych (54.6%), as well as for Yushchenko (80.4%). Not a single figure had a high rating in “fully support” than in “do not support,” suggesting the disillusionment of the electorate with the current crop of leaders (Zerkalo Nedeli, 18 Oct). Another poll also shows that more residents of Ukraine prefer integration with the European Union than the Russian-led Customs Union, particularly in the western regions where 76.9% support Euro-integration compared to only 6.2% who favor joining the “Common Economic Space” with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Overall 43.7% of those polled support integration with the EU and 30.5% the Customs Union, both relatively high figures. Support for the former is highest among young people between 18 and 29, and lowest among those over 60. Those who favor the Customs Union offer a reverse generational demography, with backing highest among those over 50 and lowest among those 18-29 years of age (news.zn.ua, 25 Oct).

The behavior of the ruling administration continues to elicit concern both inside and outside Ukraine. Following the postponement of a scheduled visit of Yanukovych to Brussels, the European Parliament expressed regrets that the European Commission and Yanukovych would not have the chance to reestablish “a constructive dialogue” that could have resulted in an Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU. The European Parliament “deplored” the sentencing of Tymoshenko to seven years in jail, noting that the law by which she was convicted dates back to Soviet times, and other laws do not conform to EU standards (Interfax Ukrainy, 27 Oct). The scheduled EU-Ukraine summit in December may deal with some of these issues. In general the EU response to the sentencing of Tymoshenko was relatively mild, perhaps because the Eastern Partnership group, which recently gathered in Warsaw, is preoccupied with the situation in neighboring Belarus, which was notably excluded from its decisions and about which a separate statement was issued by the Joint Declaration on 29-30 September (Council of the European Union, press release, 30 Sept).

However, little seems to improve as far as Ukraine’s ruling group is concerned. In late October, there appeared a report from Mariupol that employees of the giant Azovstal’ and the Illich Corporation, both of which are owned by tycoon Rinat Akhmetov, were being forced to take out membership in the Party of Regions. Employees were given two forms, one for membership in the PR and the other about payment of membership dues and asked to return the forms to the heads of their sections. Membership dues were said to be 1 UAH monthly for workers, 3 for engineers, 5 for senior foremen, and 10 for the head of the shop floor. Azovstal’ employs over 15,000 people, so the annual amount collected would be around 250,000 UAH annually, or double the budget of the Mariupol branch of the Party of Regions. Those who are reluctant to join could also be punished by deprivation of “bonuses” that account for as much as 40% of regular salaries. The report also indicated that those who were unwilling to join the PR and pay such dues could lose their jobs through reorganization of branches of the company. There were similar stories from Zaporizhzhya and Kharkiv, and in the latter city similar pressure was placed on students of the Skovoroda University (Ukrains’ka Pravda, Oct 26).

Tymoshenko’s Case versus the Ukrainian Cause

Mykola Riabchuk

The pessimists were right: the Pechersk district court has fully approved the criminal charge against Yulia Tymoshenko, the former prime-minister of Ukraine, and sentenced her to seven years in prison. This is the maximum term provided by the respective article of the Criminal Code. Additionally, Ms Tymoshenko was barred from occupying any public office within three consecutive years, and fined $190 million for the damages to the Ukrainian economy that she arguably incurred in 2009 by signing an unfair gas contract with her Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin.

A few weeks ago, rumors emerged in Kyiv that the decision on Tymoshenko’s case had been decided in advance by President Viktor Yanukovych himself, and that the court had only to rubber-stamp the maximum prison term for his arch-rival. Even though Yanukovych defeated her narrowly last year in the presidential election, Tymoshenko still is the leader of the opposition and his main challenger. Whether the rumors were based on accurate information leaked from the president’s office or merely a gloomy intuition of Tymoshenko’s supporters, optimists had some reason to expect that the Western criticism of the kangaroo process would not be completely ignored by the Ukrainian authorities. The president who boasts of his “pragmatism” would surely not put at risk the entire project of Ukraine’s European integration for the dubious purpose of personal vengeance.

The additional three-year ban on taking a public office imposed by the court on Yulia Tymoshenko, suggests that the main driving force behind Yanukovych’s decision was not only vengeance but also fear. Tymoshenko is believed to be not merely the strongest challenger for the incumbent regime but also its real nemesis who would not hesitate to pay them in kind, and would likely do so on much stronger legal grounds. Now, through the court ruling, she is effectively excluded from both the 2015 presidential election with Mr. Yanukovych and the 2020 competition with his likely handpicked successor.

The court decision, announced on 11 October, provoked a storm of protest in Western capitals, especially in the European Union. The EU leaders, indeed, placed high stakes on pending negotiations about the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) and Association Agreements with Ukraine and expected to finalize them by the end of the year. On many occasions, they warned Kyiv that they would hardly be able to maintain close relations with a country that applies selective justice against the leaders of the political opposition and criminalizes legitimate decisions of the previous government. That the warnings have been ignored has filled the Westerners with sheer indignation. Leaving diplomatic courtesy aside, they state clearly now that no Association agreement, with DCFTA as part of it can be signed until Ukraine proves its full commitment to European values.

It signifies not only a demand to release Yulia Tymoshenko and other political prisoners but also to stop government pressure on civil society, harassment of independent media, manipulation of laws (the election law in particular), and so on. The government seems to be lost. Its leaders apparently do not understand why a minor, in their view internal, issue has caused such a huge international furore, and how to get out of this lose-lose situation. Ironically, the Westerners themselves have greatly contributed to the current confusion. Since March 2010, they have benignly neglected the growing roughness and lawlessness of Yanukovych’s regime, starting with a de facto parliamentary coup d’etat and ending up with the shamelessly manipulated local elections and even more unscrupulous changes of the national constitution. In fact, the Europeans sent Yanykovych and his associates a very wrong signal: guys, as long as you can restore and maintain some order in this chaotic country, we don’t care much about law and democracy in your fiefdom. What the Westerners offered as a benefit of doubt, the Ukrainian authorities took as a carte blanche.

Now, the both sides are badly surprised and bitterly disappointed. The Westerners simply do not understand why Yanukovych ignored so defiantly their quite clear message to leave Tymoshenko in peace. And Yanukovych seems to be equally puzzled why they decided finally to react, having accepted tacitly all his tricks throughout a year and a half. He may believe, quite sincerely, that the EU reaction is just a show staged by the smart Western politicians for their candid electorate – exactly like the Tymoshenko trial is staged by his “goodfellas” for domestic purposes.

Whatever the rationale, Yanukovych seems not to fully understand that his reprisal on Tymoshenko is not the main reason for ostracizing him but just the last straw that broke the camel’s back, i.e. the patience of the EU leaders. One may speculate how many of them are truly concerned about Ukraine’s democracy and how many (likely the majority) that are using the case as the pretext to exclude a nuisance like Ukraine from the European project and, inter alia, to please the old pal Vladimir http://dt.ua/POLITICS/vin_pilyae_suk_pid_soboyu_a_vpade_krayina-89690.html. The fact is that the Ukrainian government has crossed the red line and entered uncharted land where they no longer receive the benefit of doubt and benign neglect for thuggish behavior, cheating and bluffing, for whatever reason.

In a way, Yanukovych committed the same mistake as his former boss Leonid Kuchma. He delegitimized himself, both domestically and internationally. He has lost credibility and, henceforth, will be seen not as a leader trying to fix a dysfunctional democracy, but as an arrogant autocrat who is striving to dismantle the remnants of political pluralism and genuine competition inherited from his predecessor Viktor Yushchenko. Hitherto, to maintain good relations with the EU, Yanukovych needed only to prove that he is not completely hopeless and autocratic – a not so difficult task in the context of post-Soviet sultans, dictators, and “national leaders.” After the Tymoshenko conviction a minimum pass will no longer suffice. A strong “C” is required, and this is a sea change since neither mentally nor institutionally are the Ukrainian authorities able to qualify.

Yanukovych may pardon Yulia Tymoshenko now, as some experts suggest; or may push the new Criminal Code through the parliament that decriminalizes Tymoshenko’s transgressions, as he hinted himself; or, vice-versa, he may open a new criminal case against her, as the Security Service of Ukraine has already announced http://news.dt.ua/POLITICS/sbu_spravu_za_borgi_pered_rf_porusheno_proti_timoshenko_i_lazarenka-89574.html. In either case, he would remain a lame duck president, despised at home and distrusted abroad, squeezed between the EU and Russia, and torn between two mutually exclusive but equally unreliable strategies of survival. One of them means submitting to the EU demands and accepting European values and respective behavior. This sounds promising, but looks very unlikely since neither the president nor his oligarchic team understands what those values mean and how they can be treated seriously, nor are they ready to accept fair play and expose themselves to free political and economic competition.

The alternative strategy is much more likely – to play possum as long as possible, defy the European Union’s pressure, to look for support in the Kremlin, to promise and not to deliver, to be smart like Aliaksandr Lukashenka, or at least Leonid Kuchma. The problem however is that Yanukovych is not that smart, nor are Ukrainians obedient enough, nor is the Kremlin eager to support all these smarties for a song. And last but not least, the Ukrainian officials-cum-oligarchs are not very happy with the looming prospect of being blacklisted in the EU like their Belarusian brethren.

The most probable scenario is that Yanukovych’s regime will make another attempt to cheat the Westerners. To this end, they may release Tymoshenko in order to continue reprisals against opposition, civil society, and the independent mass media, with the implicit goal to monopolize all the political and economic power http://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2011/10/14/6665143/. If society resists the latter, they will employ coercion; if the EU applies sanctions against Ukraine, they will turn to Moscow.

Paradoxically, the same people who nurtured Yanukovych might become his political gravediggers. The Ukrainian oligarchs are very unlikely to follow the president in his drift to Moscow, and even less so his break with the EU. This group, however, is highly opportunistic and would never oppose the president openly until and unless society demonstrates its strength and the West steps up pressure.

Beyond sticks and carrots: Western policy towards Ukraine

Iryna Solonenko and Peter Rutland

The publication of a letter from a dozen academics titled “EU should get tough now with Yanukovych [11]” in the Kyiv Post on June 16 has triggered a lively debate [12] about Western policy towards Ukraine. Taras Kuzio, Lucan Way, Serhiy Kudelia and half-a-dozen colleagues argue that the West must apply pressure on President Viktor Yanukovych to halt the erosion of democratic freedoms that has taken place since he took office in February 2010. They propose a visa-ban on top Ukrainian officials, and a halt to the introduction of a free-trade area with the European Union, unless what they see as the politically inspired trials of former officials such as ex-premier Yulia Tymoshenko are dropped. 

In response, Alexander Motyl [13] and Adrian Karatnycky [14] have argued that keeping Ukraine out of Moscow’s orbit should be the main priority shaping Western policy. They argue that the application of sanctions would merely help Yanukovych consolidate his authoritarian regime and push him even further in the direction of close ties with Russia.

“It is not unusual for Western foreign policy to be pulled between promoting democratic values on one hand and defending the West’s geopolitical interests on the other. However, the debate over Ukraine has an artificial quality in that it contributes to the over-personalization of politics in this country of 46 million people, reducing it to a personal battle between Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko.”

Even though most of the initial letters’ signatories are based in North America, it is interesting that they focus their call for sanctions on the European Union and not the US government. This reflects the perception that nowadays Brussels, not Washington, holds the key to Ukraine.

The context for this debate is that by the end of this year the EU and Ukraine are supposed to conclude talks on an Association Agreement [15] (AA) that have been under way for four years. The advocates of sanctions are concerned that such an agreement would give the Yanukovych government a free hand to manipulate the parliamentary elections that will take place in fall 2012.

It is not unusual for Western foreign policy to be pulled in two directions, between promoting democratic values on one hand and defending the West’s geopolitical interests on the other. However, the debate over Ukraine has an artificial quality in that it contributes to the over-personalization of politics in this country of 46 million people, reducing it to a personal battle between Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko. This is not to deny that a gross miscarriage of justice does seem to be under way in the Tymoshenko trial [16] – just that this factor alone should not bring Western policy towards Ukraine to a grinding halt.

The international record on sanctions of all types has been mixed, at best: on average, they work about half the time. One relevant success story would be the sanctions imposed on Slovakia before 1998. They did succeed in triggering a social mobilization that ousted Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and set Slovakia on the path to EU entry.

At this juncture, however, the chances that sanctions on Ukraine’s top leaders would cause a radical shift in their political style, or mobilize society against them, are slim. The sanctions advocates don’t really explain why they think these sanctions would work. Conditionality only works if the benefits of complying with external requirements outweigh the costs of reforms. Ukraine’s ruling elites (like politicians everywhere) think short-term. In the short-term perspective the incumbent elites might consider they have more to lose from having free elections than they will gain from the long-term benefits the AA offers. Indeed, it would take up to 10-15 years for the deep and comprehensive free trade area between the EU and Ukraine, a core component of the AA, to become a reality, while in the short run the costs of adaptation will need to be paid. Added to which, Moscow can also exercise leverage, and try to neutralize Western initiatives.

Rather than play the carrots and sticks game, trying to influence leaders’ decisions, it is better to wager on society. This means seeing through to their conclusion the negotiations. The sanctions debate overlooks the potential transformative effect the AA will have on Ukraine. Signing the agreement would mean that Ukraine enters serious commitments to reform itself. Since the major barriers to EU-Ukraine bilateral trade are non-tariff, access to the EU market will require Ukraine to adopt up to 1,500 pages of acquis communautaire regulations. The AA will be a legally binding arrangement, meaning that the EU and European companies can bring Ukraine to the European Court of Justice if provisions of the agreement have been violated, and vice versa.

This type of engagement will encourage domestic reform-minded actors to push for change from inside. It will unlock the potential of numerous groups and individuals that are interested in reform, but have limited tools to push for them under present conditions. These actors include both civil society groups and businesses, who will be able to use the AA procedures to push for a more competitive environment and above all a fairer judicial process in Ukraine.

It is true that the EU runs the risk of being seen as compromising the values on which it wants the partnership with neighboring countries be based. When announcing the successful conclusion of AA talks this December, the EU should make it clear that it expects democratic norms to be upheld in Ukraine. But refusing to sign the agreement altogether would likely bring no policy change at all.

Failure to conclude the AA would not only be a blow to Ukraine, but also a nail in the coffin of the EU’s already embattled Eastern Neighborhood Policy – which is built on the premise that there are common values uniting the EU and its eastern neighbors.

Smart engagement, including increased flows of trade, mobility of people and growing interdependence, which the AA offers, is the way to go. Post-war Europe started with functional and technocratic integration, with no sign of political union in sight. What the EU is today, even with the current crisis, is still impressive. This tried and proven path of long-term integration is the best hope for success with Ukraine and other Eastern neighbors. Engagement will produce a critical mass of institutions, practices and individuals that will inevitably challenge the current regimes in the longer run. There is no short-term quick fix to the deficiencies in Ukraine’s political culture.

Links:
[1] http://www.opendemocracy.net/themes/russia-theme
[2] http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia
[3] http://www.opendemocracy.net/topics/international-politics
[4] http://www.opendemocracy.net/topics/democracy-and-government
[5] http://www.opendemocracy.net/countries/ukraine
[6] http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia/topics/politics
[7] http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia/topics/human-rights
[8] http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia/topics/foreign
[9] http://www.opendemocracy.net/author/iryna-solonenko
[10] http://www.opendemocracy.net/author/peter-rutland
[11] http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/106920/
[12] http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/mykola-riabchuk/ukraine-blackmail-and-bluff
[13] http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/new/blogs/motyl/Integrating_an_Authoritarian_Ukraine_into_Democratic_Europe
[14] http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/108653/print/
[15] http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/109355/
[16] http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/natalia-sedletska/ukrainian-politics-on-trial
[17] http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/iryna-solomko/yuri-lutsenko-views-from-prison-cell
[18] http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/aleksey-matsuka/dispatch-from-donetsk
[19] http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/olena-tregub/ukraine-europe-its-brightest-hope
[20] http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/david-marples/ukraine-crisis-of-self-identity
[21] http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/mykola-riabchuk/viktor-yanukovych-pandora%E2%80%99s-box-and-moscow-orchestra
[22] http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
[23] http://www.opendemocracy.net/about/syndication

This article was originally published by our partner organization, Open Democracy, 4 August 2011 and is reissued here with permission.

Ukrainian 3-B Politics: Blackmail, Bullying, and Bluff

Mykola Riabchuk

For at least a decade, I have been hearing from my Polish friends – journalists, scholars, and politicians – a recurrent phrase: “You know, we cannot care more for Ukraine than Ukrainians themselves.” Yet, they still try.

When Poland assumed its six-month presidency of the European Union on 1 July, its leaders declared candidly that one of their priorities was the promotion of Ukraine to associate membership of the EU and finalizing, by the end of the year, the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) as part of it. The desire seems to be so strong that the Polish president Bronislaw Komorowski did not hesitate, back in June at the Global Forum in Wroclaw, to praise Ukraine’s democratization and European integration efforts.

It is very unlikely that Polish president or any other European leader has been unaware of what is really going on in Ukraine. No doubt, they have good advisers, savvy regional experts, and competent staff in their embassies. They have certainly noticed that in the eighteen months of Viktor Yankovych’s rule all civic freedoms in Ukraine have shrunk, corruption has skyrocketed, and justice has descended from low to zero. Actually, all these processes are aptly reflected in the annual reports of reputable international organizations like Freedom House, Reporters without Borders, Transparency International, and some others. All of them have significantly downgraded Ukraine’s score in every area.

The political trials with absurd criminal accusations against the leaders of the opposition and members of the former government are only the tip of the iceberg, even though they seem to have caught most of the attention in Europe. There are much more worrisome developments in Ukraine that remain much less discernible and are virtually unaddressed by the European partners. First of all, there is a very high number of people from Donbas, very often with criminal records or facing allegations, placed in various leading positions all over Ukraine, primarily in Kyiv and especially in the courts, the police, the taxation administration, and prosecutors’ offices. Secondly, the number of tax police and security service raids against disloyal businesses, including mass media companies, has escalated dramatically. People are often searched, detained, and interrogated without any legal grounds or documentation. The Kharkiv Human Rights Group, which tries to monitor all violations of this kind, has recorded a significant increase in the number of cases of torture and unexplained deaths in custody http://www.khpg.org/en/. And finally, there are more and more unidentified “hooligans” and Zimbabwe-style paramilitary gangs that intimidate and assault and destroy property of anyone who openly supports the opposition, especially in the provincial areas of central and south eastern Ukraine. Even Ukrainian priests and believers are targeted in order to “persuade” them to join the Moscow patriarchate favored by President Viktor Yanukovych.

So, why the rush? Why should a country that is steadily sliding down to Russian-style or even Belarusian-style authoritarianism be embraced by a European Union that presents itself as a community of values? Why should a regime that violates national laws and the constitution on a daily basis, emasculates the courts and renders them a mere appendage of the executive, rigs elections and extinguishes opposition, be encouraged in this activity and rewarded by the EU with an association agreement?

Alexander Motyl gives a good, though hardly definitive, explanation for the EU’s pending appeasement of Yanukovych http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/new/blogs/motyl/Integrating_an_Authoritarian_Ukraine_into_Democratic_Europe. The major rationale for this policy, shared, inter alia, by many pro-Western Ukrainians and pro-Ukrainian Westerners, including Prof. Motyl himself, is the strategic importance of pulling Ukraine into the Western orbit and preventing it from sinking further into the Russian sphere of influence. The first option means that even though “Ukraine won’t become fully democratic and market-oriented overnight… it will creep in that direction, as Ukrainians travel to Europe, as European economic ties with Ukraine are strengthened, as Ukrainian elites are forced to walk and talk like Europeans, as Ukraine slowly enters the European vocabulary and consciousness, and as European values slowly enter the Ukrainian vocabulary and consciousness.”

The second option, Motyl argues, means “an authoritarian and oligarchic Ukraine will only become more authoritarian and more oligarchic as part of any economic and political association led by today’s authoritarian and oligarchic Russia. Indeed, such an outcome would condemn Ukraine to economic backwardness for decades to come, as Ukraine would be transformed into Russia’s hinterland. And since Russia is the hinterland of the West, that would make Ukraine the hinterland of a hinterland.”

The alternative is clear-cut and hardly debatable. The first option is apparently preferable for both Ukrainians and European and ultimately, as Prof. Motyl argues, for Russians. So, he concludes, “strategic goals should guide strategic choices,” which means “even an authoritarian Ukraine should be integrated into European institutions.”

“If [Ukraine] signs a free-trade agreement with the EU and moves toward associate membership, its chances of becoming democratic, market-oriented, modern, and Western will grow. If it does not move toward Europe, Ukraine will either remain isolated in that no-man’s-land [between Russia and the EU] or, far more likely, move toward the Russia-led Customs Union, membership in which guarantees that Ukraine will become authoritarian, oligarchic, backward, and anti-Western. (…) So take your pick—creeping Europeanization or rapid hinterlandization.”

The “either/or” approach, however, is the major flaw of Motyl’s otherwise brilliant argument. Such a tricky alternative is exactly what the regime would like to sell to the EU: “Either you accept us as ugly (authoritarian and corrupt) as we are, or we move away to Russia.” First of all, this is a cynical blackmail that should be rejected in principle – if principles have any importance in the EU. And secondly, this is not only blackmail but also a bluff. The Ukrainian oligarchs are not going to Russia anyway because they know well – and even Mr. Yanukovych seems to have learned this already – that Russia would never be satisfied with whatever concessions they make, until they are suffocated completely.

There is no good reason to believe that Mr. Yanukovych and his oligarchs are willing and ready to submit themselves to Russian suzerainty or are less able to withstand Russian pressure than the arguably “pro-Russian” to his boots Mr. Lukashenko. Even less likely is it that they would ever reject their beloved idea of “European integration” (see my earlier article: http://ukraineanalysis.wordpress.com/2011/06/28/virtual-euro-integration/ ) for the sake of anything Russia-led, and turn their backs on that very space in which all their vital interests are located.

So, when Alexander Motyl poses a rhetorical question: “What’s better for Ukraine? That Ukrainian oligarchs should hobnob with the rich and mighty in Davos or in Minsk? That Regionnaire elites should negotiate with Brussels or with Moscow? Where are they more likely to learn, or be forced to adapt to, democracy and markets?” – he offers a false alternative. In fact, the Ukrainian oligarchs made their choice long ago. And none of them is going to switch Davos for Minsk and Brussels for Moscow—not because they feel it is better for Ukraine but simply because they know perfectly well what is in their own best interests.

Hence, we should get rid of these pernicious “either/or” arguments and radically change the discourse. The only efficient and viable negotiation paradigm is simple: more for more, and less for less. If Kyiv sticks to the rules, it will get more carrots. If it keeps tampering with the rules, it will get more sticks. There are many ways to hit the corrupted elite where it really hurts them: by denying hard currency credits, withholding visas, or checking illegal property and bank accounts. The EU should focus on this. And the Ukrainian oligarchs would certainly be upset if their focus was limited to the Russian hinterland and know full well the relative value of Davos versus Minsk.

Ukraine should not be rejected outright but the process of integration must be more clearly and unambiguously stated. No final decision on the DCFTA is advisable until the current negative trends are reversed and clear proof of this is given in the 2012 parliamentary elections. This should be the real litmus test: either the Ukrainian authorities are serious about their European commitments or they consider the Europeans feckless idiots who can be easily tricked with bluff and blackmailed by smart Eurasian guys.

Even less advisable is ratification of the association agreement – preferably it should be delayed until the presidential elections of 2015 that should be recognized indubitably as free and fair. Otherwise, if the Polish plan and oligarchic dream are accomplished by the end of 2011, the Ukrainian authorities would receive carte-blanche to destroy the opposition, to pass a highly perfidious and manipulative election law, to rig elections, create a constitutional majority in the parliament, and make the future election of any president within this body a pure formality.

So far, Viktor Yanukovych and his “Regionnaires” are apparently transforming Ukraine into another Belarus, albeit with a treacherous pro-European rhetoric. If the EU accepts this at face value, it may ultimately face the problem how to impose Lukashenko-style sanctions upon leaders who are associate members of the EU and ostensibly espouse the same values.