Early Elections Again

By Ivan Lozowy

THE UKRAINE INSIDER
Vol. 8, No. 3
September 23, 2008

ITEM A.: THIRD TIME THE CHARM?

The collapse of the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko coalition which became official on September 16 is the culmination of nine months of intense work by Yushchenko’s chief-of-staff, Viktor Baloha. Ever since Tymoshenko was named Prime Minister last December, Baloha has gone to great lengths to undercut her. Every action of Tymoshenko’s was countermanded or undermined by Yushchenko and publicly criticized by Baloha or his subordinates in the Presidential Secretariat.

This process has been helped along by Tymoshenko’s own charismatic chaotic and devil-may-care approach. But the bottom line has been what is, in the view of Yushchenko’s team, the need to rein in Tymoshenko. Because of his own detachment and passivity, Yushchenko’s popularity has remained in the single digits whereas presidential elections are only a year away. There was no secret as to what Tymoshenko would do once she became Prime Minister a second time. She would do what she did before, in 2005, namely, privatize and attempt to redistribute former state property through re-privatization efforts while handing out government money in populist measures aimed at increasing her poll ratings.

Accustomed in the 1990’s to running the large quasi-state energy holding United Energy Systems of Ukraine, Tymoshenko has reached new heights as Prime Minister. Now she controls a budget of hundreds of billions of hryvnia, all geared to increase her own popularity.

It was this process that Baloha’s persistent and quite successful countermeasures were designed to disrupt. Thus it was only natural that, until this summer, the bitterest conflict between Tymoshenko and Yushchenko was over the State Property Fund. Last spring, Tymoshenko used her usual heavy-handed tactics to try and install her associate, the MP Andriy Portnov, as the head of the State Property Fund. This initiative backfired when Baloha called in the heavy guns, getting the Procuratura to initiate criminal cases against officials helping Portnov.

Despite repeated efforts, Baloha was unable to dislodge Tymoshenko because the parliamentary majority underpinning her government was difficult to manipulate. Apart from Tymoshenko’s own block, BYuT, the majority was based on the Our Ukraine coalition with the National Self-Defense organization headed by Minister of Internal Affairs, Yuriy Lutsenko, who is closely allied with Tymoshenko. For its part, Our Ukraine is chaired by Vyacheslav Kyrylenko, who also heads the party’s parliamentary faction, who is not very close to Baloha and who has tried to lead an independent line.

Baloha thus created his own party in back in March, Single Center (See The Ukraine Insider, vol. 8, no. 2 from May 6, 2008). He also got two of his associates, the MPs Ihor Rybakov and Yuriy But, to leave the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko coalition. But because of parliamentary rules, these moves did not affect the governing coalition.

Following the short-lived Russian-Georgia war in August, however, Baloha seized his chance.

Tymoshenko had famously got on very well with Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, but she was conspicuously absent in the public sphere when Russian tanks rumbled into Georgia. Baloha’s subordinates at first spread rumors then spoke openly of an alleged agreement between Tymoshenko and Russia’s Prime Minister Vladimir Putin that she would not criticize Russia over its actions in the Caucasus. The rumors spoke of two additional points on which Tymoshenko had folded in to the Kremlin’s demands: she would leave the Russian fleet in Krym’s (the Crimea’s) Sevastopol alone and would not allow the Odesa-Brody pipeline to pump oil to Europe in detour of Russia. In return, Tymoshenko would receive Russia’s blessing and even, possibly, financial support for her presidential bid in 2009. Taking into account the Kremlin’s appetites, Tymoshenko’s own actions and the confidence with which one of Baloha’s direct subordinates has accused Tymoshenko of “treason,” this version seems likel!
y.

Accusations against Tymoshenko of treason made an impact within the Our Ukraine parliamentary faction, which includes representatives from such patriotically inclined parties as Rukh and the Ukrainian National Party. During a meeting of the Our Ukraine parliamentary faction hastily convened on the night of September 2, for the first time there was a majority against further cooperation with BYuT and the fate of the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko coalition was sealed.

The direct cause of the September 2 meeting was a series of votes cast in the Rada, or parliament, that day in which BYuT voted together with the Party of Regions. This voting constituted an end run by Tymoshenko around Yushchenko, avoiding his obstructionist methods by cooperating with his former rival for the presidency, Viktor Yanukovych, head of the Party of Regions.

Yushchenko and Baloha were aghast. They had just been declared irrelevant in parliament. But, stoking the fires of indignation at Tymoshenko’s “betrayal,” Baloha was able to achieve the collapse of the Our Ukraine – BYuT coalition. Small wonder then that, as Tymoshenko herself said, immediately after the collapse Baloha and several friends, including the MPs Rybakov and But, left Ukraine on a charter flight to celebrate in a foreign, undisclosed location.

With new elections expected by the end of December, Baloha expects his Single Center party to enter parliament, with him in the role of king-maker. Where is the President in all this? Following docilely along. Rumors of the degree to which Baloha has come to dominate Yushchenko’s actions and even thinking have reached legendary proportions. Yushchenko has only helped along such surmises, as when, in response to complaints from some MPs as to Baloha’s inordinate influence, Yushchenko responded: “I am Baloha.”

(In the following issue: Baloha’s genius of destruction)

Correspondence should be addressed via the Internet to: lozowy@i.com.ua

(c) Ivan Lozowy

Prospects for New Leadership in Ukraine

David R. Marples
for EDMONTON JOURNAL, 17 September 2008

There seems to be no immediate solution to the political crisis in Ukraine, which on September 16 brought about the final collapse of the Orange coalition established after the 2004 Orange Revolution. The electorate can hardly welcome the fall of the current parliament, leading to the third parliamentary election in only three years. But is that the only alternative? What are the causes of the crisis? Why does Ukraine seem to stutter from one bitter internal conflict to another?

One reason is a deep clash of personalities. The two key figures—President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko—do not get along. To listen to the president of late, an uninformed observer would gain the impression that Tymoshenko is a traitor who has sold out Ukraine to the Russians. Yushchenko has deployed his chief of staff, Viktor Baloha, a Rusyn from Transcarpathia, on a mission aimed at curtailing the career of the flamboyant Prime Minister. According to one account Baloha has forwarded documents to the Ukrainian Security Service that reportedly show Tymoshenko has committed acts of treason.

Tymoshenko is not only the most popular politician in Ukraine, she is—according to an annual ranking of the country’s most notable 100 individuals published in Korrespondent (August 22)—the most influential person as well. Lately she has made a number of maneuvers that seem contradictory: she has supported (with the backing of the Regions Party) the empowerment of parliament over the office of the president; she has expressed a wish to re-form the Orange coalition as the best way out of the current impasse; and she has approached the Regions faction with the goal of forming a new parliamentary majority coalition.

Yushchenko accuses her of joining Regions in supporting Russian actions in Georgia, undermining his own overt support for Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili. The president believes she has taken such steps in order to acquire Russian sponsorship for her candidacy in the 2010 presidential election. However, if the Constitution is indeed amended to give more power to the legislature, then the presidency would be reduced to a ceremonial office.

The ambition of the Prime Minister has always been evident. At times there seems to be a contrast between her lifestyle and public appearance and her avowed goal to eliminate corruption or take on the oligarchs. But equally significant is her refusal to take orders from Yushchenko and become a compliant figure. Her initiatives to promote privatization and to carry out reforms through the Parliament with cooperation from various factions rankle with the conservative Yushchenko, who lacks both her drive and charisma.

Four years on from the Orange Revolution that swept him to power, the president is deeply unpopular within his own country (like Gorbachev he is much more respected outside it), and an article in Ukrains’ka pravda in early September declared him “politically dead.” He has issued a decree giving Baloha the authority to inspect internal troops that led some observers (Yuri Butuzov in Zerkalo Nedeli, for example) to suspect that he wishes to impose direct presidential rule. The Parliament has demanded (323 deputies in favor, well more than the 226 required) that the president dismiss Baloha for obstructing parliament as well as alleged illegal land dealings.

Ultimately, a president needs to reflect the sentiments of the public. Yushchenko’s avowed pro-Georgian, pro-NATO, and increasingly anti-Russian policies do not have overwhelming support in Ukraine. In fact they serve to highlight the regional divisions. On Georgia especially a consensus is plainly lacking.

Thus an August poll conducted by the Razumkov Center asked a sampling of respondents in the different regions of Ukraine which country they perceived as the aggressor in the Russian-Georgian conflict (a question that would have received a unanimous verdict in neighboring Poland). In western Ukraine, 55.2% saw Russia in this role, 15.1% both countries, and 7% Georgia. The center was evenly divided. However, Eastern Ukraine perceived Georgia as the main aggressor (37.2% to 13.8%), and in southern Ukraine almost 57% maintained the same, with only 13.8% citing Russia.

Though the same Center’s webpage does not offer a recent poll on NATO membership, a June 2008 survey indicated that 60% of respondents opposed it, with 20.9% in favor. Incidentally in June 2002, according to this same source, 32% supported accession to NATO. Thus as a policy it has lost its attraction, in part because of the war in Iraq.

Yushchenko’s policies are becoming erratic, and his public utterances, particularly about his Prime Minister increasingly far-fetched. The key question is whether a parliamentary coalition could actually work. Western analyst Taras Kuzio pointed out recently that a substantial portion of the Regions’ deputies opposed Russian actions in Georgia. There is thus no necessity to associate the entire faction with the pro-Russian stance of its leader.

If a coalition between the Tymoshenko Bloc and the Regions is possible, then Ukraine might establish the more stable leadership it requires during a time of political crisis and growing tension in its relationship with Russia.

Divided nation is its own worst enemy in countering Russia

by David Marples, Special to Kyiv Post
Sep 03 2008, 23:31

Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent nations may signal the demise of Georgia. It also raises serious questions about future relations with Ukraine.

That threat cannot be dismissed as fanciful or far­fetched as in the past. Russia’s foreign policy in what it calls its “near abroad” has changed dramatically in the past month. Borders are no longer sacrosanct, and Russia has not hesitated to use its monopoly of gas supplies to Ukraine as a political weapon in the past. Ukraine is not blind to the new situation, but it is, in many respects, unprepared for the different forms of potential conflict.

The critical area is Crimea and, in particular, the port of Sevastopol. When Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko refused to extend the lease on the port to the Russian Black Sea fleet beyond 2017, he ignited a new conflict with the northern neighbor. Yushchenko has also demanded that the annual rent Russia pays for its two bases, $98 million, be increased significantly.

Last month in Sevastopol, there was a substantial protest of ethnic Russian members of the Russian Bloc, the most powerful political party on the peninsula. Led by Vladimir Tyunin, they were demanding that Crimea become part of the Russian Federation.

That demand is hardly new. In the early 1990s, former Crimean president Yuri Meshkov ignited a similar movement and promised a referendum on the issue. The Ukrainian government acted firmly to quell the separatists and abolished the post of Crimean president.

Rumors abound that Russia is issuing passports to the majority group of ethnic Russians, just as it did to South Ossetians and Abkhazians in Georgia. Prominent Russian statespersons, including Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, frequently visit Sevastopol and demand that it be returned to Russia.

Added to the mix are the Crimean Tatars, deported by Josef Stalin in 1944-­45, but permitted to return under Gorbachev and now comprising about one­sixth of the population. The relationship between the Tatars and the government in Kyiv is amicable, but relations with Russians who own most of the former Tatar lands and property are volatile.

In 2004, when the Orange Revolution took place, eventually bringing Yushchenko into office, two regions of Ukraine – Donetsk and Luhansk – threatened to leave Ukraine with support from Russia. The two regions, centers of the coal, steel and chemicals industries, provided overwhelming support to the candidacy of former prime minister Viktor Yanukovych. They have large populations of ethnic Russians comprising majorities in the major cities.

Since the population as a whole is Russian speaking, there is no ethnic tension. But the Regions Party, which dominates eastern Ukraine, has a radically different perception of the country than the Orange parties currently in office. It is backed by Ukraine’s richest and most powerful oligarch, Rinat Akhmetov, and supports warm relations with Russia and close ties with the European Union, while strongly opposing Ukraine’s request to join NATO and Yushchenko’s support for Georgia.

After Russia’s brutal defeat of Georgian forces, both Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko visited the Donbas (to Donetsk and Luhansk respectively). They were not co­ordinated visits, but the timing seemed notable. Both leaders wished to ensure that they have a voice in a formerly hostile voting area.

Today, the key issue is the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev have indicated that they are prepared to revise formerly recognized borders. The Russian government is willing to support and sow disaffection in eastern Ukraine and Crimea, as well as in the Prydnistrova region of Moldova.

However, Ukraine tends to be its own worst enemy. Though its government has requested NATO membership, most residents oppose it. The Regions Party insists that no membership can take place without a referendum, the result of which hitherto has been a foregone conclusion.

Despite two recent elections, the Ukrainian parliament is so badly divided that it could not even pass the 2008 budget before the summer recess. Yushchenko has undermined every reform initiative of Tymoshenko. In turn, the ruling Orange coalition’s majority is down to two seats.

Perhaps most revealing of Ukraine’s predicament is the low standing in the polls of the president and his party. A poll conducted between Aug. 8 and 24 found that, had a parliamentary election been held at that time, 23.4 percent of respondents would have backed the Tymoshenko Bloc and 20.3 per cent the Regions Party. Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine and People’s Self­Defense Coalition and the Communists had 4.6 percent.

In terms of the popularity of the potential presidential candidates for the 2010 election, Tymoshenko leads with 24 per cent, followed by Yanukovych with 20. Yushchenko’s 7 percent makes him the least popular leader in Europe at a time when Ukraine’s economy is as strong as it has ever been.

Ukraine’s politicians need to focus on priorities. A coalition government to ensure internal unity seems to be a logical first step. Yushchenko cannot lead Ukraine without public support as the country enters its 18th and most critical year of independence.